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  1. Eliminativism and Reading One's Own Mind.T. Parent - manuscript
    Some contemporary philosophers suggest that we know just by introspection that folk psychological states exist. However, such an "armchair refutation" of eliminativism seems too easy. I first attack two strategems, inspired by Descartes, on how such a refutation might proceed. However, I concede that the Cartesian intuition that we have direct knowledge of representational states is very powerful. The rest of this paper then offers an error theory of how that intuition might really be mistaken. The idea is that introspection (...)
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  2. Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge II: Lagadonian Judging.T. Parent - manuscript
    This draft now appears (in revised form) as Chapter 7 of _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
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  3. Whose Consciousness? Reflexivity and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Christian Coseru - forthcoming - In Mark Siderits, Ching Keng & John Spackman (eds.), Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness Tradition and Dialogue. Leiden: pp. 121-153.
    If I am aware that p, say, that it is raining, is it the case that I must be aware that I am aware that p? Does introspective or object-awareness entail the apprehension of mental states as being of some kind or another: self-monitoring or intentional? That is, are cognitive events implicitly self-aware or is “self-awareness” just another term for metacognition? Not surprisingly, intuitions on the matter vary widely. This paper proposes a novel solution to this classical debate by reframing (...)
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  4. Agency and Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. Routledge.
    This chapter concerns self-knowledge of our mental states, with a focus on how we know our own beliefs and intentions. It examines the agentialist approach to self-knowledge, which is driven by the idea that believing or intending on the basis of reasons is something that we DO, and hence involves agency. Agentialists maintain that, because beliefs and intentions are exercises of agency, self-knowledge of these attitudes differs fundamentally from self-knowledge of states that we simply undergo, such as sensations. Specifically, agentialists (...)
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  5. Pain and Incorrigibility.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In J. Corns (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it a pain (or not).
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  6. Neo-Ryleanism About Self-Understanding.Yair Levy - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The paper aims to defend the standard view of what it dubs ‘Self-understanding' — i.e., (very roughly) our knowledge of why we behave as we do — from the threat posed to it by Neo-Ryleanism. While the standard, entrenched view regards self-understanding as special in kind and status, the Neo-Rylean agrees with Gilbert Ryle that our method of understanding ourselves is much the same as our method of understanding others, involving self-interpretation on the basis of the available evidence. Neo-Ryleanism has (...)
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  7. L'accointance entre omniscience et omnipotence.Matthias Michel - forthcoming - Klesis.
    Introspection is the capacity by which we know our own conscious mental states. Several theories aim to explain it. According to acquaintance theory, we know our experiences by being acquainted with them. Acquaintance is non-causal, non-inferential, and non-observational. I present a dilemma for the acquaintance theory of introspection. Either subjects are always acquainted with all their experiences; or some attentional mechanism selects the relevant experiences (or aspects of experiences) for introspection. The first option is implausible: it implies that subjects are (...)
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  8. Schopenhauer on Inner Awareness and World-Understanding.Vasfi Onur Özen - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-23.
    I argue against a prevailing interpretation of Schopenhauer’s account of inner awareness and world-understanding. Because scholars have typically taken on board the assumption that inner awareness is non-representational, they have concerned themselves in the main with how to transfer this immediate cognition of will in ourselves and apply it to our understanding of the world–as–representation. Some scholars propose that the relation of the world-as-will to the world-as-representation is to be understood in figurative or metaphorical terms. I disagree because, for Schopenhauer, (...)
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  9. Davidson's Philosophy: Truth, Meaning and the Mental.G. Preyer (ed.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
  10. Knowledge of Language as Self-Knowledge.John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In a series of early essays, beginning with "Must We Mean What We Say?", Stanley Cavell offers a sustained response to the argument that ordinary language philosophy is nothing more than amateur linguistics, carried out from the armchair -- so that philosophers' claims about "what we say", and what we mean when we say it, are necessarily in need of proper empirical support. The present paper provides a close reading of Cavell and a defense of his argument that, since a (...)
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  11. How to Commit to Commissive Self-Knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    At least some of your beliefs are commitments. When you believe that P as a commitment, your stance on P is such that you believe it on the basis of your considered judgement. Sometimes, you also believe that you believe P. Such self-beliefs can also be commissive in a sense, as when they are reflective endorsements of your lower-order commissive beliefs. In this paper I argue that one's commissive self-beliefs ontologically constitute one's lower-order commissive beliefs because one's commissive self-beliefs instantiate (...)
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  12. Contemplating on the Nature of Selfhood in DoC Patients: Neurophenomenological Perspective.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2023 - Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 22 (1):23.
