Feminist Pragmatism

This is a review and critical commentary on Michael Plaxton's 2015 book, Implied Consent and Sexual Assault, in which he proposes that the legal definition of sexual consent be amended to permit sexual partners to define the terms and conditions of sexual consent in accordance with private "normative commitments" between themselves. The proposed "reform" is intended to permit an individual to agree to be a party to sexual activity that would otherwise constitute sexual assault under Canadian law. For reasons explained (...) in the review, this reviewer concludes that Plaxton's proposal and the rationale he presents in support of its adoption are unpersuasive. (shrink)

Pragmatism established a philosophical presence over a century ago through the work of Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey, and has enjoyed an unprecedented revival in recent years owing to the pioneering efforts of Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. The essays in this volume explore the history and themes of classic pragmatism, discuss the revival of pragmatism and show how it engages with a range of areas of inquiry including politics, law, education, aesthetics, religion and feminism. Together they provide (...) readers with an overview of the richness and vitality of pragmatist thinking and the influence that it continues to exert both in philosophy and other disciplines. The volume will be of interest to students and scholars of pragmatism, American philosophy and political theory. (shrink)

This article shows how feminism welcomed and was influenced by the pragmatism of John Dewey. While in real terms his impact on European feminism has been minimal, this was not the case in contemporary America. In this article we study both how Dewey’s ideas were received amongst American feminists, as well as certain aspects of his thinking that could be enormously useful in present-day debates between critical and postmodern feminists. We compare the Deweyan and feminist arguments against the traditional dualisms (...) that acted as philosophical support for social inequality, paying particular attention to mind–body dualism, and the consequent undervaluation of physical and emotional wellbeing. We also show that John Dewey’s proposals were, in fact, more radical than those of the feminists of the day. Indeed, democracy has to be understood as a way of life that affects every dimension of experience, and is crucial to the personal and social growth that enables the unjust social inequalities between men and women to be overcome. (shrink)

Jane Addams's early attempt to empower the people with information.

Charlotte Perkins Gilman and John Dewey were both pragmatists who recognized the need to restructure the environment to bring about social progress. Gilman was even more of a pragmatist than Dewey, however, because she addressed problems he did not identify-much less confront. Her philosophy is in accord with the spirit of Dewey's work but in important ways, it is more consistent, more comprehensive and more radical than his instrumentalism.

Despite its impact on public administration, policy development, education, philosophy and politics, American pragmatism has made a relatively small impression on the social sciences. In particular, American pragmatism has seldom influenced feminism, which is remarkable given the potentially striking affinities between these two disciplines. Drawing upon the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey and the work of feminists who support a pragmatist approach to the study of gender, this article discusses the chequered history of relations between the two disciplines. It also (...) focuses on the methodological possibilities of establishing a pragmatist-feminist position. Taking ethnography as a means to illustrate our ideas, we suggest that a pragmatist-feminist ethnography can help social scientists to rethink theory in terms of its practical application, articulate the value of an anti-foundational view of knowledge and promote investigating people's concrete experiences for understanding gender inequalities. (shrink)

Both Jane Addams and John Dewey see human beings as ultimately creative in nature and as radically connected to each other. In this paper I look to these ideas to provide a theoretical model that is able to explain why we are able to extend our care to others outside of our intimate circle of family and friends, and to show us how we can purposefully move to the next higher level of moral reasoning.

The notion of "feminist pragmatism" or "pragmatist feminism" has been around since Charlene Haddock Seigfried introduced it two decades ago. However, the bulk of the work in this field has been directed toward recovering the feminist strain of classical American philosophy, largely through renewed interest in the work of Jane Addams. This exploration of the origins of feminism and pragmatism has been fruitful in building a foundation for theoretical considerations. The editors of this volume believe the next logical step is (...) the contemporary application to both theory and experience. Contemporary Feminist Pragmatism is the first book to address the modern significance of the nexus of feminism and pragmatism. The issues explored here include the relationship between community and identity, particularly around the impact of gender and race; reframing political practice regarding feminist pragmatist commitments including education, sustainability movements, and local efforts like community gardens; and the association between ethics and inquiry including explorations of Buddhism, hospitality, and animal-human relationships. (shrink)

This paper argues that communitarian philosophy can be an important philosophic resource for feminist thinkers, particularly when considered in the light of Jane Addams's (1860-1935) feminist-pragmatism. Addams's communitarianism requires progressive change as well as a moral duty to seek out diverse voices. Contrary to some contemporary communitarians, Addams extends her concept of community to include interdependent global communities, such as the global community of women peace workers.

In this paper I argue that the essentialism/antiessentialism debate among feminists is a variety of the idealist/realist split that Dewey addressed in The Quest for Certainty. I attempt to use Dewey's thought to subvert this opposition so that we can remove the feminist discussion from the structure of an idealist/realist either/or.

Feminist claims that scientific activity is intimately involved with the oppression of women, often identify aspects of the epistemology of science, or scientific method, as the primary culprit. In my dissertation I try to persuade my feminist colleagues that despite the important gains we have made through the criticism of science, our fairly recent investment in an epistemological critique is yielding diminishing returns. I begin by examining the epistemological reflections of a number of feminist critics of evolutionary biology, including Ruth (...) Hubbard and Ruth Bleier. I then discuss the more general epistemological approaches of Evelyn Fox Keller, Sandra Harding and Helen Longino. ;There are a number of features of feminist epistemology which make it ineffective as a method for adequately addressing the oppression of women by science. For example, feminist epistemological examinations of science have often involved essentialist claims about "women's" experience, and over-general conceptions of science as an institution. These problems are discussed throughout the dissertation. However, the principal focus involves the philosophical details of the feminist epistemologies themselves. Specifically, I focus on their reliance on a questionable model of human psychology, that I refer to as "representationalism." ;My anti-representationalist approach is inspired by the work of two neo-pragamatist philosophers, Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson. For the purposes of this dissertation, representationalism is the view that beliefs are the subjective, representational end-product of a sensory process, in which the objects of our world are sensed and then screened through our subjective perceptual frameworks . My concern is that the representational conception of beliefs as filtered representations of the world makes coherent a global scepticism about the truth of our beliefs. Since, on this model, beliefs do not arise from direct access to the world, then they can be radically wrong. All of our representations might be completely inaccurate because they are filtered through our perceptual apparatus, language, cultural worldview and/or theory allegiance. Following Rorty and Davidson, I argue that epistemological debates are premised on the coherence of global scepticism, and that, due to the nature of the representationalist model on which the debates are based, the battle with global scepticism is futile. ;Surveying feminist contributions to epistemological debates in science, I show how these contributions invite the coherence of scepticism. In the end, each contribution either accepts scepticism, with relativist resignation, or attempts to defeat it with various claims to objectivity. While the latter response has proven futile, for both feminist and traditional epistemologists alike, the former response is equally problematic. Either way, issues of relativism and scepticism can be used against our well-justified claims that women are being harmed by science. ;In the latter half of my dissertation I offer a pragmatic alternative based on Davidson's philosophy of language. Davidson argues that, on a non-representationalist model of language use, global scepticism is not a coherent option. His views undermine the motivation for participating in the epistemological debates that attempt to address scepticism as a coherent and ever-present concern. By undermining the motivation for these philosophical pursuits I hope to encourage my feminist colleagues to return to their important work in science and science criticism with the assurance that our concepts of "error" and "truth" are not always enemies that need feminist epistemological reconfiguration. (shrink)