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  1. added 2018-06-17
    Litotes, Irony and Other Innocent Lies.Ignace Haaz - 2018 - Globethics Global Series No. 16.
    In the following text we would like to present the philosophical discussion on untrusting lies, which introduces a space for innocent lie understood as figurative manipulation of the speech: a poetic trope that we would argue could not only be generously used to help us tolerating our sometime deceiving human condition—which is global and universally ours, that of the finitude of human capacity of knowledge and ethical action—but also to maximise our capacity for knowledge formation and adaptation to values. Concepts (...)
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  2. added 2018-06-12
    Poésie et éthique: Présentation du livre.Ignace Haaz - manuscript
    Poetry and Ethics: Inventing Possibilities in Which We Are Moved to Action and How We Live Together, Obiora Ike / Andrea Grieder / Ignace Haaz (Eds.), Global Series No. 16, Geneva: Globethics Publications, 2018, pp. 247-262.
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  3. added 2018-06-08
    Poetry and Ethics: Inventing Possibilities in Which We Are Moved to Action and How We Live Together.Obiora Ike, Andrea Grieder & Ignace Haaz (eds.) - 2018 - Geneva, Switzerland: Globethics Publications.
    This book on the topic of ethics and poetry consists of contributions from different continents on the subject of applied ethics related to poetry. It should gather a favourable reception from philosophers, ethicists, theologians and anthropologists from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America and allows for a comparison of the healing power of words from various religious, spiritual and philosophical traditions. The first part of this book presents original poems that express ethical emotions and aphorism related to a philosophical questioning (...)
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  4. added 2018-03-25
    Self-Ascribing Emotions - Expressing or Detecting? Detectivist Components in Neo-expressivism.Joanna Komorowska - 2015 - Filozofia Nauki 23 (4):41-54.
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  5. added 2018-03-05
    As origens do expressivismo e o ponto de Geach.César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - Dissertatio:3-26.
    Our question, in this paper, is about the plausibility of the expressivist account of one’s self- attribution of mental states. More to the point, we will strictly follow the principle of charity as a mean to show that an expressivist philosopher can have good and reasonable answers to the set of objections put together in so called “Geach’s point”. Using this method, we hope to give enough evidences that an expressivist philosopher has enough resources to build a plausible explanation for (...)
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  6. added 2018-02-18
    Critical Notice of Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Sebastian Gardner - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (2):249 - 267.
  7. added 2018-01-10
    Metacognitive Deficits in Categorization Tasks in a Population with Impaired Inner Speech.Peter Langland-Hassan, Christopher Gauker, Michael J. Richardson, Aimee Deitz & Frank F. Faries - 2017 - Acta Psychologica 181:62-74.
    This study examines the relation of language use to a person’s ability to perform categorization tasks and to assess their own abilities in those categorization tasks. A silent rhyming task was used to confirm that a group of people with post-stroke aphasia (PWA) had corresponding covert language production (or “inner speech”) impairments. The performance of the PWA was then compared to that of age- and education-matched healthy controls on three kinds of categorization tasks and on metacognitive self-assessments of their performance (...)
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  8. added 2017-11-15
    Wright y la autoridad de la primera persona: Problemas de teorías constitutivas de la autoridad.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2007 - In Jorge Martínez Contreras & Aura Ponce de León (eds.), El saber filosófico. Vol. 3: Tópicos. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI and Asociación Filosófica de México, A.C.. pp. 265-276.
  9. added 2017-09-08
    Perception, Evidence, and Our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.Anil Gomes - forthcoming - In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), volume on the problem of other minds. Oxford University Press.
    ‘How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were?’ So asks Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse. It is this question, rather than any concern about pretence or deception, which forms the basis for the philosophical problem of other minds. Responses to this problem have tended to cluster around two solutions: either we know others’ minds through perception; or we know others’ minds through a form of inference. In the (...)
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  10. added 2017-03-05
    First-Person Privilege, Judgment, and Avowal.Kateryna Samoilova - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):169-182.
    It is a common intuition that I am in a better position to know my own mental states than someone else's. One view that takes this intuition very seriously is Neo-Expressivism, providing a “non-epistemic” account of first-person privilege. But some have denied that we enjoy any principled first-person privilege, as do those who have the Third-Person View, according to which there is no deep difference in our epistemic position with regard to our own and others' mental states. Despite their apparently (...)
