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Summary According to fatalists, our actions are not merely determined but fated. If our actions are determined, then it is in some sense already settled how we will decide to act; if our actions are fated, then what we will do is already settled regardless of how we will decide. Most philosophers think that fatalism is a confusion and of no relevance to the free will debate, but there is a substantive problem concerning logical fatalism. A sentence concerning some future event seems to have a truth value prior to the event's occurrence, but if the sentence is to have a truth-value prior to the event's occurrence it seems that the event must be fated to occur.
Key works The problem of logical fatalism has its canonical statement in Aristotle unknown. Some solutions to the problem of foreknowledge and free will also serve as solutions to the problem of logical fatalism: for instance Ockham's distinction between hard and soft facts, where only the former concern the past alone: Ockham 1983. A much more recent argument for fatalism is Taylor 1962.
Introductions Rice 2008
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  1. Contemporary Concepts of Time and the Idea of God. [REVIEW]E. M. A. - 1935 - Journal of Philosophy 32 (12):335-335.
  2. Turning Anomie on its Head: Fatalism as Durkheim's Concealed and Multidimensional Alienation Theory.Gabriel A. Acevedo - 2005 - Sociological Theory 23 (1):75-85.
    Durkheim's underdeveloped notion of fatalism is the keystone for a bridge between two conceptual categories central to Marxian and Durkheimian theory: alienation and anomie. Durkheim does not necessarily disagree with Marx that excessive regulation can be socially damaging but chooses to highlight the effects of under- regulation. A Durkheimian critique of overregulation becomes possible if we turn away from anomie and toward Durkheim's idea of fatalism-a concept that I will argue here is unexpectedly consistent with Marx's notion of alienation. We (...)
  3. The Arabic Sea Battle: Al-Fārābī on the Problem of Future Contingents.Peter Adamson - 2006 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (2):163-188.
    Ancient commentators like Ammonius and Boethius tried to solve Aristotle's “sea battle argument” in On Interpretation 9 by saying that statements about future contingents are “indefinitely” true or false. They were followed by al-Fārābī in his commentary on On Interpretation. The article sets out two possible interpretations of what “indefinitely” means here, and shows that al-Fārābī actually has both conceptions: one applied in his interpretation of Aristotle, and another that he is forced into by the problem of divine foreknowledge. It (...)
  4. Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan.James Andow & Florian Cova - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):550-566.
    In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance and are in fact willing to attribute free will to people no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper, we first argue that (...)
  5. Fatalism and Future Contingents.Giacomo Andreoletti - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar (...)
  6. Fatalism and Professor Taylor.Bruce Aune - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (4):512-519.
  7. Destiny: A Reality or Mirage?P. K. Awua - 2009 - Faustag Ventures.
    PART I. -- 1. The Asian, European and the American views on destiny -- 2. Biblical fulfilment of destiny -- 3. Destiny in the Ghanaian context -- 4. Mystical effects of names on destiny -- PART II. -- 5. My childhood days and primary education -- 6. My secondary education -- 7. University education -- 8. Employment after graduation, mariage life and children -- 9. Post-graduate studies at the University of Strathclyde, Glascgow, Scotland and working experience -- 10. Resignation from (...)
  8. Freedom, Fatalism, and the Other in Being and Nothingness and The Imaginary.Bruce Baugh - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):63-69.
  9. Modal Fatalism.Andrew Beedle - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):488-495.
  10. Fatalism.M. Benstein - 1992 - University of Nebraska Press.
  11. Fatalism.Boran Berčić - 2000 - Theoria 43 (3-4):25-63.
  12. The Fate of Man in the Modern World By Dorothy M. Emmet. [REVIEW]Nicholas Berdyaev - 1936 - Ethics 47:121.
  13. Fatalism.M. Bernstein - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  14. Fatalism Revisited.Mark Bernstein - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (3):270-281.
