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Summary The "extended mind" is the idea that mental states and processes extend outside the head in virtue of the environment playing an active role that is analogous to internal brain processes.   For example, extended mind theorists hold that a notebook or a mobile phone might serve as part of someone's memory, just as biological memory can, and can play a similar role in constituting a subject's beliefs.  The extended mind thesis is sometimes called "active externalism" to differentiate it from standard externalism about content, on which the environment plays a less active role. 
Key works The extended mind theses was introduced under that name by Clark & Chalmers 1998.  Predecessors include Wilson 1994, Haugeland 1993, Hutchins 1995, and others.  The idea is developed at book length in Clark 2008, and discussed by many authors in Menary 2010.  Critiques of the view include Adams & Aizawa 2008, Rupert 2009, and Gertler 2007.
Introductions Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Shapiro 2010; Rowlands 2009.
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  1. Rethinking the Problem of Cognition.Mikio Akagi - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    The present century has seen renewed interest in characterizing cognition, the object of inquiry of the cognitive sciences. In this paper, I describe the problem of cognition—the absence of a positive characterization of cognition despite a felt need for one. It is widely recognized that the problem is motivated by decades of controversy among cognitive scientists over foundational questions, such as whether non-neural parts of the body or environment can realize cognitive processes, or whether plants and microbes have cognitive processes. (...)
  2. Doxological Extended Cognition.George Adam Holland - 2007 - Zygon 42 (3):749-766.
    . Many Christian theologians have proposed a universal knowledge of God implanted in all humans. Thomas Aquinas famously stated that all humans have some knowledge of God, confused though it may be. John Calvin developed this proposition in much more detail and concluded that there is a cognitive faculty in humans, the sensus divinitatis, committed to giving the cognizer knowledge of God. Independent of such theological concerns, a current movement in cognitive science proposes a radical change to the traditional boundaries (...)
  3. Mentale Gehalte und erweiterter Geist: Warum das Argument der Nichtabgeleitetheit scheitert.Fabian Hundertmark - 2016 - In Jan G. Michel, Kim J. Boström & Michael Pohl (eds.), Ist der Geist im Kopf?: Beiträge zur These des erweiterten Geistes. mentis. pp. 133-160.
    Der These des erweiterten Geistes zufolge befinden sich manche mentalen Repräsentationen außerhalb der körperlichen Grenzen der Wesen, zu denen sie gehören. Einer der stärksten Einwände gegen diese These stellt das Argument der Nichtabgeleitetheit von Frederick Adams, Ken Aizawa und Jerry Fodor dar. Dieses Argument setzt voraus, dass genuine mentale Repräsentationen nichtabgeleitete Gehalte haben – ihre semantischen Eigenschaften sind also nicht durch Absichten, Wünsche oder Konventionen konstituiert. Repräsentationen mit nichtabgeleitetem Gehalt finden sich jedoch, so das Argument weiter, nur innerhalb der körperlichen (...)
  4. Neo-Pragmatic Intentionality and Enactive Perception: A Compromise Between Extended and Enactive Minds.Katsunori Miyahara - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):499-519.
    The general idea of enactive perception is that actual and potential embodied activities determine perceptual experience. Some extended mind theorists, such as Andy Clark, refute this claim despite their general emphasis on the importance of the body. I propose a compromise to this opposition. The extended mind thesis is allegedly a consequence of our commonsense understanding of the mind. Furthermore, extended mind theorists assume the existence of non-human minds. I explore the precise nature of the commonsense understanding of the mind, (...)
The Extended Mind Thesis
  1. Whither Internalism? How Internalists Should Respond to the Extended Mind Hypothesis.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.
    A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit (...)
  2. In What Sense Are Psychical States Extended?Francis H. Bradley - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):225-235.
  3. Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness.David Chalmers - forthcoming - In Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine & Mog Stapleton (eds.), Andy Clark and his Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  4. Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and the Future of Human Intelligence.Andy Clark - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    In Natural-Born Cyborgs, Clark argues that what makes humans so different from other species is our capacity to fully incorporate tools and supporting cultural ...
  5. The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
  6. Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis.Katalin Farkas - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.
    According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we (...)
  7. Mind Embodied and Embedded.John Haugeland - 1993 - In Yu-Houng H. Houng & J. Ho (eds.), Mind and Cognition: 1993 International Symposium. Academica Sinica. pp. 233-267.
