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  1. “Seeing Rain”: Integrating Phenomenological and Bayesian Predictive Coding Approaches to Visual Hallucinations and Self-Disturbances in Schizophrenia.J. A. Kaminski, P. Sterzer & A. L. Mishara - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 73:102757.
  2. Stanley B. Klein: The Two Selves—Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, Xx + 153, £25.00, ISBN: 987-0-19-934996-8.Kourken Michaelian - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (1):119-122.
  3. I Am.Cosmin Visan - 2019 - New York, Statele Unite ale Americii: Amazon.
    Consciousness is arguably the greatest mystery in science, still being unsolved after millennia of thinking. This book is one further attempt at trying to bring new insights regarding consciousness. While certainly the mystery will continue, the ideas in this book will raise awareness regarding an aspect of the phenomenology of consciousness that has been overlooked by past thinkers, and that is the emergent structure of consciousness, which in the end will be shown to be realized by the nature of self-reference (...)
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  4. Electrophysiological and Phenomenological Effects of Short-Term Immersion in an Altered Sensory Environment.Vladimir Miskovic, Jeffrey O. Bagg, Matthew Ríos & Jourdan J. Pouliot - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 70:39-49.
  5. Consciousness and Topologically Structured Phenomenal Spaces.Robert Prentner - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 70:25-38.
  6. Training Novice Practitioners to Reliably Report Their Meditation Experience Using Shared Phenomenological Dimensions.Oussama Abdoun, Jelle Zorn, Stefano Poletti, Enrico Fucci & Antoine Lutz - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 68:57-72.
  7. The Choreography of the Soul: A Psychedelic Philosophy of Consciousness.Ed D'Angelo - manuscript
    This is a 2020 revision of my 1988 dissertation "The Choreography of the Soul" with a new Foreword, a new Conclusion, a substantially revised Preface and Introduction, and many improvements to the body of the work. However, the thesis remains the same. A theory of consciousness and trance states--including psychedelic experience--is developed. Consciousness can be analyzed into two distinct but generally interrelated systems, which I call System X and System Y. System X is the emotional-visceral-kinaesthetic body. System X is a (...)
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  8. On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology.Anthony Vincent Fernandez & Allan Køster - forthcoming - In Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo & René Rosfort (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology.
    “On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology” provides a framework for the phenomenological study of mental disorders. The framework relies on a distinction between (ontological) existentials and (ontic) modes. Existentials are the categorial structures of human existence, such as intentionality, temporality, selfhood, and affective situatedness. Modes are the particular, concrete phenomena that belong to these categorial structures, with each existential having its own set of modes. In the first section, we articulate this distinction by drawing primarily on the work of (...)
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  9. The Mismeasure of Consciousness: A Problem of Coordination for the Perceptual Awareness Scale.Matthias Michel - 2018 - Philosophy of Science.
    As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.
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  10. How Do the Body Schema and the Body Image Interact?Victor Pitron, Adrian Alsmith & Frédérique de Vignemont - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 65:352-358.
  11. A Phenomenological Appreciation of Dancers’ Embodied Self- Consciousness.Camille Buttingsrud - 2016 - NOFOD Conference Proceedings 12 (2015):4.
  12. Events to Dualism.Frank De Silva - manuscript
    Perception is a continuous experience that exists at every instant, across a set of simultaneous events in the brain. Special relativity physics states that there can be nothing physical, that connect simultaneous events. As such perception cannot be a physical but non- physical or dualistic. This argument is analysed further and a new concept called Concept A is introduce. With the aid of concept A, free will is explained.
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  13. Changes in the Sense of Agency During Hypnosis: The Hungarian Version of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale and its Relationship with Phenomenological Aspects of Consciousness.András Költő & Vince Polito - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:245-254.
  14. The Relation of Consciousness to the Material World.Max Velmans - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):255-265.
    Within psychology and the brain sciences, the study of consciousness and its relation to human information processing is once more a focus for productive research. However, some ancient puzzles about the nature of consciousness appear to be resistant to current empirical investigations, suggesting the need for a fundamentally different approach. In Velmans I have argued that functional accounts of the mind do not `contain' consciousness within their workings. Investigations of information processing are not investigations of consciousness as such. Given this, (...)
