About this topic
Summary Feminist epistemology examines the political and ethical dimensions of knowing, particularly as these dimensions pertain to power relations along axes of oppression such as sex, gender, race, class, (dis)ability, and sexuality.  
Key works

Feminist epistemologists examine social, political, and ethical aspects of knowing using a wide range of approaches.  Moreover, many of the key works in feminist epistemology draw on and contribute to more than one approach to epistemology making any straightforward cataloging of key works deceptive. Provided one keep in mind that any given author's work may fit perfectly well in more than one category, the following should give the reader a sense of the range of key contributions in feminist epistemology: feminist empiricism (e.g. Longino 1990 and Nelson 1990), feminist naturalized epistemology (Rooney 1998 and Code 2006), feminist standpoint theory (Harding 2004 and Collins 1991/2008), decolonial and Woman of Color feminist theories (Lugones 2003 and Narayan 1988), feminist phenomenology (Alcoff 2000 and Alcoff 2006), and feminist postmodernism (Haraway 2010).  Early works considered such topics as the nature of objectivity (Harding 1995), epistemic communities (Nelson 1993), and the role of values in knowing (Longino 1987). Recent topics within the field include: trust and epistemic agency (Jones 2012 and Dotson 2011), epistemologies of ignorance (Sullivan & Tuana 2007 and Tuana & Sullivan 2006), and epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007 and Medina 2012).

Introductions Alcoff and Potter's edited volume Feminist Epistemologies is one of the earliest and now classic collections of work in feminist epistemology. It contains key essays within the field.  For book length introductions see: Harding 1991 and Tanesini 1999.  Encyclopedia introductions include: Janack 2004 and Anderson 2007
Related categories

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  1. Toward the New Objectivity.W. G. A. - 1974 - Theory and Society 1 (1).
  2. Feminist Philosophy and Information Systems.A. E. Adam & H. J. Richardson - unknown
    This paper offers a new approach to the philosophical foundations of information systems through feminist philosophy and, in particular, feminist epistemology. This can be used to expose the universalizing tendency of many information systems and to show the importance of using real-life complex examples rather than the simplified examples often favored by philosophers. Within traditional epistemology and its relation to IS, subjectivity, the propositional/skills distinction and epistemic hierarchies are subject to arguments from feminist epistemology. With respect to the emerging critical (...)
  3. Gender/Body/Machine.Alison Adam - 2002 - Ratio 15 (4):354–375.
    This article considers the question of embodiment in relation to gender and whether there are models of artificial intelligence (AI) which can enrol a concept of gender in their design. A central concern for feminist epistemology is the role of the body in the making of knowledge. I consider how this may inform a critique of the AI project and the related area of artificial life (A-Life), the latter area being of most interest in this paper. I explore briefly the (...)
  4. Deleting the Subject: A Feminist Reading of Epistemology in Artificial Intelligence.Alison Adam - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (2):231-253.
    This paper argues that AI follows classical versions of epistemology in assuming that the identity of the knowing subject is not important. In other words this serves to `delete the subject''. This disguises an implicit hierarchy of knowers involved in the representation of knowledge in AI which privileges the perspective of those who design and build the systems over alternative perspectives. The privileged position reflects Western, professional masculinity. Alternative perspectives, denied a voice, belong to less powerful groups including women. Feminist (...)
  5. Gendered Knowledge — Epistemology and Artificial Intelligence.Alison Adam - 1993 - AI and Society 7 (4):311-322.
    The paper proposes that gender can be used to explore alternative epistemologies represented within AI systems. Current research on feminist epistemology is reviewed then criticisms of the main philosophical position dominant in AI are outlined. These criticisms say little about epistemology and nothing about gender. It is suggested that the way forward might be found within the sociology of scientific knowledge as its approach is in accord with the postmodernist view of feminist epistemology in seeing knowledge as a cultural product. (...)
  6. The Real Dirt: Gossip and Feminist Epistemology.Karen C. Adkins - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (3):215 – 232.
  7. 11 Towards Objectivity.Jolyon Agar - 2004 - In Andrew Collier, Margaret Scotford Archer & William Outhwaite (eds.), Defending Objectivity: Essays in Honour of Andrew Collier. Routledge. pp. 161.
  8. Incorporating Feminist Standpoint Theory.Kristoffer Ahlstrom - 2005 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):79-92.
    As has been noted by Alvin Goldman, there are some very interesting similarities between his Veritistic Social Epistemology (VSE) and Sandra Harding's Feminist Standpoint Theory (FST). In the present paper, it is argued that these similarities are so significant as to motivate an incorporation of FST into VSE, considering that (i) a substantial common ground can be found; (ii) the claims that go beyond this common ground are logically compatible; and (iii) the generality of VSE not only does justice to (...)
