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  1. added 2020-03-10
    Varieties of Causation in Consciousness Studies.Harald Atmanspacher, Robert C. Bishop & J. Scott Jordan - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):5-6.
    In cognitive neuroscience and in philosophy of mind, causation is a notion that is immensely important but usually not defined precisely enough to afford careful application. A widespread basic flaw is the confusion of causation with correlation. All empirical knowledge in the sciences is based on observing correlations; assigning causal relations to them or interpreting them causally always requires a theoretical background that is implicitly or (better) explicitly stated. This entails that differing theoretical approaches might lead to different interpretations of (...)
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  2. added 2019-06-06
    Contents of Thought.D. D. Merrill & Robert H. Grimm (eds.) - 1987 - Tucson.
  3. added 2018-12-17
    Internalism and the Explanatory Role of Narrow Content.Sam Baird - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    The central problem addressed by this thesis is how narrow content can be genuinely representational and relate to the individuation of mental representations. A second problem relates to the explanatory role of narrow content. The challenge facing the proponent of narrow content is that externalism is the standard position with regard to representation, individuation, and explanation, and it is often held that narrow content is either incoherent or explanatorily redundant. To this end, I defend a version of a two-component theory (...)
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  4. added 2018-11-27
    Paradoxical Desires.Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):335-355.
    I present a paradoxical combination of desires. I show why it's paradoxical, and consider ways of responding. The paradox saddles us with an unappealing trilemma: either we reject the possibility of the case by placing surprising restrictions on what we can desire, or we deny plausibly constitutive principles linking desires to the conditions under which they are satisfied, or we revise some bit of classical logic. I argue that denying the possibility of the case is unmotivated on any reasonable way (...)
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  5. added 2017-05-18
    The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):467-493.
    If there is content that we reason on, cognitive content, it is in the head and accessible to reasoning mechanisms. This paper discusses the phenomenal theory of cognitive content, according to which cognitive contents are the contents of phenomenal consciousness. I begin by distinguishing cognitive content from the closely associated notion of narrow content. I then argue, drawing on prior work, that the phenomenal theory can plausibly account for the cognitive contents of many relatively simple mental states. My main focus (...)
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  6. added 2017-02-27
    Structural Representations: Causally Relevant and Different From Detectors.Paweł Gładziejewski & Marcin Miłkowski - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (3):337-355.
    This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...)
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  7. added 2017-02-11
    The Epistemology of Meaning.Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald - 2012 - In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 221--240.
  8. added 2017-01-18
    Belief Individuation and Dretske on Naturalizing Content.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1991 - In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  9. added 2016-12-08
    Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind.Dan Arnold - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Premodern Buddhists are sometimes characterized as veritable "mind scientists" whose insights anticipate modern research on the brain and mind. Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists held that the mental continuum is uninterrupted by death, they would have no truck with the idea that everything about the mental can be explained in terms of brain events. Nevertheless, a predominant stream of Indian (...)
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  10. added 2016-09-07
    Possible Worlds, Zombies, and Truth Machines.Mirza Mehmedovic - 2016 - Giornale di Metafisica 1:262-283.
    The subject of zombies is one of the most discussed and controversial topics of philosophy of mind. In this paper I will first examine the main argument of zombies, providing a summary of the current discussion. Then I will introduce a thought experiment, an epistemic window on a metaphysical scenario. By the thought experiment I will argue that zombies are logically impossible. Further I will discuss another recent epistemic window. Finally I will provide some other logical consideration to prove that (...)
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  11. added 2016-08-18
    Explanatory Exclusion and Mental Explanation.Dwayne Moore - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):390-404.
    Jaegwon Kim once refrained from excluding distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient physical cause of the effect. At that time, Kim also refrained from excluding distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect. More recently, he has excluded distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient cause of the effect, since the physical cause is individually sufficient for the effect. But there has been, to this point, no parallel (...)
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  12. added 2016-07-12
    In Defense of Representation.Arthur B. Markman & Eric Dietrich - 2000 - Cognitive Psychology 40 (2):138--171.
