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  1. added 2020-07-30
    Die Inkonsistenz Empiristischer Argumentation Im Zusammenhang MIT Dem Problem der Naturgesetzlichkeit.Dieter Wandschneider - 1986 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 17 (1):131-142.
    Summary The well-known empiristical apories of the law of nature prevent until this day an adequate philosophical interpretation of empirical science. Clarification can only be expected through an immanent refutation of the empiristical point of view. In this sense it is proved in this paper that Hume's argumentation, paradigmatic for modern empirism, is not just one-sided, but simply inconsistent: Anyone who claimes experience to be the basis of all knowledge (as the empirist does), and, due to this, denies that the (...)
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  2. added 2020-07-27
    A Saint for Our Times: Newman on Faith, Fallibility, and Certitude.Logan Paul Gage - 2020 - Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 23 (2):60-76.
    This essay shows how John Henry Newman reconciled the certitude of faith with a fallibilist epistemology. While Newman holds that many of our beliefs are held with certitude, he does not conceive of all certitude as Cartesian, apodictic certitude. In this way, he walks a middle road between rationalism and fideism.
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  3. added 2020-05-24
    Falsificationism and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Danny Frederick - forthcoming - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu.
    I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.
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  4. added 2019-09-25
    Review: "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution," by Bredo Johnsen. [REVIEW]Matt Carlson - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):32-38.
  5. added 2019-09-17
    The Ordinary Language Case for Contextualism and the Relevance of Radical Doubt.Michael P. Wolf & Jeremy Randel Koons - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):66-94.
    Many contextualist accounts in epistemology appeal to ordinary language and everyday practice as grounds for positing a low-standards knowledge (knowledgeL) that contrasts with high-standards prevalent in epistemology (knowledgeH). We compare these arguments to arguments from the height of “ordinary language” philosophy in the mid 20th century and find that all such arguments face great difficulties. We find a powerful argument for the legitimacy and necessity of knowledgeL (but not of knowledgeH). These appeals to practice leave us with reasons to accept (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Review Essay: Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive.Jonathan E. Adler - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second‐Order Skepticism.Alexander S. Harper - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
    Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains‐in‐vats, it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge‐claims is much reduced (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Proving Realism Transcendentally: Replies to Rolf George and William Harper: Dialogue.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (4):737-750.
  9. added 2019-06-06
    Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384-391.
    Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming&Quest.Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232-251.
    A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...)
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  11. added 2019-03-20
    Johna L. Austina krytyka fundamentalizmu w świetle eksternalizmu epistemologicznego (John L. Austin's criticism of foundationalism in the light of epistemic externalism).Tomasz Szubart - 2011 - Principia 54:107-132.
    W epistemologii aż do XX wieku, najbardziej rozpowszechniony pogląd dotyczący wiedzy głosił, że musi ona posiadać niepodważalne podstawy, w przeciwnym wypadku w jej uzasadnianiu popadlibyśmy w regres w nieskończoność. Takie stanowisko zostało nazwane fundamentalizmem i spotkało się z szeroką krytyką. W latach siedemdziesiątych w teorii poznania powstał nowy kierunek – eksternalizm. Jego twórcy odeszli od tradycyjnego rozumienia wiedzy i odrzucili podstawowe założenia przyjmowane przez fundamentalistów jak i niektórych z ich krytyków. Ciekawą krytykę fundamentalizmu zaprezentował John Langshaw Austin, który dominował na (...)
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  12. added 2019-02-24
    Healthy Scepticism.James Franklin - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (257):305 - 324.
    The classical arguments for scepticism about the external world are defended, especially the symmetry argument: that there is no reason to prefer the realist hypothesis to, say, the deceitful demon hypothesis. This argument is defended against the various standard objections, such as that the demon hypothesis is only a bare possibility, does not lead to pragmatic success, lacks coherence or simplicity, is ad hoc or parasitic, makes impossible demands for certainty, or contravenes some basic standards for a conceptual or linguistic (...)
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  13. added 2018-06-20
    Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism.Guy Axtell - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the responses that proponents of virtue epistemology (VE) make to radical skepticism and particularly to two related forms of it, Pyrrhonian skepticism and the “underdetermination-based” argument, both of which have been receiving widening attention in recent debate. Section 1 of the chapter briefly articulates these two skeptical arguments and their interrelationship, while section 2 explains the close connection between a virtue-theoretic and a neo-Moorean response to them. In sections 3 and 4 I advance arguments for improving (...)
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  14. added 2018-03-02
    Comment on John Greco’s Putting Skeptics in Their Place.Reza Lahroodi & Frederick F. Schmitt - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):457-465.
    In this comment, we will focus on Greco’s brief for agent reliabilism in preference to simple reliabilism. Agent reliabilism differs from simple reliabilism primarily in requiring, not merely belief that results from a reliable process, but belief grounded in stable dispositions that make up the subject’s character.
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  15. added 2017-08-29
    Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):77-87.
    According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical hypotheses are false. On this view, commonsense beliefs about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats. This explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're trying to explain by appeal to our beliefs about (...)