  9. Incorporating Feminist Standpoint Theory.Kristoffer Ahlström - 2005 - SATS 6 (2).
    As has been noted by Alvin Goldman, there are some very interesting similarities between his Veritistic Social Epistemology (VSE) and Sandra Harding's Feminist Standpoint Theory (FST). In the present paper, it is argued that these similarities are so significant as to motivate an incorporation of FST into VSE, considering that (i) a substantial common ground can be found; (ii) the claims that go beyond this common ground are logically compatible; and (Hi) the generality of VSE not only does justice to (...)
  10. An Introduction to Feminist Epistemologies. [REVIEW]Alison Ainley - 1999 - Radical Philosophy 97.
  11. The Problem of Speaking for Others.Linda Martin Alcoff - manuscript
    This was published in Cultural Critique (Winter 1991-92), pp. 5-32; revised and reprinted in Who Can Speak? Authority and Critical Identity edited by Judith Roof and Robyn Wiegman, University of Illinois Press, 1996; and in Feminist Nightmares: Women at Odds edited by Susan Weisser and Jennifer Fleischner, (New York: New York University Press, 1994); and also in Racism and Sexism: Differences and Connections eds. David Blumenfeld and Linda Bell, Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.
  12. Epistemic Identities.Linda Martín Alcoff - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):128-137.
    This paper explores the significant strengths of Fricker's account, and then develops the following questions. Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices? How can we address the structural causes of credibility-deflation? Are the motivations behind identity prejudice mostly other-directed or self-directed? And does Fricker aim for neutrality vis-à-vis identity, in which case her account conflicts with standpoint theory?
  13. Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types.Linda Martin Alcoff - 2007 - In Shannon Sullivan Nancy Tuana (ed.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance.
  14. Review of Arnold Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts[REVIEW]Linda Martin Alcoff - 2003 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (9).
  15. On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?Linda Martin Alcoff - 2000 - In Naomi Zack (ed.), On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant? Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 235-262.
  16. “Merleau-Ponty and Feminist Theory on Experience.”.Linda Martin Alcoff - 2000 - In Fred Evans Leonard Lawlor (ed.), Chiasm, Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh.
  17. 'Becoming an Epistemologist'.Linda Martın Alcoff - 1999 - In E. A. Grosz (ed.), Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures. Cornell University Press.
  18. Real Knowing : A Response to My Critics.Linda Martin Alcoff - 1998 - Social Epistemology 12 (3):289 – 305.
  19. The Blackwell Guide to Feminist Philosophy.Linda Alcoff & Eva Feder Kittay (eds.) - 2007 - Blackwell.
  20. Feminist Epistemologies.Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter (eds.) - 1992 - Routledge.
  21. A Defense of Ignorance: Its Value for Knowers and Roles in Feminist and Social Epistemologies. By Cynthia Townley. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011. [REVIEW]Ben Almassi - 2013 - Hypatia 28 (1):215-217.
  22. Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.Elizabeth Anderson - 2007 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Feminist epistemology and philosophy of science studies the ways in which gender does and ought to influence our conceptions of knowledge, the knowing subject, and practices of inquiry and justification. It identifies ways in which dominant conceptions and practices of knowledge attribution, acquisition, and justification systematically disadvantage women and other subordinated groups, and strives to reform these conceptions and practices so that they serve the interests of these groups. Various practitioners of feminist epistemology and philosophy of science argue that dominant (...)
  23. Uses of Value Judgments in Feminist Social Science: A Case Study of Research on Divorce.Elizabeth Anderson - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (1):1-24.
  24. Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense.Elizabeth Anderson - 1995 - Hypatia 10 (3):50 - 84.
    Feminist epistemology has often been understood as the study of feminine "ways of knowing." But feminist epistemology is better understood as the branch of naturalized, social epistemology that studies the various influences of norms and conceptions of gender and gendered interests and experiences on the production of knowledge. This understanding avoids dubious claims about feminine cognitive differences and enables feminist research in various disciplines to pose deep internal critiques of mainstream research.
  25. Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology.Elizabeth Anderson - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (2):27-58.
  26. Situating Feminist Epistemology.Louise M. Antony - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:31-40.
    I understand feminist epistemology to be epistemology put at the service of feminist politics. That is, a feminist epistemology is dedicated to answering the many questions about knowledge that arise in the course of feminist efforts to understand and transform patriarchal structures, questions such as: Why have so many intellectual traditions denigrated the cognitive capacities of women? Are there gender differences in epistemic capacities or strategies, and what would be the implications for epistemology if there were? I argue here that (...)
