This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

92 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 92
  1. added 2019-01-05
    From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent Revolution.Marcin Miłkowski, Robert Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska, Aleksandra Przegalińska, Tadeusz Zawidzki, Joel Krueger, Adam Gies, Marek McGann, Łukasz Afeltowicz, Witold Wachowski, Fredrik Stjernberg, Victor Loughlin & Mateusz Hohol - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives towards building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-06-08
    Mind and Chance.Christopher Gauker - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):533-552.
  3. added 2018-02-17
    Review of 'Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy-by Daniel Hutto 2nd Ed. (2006).Michael Starks - 2016 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization-- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 2nd Edition Feb 2018. Michael Starks. pp. 259-270.
    One of the leading exponents of W's ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the `Two Selves' operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc.) is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH). His approach is called `Radical Enactivism' and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers (see my review of Radicalizing Enactivism) and a new one is appearing as I write (Evolving Enactivism). It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2018-02-17
    Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics.Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.) - 2001 - Stanford: CSLI Publications.
    The philosophy of mind has long been dominated by the view that mental states are identical with, constituted by, or grounded in brain states. Lynne Rudder Baker has been a persistent critic of this view, developing instead a theory grounded in a larger metaphysical outlook called Practical Realism. This volume is the first critical book-length evaluation of her views and criticism; leading philosophers answer her challenges and explore the consequences of Practical Realism, and Baker herself provides thoughtful replies to elaborate (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. added 2018-02-17
    Broadening the Mind.John Perry - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):223-231.
    The main topic of Jerry Fodor’s The Elm and the Expert,1, and the title of the first chapter, is “If Psychological processes are computational, how can psychological laws be intentional?” I focus on the first and second chapters; The first is devoted to setting up the question, the second to answering it.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2017-12-28
    Extended Minds and Prime Mental Conditions: Probing the Parallels.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 147-161.
    Two very different forms of externalism about mental states appear prima facie unrelated: Williamson’s (1995, 2000) claim that knowledge is a mental state, and Clark & Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind hypothesis. I demonstrate, however, that the two approaches justify their radically externalist by appealing to the same argument from explanatory generality. I argue that if one accepts either Williamson’s claims or Clark & Chalmers’ claims on considerations of explanatory generality then, ceteris paribus, one should accept the other. This conclusion has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2016-12-08
    Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.
    This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about rationality turn on the form, not the content, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. added 2016-12-08
    Psychological Essentialism and Semantic Externalism: Evidence for Externalism in Lay Speakers' Language Use.Jussi Jylkk - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):37 – 60.
    Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are experimentally testable. We examine Braisby, Franks, and Hampton's (1996) study which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. added 2016-12-08
    Can Mental Content Explain Behavior?Pierre Jacob - 2002 - In Languages of the Brain.
    I scrutinize the argument for why externally individuated mental content might not be causally efficacious in the explanation of an individual's physical movements. I argue that even though externalististically construed mental content might not explain an individual's physical movements, it might nonetheless explain his or her behavior on a componential view of behavior according to which an individual's physical movement is a component of his or her behavior.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. added 2016-12-08
    Reduction, Explanation, and Realism.K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.) - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
    Reduction has long been a favourite method of analysis in all areas of philosophy, but in recent years there has been a reaction against it. The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for such anti-reductionist views and assess their coherence and success in a number of fields.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  11. added 2016-12-05
    Memory: A Philosophical Study.Sven Bernecker - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Sven Bernecker presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial to the understanding of memory. -/- Bernecker argues that memory, unlike knowledge, implies neither belief nor justification. There are instances where memory, though hitting the mark of truth, succeeds in an epistemically defective way. This book shows that, contrary to received wisdom in epistemology, memory not only preserves epistemic features generated by other epistemic sources but also functions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  12. added 2016-12-05
    Object Dependent Thoughts, Perspectival Thoughts, and Psychological Generalization.Max F. Adams, R. Stecker & G. Fuller - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (1):47–59.
  13. added 2016-06-13
    Extended Cognition and the Explosion of Knowledge.David Ludwig - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-14.
    The aim of this article is to show that externalist accounts of cognition such as Clark and Chalmers' (1998) “active externalism” lead to an explosion of knowledge that is caused by online resources such as Wikipedia and Google. I argue that externalist accounts of cognition imply that subjects who integrate mobile Internet access in their cognitive routines have millions of standing beliefs on unexpected issues such as the birth dates of Moroccan politicians or the geographical coordinates of villages in southern (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14. added 2016-04-06
    Why Broad Content Can’T Influence Behaviour.Cressida Gaukroger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3005–3020.