    The computational paradigm, which has dominated psychology and artificial intelligence since the cognitive revolution, has been a source of intense debate. Recently, several cognitive scientists have argued against this paradigm, not by objecting to computation, but rather by objecting to the notion of representation. Our analysis of these objections reveals that it is not the notion of representation per se that is causing the problem, but rather specific properties of representations as they are used in various psychological theories. Our analysis (...)
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  13. added 2016-04-06
    Why Broad Content Can’T Influence Behaviour.Cressida Gaukroger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3005–3020.
    This article examines one argument in favour of the position that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers over behaviour. This argument states that we establish that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers by considering cases where intrinsic properties remain the same but relational properties vary to see whether, under such circumstances, behaviour would ever vary. The individualist argues that behaviour will not vary with relational properties alone, which means that they (...)
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  14. added 2016-03-30
    Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep.Peter Godfrey -Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):223-236.
  15. added 2016-02-29
    Making Sense of Unpleasantness: Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger.Paul Boswell - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2969-2992.
    Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us. But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability? According to some recent evaluationist accounts, it is their representational content: unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as bad for one. Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves, for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shooting the messenger, and is every (...)
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  16. added 2015-04-13
    A Philosophically Inexpensive Introduction to Twin-Earth.Bryan Frances - manuscript
    I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument.
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  17. added 2015-04-13
    The Twin Earth Thought Experiments.Bryan Frances - 1998
  18. added 2014-09-26
    The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?Frank Hofmann & Peter Schulte - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.
    Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...)
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  19. added 2014-08-06
    Representing as Adapting.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):17-39.
    In this paper, I recommend a creature-level theory of representing. On this theory, a creature represents some entity just in case the creature adapts its behavior to that entity. Adapting is analyzed in terms of establishing new patterns of behavior. The theory of representing as adapting is contrasted with traditional causal and informational theories of mental representation. Moreover, I examine the theory in light of Putnam-Burge style externalism; I show that Putnam-Burge style externalism follows from and is explained by it. (...)
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  20. added 2014-04-02
    The Place of the Intentional in the Explanation of Behavior: A Brief Survey.Karel Lambert - 1978 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 6:75-84.
    This paper surveys the main attitudes toward intentional explanation in recent psychology. Specifically, the positions of reductionistic behaviorism, materialism and replacement behaviorism are critically examined. Finally, an assessment of the current state of the controversy is presented.
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  21. added 2014-04-01
    Fodor’s Vindication of Folk Psychology and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism.Nicholas P. Power - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.
    Jerry Fodor has long championed the view, recently dubbed “scientific intentional realism” (Loewer and Ray, 1991, p. xiv), that “a scientifically adequate psychology will contain laws that quantify over intentional phenomena in intentional terms.” On such a view our belief/desire psychology will be “vindicated” through empirical investigation; that is, it will be shown to denote the explanatory (or causally salient) states or events in the production of thought and behavior. That intentional properties, states, or events have causal efficacy---are not mere (...)
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  22. added 2014-04-01
    Discrimination Without Indication: Why Dretske Can't Lean on Learning.Carol Slater - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):163-80.
  23. added 2014-04-01
    Dretske on the Causal Efficacy of Meaning.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):181-202.
    The object of this paper is to discuss several issues raised by Fred Dretske’s account of the causal efficacy of content, as given in his book Explaining Behavior. To warrant the causal efficacy of folk-psychological properties while keeping attached to a naturalistic framework, Fred Dretske proposes that these properties are causes of a peculiar type, what he calls structuring causes. Structuring causes are not postulated ad hoc, to somehow account for the causal efficacy of content. Dretske claims that we independently (...)
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  24. added 2014-04-01
    Reply to Slater and Garcia-Carpintero.Fred Dretske - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):203-8.
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  25. added 2014-04-01
    Dretske's Intricate Behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Philosophical Papers 20 (May):1-10.
    In his recent book, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, Fred Dretske develops at length a conception of behavior as part of an ingenious attempt to display the causal relevance of intentional states, qua intentional, to behavior. So-called folk-psychological explanations of intentional human behavior accord central explanatory roles to beliefs, desires, reasons, intentions, and the like. But how, Dretske asks, do the distinctively psychological features of such items figure in the etiology of behavior - how, for example, do (...)
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  26. added 2014-04-01
    Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Belief.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.
