About this topic
Summary Feminist epistemology examines the political and ethical dimensions of knowing, particularly as these dimensions pertain to power relations along axes of oppression such as sex, gender, race, class, (dis)ability, and sexuality.  
Key works

Feminist epistemologists examine social, political, and ethical aspects of knowing using a wide range of approaches.  Moreover, many of the key works in feminist epistemology draw on and contribute to more than one approach to epistemology making any straightforward cataloging of key works deceptive. Provided one keep in mind that any given author's work may fit perfectly well in more than one category, the following should give the reader a sense of the range of key contributions in feminist epistemology: feminist empiricism (e.g. Longino 1990 and Nelson 1990), feminist naturalized epistemology (Rooney 1998 and Code 2006), feminist standpoint theory (Harding 2004 and Collins 1991/2008), decolonial and Woman of Color feminist theories (Lugones 2003 and Narayan 1988), feminist phenomenology (Alcoff 2000 and Alcoff 2006), and feminist postmodernism (Haraway 2010).  Early works considered such topics as the nature of objectivity (Harding 1995), epistemic communities (Nelson 1993), and the role of values in knowing (Longino 1987). Recent topics within the field include: trust and epistemic agency (Jones 2012 and Dotson 2011), epistemologies of ignorance (Sullivan & Tuana 2007 and Tuana & Sullivan 2006), and epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007 and Medina 2012).

Introductions Alcoff and Potter's edited volume Feminist Epistemologies is one of the earliest and now classic collections of work in feminist epistemology. It contains key essays within the field.  For book length introductions see: Harding 1991 and Tanesini 1999.  Encyclopedia introductions include: Janack 2004 and Anderson 2007
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1 — 50 / 650
  1. added 2019-01-14
    Opressões epistêmicas.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2018 - In José Leonardo Annunziato Ruivo (ed.), Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group in Epistemology. Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil: pp. 201-226.
    In this paper, I discuss some of the recent developments in the political turn of Social Epistemology, focusing on the notions of epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression. In the first part of the work, I introduce Kristie Dotson’s characterization of the epistemic injustices presented by Miranda Fricker, through the understanding of systematic ways of violating epistemic agency in terms of oppressions. In the second part, I discuss Dotson’s critique of Fricker on the grounds that there is an important kind of (...)
  2. added 2019-01-11
    Tyler Burge: Origins of Objectivity.John Campbell - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):269-285.
  3. added 2019-01-08
    Science Communication and Epistemic Injustice.Jonathan Matheson & Valerie Joly Chock - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (1):1-9.
    Epistemic injustice occurs when someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower.[1] More and more attention is being paid to the epistemic injustices that exist in our scientific practices. In a recent paper, Fabien Medvecky argues that science communication is fundamentally epistemically unjust. In what follows we briefly explain his argument before raising several challenges to it.
  4. added 2018-12-18
    Resisting Structural Epistemic Injustice.Michael D. Doan - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4).
    What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How can such struggles be understood as involving collective struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination that seek to improve practices of knowledge production and make lives more liveable? In this paper, I argue that currently dominant, Fricker-inspired approaches to theorizing epistemic wrongs and remedies make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the epistemic dimensions of historic and (...)
  5. added 2018-12-17
    Epistemic Vices and Corruption in Science.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Kristen Intemann & Sharon Crasnow (eds.), The Routledge Handbook to Feminist Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 00-00.
  6. added 2018-12-15
    Oppression and Liberation Via the Rationality of Shame.Cecilea Mun - forthcoming - In Interdisciplinary Perspectives of Shame: Methods, Theories, Norms, Cultures, and Politics. Lanham: Lexington Books.
    Standard accounts of shame characterize shame as an emotion of global negative self-assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self-evaluation. According to non-standard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self-assessment. I argue here in favor of non-standard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor’s (1985) standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper’s (...)
  7. added 2018-11-23
    A Relational Account of Intellectual Autonomy.Benjamin Elzinga - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):22-47.