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  11. added 2017-02-09
    Wittgenstein on the Cognitive Status of Avowals.Edward Sankowski - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 28:164-175.
  12. added 2017-02-01
    Professor Bradley's Avowals.M. J. Cresswell - 1967 - Mind 76 (301):121-122.
  13. added 2017-02-01
    On Avowals.Brice Noel Fleming - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (4):614-625.
  14. added 2017-01-30
    Speaking My Mind.Dorit Bar-On - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):1-34.
  15. added 2017-01-30
    IV—Avowals and Their Uses.F. E. Sparshott - 1962 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62 (1):63-76.
  16. added 2017-01-29
    Chapter Five Impersonality, Expression, and the Undoing of Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2002 - In Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press. pp. 152-194.
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  17. added 2017-01-22
    Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311 - 335.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I’m thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
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  18. added 2017-01-22
    Avowals and Their Uses.F. E. Sparshott - 1961 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:63 - 76.
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  19. added 2017-01-19
    The Mind and its Expression.David Rosenthal - manuscript
    MS., for an Eastern Division APA Author-Meets-Critics Session on Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Baltimore, December 2007.
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  20. added 2017-01-19
    Review of Dorit Bar-on, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge[REVIEW]Joseph Owens - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).
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  21. added 2017-01-19
    Avowals in the Philosophical Investigations: Expression, Reliability, Description.Eike V. Savigny - 1990 - Noûs 24 (4):507-527.
    In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein contrues psychological facts as patterns exhibited by `weaves' which include a person's behaviour as well as her temporal and social surroundings. Avowals, in being linguistic elements of such patterns, come to be taken as expressing psychological facts in a way that given the general liberty in pattern description, is normal with all conspicuous elements of behavioural patterns. Speakers come to be taken to express psychological facts because avowals are semantically self-predicating (which is understandable in the (...)
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  22. added 2017-01-17
    Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-335.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I’m thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
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  23. added 2017-01-15
    Review Essay of Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind. [REVIEW]Alex Byrne - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83:705-17.
    “Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criticize her self-ascription or (...)
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  24. added 2016-12-08
    First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71.
    What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an (...)
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  26. added 2016-09-14
    Coscienza e affettivita in cartesio.Antonio Malo - 1993 - Acta Philosophica 2 (2):281-299.
    In Cartesian philosophy the study of emotion has great importance, because its only existence constitutes a real problem. In fact, through the passions, Descartes is located in front of the obscure and confused perceptions that, despite their not intellectual evidence, appear as manifestations of a third idea: the substantial union between res extensa and res cogitans. What is the type of evidence that underpin passions? How can you reach this evidence? These are some of the questions that the author tries (...)
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  27. added 2015-12-18
    Klein and Loftus's Model of Trait Self-Knowledge: The Importance of Familiarizing Oneself with the Foundational Research Prior to Reading About its Neuropsychological Applications.Stan Klein - 2013 - Fronteris in Human Neuroscience 7:1-3.
    In this article I want to alert investigators who are familiar only with our neuropsychological investigations of self-knowledge to our earlier work on model construction. A familiarity with this foundational research can help avert concerns and issues likely to arise if one is aware only of neuropsychological extensions of our work.
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  28. added 2015-11-30
    Review of Heal Yourself with Writing.Andrea Montgomery Di Marco - manuscript
    The use of writing or journaling as a tool toward healing is becoming increasingly accepted in the vernacular of healing litanies. Reference books, personal narratives, and research on the effects of writing on healing psychological discomfort are abundant. Heal Yourself with Writing, written by screenwriter Catherine Ann Jones, and published in 2013, won a Nautilus Book Award for 2014. The following review reflects a book that is a well-thought journey through the steps of intentional or focused writing for the express (...)
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  29. added 2015-08-30
    Nietzsche et la métaphore cognitive.Ignace Haaz - 2006 - Dissertation, Geneva (Switzerland)
    F. Nietzsche does interesting indications on the anthropological foundation of language in his lessons on classical rhetoric, at the University of Basel in 1874. Many quotations of Gerber and Humboldt, and older notions, drawn from the Aristotle's Rhetoric are discussed in this dissertation. Many studies highlighted Nietzsche's attempts during thirty years (1976-2006) to draw a consistent anthropological foundation of the language. Some of them shed light on the metaphor, described from the point of view of anthropology, as an innovative perspective (...)
