This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

151 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 151
Material to categorize
  1. Language and Scientific Explanation: Where Does Semantics Fit In?Eran Asoulin - forthcoming - Berlin, Germany: Language Science Press.
    This book discusses the two main construals of the explanatory goals of semantic theories. The first, externalist conception, understands semantic theories in terms of a hermeneutic and interpretive explanatory project. The second, internalist conception, understands semantic theories in terms of the psychological mechanisms in virtue of which meanings are generated. It is argued that a fruitful scientific explanation is one that aims to uncover the underlying mechanisms in virtue of which the observable phenomena are made possible, and that a scientific (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Group-Level Cognizing, Collaborative Remembering, and Individuals.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - In Penny Van Bergen Michelle Meade (ed.), Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, and Applications. New York, NY, USA: pp. 248-260.
    This chapter steps back from the important psychological work on collaborative remembering at the heart of the present volume to take up some broader questions about the place of memory in Western cultural thought, both historically and in contemporary society, offering the kind of integrative and reflective perspective for which philosophy is often known. In particular, the text aims to shed some light on the relationship between collaborative memory and the other two topics in this title—group-level cognizing and individuals—beginning with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3. Where is My Mind? Mark Rowlands on the Vehicles of Cognition.Andreas Elpidorou - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Nature of Proof in Psychiatry.Paul Lieberman - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (3):225-228.
  5. The Mind Beyond Itself.Robert A. Wilson - 2000 - In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 31-52.
    This paper argues that the metarepresentational systems we posses are wide or extended, rather than individualistic. There are two basic ideas. The first is that metarepresentation inherits its width from the mental representation of its objects. The second is that mental processing often operates on internal and external symbols, and this suggests that cognitive systems extend beyond the heads that house them.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
Externalism and Computation
  1. Computation as Involving Content: A Response to Egan.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):195-202.
    Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They are also required if we are to explain the content‐involving properties of mental states.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  2. Stigmergy 3.0: From Ants to Economies.Leslie Marsh & Margery Doyle - forthcoming - Cognitive Systems Research.
    The editors introduce the themed issue “stigmergy 3.0”.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2007 - John Benjamins & Co.
    Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. It is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Can We Knock Off the Shackles of Syntax?Daniel Andler - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:265-270.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Computation and Intentional Psychology.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.
    The relation between computational and intentional psychology has always been a vexing issue. The worry is that if mental processes are computational, then these processes, which are defined over symbols, are sensitive solely to the non-semantic properties of symbols. If so, perhaps psychology could dispense with adverting in its laws to intentional/semantic properties of symbols. Stich, as is well-known, has made a great deal out of this tension and argued for a purely "syntactic" psychology by driving a wedge between a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. Individualism and the Nature of Syntactic States.Thomas D. Bontly - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):557-574.
    It is widely assumed that the explanatory states of scientific psychology are type-individuated by their semantic or intentional properties. First, I argue that this assumption is implausible for theories like David Marr's [1982] that seek to provide computational or syntactic explanations of psychological processes. Second, I examine the implications of this conclusion for the debate over psychological individualism. While most philosophers suppose that syntactic states supervene on the intrinsic physical states of information-processing systems, I contend they may not. Syntatic descriptions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  7. Content, Computation, and Individuation.Keith Butler - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):277-92.
    The role of content in computational accounts of cognition is a matter of some controversy. An early prominent view held that the explanatory relevance of content consists in its supervenience on the the formal properties of computational states (see, e.g., Fodor 1980). For reasons that derive from the familiar Twin Earth thought experiments, it is usually thought that if content is to supervene on formal properties, it must be narrow; that is, it must not be the sort of content that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  8. In Defence of Narrow Mindedness.Frances Egan - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.
    Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  9. Computation, External Factors, and Cognitive Explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.
    Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  10. Syntax, Semantics, and Intentional Aspects.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.
    Abstract It is widely assumed that the meaning of at least some types of expressions involves more than their reference to objects, and hence that there may be co-referential expressions which differ in meaning. It is also widely assumed that ?syntax does not suffice for semantics?, i.e. that we cannot account for the fact that expressions have semantic properties in purely syntactical or computational terms. The main goal of the paper is to argue against a third related assumption, namely that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Computationalism and the Causal Role of Content.Jean R. Kazez - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (3):231-60.
