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  1. Practice-Oriented Controversies and Borrowed Epistemic Credibility in Current Evolutionary Biology: Phylogeography as a Case Study.Alfonso Arroyo-Santos, Mark E. Olson & Francisco Vergara-Silva - 2015 - Perspectives on Science 25 (3):310-334.
    Philosophical treatments of scientific controversies usually focus on theory, excluding important practice related aspects. However, scientists in conflict often appeal to extra-theoretical and extra-empirical elements. To understand better the role that non-empirical elements play in scientific controversies, we introduce the notion of borrowed epistemic credibility, illustrating our proposal with a recent controversy in a field of evolutionary biology known as phylogeography. Our analysis shows how scientific controversies that spring from disagreements about methodological issues potentially involve deeper debates regarding what constitutes (...)
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  2. THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY AS AN EVALUATION CRITERION OF THEORIES. A CASE EXAMPLE: THE DYNAMIC UNIVERSE VS. PHYSICS AND COSMOLOGY BASED ON GENERAL RELATIVITY.Styrman Avril - 2014 - In Tuomo Suntola & Avril Styrman (eds.), SCIENTIFIC MODELS AND A COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE OF REALITY. La Nuova Critica. Volume 63-64. Publication year is officially set on 2014, but the issue was released on 2016. The general editor of the journal is Arturo Carsetti. Rome: La Nuova Critica. pp. 63-89.
    The principle of economy favours the theory which gives the most accurate predictions; of two equally accurate theories, economy favours the one which incorporates least metaphysics. The intention is to show that were metaphysical commitments of theories openly acknowledged and simplicity and other virtues generally accepted as judges in theory choice, the progress rate of science would likely become more optimal.
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  3. Falsifiability and Probability.Patricia Baillie - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):61.
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  4. Falsifiability and Probability.Patricia Baillie - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):99 – 100.
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  5. Falsification and Future Performance.David Balduzzi - manuscript
    We information-theoretically reformulate two measures of capacity from statistical learning theory: empirical VC-entropy and empirical Rademacher complexity. We show these capacity measures count the number of hypotheses about a dataset that a learning algorithm falsifies when it finds the classifier in its repertoire minimizing empirical risk. It then follows from that the future performance of predictors on unseen data is controlled in part by how many hypotheses the learner falsifies. As a corollary we show that empirical VC-entropy quantifies the message (...)
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  6. Falsifiable Implies Learnable.David Balduzzi - manuscript
    The paper demonstrates that falsifiability is fundamental to learning. We prove the following theorem for statistical learning and sequential prediction: If a theory is falsifiable then it is learnable -- i.e. admits a strategy that predicts optimally. An analogous result is shown for universal induction.
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  7. Information, Learning and Falsification.David Balduzzi - manuscript
    There are (at least) three approaches to quantifying information. The first, algorithmic information or Kolmogorov complexity, takes events as strings and, given a universal Turing machine, quantifies the information content of a string as the length of the shortest program producing it [1]. The second, Shannon information, takes events as belonging to ensembles and quantifies the information resulting from observing the given event in terms of the number of alternate events that have been ruled out [2]. The third, statistical learning (...)
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  8. What is the Problem of Ad Hoc Hypotheses?Greg Bamford - 1999 - Science and Education 8 (4):375 - 86..
    The received view of an ad hochypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-ad hocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These points (...)
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  9. Falsification and Falsifiability in Historical Linguistics.Pedro Beade - 1989 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (2):173-181.
  10. Popper e o problema da predição prática.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Analytica 15 (02):123-146.
    The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one (...)
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  11. Falsifiability.Richard Cole - 1968 - Mind 77 (305):133-135.
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  12. Empirical Falsifiability And The Frequence Of Darsana Relevance In The Sixth Century Buddhist Logic Of Sankarasvamin.Douglas D. Daye - 1979 - Logique Et Analyse 22 (March-June):223-237.
