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1 — 50 / 267
  1. added 2019-01-16
    What has Transparency to Do with Husserlian Phenomenology?Chad Kidd - forthcoming - ProtoSociology.
    This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...)
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  2. added 2019-01-02
    Authority Without Privilege: How to Be a Dretskean Conciliatory Skeptic on Self-Knowledge.Michael Roche & William Roche - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    Dretske is a “conciliatory skeptic” on self-knowledge. Take some subject S such that (i) S thinks that P and (ii) S knows that she has thoughts. Dretske’s theory can be put as follows: S has a privileged way of knowing what she thinks, but she has no privileged way of knowing that she thinks it. There is much to be said on behalf of conciliatory skepticism (“CS” for short) and Dretske’s defense of it. We aim to show, however, that Dretske’s (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-06
    Suspicious Minds: Coliva on Moore’s Paradox and Commitment.Aidan McGlynn - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-10.
  4. added 2018-08-29
    Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge.Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one is asserting is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm “Assert that p only if you believe that p”. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s (...)
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  5. added 2018-08-29
    Practical Knowledge as Knowledge of a Normative Judgment.Eric Marcus - 2018 - Manuscrito (4):319-347.
    According to one interpretation of Aristotle’s famous thesis, to say that action is the conclusion of practical reasoning is to say that action is itself a judgment about what to do. A central motivation for the thesis is that it suggests a path for understanding the non-observational character of practical knowledge. If actions are judgments, then whatever explains an agent’s knowledge of the relevant judgment can explain her knowledge of the action. I call the approach to action that accepts Aristotle’s (...)
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  6. added 2018-08-28
    What Autism May Tell Us About Self-Awareness: A Commentary on Frith and Happé.Diana Raffman - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (1):23–31.
  7. added 2018-07-18
    Colivan Commitment, Vis-À-Vis Moore’s Paradox.Ted Parent - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-11.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for (...)
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  8. added 2018-07-14
    Is There Anything to the Authority Thesis?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:125-143.
    Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascriptions enjoy a certain kind of authority that other-ascriptions lack (the Authority Thesis). The aim of this paper is not to expand the stock of existing explanations but to ask whether the Authority Thesis can be adequately specified. To this end, I identify three requirements that must be met by any satisfactory specification. I conclude that the search for an adequate specification of the Authority Thesis leads to (...)
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  9. added 2018-07-02
    The Naked Truth About First-Person Knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36.
  10. added 2018-06-15
    The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper examines how new evil demon problems could arise for our access to the internal world of our own minds. I start by arguing that the internalist/externalist debate in epistemology has been widely misconstrued---we need to reconfigure the debate in order to see how it can arise about our access to the internal world. I then argue for the coherence of scenarios of radical deception about our own minds, and I use them to defend a properly formulated internalist view (...)
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  11. added 2018-04-13
    Moran, Richard. The story of my life: narrative and self-understanding. [REVIEW]César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2017 - Analytica (Rio) 21 (1):259-262.
  12. added 2018-03-25
    Incorrigibilidade nas circunstâncias adequadas: “qualquer tipo de enunciado pode oferecer evidências para qualquer outro tipo”.Eros Carvalho - 2014 - Analytica (Rio) 18 (2):41-65.
    In this paper, I present the discussion between Ayer and Austin about whether sentences or utterances can be incorrigible and I argue in favor of Austin position. I defend Austin against objections from Ayer presented after the publication of Sense & Sensibilia. Unlike what was sustained by Ayer, experiential sentences and material object sentences are not epistemically asymmetrical. A material object sentence can be incorrigible if uttered in appropriated circumstances, and an experiential sentence can be corrigible if uttered in unappropriated (...)
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  13. added 2018-03-09
    The Moral Development of First‐Person Authority.Victoria McGeer - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):81-108.
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  14. added 2018-03-05
    Confabulation and Rational Requirements for Self-Knowledge.Sophie Keeling - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology.
    This paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why (...)
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  15. added 2018-03-05
    As origens do expressivismo e o ponto de Geach.César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - Dissertatio:3-26.
    Our question, in this paper, is about the plausibility of the expressivist account of one’s self- attribution of mental states. More to the point, we will strictly follow the principle of charity as a mean to show that an expressivist philosopher can have good and reasonable answers to the set of objections put together in so called “Geach’s point”. Using this method, we hope to give enough evidences that an expressivist philosopher has enough resources to build a plausible explanation for (...)
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  16. added 2018-02-18
    I-Knowing What You Believe.Quassim Cassam - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):1-23.
    A familiar claim is that knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes is normally immediate, that is, not normally based on observation, inference or evidence. One explanation of the possibility of immediate self-knowledge turns on the transparency of the question ‘Do I believe that P?’ to the question ‘Is it the case that P?’ This paper explains why occurrent mental states such as passing thoughts do not fall within the purview of the transparency account and proposes a different (...)
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  17. added 2018-02-17
    Evans and First Person Authority.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a belief and (...)