    1 INTIMACY Among Descartes's most and consequential achievements has been his of the mental as an independent ontological domain. By taking the mind as a substance, with cognitions as its modes, he accorded them a status as self-standing and determinate on their own, without essential regard to other entities. Only with this metaphysical conception in place, could the idea of solipsism-the idea of an intact ego existing with nothing else in the universe-so much as make sense. And behind that engine (...)
  8. Varieties of Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 101-153.
  9. Ontogenesis of the Socially Extended Mind.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Cognitive Systems Research 25:40-46.
    I consider the developmental origins of the socially extended mind. First, I argue that, from birth, the physical interventions caregivers use to regulate infant attention and emotion (gestures, facial expressions, direction of gaze, body orientation, patterns of touch and vocalization, etc.) are part of the infant’s socially extended mind; they are external mechanisms that enable the infant to do things she could not otherwise do, cognitively speaking. Second, I argue that these physical interventions encode the norms, values, and patterned practices (...)
  10. Seeing Mind in Action.Joel Krueger - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
    Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view (...)
  11. Erweiterte Kognition und mentaler Externalismus.Holger Lyre - 2010 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (2):190-215.
    Recent developments under the keywords dynamicism, embodiment and situated cognition suggest the view that cognitive systems are not confined to the neural sys‐tem but leak into the world beyond the traditional system boundaries. This is the thesis of extended cognition. Such an extension of the cognitive vehicles leads to a new kind of content externalism, known as active externalism. The essay pursues three objectives: firstly, to distinguish the theses of extended cognitive and active externalism. Secondly, to delineate active externalism from (...)
  12. The Extended Mind.Richard Menary (ed.) - 2010 - MIT Press.
    Leading scholars respond to the famous proposition by Andy Clark and David Chalmers that cognition and mind are not located exclusively in the head.
  13. Ist der Geist Im Kopf?: Beiträge Zur These des Erweiterten Geistes.Jan G. Michel, Kim J. Boström & Michael Pohl (eds.) - 2016 - Münster: mentis.
    Im Jahre 1998 verblüfften Andy Clark und David Chalmers die philosophische Gemeinschaft mit der sog. These des erweiterten Geistes, die im Kern besagt, dass kognitive Systeme nicht-biologische Komponenten enthalten können und sich damit über die Grenzen biologischer Organismen hinaus erstrecken können. Mittlerweile wird diese These nicht nur von Philosophen, sondern auch von Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaftlern intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert. -/- In den begutachteten Beiträgen des vorliegenden ersten deutschsprachigen Band zur These des erweiterten Geistes geht es u.a. um die folgenden Fragen: (...)
  14. From Embodied and Extended Mind to No Mind.Vincent C. Müller - 2012 - In Anna Esposito, Antonietta M. Esposito, Rüdiger Hoffmann, Vincent C. Müller & Alessandro Viniciarelli (eds.), Cognitive Behavioural Systems. Springer. pp. 299-303.
    The paper discusses the extended mind thesis with a view to the notions of “agent” and of “mind”, while helping to clarify the relation between “embodiment” and the “extended mind”. I will suggest that the extended mind thesis constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the notion of ‘mind’; the consequence of the extended mind debate should be to drop the notion of the mind altogether – rather than entering the discussion how extended it is.
  15. Minds Online: The Interface Between Web Science, Cognitive Science, and the Philosophy of Mind.Paul Smart, Robert William Clowes & Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Foundations and Trends in Web Science 6 (1-2):1-234.
    Alongside existing research into the social, political and economic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particularly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive significance of the Web because of the emphasis (...)
  16. Inference to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):353-362.
    This paper examines the justification for the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). HEC claims that human cognitive processes can, and often do, extend outside our heads to include objects in the environment. HEC has been justified by inference to the best explanation (IBE). Both advocates and critics of HEC claim that we should infer the truth value of HEC based on whether HEC makes a positive, or negative, explanatory contribution to cognitive science. I argue that IBE cannot play this epistemic (...)
  17. Res Cogitans Extensa: A Philosophical Defense of the Extended Mind Thesis.Georg Theiner - 2011 - Peter Lang.
    For Descartes, minds were essentially non-extended things. Contemporary cognitive science prides itself on having exorcised the Cartesian ghost from the biological machine. However, it remains committed to the Cartesian vision of the mental as something purely inner. Against the idea that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the situated and embodied nature of cognition have long stressed the importance of dynamic brain-body-environment couplings, the opportunistic exploitation of bodily morphology, the strategic performance of epistemically potent actions, the generation (...)