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  15. I Can See It Both Ways: First- And Third-Person Visual Perspectives At Retrieval.Heather Rice & David Rubin - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):877-890.
    The number of studies examining visual perspective during retrieval has recently grown. However, the way in which perspective has been conceptualized differs across studies. Some studies have suggested perspective is experienced as either a first-person or a third-person perspective, whereas others have suggested both perspectives can be experienced during a single retrieval attempt. This aspect of perspective was examined across three studies, which used different measurement techniques commonly used in studies of perspective. Results suggest that individuals can experience more than (...)
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  16. Self-Reports of Trauma and Dissociation: An Examination of Context Effects.Peter Lemons & Steven Jay Lynn - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 44:8-19.
  17. Attention and Blindness: Objectivity and Contingency in Moral Perception.Rebecca Kukla - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (sup1):319-346.
  18. Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review; Psychological Review 84 (3):231.
  19. The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized.Owen Flanagan - 2011 - Bradford.
    If we are material beings living in a material world -- and all the scientific evidence suggests that we are -- then we must find existential meaning, if there is such a thing, in this physical world. We must cast our lot with the natural rather than the supernatural. Many Westerners with spiritual inclinations are attracted to Buddhism -- almost as a kind of moral-mental hygiene. But, as Owen Flanagan points out in The Bodhisattva's Brain, Buddhism is hardly naturalistic. In (...)
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  20. Psychophysical Methods and the Evasion of Introspection.Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):914-926.
    While introspective methods went out of favour with the decline of Titchener’s analytic school, many important questions concern the rehabilitation of introspection in contemporary psychology. Hatfield rightly points out that introspective methods should not be confused with analytic ones, and goes on to describe their “ineliminable role” in perceptual psychology. Here I argue that certain methodological conventions within psychophysics reflect a continued uncertainty over appropriate use of subjects’ perceptual observations and the reliability of their introspective judgements. My first claim is (...)
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  21. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness.Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.) - 2007 - New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
    (From the book cover in 2007) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness is the most thorough and comprehensive survey of contemporary scientific research and philosophical thought on consciousness currently available. Its 55 newly commissioned, peer-reviewed chapters combine state-of-the-art surveys with cutting edge research. Taken as a whole, these essays by leading lights in the philosophy and science of consciousness create an engaging dialog and unparalleled source of information regarding this most fascinating and mysterious subject.
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  22. Commentary On: John E. Fields' "Credibility and Commitment in the Making of Truly Astonishing First-Person Reports".Gilbert Plumer - 2011 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-4.
  23. To Beep or Not To Beep: Obtaining Accurate Reports About Awareness.Hulburt Russell & C. Heavey - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):113-128.
    We begin by accepting that introspective evidence is important to cognitive science. However, as its history shows, introspection is risky, so methods should be used that minimize those risks. We argue that there are 13 ways that a beeper can reduce those risks, dividing those ways into three categories: time sampling per se, minimizing the reactive disturbance of evanescent phenomena, and aiding phenomenological fidelity. We turn aside six criticisms of beeper-based research, and describe five characteristics of a good beep.
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  24. A Cognitive Semantics for First-Person Statements.Allison Shalinsky - 1988 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    The dissertation investigates some linguistic data associated with the first person. It is argued that the data may be successfully treated within a semantic framework which focuses on the relation between linguistic expressions and intermediate cognitive constructions. The dissertation also defends the sub-claim that approaches which proceed within a model-theoretic framework are incapable of accounting for the data. This incapacity is traced to the model-theoretic assumption that the relation between linguistic expressions and extralinguistic reality constitutes the appropriate domain of study. (...)
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  25. Neuro-Phenomenology: First Person Methodologies on the Study of Consciusness.Jaime Montero Anazola - 2008 - Universitas Philosophica 25 (51).
    First person methodologies on the study of consciousness have a great relevance in Francisco Varela´s thought which this essay aims to highlight. Firstly, describing some philosopher's remarks on the irreducible character of consciousness, followed by a presentation of three ways to access it in the first person mode: introspection, phenomenology, and some Madhyamika Buddhist practices; subsequently, through an enquiry into the implementation of these methods and their validity and finally, reflecting on some existential and theoretical consequences these practices have for (...)