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  13. The Alleged Unity of Popper's Philosophy of Science: Falsifiability as Fake Cement.A. A. Derksen - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (3):313 - 336.
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  14. The Falsifiability of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis.Herbert Dingle - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (39):228-229.
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  15. Poppers zwei Definitionsvarianten von 'falsifizierbar'. Eine logische Notiz zu einer klassischen Stelle aus der 'Logik der Forschung'.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1984 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 18:42–49.
    In paragraph 21 of his "Logic of Scientific Discovery", Karl Popper characterizes with the help of two seemingly synonymous definitions the falsifiability of a theory as a logical relation between the theory itself and its basic statements. It is shown that his definitions do not agree with each other, and this result is applied to the problem of the falsifiability of contradictions, to the difference between falsifiable and empirical statements and to the demarcation criterion.
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  16. Falsifiability and Corroboration.Milton Fisk - 1959 - Philosophical Studies 9:49-65.
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  17. A Regimented and Concise Exposition of Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalist Epistemology.Danny Frederick - manuscript
  18. Haack's Defective Discussion of Popper and the Courts.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    Susan Haack criticises the US courts' use of Karl Popper's epistemology in discriminating acceptable scientific testimony. She claims that acceptable testimony should be reliable and that Popper's epistemology is useless in discriminating reliability. She says that Popper's views have been found acceptable only because they have been misunderstood and she indicates an alternative epistemology which she says can discriminate reliable theories. However, her account of Popper's views is a gross and gratuitous misrepresentation. Her alternative epistemology cannot do what she claims (...)
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  19. Space, Time and Falsifiability Critical Exposition and Reply to "A Panel Discussion of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Science".Adolf Grunbaum - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (4):469 - 588.
    Prompted by the "Panel Discussion of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Science" (Philosophy of Science 36, December, 1969) and other recent literature, this essay ranges over major issues in the philosophy of space, time and space-time as well as over problems in the logic of ascertaining the falsity of a scientific hypothesis. The author's philosophy of geometry has recently been challenged along three main distinct lines as follows: (i) The Panel article by G. J. Massey calls for a more precise and more (...)
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  20. The Falsifiability of Theories: Total or Partial? A Contemporary Evaluation of the Duhem-Quine Thesis.Adolf Grünbaum - 1962 - Synthese 14 (1):17 - 34.
  21. Professor Dingle on Falsifiability: A Second Rejoinder.Adolf Grūnbaum - 1961 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (46):153-156.
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  22. The Falsifiability of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis: A Rejoinder to Professor Dingle.Adolf Grünbaum - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42):143-145.
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  23. Discussions: Thb Falsifiability Op the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis.Adolf Grünbaum - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):48-50.
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  24. The Falsifiability of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis.Adolf Grünbaum - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):48-50.
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  25. Empirical Statements and Falsifiability.Carl G. Hempel - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (127):342 - 348.
    1. Object of this note . In his lively essay, “Between Analytic and Empirical,” , Mr. J. W. N. Watkins challenges the empiricist identification of synthetic statements with empirical ones by arguing that there exists an important class of statements which are synthetic, i.e. not analytically true or false, and yet not empirical. I find Mr. Watkins's arguments very stimulating, but I do not think they provide a sound basis for his contention. In the present note, I wish to indicate (...)
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  26. Ceteris Paribus Clauses, Closure Clauses and Falsifiability.Ingvar Johansson - 1980 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 11 (1):16-22.
    Summary The article argues thatceteris paribus clauses have to be separated from another type of clauses called closure clauses. The former are associated with laws and theories, the latter with test situations of a particular kind. It is also argued that closure clauses, but notceteris paribus clauses, make Popper's falsifiability principle untenable. In that way, it also resolves the quarrel between Popper and Lakatos aboutceteris paribus clauses and falsifiability by saying that both are partly wrong and partly right.
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  27. Falsifiability and Traction in Theories of Divine Action.Kile Jones - 2010 - Zygon 45 (3):575-589.