  18. Wide Computationalism.Robert A. Wilson - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):351-72.
    The computational argument for individualism, which moves from computationalism to individualism about the mind, is problematic, not because computationalism is false, but because computational psychology is, at least sometimes, wide. The paper provides an early, or perhaps predecessor, version of the thesis of extended cognition.
Applications of Extended Cognition
  1. The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the ‘Inside–Outside’ Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW]Ciano Aydin - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):73-94.
    This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s (...)
  2. The Molecules of Social Recognition Memory: Implications for Social Cognition, Extended Mind, and Neuroethics.J. Bickle - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):468-474.
    Social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroethics have reached a synthesis of late, but some troubling features are present. The neuroscience that currently dominates the study of social cognition is exclusively cognitive neuroscience, as contrasted with the cellular and increasingly molecular emphasis that has gripped mainstream neuroscience over the past three decades. Furthermore, the recent field of molecular and cellular cognition has begun to unravel some molecular mechanisms involved in social cognition, especially pertaining to the consolidation of memories of particular conspecific (...)
  3. Interacting to Remember at Multiple Timescales: Coordination, Collaboration, Cooperation and Culture in Joint Remembering.Lucas M. Bietti & John Sutton - 2015 - Interaction Studies 16 (3):419-450.
    Everyday joint remembering, from family remembering around the dinner table to team remembering in the operating theatre, relies on the successful interweaving of multiple cognitive, bodily, social and material resources, anchored in specific cultural ecosystems. Such systems for joint remembering in social interactions are composed of processes unfolding over multiple but complementary timescales, which we distinguish for analytic purposes so as better to study their interanimation in practice: (i) faster, lower-level coordination processes of behavioral matching and interactional synchrony occurring at (...)
  4. Neurotechnology, Invasiveness and the Extended Mind.Tom Buller - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (3):593-605.
    According to a standard view, the physical boundary of the person—the skin-and-skull boundary—matters morally because this boundary delineates between where the person begins and the world ends. On the basis of this view we make a distinction between invasive interventions that penetrate this boundary and non-invasive interventions that do not. The development of neuroprosthetics, however, raises questions about the significance of this boundary and the relationship between person and body. In particular it has been argued by appeal to the Extended (...)
  5. The Sign of the Hand: Symbolic Practices and the Extended Mind.Massimiliano Cappuccio & Michael Wheeler - 2011 - Versus 113:33-56.
  6. Offloading Memory to the Environment: A Quantitative Example. [REVIEW]J. Case - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):387-89.
    R.W. Ashby maintained that people and animals do not have to remember as much as one might think since considerable information is stored in the environment. Presented herein is an everyday, quantitative example featuring calculation of the number bits of memory that can be off-loaded to the environment. The example involves one’s storing directions to a friend’s house. It is also argued that the example works with or without acceptance of the extended mind hypothesis. Additionally, a brief supporting argument for (...)
  7. Expression and Extended Cognition.Tom Cochrane - 2008 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (4):59-73.
    I argue for the possibility of an extremely intimate connection between the emotional content of the music and the emotional state of the person who produces that music. Under certain specified conditions, the music may not just influence, but also partially constitute the musician’s emotional state.
  8. Constructing Religion Without the Social: Durkheim, Latour, and Extended Cognition.Matthew Day - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):719-737.
    I take up the question of how models of extended cognition might redirect the academic study of religion. Entering into a conversation of sorts with Emile Durkheim and Bruno Latour regarding the "overtakenness" of social agency, I argue that a robust portrait of extended cognition must redirect our interest in explaining religion in two key ways. First, religious studies should take up the methodological principle of symmetry that informs contemporary histories of science and begin theorizing the efficacy of gods as (...)
  9. Procrastination and the Extended Will.Joseph Heath & Joel Anderson - 2010 - In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 233--253.
  10. Distributed Cognition and Distributed Morality: Agency, Artifacts and Systems.Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (2):431-448.