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  18. added 2018-02-17
    Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2004 - In M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 297-339.
    The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises from the (...)
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  19. added 2018-02-17
    Why Did We Think We Dreamed in Black and White?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (4):649-660.
    In the 1950s, dream researchers commonly thought that dreams were predominantly a black and white phenomenon, although both earlier and later treatments of dreaming assume or assert that dreams have color. The first half of the twentieth century saw the rise of black and white film media, and it is likely that the emergence of the view that dreams are black and white was connected to this change in film technology. If our opinions about basic features of our dreams can (...)
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  20. added 2018-02-06
    Hidden Qualia.Derek Shiller - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):165-180.
    In this paper, I propose that those who reject higher-order theories of consciousness should not rule out the possibility of having conscious experiences that they cannot introspect. I begin by offering four arguments that such non-introspectible conscious experiences are possible. Next, I offer two arguments for thinking that we actually have such experiences. According to the first argument, it is unlikely that evolution would have furnished us with a faculty of introspection that worked flawlessly. According to the second argument, there (...)
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  21. added 2018-01-25
    Saying Without Knowing What or How.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):351-382.
    In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic realization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean intention-based semantics should seek divorce from Cartesian assumptions of transparent access to propositional attitudes and, consequently, that Stephen Schiffer's so-called meaning-intention problem is not powerful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization in contemporary philosophy (...)
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  22. added 2018-01-20
    If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Logos and Episteme:389-416.
    Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that (...)
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  23. added 2017-11-16
    Explicaciones "racionalistas" de la autoridad de la primera persona.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2010 - In Jaime Labastida & Violeta Aréchiga (eds.), Identidad y diferencia. Vol. 3: La filosofía y la ciencia. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI and Asociación Filosófica de México. pp. 211-226.
    Conocemos la propia mente mejor que la mente de otras personas. Explicaciones racionalistas dicen que este fenómeno se debe a nuestra racionalidad: Somos capaces de ajustar nuestras creencias e intenciones racionalmente en vista de su coherencia o de nueva evidencia y tal ajuste requiere que conozcamos nuestras creencias e intenciones con la autoridad de la primera persona. Examino pasajes de McGinn, Shoemaker y Burge, criticando el argumento en tres puntos: (1) Es posible pensar racionalmente sin autoconocimiento. (2) Los requerimientos racionalistas (...)
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  24. added 2017-11-15
    Wright y la autoridad de la primera persona: Problemas de teorías constitutivas de la autoridad.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2007 - In Jorge Martínez Contreras & Aura Ponce de León (eds.), El saber filosófico. Vol. 3: Tópicos. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI and Asociación Filosófica de México, A.C.. pp. 265-276.
  25. added 2017-11-01
    Action Without The First Person Perspective.Herman Cappelen & Joshua Dever - manuscript
    In our book The Inessential Indexical we argue that the various theses of essential indexicality all fail. Indexicals are not essential, we conclude. One essentiality thesis we target in the third chapter is the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action. Our strategy is to give examples of what we call impersonal action rationalizations , which explain actions without citing indexical attitudes. To defeat the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action, it suffices that there could be even (...)
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  26. added 2017-10-24
    Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.
    This article explores whether perspective taking has an impact on the ascription of epistemic states. To do so, a new method is introduced which incites participants to imagine themselves in the position of the protagonist of a short vignette and to judge from her perspective. In a series of experiments, perspective proves to have a significant impact on belief ascriptions, but not on knowledge ascriptions. For belief, perspective is further found to moderate the epistemic side-effect effect significantly. It is hypothesized (...)
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  27. added 2017-10-05
    Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Jordi Fernandez. Oxford: OUP, 2013, Xx + 245 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-966402-3 Hb £42.00. [REVIEW]Matthew Parrott - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (S1):e19-e22.
  28. added 2017-09-19
    Transparency and Partial Beliefs.Weng Hong Tang - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):153-166.
    How should we account for self-knowledge of our inner lives? Some have argued that just as we have various senses that allow us to perceive the environment, we have an inner sense that allows us to perceive our inner lives. But others find such a view implausible and think that there are other ways to account for self-knowledge. With respect to all-or-nothing beliefs, some have held that we may account for self-knowledge by appealing to the claim that such beliefs are (...)
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  29. added 2017-09-12
    Indexicality, Transparency, and Mental Files.Derek Nelson Ball - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):353-367.
    Francois Recanati’s Mental Files presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for regarding mental representations as indexical, and there are counterexamples to transparency.
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  30. added 2017-08-06
    Reliability of a Speaker and Recognition of a Listener: Bocheński and Nyāya on the Relation of Authority.Agnieszka Rostalska - 2017 - Kervan. International Journal of Afro-Asiatic Studies 21:155-173.
    In the Nyāyasūtras (NS), the fundamental text of the Nyāya tradition, testimony is defined as a statement of a reliable speaker (āpta). According to the NS, such a speaker should possess three qualities: competence, honesty and desire to speak. The content of a discourse, including the prescriptions, is also considered reliable due to the status of a given author and the person that communicated it. -/- The Polish philosopher J.M. Bocheński similarly stresses the role of a speaker; he holds that (...)
