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  1. Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep.Peter Godfrey -Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):223-236.
  2. Causal Contents.Frederick R. Adams - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  3. Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind.Dan Arnold - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Premodern Buddhists are sometimes characterized as veritable "mind scientists" whose insights anticipate modern research on the brain and mind. Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists held that the mental continuum is uninterrupted by death, they would have no truck with the idea that everything about the mental can be explained in terms of brain events. Nevertheless, a predominant stream of Indian (...)
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  4. Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Belief.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.
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  5. Syntax, Semantics, and Levels of Explanation.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):361-367.
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  6. Does Semantics Run the Psyche?Radu J. Bogdan - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700.
    If there is a dogma in the contemporary philosophy of the cognitive mind, it must be the notion that cognition is semantic causation or, differently put, that it is semantics that runs the psyche. This is what the notion of psychosemantics and (often) intentionality are all about. Another dogma, less widespread than the first but almost equally potent, is that common sense psychology is the implicit theory of psychosemantics. The two dogmas are jointly encapsulated in the following axiom. Mental attitudes (...)
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  7. Making Sense of Unpleasantness: Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger.Paul Boswell - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2969-2992.
    Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us. But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability? According to some recent evaluationist accounts, it is their representational content: unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as bad for one. Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves, for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shooting the messenger, and is every (...)
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  8. The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    If there is content that we reason on, cognitive content, it is in the head and accessible to reasoning mechanisms. This paper discusses the phenomenal theory of cognitive content, according to which cognitive contents are the contents of phenomenal consciousness. I begin by distinguishing cognitive content from the closely associated notion of narrow content. I then argue, drawing on prior work, that the phenomenal theory can plausibly account for the cognitive contents of many relatively simple mental states. My main focus (...)
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  9. Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations.David M. Braun - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  10. Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
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  11. Language, Mind and Logic.Jeremy Butterfield (ed.) - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of eleven original essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centering on the connection between mind and language. Two themes predominate: how it is that thoughts and sentences can represent the world; and what having a thought - a belief, for instance - involves. Developing from these themes are the questions: what does having a belief require of the believer, and of the way he or she relates to the environment? In particular, does having (...)
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  12. The Role of Mental Meaning in Psychological Explanation.Robert C. Cummins - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  13. Why Fodor Can't Have It Both Ways.Michael Devitt - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 95--118.
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  14. Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons.Eric Dietrich (ed.) - 1994 - Academic Press.
  15. Psychological Vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):167-177.
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts can be structuring causes of behavior even though (...)
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  16. Burge on Mentalistic Explanations, or Why I Am Still Epiphobic.Fred Dretske - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
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  17. Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior.Fred Dretske - 1998 - In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 157--173.
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  18. Human Action, Deliberation and Causation.Fred Dretske - 1998 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  19. How Reasons Explain Behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof.Fred Dretske - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):223-229.
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  20. Reply to Slater and Garcia-Carpintero.Fred Dretske - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):203-8.
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  21. How Beliefs Explain: Reply to Baker.Fred Dretske - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 113 (July):113-117.
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  22. Does Meaning Matter?Fred Dretske - 1990 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  23. Reply: Causal Relevance and Explanatory Exclusion.Fred Dretske - 1990 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  24. Reply to Reviewers of Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819-839.
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  25. Reasons and Causes.Fred Dretske - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  26. The Explanatory Role of Content.Fred Dretske - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
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  27. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  28. Content and the Subtle Extensionality of " -Explains...".Crawford L. Elder - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):320-32.
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  29. Remarks on Content and its Role in Explanation.Hartry Field - manuscript
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  30. Can Mental Representations Be Triggering Causes?Carrie Figdor - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.
    Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account (...)
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  31. Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum.J. A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  32. Reply to Dretske's Does Meaning Matter?.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  33. Banish Discontent.Jerry A. Fodor - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
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  34. A Philosophically Inexpensive Introduction to Twin-Earth.Bryan Frances - manuscript
    I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument.
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  35. Twin Earth Thought Experiments.Bryan Frances - 1998
  36. Dretske on the Causal Efficacy of Meaning.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):181-202.
    The object of this paper is to discuss several issues raised by Fred Dretske’s account of the causal efficacy of content, as given in his book Explaining Behavior. To warrant the causal efficacy of folk-psychological properties while keeping attached to a naturalistic framework, Fred Dretske proposes that these properties are causes of a peculiar type, what he calls structuring causes. Structuring causes are not postulated ad hoc, to somehow account for the causal efficacy of content. Dretske claims that we independently (...)
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  37. Why Broad Content Can't Influence Behaviour.Cressida Gaukroger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3005–3020.
    This article examines one argument in favour of the position that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers over behaviour. This argument states that we establish that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers by considering cases where intrinsic properties remain the same but relational properties vary to see whether, under such circumstances, behaviour would ever vary. The individualist argues that behaviour will not vary with relational properties alone, which means that they (...)
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  38. Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):223-36.
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  39. Belief, Content, and Cause.Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya - 1997 - In European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Stanford: CSLI.
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  40. European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics.Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya - 1997 - Stanford: CSLI.
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  41. Contents of Thought.Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.) - 1988 - University of Arizona Press.
  42. Structural Representations: Causally Relevant and Different From Detectors.Paweł Gładziejewski & Marcin Miłkowski - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (3):337-355.
    This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...)
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  43. Fred Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Semantic Content.B. Hassrick - 1995 - Conference 6 (1):59-66.
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  44. The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?Frank Hofmann & Peter Schulte - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.
    Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...)
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  45. Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content.Terence E. Horgan - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  46. Human Action, Deliberation and Causation.Pierre Jacob - 1998 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  47. What Can the Semantic Properties of Innate Representations Explain?Pierre Jacob - 1997 - In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 175--197.
    Dretske has argued that, unlike the content of beliefs and desires, the contents of innate representations cannot in principle play a role in the causal explanation of an individual's behavior. I examine this "asymmetry" and against it, I argue that the content of innate mental representations too can play a causal role in the explanation of behavior.
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  48. Representing as Adapting.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):17-39.
    In this paper, I recommend a creature-level theory of representing. On this theory, a creature represents some entity just in case the creature adapts its behavior to that entity. Adapting is analyzed in terms of establishing new patterns of behavior. The theory of representing as adapting is contrasted with traditional causal and informational theories of mental representation. Moreover, I examine the theory in light of Putnam-Burge style externalism; I show that Putnam-Burge style externalism follows from and is explained by it. (...)
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  49. Dretske and His Critics.Jaegwon Kim - 1991 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  50. Dretske on How Reasons Explain Behavior.Jaegwon Kim - 1991 - In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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