  27. added 2014-04-01
    How Beliefs Explain: Reply to Baker.Fred Dretske - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63:113-117.
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  28. added 2014-03-30
    How Reasons Explain Behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof.Fred Dretske - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):223-229.
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  29. added 2014-03-30
    The Prospects for Dretske's Account of the Explanatory Role of Belief.Andrew Melnyk - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):203-15.
    When a belief is cited as part of the explanation of an agent’s behaviour, it seems that the belief is explanatorily relevant in virtue of its content. In his Explaining Behavior, Dretske presents an account of belief, content, and explanation according to which this can be so. I supply some examples of beliefs whose explanatory relevance in virtue of content apparently cannot be accounted for in the Dretskean way. After considering some possible responses to this challenge, I end by discussing (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-30
    Accidental Associations, Local Potency, and a Dilemma for Dretske.Paul Noordhof - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):216-22.
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  31. added 2014-03-23
    Can Mental Representations Be Triggering Causes?Carrie Figdor - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.
    Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account (...)
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  32. added 2014-03-21
    Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations.David M. Braun - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  33. added 2014-02-20
    The Compatibility of Psychological Naturalism and Representationalism.Andrew Ward - 2001 - Disputatio 1 (11):3-23.
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  34. added 2014-02-10
    Seismograph Readings for Explaining Behavior.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):807-812.
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  35. added 2014-02-10
    Reply to Reviewers of Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819-839.
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  36. added 2014-02-10
    Are Reason-Explanations Explanations by Means of Structuring Causes?Raimo Tuomela - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):813-818.
  37. added 2014-02-10
    Does Semantics Run the Psyche?Radu J. Bogdan - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700.
    If there is a dogma in the contemporary philosophy of the cognitive mind, it must be the notion that cognition is semantic causation or, differently put, that it is semantics that runs the psyche. This is what the notion of psychosemantics and (often) intentionality are all about. Another dogma, less widespread than the first but almost equally potent, is that common sense psychology is the implicit theory of psychosemantics. The two dogmas are jointly encapsulated in the following axiom. Mental attitudes (...)
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  38. added 2013-12-03
    Debunking Enactivism: A Critical Notice of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism. [REVIEW]Mohan Matthen - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128.
    In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice (...)
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  39. added 2012-01-27
    Is Knowledge a Natural Kind?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):371 - 386.
    The project of treating knowledge as an empirical object of study has gained popularity in recent naturalistic epistemology. It is argued here that the assumption that such an object of study exists is in tension with other central elements of naturalistic philosophy. Two hypotheses are considered. In the first, “knowledge” is hypothesized to refer to mental states causally responsible for the behaviour of cognitive agents. Here, the relational character of truth creates a problem. In the second hypothesis “knowledge” is hypothesized (...)
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  40. added 2011-08-15
    Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum.J. A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  41. added 2010-06-22
    Human Action, Deliberation and Causation.Fred Dretske - 1998 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  42. added 2010-06-22
    Human Action, Deliberation and Causation.Pierre Jacob - 1998 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  43. added 2010-06-22
    European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics.Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya - 1997 - Stanford: CSLI.
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  44. added 2010-06-22
    Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons.Eric Dietrich (ed.) - 1994 - Academic Press.
  45. added 2010-06-22
    Dretske and His Critics.Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.) - 1991 - Blackwell.
  46. added 2010-06-22
    Dretske and His Critics.Jaegwon Kim - 1991 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  47. added 2010-06-22
    Information, Semantics and Epistemology.Enrique Villanueva (ed.) - 1990 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
  48. added 2010-06-22
    Language Mind and Logic. Butterfield (ed.) - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of eleven original essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centering on the connection between mind and language. Two themes predominate: how it is that thoughts and sentences can represent the world; and what having a thought - a belief, for instance - involves. Developing from these themes are the questions: what does having a belief require of the believer, and of the way he or she relates to the environment? In particular, does having (...)
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  49. added 2008-12-31
    Remarks on Content and its Role in Explanation.Hartry Field - manuscript
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  50. added 2008-12-31
    An Introduction to Content and its Role in Explanation.Stephen R. Schiffer - manuscript
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1 — 50 / 77