    One of the most focused research programs in the science-religion dialogue that has taken place up to the present is the series of volumes published jointly by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences. Originating with the encouragement of Pope John Paul II, this series has produced seven volumes focusing on how divine action can be understood in light of contemporary science. A retrospective volume published in 2008, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: Twenty Years of (...)
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  28. Openness to the Unknown: The Role of Falsifiability in Search of Better Knowledge.Yasuyuki Kageyama - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):100-121.
    From the time of its birth, Popper’s theory of falsifiability has been fiercely criticized from various viewpoints. In the author’s view, however, those various criticisms all have the same root in their assumption that a falsification must be certain and conclusive. As the theory of falsifiability has never had such an assumption, it is the source of misunderstanding. By discarding it, we can reply to every criticism and thereby clarify the role of falsifiability in our search for better knowledge; that (...)
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  29. The Curious Case of the Self-Refuting Straw Man: Trafimow and Earp’s Response to Klein (2014).Stan Klein - 2016 - Theory and Psychology 26:549– 556.
    In their critique of Klein (2014a), Trafimow and Earp present two theses. First, they argue that, contra Klein, a well-specified theory is not a necessary condition for successful replication. Second, they contend that even when there is a well-specified theory, replication depends more on auxiliary assumptions than on theory proper. I take issue with both claims, arguing that (a) their first thesis confuses a material conditional (what I said) with a modal claim (T&E’s misreading of what I said), and (b) (...)
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  30. Domains of Applicability of Social-Scientific Theories: Problems in the Empirical Falsifiability of Bounded Generalizations.Peter Knapp - 1984 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (1):25–41.
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  31. Falsifiability and the Cosmological Argument.Carl R. Kordig - 1972 - New Scholasticism 46 (4):485-487.
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  32. Popper's Falsifiability and Darwin's Natural Selection.K. K. Lee - 1969 - Philosophy 44 (170):291 - 302.
    Popper Proposed the criterion of falsifiability as a solution to the problem of demarcation i.e. of distinguishing science from pseudo-science and not, as many of his contemporaries in the Vienna Circle mistook it to be, a solution to the quite different problem with which they themselves were preoccupied, viz. of providing a criterion of meaning to distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless. While the positivists were concerned to damn metaphysics and exalt science, by identifying the empirically verifiable with the meaningful, (...)
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  33. Falsifiability, Rationality, and the Growth of Knowledge.Robert Lee, Wai-Chung & 李慧忠 - unknown
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  34. Professor Scheffler on Falsifiability and Meaning.Arnold B. Levison - 1965 - Philosophical Studies 16 (5):76 - 79.
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  35. Countervailing Tendencies and Falsifiability in Capital.Daniel Little - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (2):283-291.
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  36. Criteria of Empirical Significance: A Success Story.Sebastian Lutz - manuscript
    The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are trivial, (...)
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  37. Carnap on Empirical Significance.Sebastian Lutz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):217-252.
    Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow for definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by chains of reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to (...)
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  38. Withdrawing Unfalsifiable Hypotheses.Lorenzo Magnani - 1999 - Foundations of Science 4 (2):133-153.
    There has been little research into the weak kindsof negating hypotheses. Hypotheses may be unfalsifiable. In this case it is impossible tofind a contradiction in some area of the conceptualsystems in which they are incorporated.Notwithstanding this fact, it is sometimes necessaryto construct ways of rejecting the unfalsifiablehypothesis at hand by resorting to some external forms of negation, external because wewant to avoid any arbitrary and subjectiveelimination, which would be rationally orepistemologically unjustified. I will consider akind of ``weak'''' (unfalsifiable) hypotheses that (...)
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  39. The Falsifiability of Curve-Hypotheses.Michael Martin - 1965 - Philosophical Studies 16 (4):56 - 60.