  27. Symposium: Feminist Epistemology: Comment on Naomi Scheman.Louise M. Antony - 1995 - Metaphilosophy 26 (3):191-198.
  28. A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity.Louise M. Antony & Charlotte Witt (eds.) - 2002 - Westview Press.
    A book of tremendous influence when it first appeared, A Mind of One's Own reminded readers that the tradition of Western philosophy-- in particular, the ideals of reason and objectivity-- has come down to us from white males, nearly all of whom are demonstrably sexist, even misogynist. In this second edition, the original authors continue to ask, What are the implications of this fact for contemporary feminists working within this tradition? The second edition pursues this question about the value of (...)
  29. A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity.Louise Antony, Charlene Witt, Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter - 1993 - Hypatia 8 (4):140-149.
    The contributors to two new anthologies A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity and Feminist Epistemologies are philosophers for whom feminism is an intellectual as well as political commitment and they produce original, valuable feminist and philosophical work. I focus on differences between the anthologies and on two themes: the social character of knowledge and the allegedly oppressive "masculinism" of epistemological ideals.
  30. 8 Objectivity and the Growth of Knowledge.Margaret S. Archer - 2004 - In Andrew Collier, Margaret Scotford Archer & William Outhwaite (eds.), Defending Objectivity: Essays in Honour of Andrew Collier. Routledge. pp. 117.
  31. Situating Feminist Epistemology.Natalie Alana Ashton & Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    Feminist epistemologies hold that differences in the social locations of inquirers make for epistemic differences, for instance, in the sorts of things that inquirers are justified in believing. In this paper we situate this core idea in feminist epistemologies with respect to debates about social constructivism. We address three questions. First, are feminist epistemologies committed to a form of social constructivism about knowledge? Second, to what extent are they incompatible with traditional epistemological thinking? Third, do the answers to these questions (...)
  32. 5 The Objectivity of Value.Alison Assiter - 2004 - In Andrew Collier, Margaret Scotford Archer & William Outhwaite (eds.), Defending Objectivity: Essays in Honour of Andrew Collier. Routledge. pp. 63.
  33. Review: Objectivity and the Internal-External Reasons Controversy: A Study of Paul K. Moser's Philosophy After Objectivity. [REVIEW]Robert Audi - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):395 - 400.
  34. Feminism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance.Y. A. P. Audrey - 2010 - Hypatia 25 (2):437-454.
    The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value-neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap's views that make him seem like much less of a straightforwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.
  35. Responsibilism: A Proposed Shared Research Program.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    Originally titled “Institutional, Group, and Individual Virtue,” this was my paper for an Invited Symposium on "Intersections between Social, Feminist, and Virtue Epistemologies," APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 2011, San Diego. -/- Abstract: This paper examines recent research on individual, social, and institutional virtues and vices; the aim is to explore and make proposals concerning their inter-relationships, as well as to highlight central questions for future research with the study of each. More specifically, the paper will focus on how these (...)
  36. Bridging a Fault Line: On Underdetermination and the Ampliative Adequacy of Competing Theories.Guy Axtell - 2014 - In Editor Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Synthese Library. pp. 227-245.
    This paper pursues Ernan McMullin‘s claim ("Virtues of a Good Theory" and related papers on theory-choice) that talk of theory virtues exposes a fault-line in philosophy of science separating "very different visions" of scientific theorizing. It argues that connections between theory virtues and virtue epistemology are substantive rather than ornamental, since both address underdetermination problems in science, helping us to understand the objectivity of theory choice and more specifically what I term the ampliative adequacy of scientific theories. The paper argues (...)
  37. The Epistemology of Gender Identity: Implications for Social Policy.Maryann Ayim & Barbara Houston - 1985 - Social Theory and Practice 11 (1):25-59.
  38. Book Review: Shari Stone-Mediatore. Reading Across Borders: Storytelling and Knowledges of Resistance. Newyork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. [REVIEW]Susan Babbitt - 2006 - Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 21 (3):203-206.
  39. Reading Across Borders: Storytelling and Knowledges of Resistance (Review).Susan E. Babbitt - 2006 - Hypatia 21 (3):203-206.
  40. Reasons, Explanation, and Saramago's Bell.Susan E. Babbitt - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (4):144-163.
    In this essay, I suggest that significant insights of recent feminist philosophy lead, among other things, to the thought that it is not always better to choose than to be compelled to do what one might have done otherwise. However, few feminists, if any, would defend such a suggestion. I ask why it is difficult to consider certain ideas that, while challenging in theory, are, nonetheless, rather unproblematic in practice. I suggest that some questions are not pursued seriously enough by (...)