  12. Individualism and Artificial Intelligence.Bernard W. Kobes - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:429-56.
  13. Computation, Content and Cause.Nenad Miščević - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-63.
  14. Computation, Content and Cause.Nenad Miščević - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-263.
  15. Content, Computation, and Externalism.Christopher Peacocke - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):227-264.
  16. Direct Reference, Psychological Explanation, and Frege Cases.Susan Schneider - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447.
    In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  17. Thought and Syntax.William E. Seager - 1992 - Philosophy of Science Association 1992:481-491.
    It has been argued that Psychological Externalism is irrelevant to psychology. The grounds for this are that PE fails to individuate intentional states in accord with causal power, and that psychology is primarily interested in the causal roles of psychological states. It is also claimed that one can individuate psychological states via their syntactic structure in some internal "language of thought". This syntactic structure is an internal feature of psychological states and thus provides a key to their causal powers. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Content, Computation and Externalism.Oron Shagrir - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):369-400.
    The paper presents an extended argument for the claim that mental content impacts the computational individuation of a cognitive system (section 2). The argument starts with the observation that a cognitive system may simultaneously implement a variety of different syntactic structures, but that the computational identity of a cognitive system is given by only one of these implemented syntactic structures. It is then asked what are the features that determine which of implemented syntactic structures is the computational structure of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
Externalism and the Theory of Vision
  1. Seeing What is Not There.Gabriel Segal - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (2):189.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  2. Perception.Kathleen Akins (ed.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
  3. Reconsidering Perceptual Content.William T. Wojtach - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.
    An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be determined empirically according (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Individualism and Psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
  5. Content, Computation, and Individualism in Vision Theory.Keith Butler - 1996 - Analysis 56 (3):146-54.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. Individualism and Marr's Computational Theory of Vision.Keith Butler - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Individualism, Twin Scenarios and Visual Content.M. J. Cain - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):441-463.
    In this paper I address an important question concerning the nature of visual content: are the contents of human visual states and experiences exhaustively fixed or determined (in the non-causal sense) by our intrinsic physical properties? The individualist answers this question affirmatively. I will argue that such an answer is mistaken. A common anti-individualist or externalist tactic is to attempt to construct a twin scenario involving humanoid duplicates who are embedded in environments that diverge in such a way that it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Individualism and Perceptual Content.Martin Davies - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):461-84.
  9. Intentionality and the Theory of Vision.Frances Egan - 1996 - In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content.Frances Egan - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):443-59.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  11. Externalism and Marr's Theory of Vision.Robert M. Francescotti - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.
    According to one brand of 'externalism', cognitive theories should individuate mental content 'widely'--that is, partly in terms of environmental features. David Marr's theory of vision is often cited in support of this view. Many philosophers (most notably, Tyler Burge) regard it as a prime example of a fruitful cognitive theory that widely individuates the representations it posits. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, Marr's theory does not presuppose an externalist view of mental content.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Marr's Computational Theory of Vision.Patricia Kitcher - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.
    David Marr's theory of vision has been widely cited by philosophers and psychologists. I have three projects in this paper. First, I try to offer a perspicuous characterization of Marr's theory. Next, I consider the implications of Marr's work for some currently popular philosophies of psychology, specifically, the "hegemony of neurophysiology view", the theories of Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, and Stephen Stich, and the view that perception is permeated by belief. In the last section, I consider what the phenomenon of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  13. Content Individuation in Marr's Theory of Vision.Basileios Kroustallis - 2006 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):57-71.
    The debate concerning the individuating role of the external environment in propositional content has turned to Marr’s computational theory of vision for either verification or disproof. Although not all the relevant arguments concerning the determining role of environmental constraints that Marr invokes in his visual account may succeed, the paper argues that Marr divides his computational explanation into two parts, the information processing “what” and the constraint introducing “why” aspect. It is the second part where separate claims concerning the necessity (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. Supervenience and Computational Explanation in Vision Theory.P. Morton - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99.