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  31. added 2017-07-02
    What It's Like To Have a Cognitive Home.Matt Duncan - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):66-81.
    Many people believe that the mind is an epistemic refuge of sorts. The idea is that when it comes to certain core mental states, one’s being in such a state automatically puts one in a position to know that one is in that state. This idea has come under attack in recent years. One particularly influential attack comes from Timothy Williamson (2000), who argues that there is no central core of states or conditions—mental or otherwise—to which we are guaranteed epistemic (...)
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  32. added 2017-04-24
    Why Care Beyond the Square? Classical and Extended Shapes of Oppositions in Their Application to „Introspective Disputes“.Fink S. Benjamin - 2017 - In Jean-Yves Béziau & Gianfranco Basti (eds.), The Square of Opposition: A Cornerstone of Thought (Studies in Universal Logic). Birkhäuser. pp. 325-337.
    So called “shapes of opposition”—like the classical square of opposition and its extensions—can be seen as graphical representations of the ways in which types of statements constrain each other in their possible truth values. As such, they can be used as a novel way of analysing the subject matter of disputes. While there have been great refinements and extensions of this logico-topological tool in the last years, the broad range of shapes of opposition are not widely known outside of a (...)
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  33. added 2017-03-15
    Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense.Cynthia Macdonald - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):711-738.
    What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve detailed examination. Shoemaker's arguments are directed against (...)
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  34. added 2017-03-10
    Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind: An Essay in Neo-Sellarsian Philosophy.T. Parent - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
    _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...)
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  35. added 2017-03-05
    First-Person Privilege, Judgment, and Avowal.Kateryna Samoilova - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):169-182.
    It is a common intuition that I am in a better position to know my own mental states than someone else's. One view that takes this intuition very seriously is Neo-Expressivism, providing a “non-epistemic” account of first-person privilege. But some have denied that we enjoy any principled first-person privilege, as do those who have the Third-Person View, according to which there is no deep difference in our epistemic position with regard to our own and others' mental states. Despite their apparently (...)
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  36. added 2017-03-02
    Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske's Theory, and Why It Matters.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):975-992.
    Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the knowledge denied by its negative side? The (...)
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  37. added 2017-03-02
    Knowing Our Degrees of Belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...)
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  38. added 2017-02-16
    Ralf Stoecker , Reflecting Davidson. Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers. [REVIEW]Verena Mayer - 1995 - ProtoSociology 7:218-222.
  39. added 2017-02-15
    Feminist Skepticism, Authority, and Transparency.Margaret Urban Walker - unknown
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  40. added 2017-02-14
    Transparent Minds. A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Fernández, Jordi.Thor Grünbaum - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):413-413.
  41. added 2017-02-14
    Co‐Op Students' Access to Shared Knowledge in Science‐Rich Workplaces.Hugh Munby, Jennifer Taylor, Peter Chin & Nancy L. Hutchinson - 2007 - Science Education 91 (1):115-132.
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  42. added 2017-02-13
    On Davidson's View of First—Person Authority.Bruce Aune - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press. pp. 214.
  43. added 2017-02-13
    Donald Davidson on the First Person Authority.P. Kotatko - 1999 - Filosoficky Casopis 47 (2):215-226.
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  44. added 2017-02-12
    Notes Et Discussions On Donald Davidson's First Person Authority.W. J. Holly - 1986 - Dialectica 40 (2):153-156.
  45. added 2017-02-10
    On Davidson's View of First-Person Authority.Bruce Aune - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
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  46. added 2017-02-01
    Davidson's Second Person.Claudine Verheggen - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):361-369.
    According to Donald Davidson, language is social in that only a person who has interacted linguistically with another could have a language. This paper is a discussion of Davidson’s argument in defence of that claim. I argue that he has not succeeded in establishing it, but that he has provided many of the materials out of which a successful argument could be built. Chief among these are the claims that some version of externalism about meaning is true, that possession of (...)
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  47. added 2017-01-29
    Why Transparency Undermines Economy.Derek Clayton Baker - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3037-3050.
    Byrne offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address.
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  48. added 2017-01-26
    Self-Knowledge,'Transparency', and the Forms of Activity.Richard Moran - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 211.
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  49. added 2017-01-26
    Belief, Authority, Structure.Niilo Kauppi - 2000 - Semiotica 131 (3-4):383-391.
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  50. added 2017-01-24
    The Presidential Address: Knowing What You Believe.Quassim Cassam - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):1 - 23.
    A familiar claim is that knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes is normally immediate, that is, not normally based on observation, inference or evidence. One explanation of the possibility of immediate self-knowledge turns on the transparency of the question 'Do I believe that P?' to the question 'Is it the case that P?' This paper explains why occurrent mental states such as passing thoughts do not fall within the purview of the transparency account and proposes a different (...)
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1 — 50 / 267