    There are various philosophical approaches and theories describing the intimate relation people have to artifacts. In this paper, I explore the relation between two such theories, namely distributed cognition and distributed morality theory. I point out a number of similarities and differences in these views regarding the ontological status they attribute to artifacts and the larger systems they are part of. Having evaluated and compared these views, I continue by focussing on the way cognitive artifacts are used in moral practice. (...)
  11. Embodied Tools, Cognitive Tools and Brain-Computer Interfaces.Richard Heersmink - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (1):207-219.
    In this paper I explore systematically the relationship between Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) and their human users from a phenomenological and cognitive perspective. First, I functionally decompose BCI systems and develop a typology in which I categorize BCI applications with similar functional properties into three categories, those with (1) motor, (2) virtual, and (3) linguistic applications. Second, developing and building on the notions of an embodied tool and cognitive tool, I analyze whether these distinct BCI applications can be seen as bodily (...)
  12. Mind and Artifact: A Multidimensional Matrix for Exploring Cognition-Artifact Relations.Richard Heersmink - 2012 - In J. M. Bishop & Y. J. Erden (eds.), Proceedings of the 5th AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy (pp. 54-61).
    What are the possible varieties of cognition-artifact relations, and which dimensions are relevant for exploring these varieties? This question is answered in two steps. First, three levels of functional and informational integration between human agent and cognitive artifact are distinguished. These levels are based on the degree of interactivity and direction of information flow, and range from monocausal and bicausal relations to continuous reciprocal causation. In these levels there is a hierarchy of integrative processes in which there is an increasing (...)
  13. Epistemological and Phenomenological Issues in the Use of Brain-Computer Interfaces.Richard Heersmink - 2011 - In C. Ess & R. Hagengruber (eds.), Proceedings of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy 2011 (pp. 98-102). MV-Wissenschaft.
    Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are an emerging and converging technology that translates the brain activity of its user into command signals for external devices, ranging from motorized wheelchairs, robotic hands, environmental control systems, and computer applications. In this paper I functionally decompose BCI systems and categorize BCI applications with similar functional properties into three categories, those with (1) motor, (2) virtual, and (3) linguistic applications. I then analyse the relationship between these distinct BCI applications and their users from an epistemological and (...)
  14. On Distinguishing Epistemic From Pragmatic Action.David Kirsh & P. Maglio - 1994 - Cognitive Science 18 (4):513-49.
    We present data and argument to show that in Tetris - a real-time interactive video game - certain cognitive and perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world rather than by performing computational actions in the head alone. We have found that some translations and rotations are best understood as using the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to (...)
  15. Extended Mind and Religious Cognition.Joel Krueger - 2016 - Religion: Mental Religion. Part of the Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Religion Series.
    The extended mind thesis claims that mental states need not be confined to the brain or even the biological borders of the subject. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have in recent years debated the plausibility of this thesis, growing an immense body of literature. Yet despite its many supporters, there have been relatively few attempts to apply the thesis to religious studies, particularly studies of religious cognition. In this essay, I indicate how various dimensions of religious cognition might be thought of (...)
  16. At Home in and Beyond Our Skin: Posthuman Embodiment in Film and Television.Joel Krueger - 2015 - In Hauskeller Michael, Carbonell Curtis D. & Philbeck Thomas D. (eds.), Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 172-181.
    Film and television portrayals of posthuman cyborgs melding biology and technology, simultaneously “animal and machine” abound. Most of us immediately think of iconic characters like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s relentless cyborg assassin in the Terminator series or Peter Weller’s crime-fighting cyborg police officer in Robocop (1987). Or perhaps we recall the many cyborgs populating the Dr. Who, Star Trek, and Star Wars television series and films—including Darth Vader, surely the most famous cinematic cyborg of all time. But lesser-known explorations of cybernetic embodiment (...)
  17. Empathy Beyond the Head: Comment on "Music, Empathy, and Cultural Understanding".Joel Krueger - 2015 - Physics of Life Reviews 15:92-93.
  18. Musicing, Materiality, and the Emotional Niche.Joel Krueger - 2015 - Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education 14 (3):43-62.
    Building on Elliot and SilvermanÕs (2015) embodied and enactive approach to musicing, I argue for an extended approach: namely, the idea that music can function as an environmental scaffolding supporting the development of various experiences and embodied practices that would otherwise remain inaccessible. I focus especially on the materiality of music. I argue that one of the central ways we use music, as a material resource, is to manipulate social spaceÑand in so doing, manipulate our emotions. Acts of musicing, thought (...)