    According to relational views of autonomy, some social relations or forms of dependence are necessary for autonomous agency. Recent relational theorists have primarily focused on autonomy of action or practical autonomy, and the result has been a shift away from individualistic conceptions of autonomy in the practical realm. Despite these trends, individualistic conceptions are still the default when it comes to autonomy of belief or intellectual autonomy. In this paper, I argue for a relational account of intellectual autonomy. Specifically, I (...)
  8. added 2018-11-14
    Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
    This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...)
  9. added 2018-11-09
    On the Politics of Coalition.Elena Ruíz & Kristie Dotson - 2017 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (2):1-16.
    In the wake of continued structural asymmetries between women of color and white feminisms, this essay revisits intersectional tensions in Catharine MacKinnon’s Toward a Feminist Theory of the State while exploring productive spaces of coalition. To explore such spaces, we reframe Toward a Feminist Theory of the State in terms of its epistemological project and highlight possible synchronicities with liberational features in women-of-color feminisms. This is done, in part, through an analysis of the philosophical role “method” plays in MacKinnon’s argument, (...)
  10. added 2018-11-08
    The Feminist Question in Realism.Paige L. Sweet - 2018 - Sociological Theory 36 (3):221-243.
    Feminist standpoint theory and critical realism both offer resources to sociologists interested in making arguments that account for causal complexity and epistemic distortion. However, the impasse between these paradigms limits their utility. In this article, I argue that critical realism has much to gain from a confrontation with feminist theory. Feminist theory’s emphasis on boundary-crossing epistemologies and gendered bodies can help critical realism complicate its notion of the bifurcation between epistemology and ontology. But taking feminist theory seriously also involves careful (...)
  11. added 2018-10-22
    Situating Feminist Epistemology.Natalie Alana Ashton & Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    Feminist epistemologies hold that differences in the social locations of inquirers make for epistemic differences, for instance, in the sorts of things that inquirers are justified in believing. In this paper we situate this core idea in feminist epistemologies with respect to debates about social constructivism. We address three questions. First, are feminist epistemologies committed to a form of social constructivism about knowledge? Second, to what extent are they incompatible with traditional epistemological thinking? Third, do the answers to these questions (...)
  12. added 2018-10-22
    No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’.Robin McKenna - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):335-342.
    In a recent article in this journal, Mona Simion argues that Sally Haslanger’s “engineering” approach to gender concepts such as ‘woman’ faces an epistemic objection. The primary function of all concepts—gender concepts included—is to represent the world, but Haslanger’s engineering account of ‘woman’ fails to adequately represent the world because, by her own admission, it doesn’t include all women in the extension of the concept ‘woman.’ I argue that this objection fails because the primary function of gender concepts—and social kind (...)
  13. added 2018-10-18
    For an Impure, Antiauthoritarian Ethics.Michael D. Doan - 2018 - Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 18 (1):8-12.
    My commentary deals with the fourth chapter of Against Purity, entitled “Consuming Suffering,” where Shotwell invites us to imagine what an alternative to ethical individualism might look like in practice. I am particularly interested in the analogy she develops to help pull us into the frame of what she calls a “distributed” or “social” approach to ethics. I will argue that grappling with this analogy can help illuminate three challenges confronting those of us seeking a genuine alternative to ethical individualism: (...)
  14. added 2018-09-20
    "Objectivity" and the Arbitration of Experiential Knowledge.Devora Shapiro - 2012 - Social Philosophy Today 28:67-82.
    In order to arbitrate conflicting propositional knowledge claims—such as when two individuals claim to know the height of a tree in the yard—there is a “fact of the matter” about who is correct. Experiential, non-propositional knowledge, on the other hand, is not so obviously mediated. For one, experiential knowledge is—at least partially—subjective; one of its virtues is that it matters what a person’s background is, socially, etc., when determining the legitimacy of their claims. But this suggests a question: How do (...)
  15. added 2018-09-13
    Wronged Beyond Words.Matthew Congdon - 2016 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (8):815-834.