    This article examines one argument in favour of the position that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers over behaviour. This argument states that we establish that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers by considering cases where intrinsic properties remain the same but relational properties vary to see whether, under such circumstances, behaviour would ever vary. The individualist argues that behaviour will not vary with relational properties alone, which means that they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. added 2015-03-22
    Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63.
  16. added 2014-07-28
    The Creative Aspect of Language Use and the Implications for Linguistic Science.Eran Asoulin - 2013 - Biolinguistics 7:228-248.
    The creative aspect of language use provides a set of phenomena that a science of language must explain. It is the “central fact to which any signi- ficant linguistic theory must address itself” and thus “a theory of language that neglects this ‘creative’ aspect is of only marginal interest” (Chomsky 1964: 7–8). Therefore, the form and explanatory depth of linguistic science is restricted in accordance with this aspect of language. In this paper, the implications of the creative aspect of language (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. added 2014-04-03
    Perspectival Thoughts and Psychological Generalizations.Eros Corazza - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):307-36.
    SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalizations in a straightforward way; do not need to be fully articulated and, as such, fit with an economical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. added 2014-04-03
    The Explanatory Role of Belief Ascriptions.Sarah Patterson - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):313-32.
  19. added 2014-04-02
    Emdedded Systems Vs. Individualism.Michael Losonsky - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.
    The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject''s natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system''s interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. added 2014-04-02
    Language and Nature.Noam Chomsky - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):1-61.
  21. added 2014-04-02
    Externalism and the Explanatory Relevance of Broad Content.Pierre Jacob - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.
  22. added 2014-04-01
    Individualism and Semantic Development.Sarah Patterson - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (March):15-35.
    This paper takes issue with Tyler Burge's claim that intentional states are nonindividualistically individuated in cognitive psychology. A discussion of current models of children's acquisition of semantic knowledge is used to motivate a thought-experiment which shows that psychologists working in this area are not committed to describing the concepts children attach to words in terms of the concepts standardly attached to those words in the child's community. The content of the child's representational states are thus not individuated with reference to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. added 2014-03-30
    In Defence of Object-Dependent Thoughts.Sean Crawford - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210.
    The existence of object-dependent thoughts has been doubted on the grounds that reference to such thoughts is unnecessary or 'redundant' in the psychological explanation of intentional action. This paper argues to the contrary that reference to object-dependent thoughts is necessary to the proper psychological explanation of intentional action upon objects. Section I sets out the argument for the alleged explanatory redundancy of object-dependent thoughts; an argument which turns on the coherence of an alternative 'dual-component' model of explanation. Section II rebuts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  24. added 2014-03-30
    Sticking Up for Oedipus: Fodor on Intentional Generalizations and Broad Content.D. Arjo - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25. added 2014-03-30
    Against Methodological Solipsism: The Ecological Approach.Mark Rowlands - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):5-24.
    This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26. added 2014-03-29
    Causal Depth, Theoretical Appropriateness, and Individualism in Psychology.Robert A. Wilson - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):55-75.
    Individualists claim that wide explanations in psychology are problematic. I argue that wide psychological explanations sometimes have greater explanatory power than individualistic explanations. The aspects of explanatory power I focus on are causal depth and theoretical appropriateness. Reflection on the depth and appropriateness of other wide explanations of behavior, such as evolutionary explanations, clarifies why wide psychological explanations sometimes have more causal depth and theoretical appropriateness than narrow psychological explanations. I also argue for the rejection of eliminative materialism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. added 2014-03-25
    Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations?Murat Aydede & P. Robbins - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  28. added 2014-03-25
    [Explanation] is Explanation Better.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):154-60.
    Robert Wilson (1994) maintains that many interesting and fundamental aspects of psychology are non-individualistic because large chunks of psychology depend upon organisms being deeply embedded in some environment. I disagree and present one version of narrow content that allows enough reference to the environment to meet any wide challenge. I argue that most psychologists are already this sort of narrow content theorist and that these narrow content explanations of psychological phenomena meet Wilson's criteria for being a good explanation better than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2014-03-25
    Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (Or: In Defense of "Narrow" Functions).David J. Buller - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):74-95.
    Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. added 2014-03-22
    Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws.Sean Crawford - 2003 - Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
    This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. added 2014-03-22
    On the Explanatory Deficiencies of Linguistic Content.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.
    The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. added 2014-03-21
    Recent Work on Individualism in the Social, Behavioural, and Biological Sciences.Robert A. Wilson - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (3):397-423.