    Medical well-regarded policy recommendations for patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) are almost exclusively relied on behavioural examination and evaluation of higher-order cognition, and largely disregard the patients’ self. This is so because practically establishing the presence of self-awareness or Selfhood is even more challenging than evaluating the presence of consciousness. At the same time, establishing the potential (actual physical possibility) of Selfhood in DoC patients is crucialy important from clinical, ethical, and moral standpoints because Selfhood is the most central (...)
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  13. Gender and first-person authority.Gus Turyn - 2023 - Synthese 201 (122):1-19.
    Following Talia Mae Bettcher, many philosophers distinguish between ethical and epistemic conceptions of the first-person authority that we have over our gender identities. Rather than construing this authority as explained by our superior epistemic access to our own gender identities, many have argued that we should view this authority as explained by ethical obligations that we have towards others. But such views remain silent on what we ought to believe about others’ gender identities: when someone avows their gender identity, should (...)
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  14. Knowing Your Mind by Making Up Your Mind Without Changing Your Mind, Too Much.Casey Doyle - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Research 47:133-146.
    At the center of much contemporary work on self-knowledge of our attitudes is a debate between Agentialists and Empiricists. Empiricists hold that first-person knowledge of one’s own attitudes possesses a broadly empirical basis, such as observation or inference. Agentialists insist that an account of self-knowledge must make sense of the intimate connection between knowing one’s attitudes and actively forming them in response to reasons. But it is plausible to suppose that a psychologically realistic account of self-knowledge will emphasize both active (...)
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  15. Shared consciousness and asymmetry.Shao-Pu Kang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-17.
    It is widely held that there is an asymmetry between our access to our minds and our access to others’ minds. Philosophers in the literature tend to focus on the asymmetry between our access to our mental states and our access to those mental states of others that are not shared by us. What if a mental state can have multiple subjects? Is there still an asymmetry between our access to our mental states and our access to those mental states (...)
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  16. Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.
    This paper concerns a specific epistemic feature of believing for a reason (e.g., believing that it will rain on the basis of the grey clouds outside). It has commonly been assumed that our access to such facts about ourselves is akin in all relevant respects to our access to why other people hold their beliefs. Further, discussion of self-intimation - that we are necessarily in a position to know when we are in certain conditions - has centred largely around mental (...)
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  17. Augustine’s Master Argument for the Incorporeality of the Mind.Tamer Nawar - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):422-440.
    In De Trinitate 10, Augustine offers an argument that seemingly proceeds from certain premises about self-knowledge to the conclusion that the mind is incorporeal. Although the argument has sometimes been compared to later Cartesian arguments, it has received relatively little philosophical attention. In this paper, I offer a detailed analysis and original interpretation of Augustine's argument and argue that it is not vulnerable to some of the main objections which have been raised against it. I go on to argue that (...)
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  18. Opacity.Francey Russell - 2022 - The Philosopher 110 (3):37-41.
  19. The Social Epistemology of Introspection.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2022 - Mind and Language:1-18.
    I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves. On one popular view of speech acts, however, this is precisely what speakers do when speaking to others. On this basis, I argue that every bias discovered by social epistemology applies to introspection and other (...)
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  20. There Is Something to the Authority Thesis.Benjamin Winokur - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Research 47:115-132.
    Many philosophers accept an ‘Authority Thesis’ according to which self-ascriptions of one’s current mental states ordinarily are or ought to be met with a distinctive presumptive of truth. Recently, however, Wolfgang Barz (2018) has argued that there is no adequately specified Authority Thesis. This, he argues, is because available specifications are either (1) philosophically puzzling but implausible, or (2) plausible but philosophically unpuzzling. I argue that there are several plausible and philosophically puzzling specifications of the Authority Thesis.
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  21. Authoritatively avowing your imaginings by self-ascriptively expressing them.Benjamin Winokur - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):23-29.
    Neo-expressivism is the view that avowals—first-personal, present tense self-ascriptions of mental states—ordinarily express the very mental states that they semantically represent, such that they carry a strong presumption of truth and are immune to requests for epistemic support. Peter Langland-Hassan (2015. “Self-Knowledge and Imagination.” Philosophical Explorations 18 (2): 226–245) has argued that Neo-expressivism cannot accommodate avowals of one’s imaginings. In this short paper I argue that Neo-expressivism can, in fact, accommodate them.
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  22. There’s Something About Authority.Casey Doyle - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Research 46:363-374.
    Barz (2018) contends that there is no specification of the phenomenon of first-person authority that avoids falsity or triviality. This paper offers one. When a subject self-ascribes a current conscious mental state in speech, there is a presumption that what she says is true. To defeat this presumption, one must be able to explain how she has been led astray.
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  23. Introspection without Judgment.Anna Giustina - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86:407-427.