    In this paper, I discuss cases in which moral grievances, particularly assertions that a moral injury has taken place, are systematically obstructed by received linguistic and epistemic practices. I suggest a social epistemological model for theorizing such cases of moral epistemic injustice. Towards this end, I offer a reconstruction of Lyotard’s concept of the differend, comparing it to Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, and considering it in light of some criticisms posed by Axel Honneth. Through this reconstruction and a (...)
  16. added 2018-09-06
    Le Dœuff, Pyrrhonism and the Rational Solidarity of ‘People Fed Up with Oppressive Relationships’.Richard Fitch - 2014 - Paragraph 37 (3):326-340.
  17. added 2018-08-20
    Appraising Metaphors for Philosophical Practice.Ian James Kidd - manuscript
    Against those who criticise martial metaphors for philosophical practice, I argue that the problem is really with academic cultures that encode mascinulInst prejudices which distort our ability to explore and deploy the richness of those metaphors. Crucial to this argument is work by Phyllis Rooney.
  18. added 2018-08-20
    Humility and Oppression.Ian James Kidd - manuscript
    A chapter exploring the relations between humility and oppression, the gist being that the capacity of the trait of humility to function as a virtue depends upon one's social situation.
  19. added 2018-08-20
    The Prejudicial Effects of 'Reasonable Steps' in Analysis of Mens Rea and Sexual Consent: Two Solutions.Lucinda Vandervort - 2018 - Alberta Law Review 55 (4):933-970.
    This article examines the operation of “reasonable steps” as a statutory standard for analysis of the availability of the defence of belief in consent in sexual assault cases and concludes that application of section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, as presently worded, often undermines the legal validity and correctness of decisions about whether the accused acted with mens rea, a guilty, blameworthy state of mind. When the conduct of an accused who is alleged to have made a mistake about whether (...)
  20. added 2018-08-20
    Feminist Art Epistemologies: Understanding Feminist Art.Peg Brand - 2006 - Hypatia 21 (3):166 - 189.
    Feminist art epistemologies (FAEs) greatly aid the understanding of feminist art, particularly when they serve to illuminate the hidden meanings of an artist's intent. The success of parodic imagery produced by feminist artists (feminist visual parodies, FVPs) necessarily depends upon a viewer's recognition of the original work of art created by a male artist and the realization of the parodist's intent to ridicule and satirize. As Brand shows in this essay, such recognition and realization constitute the knowledge of a well-(in)formed (...)
  21. added 2018-08-16
    Refurbishing Epistemology: A Meta-Epistemological Framework.Dominique Kuenzle - 2017 - De Gruyter.
    Epistemology is an important philosophical discipline, yet little research has directly addressed its aims and criteria of success. This study closes the gap by offering epistemological functionalism as a fully worked-out meta-epistemological framework that accommodates not only questions of traditional epistemology, but also more recent developments such as naturalism, social epistemology, pragmatism and feminism.
  22. added 2018-08-04
    Agential Insensitivity and Socially Supported Ignorance.Lauren Woomer - forthcoming - Episteme.
    In this paper, I identify a form of epistemic insensitivity that occurs when someone fails to make proper use of the epistemic tools at their disposal in order to bring their beliefs in line with epistemically relevant evidence that is available to them. I call this kind of insensitivity agential insensitivity because it stems from the epistemic behavior of an individual agent. Agential insensitivity can manifest as a failure to either attend to relevant and available evidence, or appropriately interpret evidence (...)
  23. added 2018-08-01
    Feminist Politics and Epistemology: The Standpoint of Women.Alison M. Jaggar - 2004 - In Sandra G. Harding (ed.), The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies. Routledge. pp. 55--66.
  24. added 2018-07-09
    Scientific Community Through Grid-Group Analysis.A. Cerroni & Z. Simonella - 2014 - Social Science Information 53 (1):119-138.