    The social, behavioral, and a good chunk of the biological sciences concern the nature of individual agency, where our paradigm for an individual is a human being. Theories of economic behavior, of mental function and dysfunction, and of ontogenetic development, for example, are theories of how such individuals act, and of what internal and external factors are determinative of that action. Such theories construe individuals in distinctive ways.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2014-03-21
    False Consciousness of Intentional Psychology.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):271-295.
    According to explanatory individualism, every action must be explained in terms of an agent's desire. According to explanatory nonindividualism, we sometimes act on our desires, but it is also possible for us to act on others' desires without acting on desires of our own. While explanatory nonindividualism has guided the thinking of many social scientists, it is considered to be incoherent by most philosophers of mind who insist that actions must be explained ultimately in terms of some desire of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  34. added 2014-03-21
    Broad Versus Narrow Content in the Explanation of Action: Fodor on Frege Cases.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.
    A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. added 2014-03-21
    Some Problems for Alternative Individualism.Robert A. Wilson - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):671-679.
    This paper points to some problems for the position that D.M. Walsh calls "alternative individualism," and argues that in defending this view Walsh has omitted an important part of what separates individualists and externalists in psychology. Walsh's example of Hox gene complexes is discussed in detail to show why some sort of externalism about scientific taxonomy more generally is a more plausible view than any extant version of individualism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2014-03-09
    Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content.Akeel Bilgrami - 1992 - Blackwell.
    Belief and Meaning is a philosophical treatment of intentionality. It offers an original, logical and convincing account of intentional content which is local and contextual and which takes issues with standard theories of meaning.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  37. added 2014-02-10
    Psychological Externalism and Psychological Explanation. [REVIEW]Joseph Owens - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):921-928.
  38. added 2013-09-30
    Naturalizing Intention in Action. [REVIEW]Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):1-4.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2012-01-24
    Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):61-64.
  40. added 2012-01-24
    Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):109-121.
    This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, Memory and Identity , Fred Adams, Husker Du? , and Sanford Goldberg The Metasemantics of Memory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. added 2011-08-13
    The Nature of Commonsense Psychological Explanation.Sean Crawford - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
  42. added 2011-07-30
    Explaining Perceptual Entitlement.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):243-261.
    This paper evaluates the prospects of harnessing “anti-individualism” about the contents of perceptual states to give an account of the epistemology of perception, making special reference to Tyler Burge’s ( 2003 ) paper, “Perceptual Entitlement”. I start by clarifying what kind of warrant is provided by perceptual experience, and I go on to survey different ways one might explain the warrant provided by perceptual experience in terms of anti-individualist views about the individuation of perceptual states. I close by motivating accounts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. added 2011-04-26
    What Can Externalism Do for Psychologists?Alison Gopnik - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):73-74.
    I suggest several ways that externalism could influence psychological theorizing. Externalism could just capture our everyday intuitions about concepts and meanings. More profoundly, it could enter into psychology through evolutionary theory, guide our hypotheses about conceptual abilities, and, most significantly, it could influence our accounts of learning and conceptual change.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2011-04-26
    Staying in Touch: Externalism Needs Descriptions.James A. Hampton - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):74-74.
    Externalism cannot work as a theory of concepts without explaining how we reidentify substances as being of the same kind. Yet this process implies just the level of descriptive content to which externalism seeks to deny a role in conceptual content.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2011-04-04
    Just What Do We Have In Mind?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1986 - In Theodore E. Uehling Peter A. French (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 25-48.
    M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2011-03-21
    Social Externalism and Psychological Explanations - The Problem of the Semantic Features of Contents.Sara Dellantonio - unknown
    It starts to rain and I open the umbrella or, if I don"t have one, I ask my colleague, who is walking with me, if he has an umbrella in the bag. Why do I do so? There are many ways to answer this question, but if I adopt the strategy to explain the causes of my acting or speaking by looking for the reasons that I have for doing it (for instance, I notice that it is raining and I (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2011-03-21
    Reply to Russow.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.
    In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. added 2011-01-29
    Externalisme, Rationalité Et Explanandum de la Psychologie Intentionnelle.Élisabeth Pacherie - 1995 - Dialogue 34 (2):237-.
    In The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor attempts to reconcile the idea that psychological laws are characteristically intentional with the idea that their implementation is typically computational. In order to do so, Fodor must show that narrow contents are superfluous for the purposes of psychological explanation and that Frege cases are rare and constitute unsystematic exceptions. The paper contends that the argument Fodor offers in order to establish his claim is flawed. It argues that the principle of informational equilibrium (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2010-06-22
    Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind.Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2002 - Blackwell.
  50. added 2010-06-22
    Languages of the Brain.Pierre Jacob - 2002
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 92