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  30. added 2015-08-24
    Self-Knowledge, Edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis. [REVIEW]Will Small - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1091-1095.
  31. added 2015-04-05
    Avowals and First‐Person Privilege.Douglas C. Long Dorit Bar‐on - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-335.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first‐person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio‐linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
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  32. added 2015-03-21
    The Expression of Historical Knowledge.Humphrey Palmer - 1983 - Philosophical Books 24 (2):111-113.
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  33. added 2015-03-20
    How to Be an Expressivist About Avowals Today.Ángel García Rodríguez - 2012 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review.
    According to expressivism about avowals, the meaning of typical self-ascriptions of mental states is a matter of expressing an attitude, rather than describing a state of affairs. Traditionally, expressivism has been glossed as the view that, qua expressions, avowals are not truth-evaluable. Contemporary neoexpressivists like Finkelstein and Bar-On have argued that avowals are expressions, and truth-evaluable besides . In contrast, this paper provides a defence of the view that avowals are, qua expressions, truth-evaluable. This defence is based on an argument (...)
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  34. added 2015-02-08
    Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind: An Essay in Neo-Sellarsian Philosophy.T. Parent - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
    _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...)
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  35. added 2015-02-05
    Self-Knowledge and Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):226-245.
    How do we know when we have imagined something? How do we distinguish our imaginings from other kinds of mental states we might have? These questions present serious, if often overlooked, challenges for theories of introspection and self-knowledge. This paper looks specifically at the difficulties imagination creates for Neo-Expressivist, outward-looking, and inner sense theories of self-knowledge. A path forward is then charted, by considering the connection between the kinds of situations in which we can reliably say that another person is (...)
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  36. added 2014-11-18
    Expressing First-Person Authority.Matthew Parrott - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2215-2237.
    Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we presume she is right. According to standard views, this deferential trust is justified on the basis of certain epistemic properties of her assertion. In this paper, I offer a non-epistemic account of deference. I first motivate the account by noting two asymmetries between the kind of deference we show psychological self-ascriptions and the kind we grant to epistemic experts more generally. I then propose a novel agency-based account (...)
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  37. added 2014-07-07
    Unwitting Self‐Awareness?Peter Langland‐Hassan - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):719-726.
    This is a contribution to a book symposium on Joelle Proust’s The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness (OUP). While there is much to admire in Proust’s book, the legitimacy of her distinction between “procedural” and “analytic” metacognition can be questioned. Doing so may help us better understand the relevance of animal metacognition studies to human self-knowledge.
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  38. added 2014-06-10
    Rules of Language and First Person Authority.Martin F. Fricke - 2012 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):15-32.
    This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that they might (...)
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  39. added 2014-03-27
    Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2011 - Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
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  40. added 2014-03-27
    Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for access to (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-27
    Deliberation and the First Person.David Owens - 2008 - In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief.
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  42. added 2014-03-27
    Self-Knowledge.Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    The essays featured in this collection seek to deepen our understanding of self-knowledge, to solve some of the genuine (and to resolve some of the spurious) ...
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  43. added 2014-03-27
    Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - 2008 - In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-26
    Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-35.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I’m thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
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  45. added 2014-03-26
    Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy.C. J. G. Wright - 2000 - In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 101-122.
  46. added 2014-03-25
    The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge.SANFORD C. GOLDBERG - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):165 - 199.
    In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-23
    Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Eldridge - 2003 - Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):360–368.
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  48. added 2014-03-23
    Words as Deeds: Wittgenstein's ''Spontaneous Utterances'' and the Dissolution of the Explanatory Gap.Daniele Moyal-Sharrock - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):355 – 372.
    Wittgenstein demystified the notion of 'observational self-knowledge'. He dislodged the long-standing conception that we have privileged access to our impressions, sensations and feelings through introspection, and more precisely eliminated knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes our first-person present-tense psychological statements. He was not thereby questioning our awareness of our emotions or sensations, but debunking the notion that we come to that awareness via any epistemic route. This makes the spontaneous linguistic articulation of our sensations and impressions nondescriptive. (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-23
    Speaking My Mind.Dorit Bar-On - 2000 - Philsophical Topics 28 (2):1-34.
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  50. added 2014-03-17
    Wittgenstein's Externalism: Context, Self-Knowledge & the Past.William Child - 2006 - In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
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