  15. Fatalism and Time.Mark Bernstein - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (3):461-.
  16. Fatalism, Tense, and Changing the Past.Mark Bernstein - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (2):175 - 186.
  17. Logical Fatalism and the Excluded Middle.Martin A. Bertman - 1976 - New Scholasticism 50 (4):481-489.
  18. Anomie and Fatalism in Durkheim's Theory of Regulation.Philippe Besnard - 1993 - In Stephen P. Turner (ed.), Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Moralist. Routledge. pp. 169--90.
  19. Fatalism — its Roots and Effects.Sukumari Bhattacharji - 1982 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (2):135-154.
  20. Jordan Howard Sobel, Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience. [REVIEW]Thomas Bittner - 2000 - Philosophy in Review 20:222-224.
  21. A Note on Theological Fatalism1.Alex Blum - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2):143-147.
    We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope-fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the (...)
  22. Fatalism: Arguments and Attitudes.Daniel Nathan Boone - 1971 - Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
  23. The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line.Andrea Borghini & Giuliano Torrengo - 2013 - In F. Correia & A. Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree. Semantical and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 105-125.
    There seems to be a minimal core that every theory wishing to accommodate the intuition that the future is open must contain: a denial of physical determinism (i.e. the thesis that what future states the universe will be in is implied by what states it has been in), and a denial of strong fatalism (i.e. the thesis that, at every time, what will subsequently be the case is metaphysically necessary).1 Those two requirements are often associated with the idea of an (...)
  24. Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy.Sophie Botros - 1985 - Phronesis 30 (3):274-304.
  25. On Endymion’s Fate.Noel Boulting - 1996 - Social Philosophy Today 12:367-387.
  26. Fatalism and the Future.Craig Bourne - 2011 - In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 41-67.
  27. Causality, Fatalism, and Morality.R. D. Bradley - 1963 - Mind 72 (288):591-594.
  28. Must the Future Be What It is Going to Be.R. D. Bradley - 1959 - Mind 68 (270):193-208.
  29. Fatalism.Raymond D. Bradley - unknown
    The belief in fatalism, like many others, has its roots in the quasi-religious mythologies of ancient peoples many of whom personified the notion of fate. Thus Greek mythology supposed that three Fates, daughters of the goddess of Necessity, had control of our lives from beginning to end and that it was therefore impossible for us to do anything contrary to what they had prescribed for us. We may think we are in control of our own destinies. But we are mistaken. (...)
  30. Fallacies in Taylor's "Fatalism".Charles D. Brown - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (13):349-353.
  31. On the 'Standard' Argument for Fatalism.David Buller - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (2):111-125.
    What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, the (...)
  32. Freedom and the Self: Essays on the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace.Steven M. Cahn & Maureen Eckert (eds.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    The book_ Fate, Time, and Language: An Essay on Free Will_, published in 2010 by Columbia University Press, presented David Foster Wallace's challenge to Richard Taylor's argument for fatalism. In this anthology, notable philosophers engage directly with that work and assess Wallace's reply to Taylor as well as other aspects of Wallace's thought. With an introduction by Steven M. Cahn and Maureen Eckert, this collection includes essays by William Hasker, Gila Sher, Marcello Oreste Fiocco, Daniel R. Kelly, Nathan Ballantyne, Justin (...)
  33. Fate, Time and Language: An Essay on Free Will.Steven M. Cahn & Maureen Eckert (eds.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    In 1962, the philosopher Richard Taylor used six commonly accepted presuppositions to imply that human beings have no control over the future. David Foster Wallace not only took issue with Taylor's method, which, according to him, scrambled the relations of logic, language, and the physical world, but also noted a semantic trick at the heart of Taylor's argument. _Fate, Time, and Language_ presents Wallace's brilliant critique of Taylor's work. Written long before the publication of his fiction and essays, Wallace's thesis (...)