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  16. added 2017-02-07
    Virtues, Emotions and Fallibilism.Alessandra Tanesini - 2008 - In G. Brun, U. Dogluoglu & D. Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and the Emotions. Aldershot, UK: pp. 67-82.
  17. added 2017-02-06
    Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.
    We often hear such casual accusations: you just believe that because you are a liberal, a Christian, an American, a woman… When such charges are made they are meant to sting—not just emotionally, but epistemically. But should they? It can be disturbing to learn that one's beliefs reflect the influence of such irrelevant factors. The pervasiveness of such influence has led some to worry that we are not justified in many of our beliefs. That same pervasiveness has led others to (...)
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  18. added 2017-02-06
    Fallibilism, Ambivalence, and Belief.Jonathan Roorda - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):126.
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  19. added 2017-02-06
    Fallibilism, Ambivalence, and Belief.Jonathan Roorda - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):126-155.
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  20. added 2017-02-04
    Fallibilism and the Aim of Inquiry.Christopher Hookway - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):1 - 22.
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  21. added 2017-01-22
    Fallibilism is Not a Thesis.Mark O. Webb - 1996 - Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):45-51.
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  22. added 2017-01-19
    Fallibilism and Necessity.Susan Haack - 1979 - Synthese 41 (1):37 - 63.
    Part of an early version of this paper was read at the University of Warwick in October 1977, and a later version was read at the Newcastle Royal Institute of Philosophy in November 1977 and at Aberystwyth and Oxford in early 1978. Thanks are due to the many colleagues and friends who made helpful comments on early drafts; special thanks to Hugh Mellor, Rita Nolan and Paul Weiss for detailed written criticisms, and to Don Locke, for very helpful discussions.
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  23. added 2017-01-06
    What's the Point of a Dreaming Argument?Scott Stapleford - 2019 - Think 18 (52):31-34.
    In this paper, I argue that dreaming arguments are no cause for alarm.
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  24. added 2016-12-08
    Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism.E. J. Coffman - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):257-272.
    In this paper, I consider some issues involving a certain closure principle for Structural Justification, a relation between a cognitive subject and a proposition that's expressed by locutions like 'S has a source of justification for p' and 'p is justifiable for S'. I begin by summarizing recent work by Peter Klein that advances the thesis that the indicated closure principle is plausible but lacks Skeptical utility. I then assess objections to Klein's thesis based on work by Robert Audi and (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    Kann Es Ein Argument Für Den Skeptizismus Geben? Das Epistemische Problem Der Irrtumsmöglichkeit.Sten Olaf Welding - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):107-118.
    Is there any argument for scepticism? The epistemic problem of the possibility of error. Arguments for scepticism rest on the assumption that knowledge claims are fallible. For this reason the concept of knowledge appears to be questionable. Since it is necessary to distinguish doubts from possible doubts, the arguments for scepticism appear to be unconvincing. If we take it into account that we know something that is immune to doubt, we should draw the conclusion that, contrary to scepticism, knowledge claims (...)
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  26. added 2016-06-03
    Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming.Stephen Hetherington - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):83 - 102.
    Of course, if infallibilism about such knowledge is true, then it is true that one can never know that one is not dreaming. But, of course, if infallibilism is true, then there is also no special difficulty posed for one’s having knowledge in general by one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming: one would know either nothing or next to nothing anyway, regardless of one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming. Yet epistemologists have generally (...)
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  27. added 2016-03-21
    Some Thoughts on Thinking: Philosophy at Five Miles Per Hour.Jonathan Finch - 2002 - University Press of America.
    Some Thoughts on Thinking is a work dealing with the issues one faces when one attempts to construct non-arbitrary beliefs about ourselves and our surroundings. The text opens up with a discussion of the similarities and differences between science, theology, philosophy and tradition. This initial discussion provides the foundation for a deeper push into what is, and what is not, a recommendable and non-arbitrary belief. No previous exposure to philosophy is assumed and the language of the work is free of (...)
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  28. added 2016-01-04
    A Crisis of Belief, Ethics, and Faith.Jonathan Finch - 2015 - Upa.
    This book presents a self-corrective and contemporary system of philosophy and attempts to explain how we might go about forming our thoughts and beliefs about ourselves, our world and how we should properly conduct ourselves in a justifiable and non-arbitrary fashion.
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  29. added 2015-08-26
    Fallibilism and Faith.Richard Shusterman - 2007 - Common Knowledge 13 (2):379-384.
  30. added 2015-08-26
    CHAPTER 1. Skepticism Without Indubitability.Margaret Dauler Wilson - 1999 - In Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy. Princeton University Press. pp. 1-9.
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  31. added 2015-08-25
    Against Overconfidence in Radical A Priori Fallibilism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
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  32. added 2015-08-25
    Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.
    Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists – there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject’s being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully (...)
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  33. added 2015-08-25
    Modest Skepticism and Question Begging Proper.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):9-32.
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  34. added 2015-08-25
    Scepticism, Externalism and Predictive Dimension of Knowledge Claims.Živan Lazović - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (2):215-237.