    The focus of this paper is introspection of phenomenal states, i.e. the distinctively first-personal method through which one can form beliefs about the phenomenology of one’s current conscious mental states. I argue that two different kinds of phenomenal state introspection should be distinguished: one which involves recognizing and classifying the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of a certain experience type, and another which does not involve such classification. Whereas the former is potentially judgment-like, the latter is not. I call (...)
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  24. Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation.Ali Hossein Khani - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):153-184.
    Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the “Externalist Explanation”. I will (...)
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  25. Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind.Eric Marcus - 2021 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once. Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation between one person's beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational mind--what makes it one mind--is what explains why, given what we already believe, we can't believe certain things and must believe certain others in this special (...)
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  26. A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation.Joel Pust - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (3):385-397.
    According to the probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, E confirms H relative to background knowledge K just in case P(H/K&E) > P(H/K). This requires an inequality between the rational degree of belief in H determined relative to two bodies of total knowledge which are such that one (K&E) includes the other (K) as a proper part. In this paper, I argue that it is quite plausible that there are no two possible bodies of total knowledge for ideally rational agents meeting (...)
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  27. Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1071-1087.
    Dretske is a “conciliatory skeptic” on self-knowledge. Take some subject S such that S thinks that P and S knows that she has thoughts. Dretske’s theory can be put as follows: S has a privileged way of knowing what she thinks, but she has no privileged way of knowing that she thinks it. There is much to be said on behalf of conciliatory skepticism and Dretske’s defense of it. We aim to show, however, that Dretske’s defense fails, in that if (...)
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  28. Critical Reasoning and the Inferential Transparency Method.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):23-42.
    Alex Byrne (2005; 2011a; 2011b; 2018) has argued that we can gain self-knowledge of our current mental states through the use of a transparency method. A transparency method provides an extrospective rather than introspective route to self-knowledge. For example, one comes to know whether one believes P not by thinking about oneself but by considering the world-directed question of whether P is true. According to Byrne, this psychological process consists in drawing inferences from world-directed propositions to mind-directed conclusions. In this (...)
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  29. Davidson, first-person authority, and direct self-knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13421-13440.
    Donald Davidson famously offered an explanation of “first-person authority”. However, he described first-person authority differently across different works—sometimes referring to the presumptive truth of agents’ self-ascriptions of their current mental states, and sometimes referring to the direct self-knowledge that agents often have of said states. First, I show that a standard Davidsonian explanation of first-person authority can at best, and with some modification, explain the presumptive truth of agents’ self-ascriptions. I then develop two Davidsonian accounts of direct self-knowledge—one accounting for (...)
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  30. Extending the Transparency Method beyond Belief: a Solution to the Generality Problem.Adam J. Andreotta - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):191-212.
    According to the Transparency Method, one can know whether one believes that P by attending to a question about the world—namely, ‘Is P true?’ On this view, one can know, for instance, whether one believes that Socrates was a Greek philosopher by attending to the question ‘Was Socrates a Greek philosopher?’ While many think that TM can account for the self-knowledge we can have of such a belief—and belief in general—fewer think that TM can be generalised to account for the (...)
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  31. Acting Without Me: Corporate Agency and the First Person Perspective.Herman Cappelen & Joshua Dever - 2020 - In Stephen Biggs & Heimir Geirsson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge. pp. 599-613.
    In our book The Inessential Indexical we argue that the various theses of essential indexicality all fail. Indexicals are not essential, we conclude. One essentiality thesis we target in the third chapter is the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action. Our strategy is to give examples of what we call impersonal action rationalizations , which explain actions without citing indexical attitudes. To defeat the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action, it suffices that there could be even (...)
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  32. Connaissance négative et conscience (de) soi.Jörg Disse - 2020 - In Sebastian Hüsch, Isabelle Koch & Philipp Thomas (eds.), Negative Knowledge. Tübingen: Narr Francke. pp. 73-88.
    La connaissance négative ne se cantonne pas à la connaissance de Dieu. Partant de l’idée d’une conscience préréflexive qu’à la suite de l’école de Heidelberg je considère comme indispensable à une compréhension adéquate de la conscience humaine et dont Jean-Paul Sartre marque la particularité en l’appelant conscience (de) soi, j’affirme, en me référant à Dieter Henrich, qu’il n’y a d’accès à une telle conscience que par une connaissance négative, comme celle développée par Thomas d’Aquin dans sa doctrine de Dieu. Les (...)
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  33. Two epistemological arguments against two semantic dispositionalisms.Andrea Guardo - 2020 - Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts 1 (1):13-25.
    Even though he is not very explicit about it, in “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language” Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses ‒ the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the philosophy of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I (...)
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  34. Interpretationism and judgement-dependence.Ali Hossein Khani - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9639-9659.