  34. Fatalism: A Philosophical Study.Steven Mark Cahn - 1966 - Dissertation, Columbia University
  35. Incompatibilism and Fatalism: Reply to Loss.Joseph K. Campbell - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):71-76.
  36. Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience Jordan Howard Sobel Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998, Xiii + 212 Pp., $55.00. [REVIEW]Richmond Campbell - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (3):634-.
  37. Some Comments on Fatalism.James Cargile - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):1-11.
    This paper discusses fatalism, defined as the view that it is never both in one's power to do X and in one's power to not do X. It is argued that this view is made out as more plausible than it really is, because of unclarity as to its meaning. Some philosophers, such as Michael Dummett or David Lewis, who criticise fatalism, actually advocate views closely in line with fatalism as defined here.
  38. The Fate of Empires.A. M. Carr-Saunders - 1913 - The Eugenics Review 5 (1):71.
  39. Context, Conditionals, Fatalism, Freedom & Time Travel.John Carroll - manuscript
  40. Context, Conditionals, Fatalism, Time Travel, and Freedom.John Carroll - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press. pp. 79.
    This chapter illustrates a theory that describes how certain modal statements, including counterfactual sentences, are dependent on context. Building on the work of Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis, its application to a familiar argument for fatalism and a recent exchange about time-traveler freedom between Kadri Vihvelin and Ted Sider is considered. This chapter presents a new perspective on the flaws and the seductiveness of both the fatalist argument and the freedom paradox. This new perspective may be applied to arguments for (...)
  41. Ancient Self-Refutation: The Logic and History of the Self-Refutation Argument From Democritus to Augustine.Luca Castagnoli - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    A 'self-refutation argument' is any argument which aims at showing that a certain thesis is self-refuting. This study was the first book-length treatment of ancient self-refutation and provides a unified account of what is distinctive in the ancient approach to the self-refutation argument, on the basis of close philological, logical and historical analysis of a variety of sources. It examines the logic, force and prospects of this original style of argumentation within the context of ancient philosophical debates, dispelling various misconceptions (...)
  42. La Science Contre le Destin Quand la Science Retrouve les Racines Naturelles de la Liberté.Jacques-Jean Caubet - 1994
  43. Planning Versus Fatalism.Audrey Chamberlain - 1976 - Journal of Biosocial Science 8 (1):1.
  44. On Fate = de Fato.Marcus Tullius Cicero, R. W. Boethius & Sharples - 1991
  45. Metaphysical Fatalism, in Five Steps.Nicola Ciprotti - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):35-54.
    The paper presents an argument for the conclusion that a certain conception of truth, according to which truth is timeless, truth-values are just two and the primary truth-bearers are propositions, leads to a kind of inevitabilism here labelled Metaphysical Fatalism. After the presentation of the argument for Metaphysical Fatalism, three objections to it are discussed and rebutted.
  46. Alethic Determinism. Or: How to Make Free Will Inconsistent with Timeless Truth.Nicola Ciprotti & Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - Logique and Analyse 56 (221):85-99.
    The paper purports to show that truth-atemporalism, the thesis that truth is timeless, is incompatible with power to do otherwise. Since a parallel and simpler argument can be run to the effect that truth-omnitemporalism, the thesis that truth is sempiternal, is incompatible with power to do otherwise, our conclusion achieves greater generality, and the possible shift from the claim that truth is omnitemporal to the claim that it is atemporal becomes useless for the purpose to resist it. On the other (...)
  47. Discourse About the Future.Michael Clark - 1970 - In G. Vesey (ed.), Knowledge and Necessity. Macmillan. pp. 169-190.
  48. Fate.Moncure Daniel Conway - 1930 - Antioch Press.
  49. Purtill on Fatalism and Truth.William Lane Craig - 1990 - Faith and Philosophy 7 (2):229-234.
  50. And How Can One Die Better? Courage, Faith, and Fatalism.Teo Forcht Dagi - 1983 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (4):431-435.
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