  41. Stories From the South: A Question of Logic.Susan E. Babbitt - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (3):1-21.
    In this paper, I argue that stories about difference do not promote critical self and social understanding; rather, on the contrary, it is the way we understand ourselves that makes some stories relevantly different. I discuss the uncritical reception of a story about homosexuality in Cuba, urging attention to generalizations explaining judgments of importance. I suggest that some stories from the South will never be relevant to discussions about human flourishing until we critically examine ideas about freedom and democracy, and (...)
  42. The Market for Feminist Epistemology.Harriet Baber - 1994 - The Monist 77 (4):403-423.
  43. "On Anger, Silence and Epistemic Injustice".Alison Bailey - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:93-115.
    Abstract: If anger is the emotion of injustice, and if most injustices have prominent epistemic dimensions, then where is the anger in epistemic injustice? Despite the question my task is not to account for the lack of attention to anger in epistemic injustice discussions. Instead, I argue that a particular texture of transformative anger – a knowing resistant anger – offers marginalized knowers a powerful resource for countering epistemic injustice. I begin by making visible the anger that saturates the silences (...)
  44. Tracking Privilege-Preserving Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes.Alison Bailey - 2017 - Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 32 (4):876-892.
    Classrooms are unlevel knowing fields, contested terrains where knowledge and ignorance are produced and circulate with equal vigor, and where members of dominant groups are accustomed to having an epistemic home-terrain advantage. My project focuses on one form of resistance that regularly surfaces in discussions with social-justice content. Privilege-protective epistemic pushback is a variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider both the lived and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience (...)
  45. On Intersectionality and the Whiteness of Feminist Philosophy.Alison Bailey - 2010 - In George Yancy (ed.), THE CENTER MUST NOT HOLD: WHITE WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS ON THE WHITENESS OF PHILOSOPHY. Lexington Books.
    In this paper I explore some possible reasons why white feminists philosophers have failed to engage the radical work being done by non-Western women, U.S. women of color and scholars of color outside of the discipline. -/- Feminism and academic philosophy have had lots to say to one another. Yet part of what marks feminist philosophy as philosophy is our engagement with the intellectual traditions of the white forefathers. I’m not uncomfortable with these projects: Aristotle, Foucault, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Quine, Austin, (...)
  46. Strategic Ignorance.Alison Bailey - 2007 - In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. State Univ of New York Pr. pp. 77--94.
    I want to explore strategic expressions of ignorance against the background of Charles W. Mills's account of epistemologies of ignorance in The Racial Contract (1997). My project has two interrelated goals. I want to show how Mills's discussion is restricted by his decision to frame ignorance within the language and logic of social contract theory. And, I want to explain why Maria Lugones's work on purity is useful in reframing ignorance in ways that both expand our understandings of ignorance and (...)
  47. Locating Traitorous Identities: Toward a Theory of White Character Formation.Alison Bailey - 2000 - In Sandra Harding & Uma Narayan (eds.), Hypatia. University of Indiana Press.
    This essay explores how the social location of white traitorous identities might be understood. I begin by examining some of the problematic implications of Sandra Harding's standpoint framework description of race traitors as 'becoming marginal.' I argue that the location of white traitors might be better understood in terms of their 'decentering the center.' I distinguish between 'privilege-cognizant' and 'privilege-evasive' white scripts. Drawing on the work of Marilyn Frye and Anne Braden, I offer an account of the contrasting perceptions and (...)
  48. Mothering, Diversity and Peace: Comments on Sara Ruddick's Feminist Maternal Peace Politics.Alison Bailey - 1994 - Journal of Social Philosophy 26 (1):162-182.
    Sara Ruddick's contemporary philosophical account of mothering reconsiders the maternal arguments used in the women's peace movements of the earlier part of this century. The culmination of this project is her 1989 book, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace. Ruddick's project is ground-breaking work in both academic philosophy and feminist theory. -/- In this chapter, I first look at the relationship between the two basic components of Ruddick's argument in Maternal Thinking: the "practicalist conception of truth" (PCT) and feminist (...)
  49. "More or Less Raped": Foucault, Causality, and Feminist Critiques of Sexual Violence.Kelly H. Ball - 2013 - philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 3 (1):14.
  50. Some Suggestions for Developing an Africanist Phenomenological Philosophy of Science.Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino - 2007 - In M. P. Banchetti-Robino & C. Headley (eds.), Shifting the Geography of Reason: Gender, Science and Religion. Cambridge Scholars Press.
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