    Ordinary knowledge claims are challenged by philosophical scepticism which holds that we are unable to exclude the possibilities of error involved in well-known sceptical alternatives . In order to explain how we can resist this challenge, first I compare philosophical and ordinary doubt. I point out that they do not differ in terms of the way they aim to undermine knowledge claims, but rather in the character of the alternatives to which they appeal. Thus, in ordinary contexts, philosophical sceptical alternatives (...)
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  35. added 2015-08-25
    Knowledge, Agency, and Personhood.Baron Reed - 2002 - Dissertation, Brown University
    Fallibilism is the philosophical view that reconciles our ability to have knowledge with our constant vulnerability to error: we know even though our basis for knowledge might have failed to be adequate. In the central chapter, I trace a parallel between fallibilism and compatibilism. Recent work in the philosophy of free agency has drawn attention to a connection between freedom and personhood . I suggest that a similar connection is crucial in epistemology: only persons can know, and knowledge must be (...)
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  36. added 2015-08-25
    Possibilities and Fallibilism.GeorgeN Schlesinger - 1984 - Erkenntnis 21 (3):263 - 278.
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  37. added 2015-08-25
    The Doctrine of Fallibilism.Leo Simons - 1951 - Dissertation, Columbia University
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  38. added 2015-07-27
    To Save Fallibilism.J. N. Hattiangadi - 1983 - Mind 92 (367):407-409.
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  39. added 2015-04-23
    Fallibilism.Trent Dougherty - 2011 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
    Fallibilism in epistemology is neither identical to nor unrelated to the ordinary notion of fallibility. In ordinary life we are forced to the conclusion that human beings are prone to error. The epistemological doctrine of fallibilism, though, is about the consistency of holding that humans have knowledge while admitting certain limitations in human ways of knowing. As will be seen, making the content of the basic intuition more precise is both somewhat contentious and the key to an adequate definition of (...)
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  40. added 2014-04-25
    Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
    A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not as (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-31
    Two-Context Probabilism and the Dissolution of the 'Lottery' Problem.Gregor Flock - manuscript
    In this paper it will be attempted to dissolve the lottery problem based on fallibilism, probabilism and the introduction of a so far widely neglected second context of knowledge. First, it will be argued that the lottery problem is actually an exemplification of the much wider Humean "future knowledge problem" (ch. 1). Two types of inferences and arguments will be examined, compared and evaluated in respect to their ability to fittingly describe the thought processes behind lottery/future knowledge propositions (ch. 2). (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-29
    Fallibilism and Rational Belief.Ruth Weintraub - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):251-261.
    Fallibilism is an attractive epistemological position, avoiding the Scylla of rationalism, and the Charybdis of scepticism. Acknowledging, on the one hand, human imperfection, yet claiming that science and rational inquiry are possible. Fallibilism is a thesis, but equally importantly – an epistemological recommendation. that we should never be absolutely sure of anything. My aim in this paper is to drive a wedge between the thesis and the recommendation. The (eminently plausible) doctrine, I shall argue, cannot be used to ground the (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-19
    Epistemic Gradualism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice: Responce to Hetherington.Adam Leite - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (3):311-324.
    This paper responds to Stephen Hetherington's discussion of my ‘Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?’ (2004). The Infallibilist skeptic holds that in order to know something, one must be able to rule out every possible alternative to the truth of one’s belief. This requirement is false. In this paper I first clarify this requirement’s relation to our ordinary practice. I then turn to a more fundamental issue. The Infallibilist holds – along with many non-skeptical epistemologists – that Infallibility is epistemically superior (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-19
    Scepticism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (3):303-310.
    It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what (...)
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  45. added 2014-03-13
    Knowledge and Certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.
    This paper is a companion piece to my earlier paper “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”. There are two intuitive charges against fallibilism. One is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. The second is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, even though (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-06
    Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed’s Long Road to Skepticism.Brian Ribeiro - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):789-793.
    Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: (1) contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, (2) these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, (3) knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributabilism that is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful that many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any direct (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-04
    Concessive Knowledge Attributions and Fallibilism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):603-619.
    Lewis thought concessive knowledge attributions (e.g., ‘I know that Harry is a zebra, but it might be that he’s just a cleverly disguised mule’) caused serious trouble for fallibilists. As he saw it, CKAs are overt statements of the fallibilist view and they are contradictory. Dougherty and Rysiew have argued that CKAs are pragmatically defective rather than semantically defective. Stanley thinks that their pragmatic response to Lewis fails, but the fallibilist cause is not lost because Lewis was wrong about the (...)
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  48. added 2013-07-03
    From E = K to Scepticism?Clayton Littlejohn - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):679-684.
    In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about die external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd's argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong.
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  49. added 2012-12-28
    Scepticism and the Search for Knowledge: A Peirceish Answer to a Kantian Doubt.Luciano Floridi - 1994 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 30 (3):543 - 573.
  50. added 2012-12-20
    Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?By Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232–251.
    A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...)
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