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  40. Falsification of Theories Without Verification of Basic Statements – an Argument for the Possibility of Knowledge Growth.Rainer Willi Maurer - unknown
    Karl Popper rightly contests the possibility of a verification of basic statements. At the same time he strictly believes in the possibility of growth of empirical knowledge. Knowledge growth, however, is only possible if empirical theories can be falsified. This raises the question, how theories can be falsified, if a verification of those statements that falsify theories – i.e. basic statements – is not possible. This problem is often referred to as the “basic problem” or “problem of the empirical basis”. (...)
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  41. Science Without Inductivism.Ningombam Bupenda Meitei - 2013 - viXra.Org:6.
    The paper aims to expound on the issue of science being different from non science or prescience in the form of the scientific methodology used. Popper’s method of falsifiability ensures the aim of science to be successful. The aim of science which also needs a critical attitude, can enable scientific progress by rejecting inductivism as its scientific methodology. Popper’s view on what the aim of science is and why and how inductivism fails in the case of science, along with examples (...)
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  42. Falsification and Grünbaum's Duhemian Theses.Arthur B. Millman - 1990 - Synthese 82 (1):23 - 52.
    This paper is a detailed critical study of Adolf Grünbaum's work on the Duhemian thesis. I show that (a) Grünbaum's geometrical counterexample to the (D1) subthesis is unsuccessful, even with minimal claims made for what the counterexample is supposed to show, and (b) the (D2) subthesis is not a reasonable one (and cannot correctly be attributed to Duhem). The paper concludes with an argument about the relation between the Duhemian thesis, concerning component hypotheses of a scientific theory, and the view (...)
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  43. Refutability Revamped: How Quantum Mechanics Saves the Phenomena.Frederik A. Muller - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):189 - 211.
    On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term (...)
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  44. Falsifiability and Probability: A Comment.A. E. Musgrave - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):58 – 60.
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  45. To Be Scientific Is To Be Interactive.Seungbae Park - 2016 - European Journal of Science and Theology 12 (1):77-86.
    Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argue that to be scientific is largely to be interactive, offering some examples from science to show that the ideas from different fields of science interact with one another. The results of the interactions are that hypotheses become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we understand phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview (...)
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  46. Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem's Thesis Revisited.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
    This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.
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  47. Falsifiability and the Semantic Eliminability of Theoretical Languages.Robert A. Rynasiewicz - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (3):225-241.
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  48. Lesser Degrees of Explanation: Some Implications of F.A. Hayek’s Methodology of Sciences of Complex Phenomena.Scott Scheall - manuscript
    From the early-1950s on, F.A. Hayek was concerned with the development of a methodology of sciences that study systems of complex phenomena. Hayek argued that the knowledge that can be acquired about such systems is, in virtue of their complexity (and the comparatively narrow boundaries of human cognitive faculties), relatively limited. The paper aims to elucidate the implications of Hayek’s methodology with respect to the specific dimensions along which the scientist’s knowledge of some complex phenomena may be limited. Hayek’s fallibilism (...)
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  49. Why Popper's Basic Statements Are Not Falsifiable. Some Paradoxes in Popper's “Logic of Scientific Discovery”.Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn - 1988 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (1):124-143.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Basic statements play a central role in Popper's "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", since they permit a distinction between empirical and non-empirical theories. A theory is empirical iff it consists of falsifiable statements, and statements (of any kind) are falsifiable iff they are inconsistent with at least one basic statement. Popper obviously presupposes that basic statements are themselves empirical and hence falsifiable; at any rate, he claims several times that they are falsifiable. In this paper we prove that (...)
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  50. Theism and Other Minds: On the Falsifiability of Non-Theories.James F. Sennett - 1995 - Topoi 14 (2):149-160.
    In this paper I consider three necessary conditions for a proposition counting as a theory: that the proposition be posited for its explanatory power; that it derive its feasibility from the extent to which it provides such explanatory power; and that it be empirically falsifiable. I then argue that some propositions might fail as theories because they do not satisfy the first two conditions, yet still satisfy the third condition. Such propositions I label falsifiable non-theories. I offer folk psychology (the (...)
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