  19. Affordances and the Musically Extended Mind.Joel Krueger - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 4 (1003):1-12.
    I defend a model of the musically extended mind. I consider how acts of “musicking” grant access to novel emotional experiences otherwise inaccessible. First, I discuss the idea of “musical affordances” and specify both what musical affordances are and how they invite different forms of entrainment. Next, I argue that musical affordances – via soliciting different forms of entrainment – enhance the functionality of various endogenous, emotiongranting regulative processes, drawing novel experiences out of us with an expanded complexity and phenomenal (...)
  20. Emotions and the Social Niche.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Christian von Scheve & Mikko Salmela (eds.), Collective Emotions. Oxford University Press. pp. 156-171.
  21. Musical Manipulations and the Emotionally Extended Mind.Joel Krueger - 2014 - Empirical Musicology Review 9 (3-4):208-212.
    I respond to Kersten’s criticism in his article “Music and Cognitive Extension” of my approach to the musically extended emotional mind in Krueger (2014). I specify how we manipulate—and in so doing, integrate with—music when, as active listeners, we become part of a musically extended cognitive system. I also indicate how Kersten’s account might be enriched by paying closer attention to the way that music functions as an environmental artifact for emotion regulation.
  22. Varieties of Extended Emotions.Joel Krueger - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):533-555.
    I offer a preliminary defense of the hypothesis of extended emotions (HEE). After discussing some taxonomic considerations, I specify two ways of parsing HEE: the hypothesis of bodily extended emotions (HEBE), and the hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions (HEEE). I argue that, while both HEBE and HEEE are empirically plausible, only HEEE covers instances of genuinely extended emotions. After introducing some further distinctions, I support one form of HEEE by appealing to different streams of empirical research—particularly work on music and (...)
  23. Empathy and the Extended Mind.Joel Krueger - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):675-698.
    I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis to analyze empathy and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that empathy is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and empathy. Next, I challenge their internalist orthodoxy and offer an alternative "extended" (...)
  24. Extended Cognition in Science Communication.David Ludwig - 2014 - Public Understanding of Science 23 (8):982-995.
    The aim of this article is to propose a methodological externalism that takes knowledge about science to be partly constituted by the environment. My starting point is the debate about extended cognition in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. Externalists claim that human cognition extends beyond the brain and can be partly constituted by external devices. First, I show that most studies of public knowledge about science are based on an internalist framework that excludes the environment we usually utilize to make (...)
  25. The Web-Extended Mind.Paul R. Smart - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (4):446-463.
    This article explores the notion of the Web-extended mind, which is the idea that the technological and informational elements of the Web can sometimes serve as part of the mechanistic substrate that realizes human mental states and processes. It is argued that while current forms of the Web may not be particularly suited to the realization of Web-extended minds, new forms of user interaction technology as well as new approaches to information representation do provide promising new opportunities for Web-based forms (...)
  26. The Cognitive Ecology of the Internet.Paul Smart, Richard Heersmink & Robert Clowes - 2017 - In Stephen Cowley & Frederic Vallée-Tourangeau (eds.), Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity and Human Artifice (2nd ed.). Springer. pp. 251-282.
    In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet and its users in terms of situated cognition theory. We first argue that the Internet is a new kind of cognitive ecology, providing almost constant access to a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collective cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by taking an embedded (...)
  27. Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process.John Sutton - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 189-225.
    On the extended mind hypothesis (EM), many of our cognitive states and processes are hybrids, unevenly distributed across biological and nonbiological realms. In certain circumstances, things - artifacts, media, or technologies - can have a cognitive life, with histories often as idiosyncratic as those of the embodied brains with which they couple. The realm of the mental can spread across the physical, social, and cultural environments as well as bodies and brains. My independent aims in this chapter are: first, to (...)
  28. Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind and the Civilizing Process.John Sutton - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 189--225.
    On the extended mind hypothesis (EM),l many of our cognitive states and processes are hybrids, unevenly distributed across biological and nonbiological realms (Clark 1997; Clark and Chalmers 1998). In certain circumstances, things-artifacts, media, or technologies-can have a cognitive life, with histories often as idiosyncratic as those of the embodied brains with which they couple (Sutton 2002a, 2008). The realm of the mental can spread across the physical, social, and cultural environments as well as bodies and brains. My independent aims in (...)
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