    Mary Douglas introduced the grid-group map as a tool of anthropological analysis. Several studies have been applying this approach to study social phenomena, but very few concerning the scientific community. This article aims to bridge the current gap, building sociological ideal-types in the scientific community based on grid-group analysis. First, we illustrate the main features of Douglas’s grid-group analysis, up to and including the latest studies developed in the social sciences. Then, we apply Douglas’s approach to a sample of scientists, (...)
  25. added 2018-07-09
    Ethos and Symbolic Violence Among Women of Science: An Empirical Study.A. Cerroni & Z. Simonella - 2012 - Social Science Information 51 (2):165-182.
    While scientific challenges raise relevant debates about the ethics of science, the scientific ethos, shattered by post-Mertonian studies, has received neither due attention nor further conceptualizations in view of the transition to knowledge society. On the contrary, in our investigation of Italian women scientists, it appears to have survived as a reference for scientists, even if the context has changed. Indeed, the ethos of scientists is no longer conceivable as exclusive, but is instead seen as open and dynamic in interaction (...)
  26. added 2018-06-08
    Rehabilitating Objectivity: Rorty, Brandom, and the New Pragmatism.Steven Levine - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):567-589.
    In recent years, a renascent form of pragmatism has developed which argues that a satisfactory pragmatic position must integrate into itself the concepts of truth and objectivity. This New Pragmatism, as Cheryl Misak calls it, is directed primarily against Rorty's neo-pragmatic dismissal of these concepts. For Rorty, the goal of our epistemic practices should not be to achieve an objective view, one that tries to represent things as they are 'in themselves,' but rather to attain a view of things that (...)
  27. added 2018-05-31
    Ignorância Branca - White Ignorance (Translation to Portuguese).Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos & Charles Mills - 2018 - Griot 1 (17):413-438.
    In this paper, Charles Mills discusses what he calls “white ignorance”, developing one of the main themes of his 1997 book, The Racial Contract. His discussion is concerned with the idea of a cognitive disadvantage based on membership in a social group, which is not strange to the radical philosophical tradition, and that has been explored with more vigor in the recent Social Epistemology, in debates about epistemic injustices, silencing, willful ignorance, cognitive biases, epistemological standpoints, etc. Mills argues for an (...)
  28. added 2018-05-31
    Injustiças epistêmicas, Dominação e Virtudes.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2017 - In Felipe de Matos Muller & Kátia Martins Etcheverry (eds.), Ensaios sobre epistemologia do testemunho. Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil: pp. 143-172.
    ‘Injustiça epistêmica’ é o termo usado por Miranda Fricker para descrever um tipo de injustiça que ocorre quando excluímos a contribuição de uma ou mais pessoas à produção, disseminação e manutenção do conhecimento. Em seu livro de mesmo nome (2007), e em uma série de outros trabalhos, Fricker examina de que modo interações interpessoais e sistemas sociais estruturais podem ser responsáveis por influenciar nossa prática cotidiana, consciente ou não, de atribuir status epistêmico a membros de uma comunidade. Seu trabalho se (...)
  29. added 2018-05-09
    "On Anger, Silence and Epistemic Injustice".Alison Bailey - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:93-115.
    Abstract: If anger is the emotion of injustice, and if most injustices have prominent epistemic dimensions, then where is the anger in epistemic injustice? Despite the question my task is not to account for the lack of attention to anger in epistemic injustice discussions. Instead, I argue that a particular texture of transformative anger – a knowing resistant anger – offers marginalized knowers a powerful resource for countering epistemic injustice. I begin by making visible the anger that saturates the silences (...)
  30. added 2018-04-23
    Against a Sequestered Philosophy.Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (2):443-464.
    This paper argues that philosophical practice in the Western world, in particular analytic philosophy, suffers from problems that contribute to its lack of diversity in two senses: the exclusion of women and minorities, and a narrow choice of subjects and methods. This is not fruitful for philosophical exchange and the flourishing of philosophical thought. Three contributing factors are covered: a flawed execution when instilling intellectual humility; the gaslighting of women in philosophy; and an overemphasis on a narrow conception of intelligence. (...)