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  26. First-Person Approaches in Neuroscience of Consciousness: Brain Dynamics Correlate with the Intention to Act.Han-Gue Jo, Marc Wittmann, Tilmann Lhündrup Borghardt, Thilo Hinterberger & Stefan Schmidt - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 26:105-116.
    The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet’s experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N = 1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential is attributable to more frequent occurrences (...)
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  27. More Than One Voice: Investigating the Phenomenological Properties of Inner Speech Requires a Variety of Methods.Ben Alderson-Day & Charles Fernyhough - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 24:113-114.
  28. First-Person Methodologies.Varela Francisco & Shaer Jonathan - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):1-14.
  29. On Haptic and Motor Incorporation of Tools and Other Objects.Filipe Herkenhoff Carijó, Maria Clara Almeida & Virgínia Kastrup - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):685-701.
    This article presents a conceptual discussion on the phenomenon of incorporation of tools and other objects in the light of Maine de Biran’s philosophy of the relation between the body and the motor will. Drawing on Maine de Biran’s view of the body as that portion of the material world which directly obeys one’s motor will, as well as on his view (supported by studies in contemporary cognitive science) of active touch as the perceptual modality that is sensitive to objects (...)
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  30. The Phenomenology and Development of Social Perspectives.Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):655-683.
    The paper first gives a conceptual distinction of the first, second and third person perspectives in social cognition research and connects them to the major present theories of understanding others (simulation, interaction and theory theory). It then argues for a foundational role of second person interactions for the development of social perspectives. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes in detail how infants, in particular through triangular interactions with persons and objects, expand their understanding of perspectives and arrive at a (...)
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  31. Book Review: Bayne, T. And Montague, M. (Eds.) (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Marta Jorba - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):883-890.
  32. Descriptive Experience Sampling.Russell T. Hurlburt & R. T. Hurlburt - 2009 - In Bayne Tim, Cleeremans Axel & Wilken Patrick (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 225--227.
  33. Telling What We Know: Describing Inner Experience.Russell T. Hurlburt & Christopher L. Heavey - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (9):400-403.
  34. Phenomenological Reports as Data.K. Anders Ericsson, William G. Chase & Herbert A. Simon - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):601-602.
  35. A Gap in Nisbett and Wilson’s Findings? A First-Person Access to Our Cognitive Processes.Claire Petitmengin, Anne Remillieux, Béatrice Cahour & Shirley Carter-Thomas - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):654-669.
    The well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson lead to the conclusion that we have no introspective access to our decision-making processes. Johansson et al. have recently developed an original protocol consisting in manipulating covertly the relationship between the subjects’ intended choice and the outcome they were presented with: in 79.6% of cases, they do not detect the manipulation and provide an explanation of the choice they did not make, confirming the findings of Nisbett and Wilson. We have reproduced this protocol, (...)
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  36. Reviving Brain Death: A Functionalist View. [REVIEW]Samuel H. LiPuma & Joseph P. DeMarco - 2013 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (3):383-392.
    Recently both whole brain death (WBD) and higher brain death (HBD) have come under attack. These attacks, we argue, are successful, leaving supporters of both views without a firm foundation. This state of affairs has been described as “the death of brain death.” Returning to a cardiopulmonary definition presents problems we also find unacceptable. Instead, we attempt to revive brain death by offering a novel and more coherent standard of death based on the permanent cessation of mental processing. This approach (...)
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  37. The Failing of Meaning: A Few Steps Into a First-Person Phenomenological Practice.Natalie Depraz - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12):10-12.
    The experience I am going to go into refers to a process of emergence of meaning in consciousness. More particularly, what was given to me in terms of 'meaning' was the very lack of meaning of what was happening to me in the very moment. There is a crucial hypothesis here: this is the discovery of one's own experience and the production of a personal description of it within the framework of a disciplined practice. It is the only way to (...)
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  38. Listening From Within.Claire Petitmengin & Michel Bitbol - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12):10-12.
    In this paper we list the various criticisms that have been formulated against introspection, from Auguste Comte denying that consciousness can observe itself, to recent criticisms of the reliability of first person descriptions. We show that these criticisms rely on the one hand on poor knowledge of the introspective process, and on the other hand on a naïve conception of scientific objectivity. Two kinds of answers are offered: the first one is grounded on a refined description of the process of (...)
