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  1. Can We Knock Off the Shackles of Syntax?Daniel Andler - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:265-270.
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  2. Computation and Intentional Psychology.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.
    The relation between computational and intentional psychology has always been a vexing issue. The worry is that if mental processes are computational, then these processes, which are defined over symbols, are sensitive solely to the non-semantic properties of symbols. If so, perhaps psychology could dispense with adverting in its laws to intentional/semantic properties of symbols. Stich, as is well-known, has made a great deal out of this tension and argued for a purely "syntactic" psychology by driving a wedge between a (...)
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  3. Individualism and the Nature of Syntactic States.Thomas D. Bontly - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):557-574.
    It is widely assumed that the explanatory states of scientific psychology are type-individuated by their semantic or intentional properties. First, I argue that this assumption is implausible for theories like David Marr's [1982] that seek to provide computational or syntactic explanations of psychological processes. Second, I examine the implications of this conclusion for the debate over psychological individualism. While most philosophers suppose that syntactic states supervene on the intrinsic physical states of information-processing systems, I contend they may not. Syntatic descriptions (...)
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  4. Content, Computation, and Individuation.Keith Butler - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):277-92.
    The role of content in computational accounts of cognition is a matter of some controversy. An early prominent view held that the explanatory relevance of content consists in its supervenience on the the formal properties of computational states (see, e.g., Fodor 1980). For reasons that derive from the familiar Twin Earth thought experiments, it is usually thought that if content is to supervene on formal properties, it must be narrow; that is, it must not be the sort of content that (...)
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  5. In Defence of Narrow Mindedness.Frances Egan - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.
    Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology.
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  6. Computation, External Factors, and Cognitive Explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.
    Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I (...)
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  7. Syntax, Semantics, and Intentional Aspects.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.
    Abstract It is widely assumed that the meaning of at least some types of expressions involves more than their reference to objects, and hence that there may be co-referential expressions which differ in meaning. It is also widely assumed that ?syntax does not suffice for semantics?, i.e. that we cannot account for the fact that expressions have semantic properties in purely syntactical or computational terms. The main goal of the paper is to argue against a third related assumption, namely that (...)
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  8. Computationalism and the Causal Role of Content.J. R. Kazez - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (3):231-60.
  9. Individualism and Artificial Intelligence.Bernard W. Kobes - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:429-56.
  10. Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2007 - John Benjamins & Co.
    Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. It is (...)
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  11. Stigmergy 3.0: From Ants to Economies.Leslie Marsh & Margery Doyle - forthcoming - Cognitive Systems Research.
    The editors introduce the themed issue “stigmergy 3.0”.
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  12. Computation, Content, and Cause.Nenad Miscevic - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-63.
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  13. Computation, Content and Cause.Nenad Miščević - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-263.
  14. Computation as Involving Content: A Response to Egan.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):195-202.
    Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They are also required if we are to explain the content‐involving properties of mental states.
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  15. Content, Computation, and Externalism.Christopher Peacocke - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6 (3):227-264.
  16. Direct Reference, Psychological Explanation, and Frege Cases.Susan Schneider - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447.
    In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that (...)
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  17. Thought and Syntax.William E. Seager - 1992 - Philosophy of Science Association 1992:481-491.
    It has been argued that Psychological Externalism is irrelevant to psychology. The grounds for this are that PE fails to individuate intentional states in accord with causal power, and that psychology is primarily interested in the causal roles of psychological states. It is also claimed that one can individuate psychological states via their syntactic structure in some internal "language of thought". This syntactic structure is an internal feature of psychological states and thus provides a key to their causal powers. I (...)
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  18. Content, Computation and Externalism.Oron Shagrir - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):369-400.
    The paper presents an extended argument for the claim that mental content impacts the computational individuation of a cognitive system (section 2). The argument starts with the observation that a cognitive system may simultaneously implement a variety of different syntactic structures, but that the computational identity of a cognitive system is given by only one of these implemented syntactic structures. It is then asked what are the features that determine which of implemented syntactic structures is the computational structure of the (...)
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