  31. added 2018-04-22
    Social Constraints On Moral Address.Vanessa Carbonell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The moral community is a social community, and as such it is vulnerable to social problems and pathologies. In this essay I identify a particular way in which participation in the moral community can be constrained by social factors. I argue that features of the social world—including power imbalances, oppression, intergroup conflict, communication barriers, and stereotyping—can make it nearly impossible for some members of the moral community to hold others responsible for wrongdoing. Specifically, social circumstances prevent some marginalized people from (...)
  32. added 2018-03-28
    Hermeneutical Injustice and Liberatory Education.Benjamin Elzinga - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):59-82.
    Hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a gap in the interpretive resources available to members of a society due to the marginalization of members of a social group from sense‐making practices. In this paper, I address two questions about hermeneutical injustice that are undertheorized in the recent literature: (1) what do we mean when we say that someone lacks the interpretive resources for making sense of an experience? and (2) how do marginalized individuals develop interpretive resources? In response to (1), (...)
  33. added 2018-02-18
    Book Review: Shari Stone-Mediatore. Reading Across Borders: Storytelling and Knowledges of Resistance. Newyork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. [REVIEW]Susan Babbitt - 2006 - Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 21 (3):203-206.
  34. added 2018-02-18
    Ignorance and Opinion in Stoic Epistemology.Constance Meinwald - 2005 - Phronesis 50 (3):215-231.
    This paper argues for a view that maximizes in the Stoics' epistemology the starkness and clarity characteristic of other parts of their philosophy. I reconsider our evidence concerning doxa (opinion/belief): should we really take the Stoics to define it as assent to the incognitive, so that it does not include the assent of ordinary people to their kataleptic impressions, and is thus actually inferior to agnoia (ignorance)? I argue against this, and for the simple view that in Stoicism assent is (...)
  35. added 2018-02-17
    Feminist Epistemologies.Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter (eds.) - 1992 - Routledge.
  36. added 2018-02-17
    The Radical Future of Feminist Empiricism.Nancy Tuana - 1992 - Hypatia 7 (1):100-114.
    I argue that Nelson's feminist transformation of empiricism provides the basis of a dialogue across three currently competing feminist epistemologies: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theories, and postmodern feminism, a dialogue that will result in a dissolution of the apparent tensions between these epistemologies and provide an epistemology with the openness and fluidity needed to embrace the concerns of feminists.
  37. added 2018-02-17
    The Epistemology of Gender Identity: Implications for Social Policy.Maryann Ayim & Barbara Houston - 1985 - Social Theory and Practice 11 (1):25-59.
  38. added 2018-02-16
    Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
    This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim that these stereotypes (...)
  39. added 2018-02-16
    Can Science Be Objective? Longino's Science as Social Knowledge.Sharon L. Crasnow - 1993 - Hypatia 8 (3):194-201.
    In Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Longino offers a contextual analysis of evidential relevance. She claims that this "contextual empiricism" reconciles the objectivity of science with the claim that science is socially constructed. I argue that while her account does offer key insights into the role that values play in science, her claim that science is nonetheless objective is problematic.
  40. added 2018-01-31
    "Is That All There is to Know?: The Limits of 'Eurocentric' Epistemology".Miguel Hernandez - manuscript
  41. added 2018-01-26
    Kontextualität in der Philosophie.Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach - 2017 - Information Philosophie 4:52-57.
    This short essay applies some core assumptions of critical social epistemology to the production of (cross-cultural) knowledge.
  42. added 2018-01-19
    Epistemic Identities.Linda Martín Alcoff - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):128-137.
    This paper explores the significant strengths of Fricker's account, and then develops the following questions. Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices? How can we address the structural causes of credibility-deflation? Are the motivations behind identity prejudice mostly other-directed or self-directed? And does Fricker aim for neutrality vis-à-vis identity, in which case her account conflicts with standpoint theory?