    According to Marr's theory of vision, computational processes of early vision rely for their success on certain "natural constraints" in the physical environment. I examine the implications of this feature of Marr's theory for the question whether psychological states supervene on neural states. It is reasonable to hold that Marr's theory is nonindividualistic in that, given the role of natural constraints, distinct computational theories of the same neural processes may be justified in different environments. But to avoid trivializing computational explanations, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  15. Success-Orientation and Individualism in the Theory of Vision.Sarah Patterson - 1996 - In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 5--248.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Defence of a Reasonable Individualism.Gabriel Segal - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):485-94.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  17. A Clearer Vision.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.
    Frances Egan argues that the states of computational theories of vision are individuated individualistically and, as far as the theory is concerned, are not intentional. Her argument depends on equating the goals and explanatory strategies of computational psychology with those of its algorithmic level. However, closer inspection of computational psychology reveals that the computational level plays an essential role in explaining visual processes and that explanations at this level are nonindividualistic and intentional. In conclusion, I sketch an account of content (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  18. Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr's Theory of Vision.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):489-513.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  19. Junk Representations.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):345-361.
    Many philosophers and psychologists who approach the issue of representation from a computational or measurement theoretical perspective end up having to deny the possibility of junk representations?representations present in an organism's head but that enter into no psychological processes or produce no behaviour. However, I argue, a more functional perspective makes the possibility of junk representations intuitively quite plausible?so much so that we may wish to question those views of representation that preclude the possibility of junk representations. I explore some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Chomsky and Egan on Computational Theories of Vision.Arnold Silverberg - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.
  21. Individualism, Behavior, and Marr's Theory of Vision.Wayne Wright - manuscript
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Externalism and Psychological Explanation
  1. Refutando Inconsistencias y malentendidos cuánticos. Reflexión crítica en torno a las malas interpretaciones sobre un experimento.Sergio Barrera Rodríguez & Nicolás Pérez - 2019 - Scientia in Verba Magazine 4 (2):225-248.
    A lo largo del texto se hace una exposición detallada de temáticas y argumentos necesarios para ejecutar un análisis crítico en torno a los contenidos de varios artículos acerca del experimento “ Experimental rejection of observerindependence in the quantum world”. Dentro del apartado (3) se exponen brevemente algunas de las problemáticas elementales que presentan los artículos que son objeto de crítica, asimismo en (3.2) se halla una tabla organizada con los fragmentos específicos que se van a tratar de los mencionados (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. A tese da mente estendida à luz do externismo ativo: Como tornar Otto responsivo a razões?Eros Carvalho - forthcoming - Trans/Form/Ação 43.
    The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition. It would be advantageous to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent Revolution.Marcin Miłkowski, Robert Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska, Aleksandra Przegalińska, Tadeusz Zawidzki, Joel Krueger, Adam Gies, Marek McGann, Łukasz Afeltowicz, Witold Wachowski, Fredrik Stjernberg, Victor Loughlin & Mateusz Hohol - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives towards building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Extended Minds and Prime Mental Conditions: Probing the Parallels.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 147-161.
    Two very different forms of externalism about mental states appear prima facie unrelated: Williamson’s (1995, 2000) claim that knowledge is a mental state, and Clark & Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind hypothesis. I demonstrate, however, that the two approaches justify their radically externalist by appealing to the same argument from explanatory generality. I argue that if one accepts either Williamson’s claims or Clark & Chalmers’ claims on considerations of explanatory generality then, ceteris paribus, one should accept the other. This conclusion has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Broadening the Mind.John Perry - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):223-231.
    The main topic of Jerry Fodor’s The Elm and the Expert,1, and the title of the first chapter, is “If Psychological processes are computational, how can psychological laws be intentional?” I focus on the first and second chapters; The first is devoted to setting up the question, the second to answering it.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Mind and Chance.Christopher Gauker - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):533-552.
    Much discussed but still unresolved is whether a subject's internal physical structure is a sufficient condition for his beliefs and desires. The question has sometimes been expressed as a question about microstructurally identical Doppelgänger. Imagine two subjects who are identical right down to the ions traversing the synapses. Their senses are stimulated in all the same ways, their bodies execute the same motions, and identical physical events mediate between the sensory inputs and the behavioral outputs. Must they have the very (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 151