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  39. Sense of Ownership and Sense of Agency During Trauma.Yochai Ataria - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):199-212.
    This paper seeks to describe and analyze the traumatic experience through an examination of the sense of agency—the sense of controlling one’s body, and sense of ownership—the sense that it is my body that undergoes experiences. It appears that there exist two levels of traumatic experience: on the first level one loses the sense of agency but retains the sense of ownership, whilst on the second one loses both of these, with symptoms becoming progressively more severe. A comparison of the (...)
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  40. Teaching Phenomenology by Way of “Second-Person Perspectivity”(From My Thirty Years at the University of Dallas).Scott D. Churchill - 2012 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 12 (sup3):14.
    Phenomenology has remained a sheltering place for those who would seek to understand not only their own "first person" experiences but also the first person experiences of others. Recent publications by renowned scholars within the field have clarified and extended our possibilities of access to "first person" experience by means of perception and reflection . Teaching phenomenology remains a challenge, however, because one must find ways of communicating to the student how to embody it as a process rather than simply (...)
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  41. Interview.Grant J. Rich - 2004 - Anthropology of Consciousness 15 (2):51-65.
  42. Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective.Elizabeth Irvine - 2012 - Springer.
    The source of endless speculation and public curiosity, our scientific quest for the origins of human consciousness has expanded along with the technical capabilities of science itself and remains one of the key topics able to fire public as much as academic interest. Yet many problematic issues, identified in this important new book, remain unresolved. Focusing on a series of methodological difficulties swirling around consciousness research, the contributors to this volume suggest that ‘consciousness’ is, in fact, not a wholly viable (...)
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  43. Constitutive Relevance and the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Matteo Colombo - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology (ahead-of-print):1–24.
    Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons? behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. (...)
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  44. Some Ideas for the Integration of Neurophenomenology and Affective Neuroscience.G. Colombetti - 2013 - Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):288-297.
    Context: Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central dimension of affectivity. Problem: I propose that augmenting affective neuroscience with a neurophenomenological method can help address long-standing questions in emotion theory, such as: Do different emotions come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity? How do emotion experience, bodily feelings and brain and bodily activity relate to one another? Method: This paper is theoretical. (...)
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  45. From Hinge Narrative to Habit: Self-Oriented Narrative Psychotherapy Meets Feminist Phenomenological Theories of Embodiment.Jennifer Hansen - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):69-73.
    In what follows, I offer some friendly amendments to Potter’s psychotherapeutic model—‘the hinge narrative’ (HN)—designed to help bipolar patients cultivate self-trust. My primary contribution is to suggest an alliance between narrative theory and feminist phenomenological theories of embodiment. I argue that these projects are mutually supporting in both the metaphysical and therapeutic project of constituting a rich moral self, that is, a self who has self-trust and thereby satisfying relationships with others. I also register a slight disagreement with Potter concerning (...)
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  46. Narrative Selves, Relations of Trust, and Bipolar Disorder.Nancy Nyquist Potter - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):57-65.
  47. Anorexia Nervosa and the Body Uncanny: A Phenomenological Approach.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):81-91.
    Anorexia nervosa is a psychiatric disorder that seems to be closely related to the identity of the person suffering from it. This is referred to in the vast literature on anorexia nervosa by specifying the quality of symptoms as ‘egosyntonic’ (e.g., Vitousek, Watson, and Wilson 1998). The pursuit of excessive thinness is part of a search for identity in which the control of the body—its size and needs—becomes central (Gillett 2009). This need for control seems to be triggered by a (...)
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  48. Defending the Middle Ground in Narrative Theory and the Self.David Lumsden - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):29-31.
    I am grateful for the responses from Serife Tekin and James Phillips to my paper (Lumsden 2013), for they allow me to clarify my position. Tekin (2013) accurately characterizes me as attempting to salvage the value of narrative theory without accepting the more stringent demands that have been required or implied, notably the necessity for personhood of a whole life narrative. She notes that I attempt to provide an alternative view of the unity of a person, to the degree that (...)
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  49. The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence.Stan Klein - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a "thing" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to (...)
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  50. Remarks on Explicit Knowledge and Expertise Acquisition.Rodrigo Ribeiro - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):431-435.
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