    According to Wright’s Judgement-Dependent account of intention, facts about a subject’s intentions can be taken to be constituted by facts about the subject’s best opinions about them formed under certain optimal conditions. This paper aims to defend this account against three main objections which have been made to it by Boghossian, Miller and implicitly by Wright himself. It will be argued that Miller’s objection is implausible because it fails to take into account the partial-determination claim in this account. Boghossian’s objection (...)
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  35. The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):325-343.
    This paper examines how new evil demon problems could arise for our access to the internal world of our own minds. I start by arguing that the internalist/externalist debate in epistemology has been widely misconstrued---we need to reconfigure the debate in order to see how it can arise about our access to the internal world. I then argue for the coherence of scenarios of radical deception about our own minds, and I use them to defend a properly formulated internalist view (...)
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  36. Confabulation does not undermine introspection for propositional attitudes.Adam J. Andreotta - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4851-4872.
    According to some, such as Carruthers (2009, 2010, 2011, 2015), the confabulation data (experimental data showing subjects making false psychological self-ascriptions) undermine the view that we can know our propositional attitudes by introspection. He believes that these data favour his interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory—the view that self-knowledge of our propositional attitudes always involves self-interpretation of our sensations, behaviour, or situational cues. This paper will review some of the confabulation data and conclude that the presence and pattern of these data do (...)
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  37. Urteilen, Glauben, Bewusstsein: Ein Kommentar zu Andreas Kemmerlings Glauben. Essay über einen Begriff.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (2):279-284.
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  38. Introspektion.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 129-135.
  39. Transparency and self‐knowledge, by Alex Byrne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, xi + 227 pp. ISBN: 9780198821618. hb £30.00. [REVIEW]Casey Doyle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):515-518.
  40. Aiding self-knowledge.Casey Doyle - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1104-1121.
    Some self-knowledge must be arrived at by the subject herself, rather than being transmitted by another’s testimony. Yet in many cases the subject interacts with an expert in part because she is likely to have the relevant knowledge of their mind. This raises a question: what is the expert’s knowledge like that there are barriers to simply transmitting it by testimony? I argue that the expert’s knowledge is, in some circumstances, proleptic, referring to attitudes the subject would hold were she (...)
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  41. ‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant.Thomas Khurana - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):956-979.
    The paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the (...)
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  42. What has Transparency to do with Husserlian Phenomenology?Chad Kidd - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:221-242.
    This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...)
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  43. Assertion and transparent self-knowledge.Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):873-889.
    We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm ‘Assert that p only if you believe that p’. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own (...)
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  44. Suspicious Minds: Coliva on Moore’s Paradox and Commitment.Aidan McGlynn - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):313-322.
  45. Colivan Commitment, vis-à-vis Moore’s Paradox.Ted Parent - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):323-333.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for (...)
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  46. Concepts, conceptions and self-knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2019 - Erkenntnis (y).
    Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a con-scious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind.
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  47. Alien Experience.Maura Tumulty - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    “If I were a better human being, that person’s voice wouldn’t sound so shrill to me.” Many of us may have had such thoughts. They give voice to the worrying intuition that if we were less affected by sexism and racism, or better at keeping our tempers, our fellow humans would look and sound differently to us. Making sense of this unease requires us to re-think the relation between experiences and standing commitments; to reconsider what we mean by self-control; and (...)
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  48. Is There Anything to the Authority Thesis?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:125-143.
    Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascriptions enjoy a certain kind of authority that other-ascriptions lack (the Authority Thesis). The aim of this paper is not to expand the stock of existing explanations but to ask whether the Authority Thesis can be adequately specified. To this end, I identify three requirements that must be met by any satisfactory specification. I conclude that the search for an adequate specification of the Authority Thesis leads to (...)
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  49. Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’.Tim Button - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:205-229.
    In the early-to-mid 1930s, Wittgenstein investigated solipsism via the philosophy of language. In this paper, I want to reopen Wittgenstein's ‘grammatical’ examination of solipsism.Wittgenstein begins by considering the thesis that only I can feel my pains. Whilst this thesis may tempt us towards solipsism, Wittgenstein points out that this temptation rests on a grammatical confusion concerning the phrase ‘my pains’. In Section 1, I unpack and vindicate his thinking. After discussing ‘my pains’, Wittgenstein makes his now famous suggestion that the (...)
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  50. Transparency and Self-Knowledge.Alex Byrne - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    You know what someone else is thinking and feeling by observing them. But how do you know what you are thinking and feeling? This is the problem of self-knowledge: Alex Byrne tries to solve it. The idea is that you know this not by taking a special kind of look at your own mind, but by an inference from a premise about your environment.
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