  43. added 2017-11-17
    Epistemology—Old Dilemmas and New Perspectives.Marek Hetmański - 2008 - Dialogue and Universalism 18 (7-8):11-28.
    The paper presents a survey of traditional problems tackled by epistemology throughout its history, especially its meta-theoretical inclination as well as the old dilemma of its normative versus descriptive nature. I sketch the prevailing models of epistemological normativity (epistemic values such as truth, falsity, justification, or evidence etc.), and show how they function, what their essence and genesis are, how they change and what influences them. I also consider the utility of epistemology for science, education and practice in respect of (...)
  44. added 2017-11-03
    Attending to Others: Simone Weil and Epistemic Pluralism.Shari Stone-Mediatore - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (2):79-95.
    Since the 1980s, feminist epistemologists have exposed the cultural biases that have denied epistemic value to certain epistemic styles and agents while they have explored ways to reclaim the devalued epistemic modes--including more practical, emotionally invested, and community-situated modes of knowing--that many of us have found to be meaningful ways of engaging the world. At the same time, feminist critics have sought not merely to reverse received epistemic hierarchies but to explore more pluralistic epistemologies that appreciate as well as examine (...)
  45. added 2017-11-02
    Tracking Privilege-Preserving Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes.Alison Bailey - 2017 - Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 32 (4):876-892.
    Classrooms are unlevel knowing fields, contested terrains where knowledge and ignorance are produced and circulate with equal vigor, and where members of dominant groups are accustomed to having an epistemic home-terrain advantage. My project focuses on one form of resistance that regularly surfaces in discussions with social-justice content. Privilege-protective epistemic pushback is a variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider both the lived and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience (...)
  46. added 2017-10-01
    Rape Culture and Epistemology.Bianca Crewe & Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - manuscript
    This paper critiques a deferential attitude about the epistemology of sexual assault testimony. According to the deferential attitude, individuals and institutions should decline to act on allegations of sexual assault unless and until they are proven in a formal setting, i.e., a criminal court. We attack this deference from several angles, including the pervasiveness of rape culture in the criminal justice system, the epistemology of testimony and norms connecting knowledge and action, the harms of tacit idealizations away from important contextual (...)
  47. added 2017-09-01
    Dissolving the Epistemic/Ethical Dilemma Over Implicit Bias.Katherine Puddifoot - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):73-93.
    It has been argued that humans can face an ethical/epistemic dilemma over the automatic stereotyping involved in implicit bias: ethical demands require that we consistently treat people equally, as equally likely to possess certain traits, but if our aim is knowledge or understanding our responses should reflect social inequalities meaning that members of certain social groups are statistically more likely than others to possess particular features. I use psychological research to argue that often the best choice from the epistemic perspective (...)
  48. added 2017-07-20
    Stereotyping: The Multifactorial View.Katherine Puddifoot - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (1):137-156.
    This paper proposes and defends the multifactorial view of stereotyping. According to this view, multiple factors determine whether or not any act of stereotyping increases the chance of an accurate judgment being made about an individual to whom the stereotype is applied. To support this conclusion, various features of acts of stereotyping that can determine the accuracy of stereotyping judgments are identified. The argument challenges two existing views that suggest that it is relatively easy for an act of stereotyping to (...)
  49. added 2017-04-27
    Varieties of Epistemic Injustice.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2017 - In Ian James Kidd, Gaile Pohlhaus & José Médina Médina (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice.
  50. added 2017-04-25
    Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology.Helen Longino & Kathleen Lennon - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71:19-54.
    Feminist scholars advocate the adoption of distinctive values in research. While this constitutes a coherent alternative to the more frequently cited cognitive or scientific values, they cannot be taken to supplant those more orthodox values. Instead, each set might better be understood as a local epistemology guiding research answerable to different cognitive goals. Feminist scholars advocate the adoption of distinctive values in research. While this constitutes a coherent alternative to the more frequently cited cognitive or scientific values, they cannot be (...)
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