About this topic
Summary There is a contrast between third-person attitudes which represent the world from a god's eye perspective and first-person attitudes which represent things from our own subjective location. Third-person attitudes concern what the universe is like; first-person attitudes, on the other hand, concern our position within the universe—what we ourselves are like, and where we are located in space or time. John Perry and David Lewis have argued that first-person attitudes challenge the received understanding of propositional attitudes, and suggested that first-person attitudes have special first-person contents (Lewis) or special first-person modes of presentation (Perry). First-person attitudes seem to play a special role in cognition and action.  
Key works Pioneering papers on the significance of first-person attitudes are Castañeda 1966 and Castaneda 1967. The by now orthodox view that first-person attitudes are incompatible with the traditional theory of attitudes was argued for by Perry 1977, Perry 1979 and Lewis 1979. Early criticisms of Perry's and Lewis's arguments are found in Boër & Lycan 1980 and  Stalnaker 1981. More recent opposition against orthodoxy can be found in Cappelen & Dever 2013 and Magidor 2015. Torre & Weber 2022 offer a defence of the orthodox view. 
Introductions Perry 1993Récanati 2007; Feit 2008Ninan 2010Ninan 2016;  García-Carpintero & Torre 2016; Torre & Weber 2021
Related

Contents
950 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 950
  1. First Person Singular: Review of: Brian Rotman: Becoming Beside Ourselves: Alphabet, ghosts, distributed human beings. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - manuscript
    Brian Rotman argues that (one) “mind” and (one) “god” are only conceivable, literally, because of (alphabetic) literacy, which allowed us to designate each of these ghosts as an incorporeal, speaker-independent “I” (or, in the case of infinity, a notional agent that goes on counting forever). I argue that to have a mind is to have the capacity to feel. No one can be sure which organisms feel, hence have minds, but it seems likely that one-celled organisms and plants do not, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Individual Consciousness.Roderick Malcolm MacLeod - manuscript
    If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these consciousnesses, one's own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular consciousness. But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context to be specified. This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. First-Person Plural Quantum Mechanics.Ulrich J. Mohrhoff - manuscript
    Doing justice to quantum mechanics calls for a deeper examination of the relations between our experience, its objects, and its subjects than either third-person interpretations or the first-person singular interpretation of the QBist permit. The metaphysical space opened by Bohr's employment of the "Kantian wedge" between the objective world, about which we can communicate, and the world "in itself" allows quantum mechanics to unfold its metaphysical potential. This in turn makes it possible to go a long way towards bridging the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Being Embodied: First-Person Judgements and Their Relation to Embodiment.Anne Newstead - manuscript
    This is a grant proposal written as a post-doctoral application for MQRF at Macquarie University in 2009. As I did so much research for it, I have plans to spin it into an article. I note with pleasure the increased relevance of this kind of research given developments such as Neuralink and ChatGPT.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Self-locating belief and the goal of accuracy.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    The goal of a partial belief is to be accurate, or close to the truth. By appealing to this norm, I seek norms for partial beliefs in self-locating and non-self-locating propositions. My aim is to find norms that are analogous to the Bayesian norms, which, I argue, only apply unproblematically to partial beliefs in non-self-locating propositions. I argue that the goal of a set of partial beliefs is to minimize the expected inaccuracy of those beliefs. However, in the self-locating framework, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. The Self, Self-knowledge, and a Flattened Path to Self-improvement.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This essay explores the connection between theories of the self and theories of self-knowledge, arguing (a) that empirical results strongly support a certain negative thesis about the self, a thesis about what the self isn’t, and (b) that a more promising account of the self makes available unorthodox – but likely apt – ways of characterizing self-knowledge. Regarding (a), I argue that the human self does not appear at a personal level the autonomous (or quasi-autonomous) status of which might provide (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Perspective Reasoning and the Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Xianda Gao - 2018
    This paper proposes a new explanation for the paradoxes related to anthropic reasoning. Solutions to the Sleeping Beauty Problem and the Doomsday argument are discussed in detail. The main argument can be summarized as follows: -/- Our thoughts, reasonings and narratives inherently comes from a certain perspective. With each perspective there is a center, or using the term broadly, a self. The natural first-person perspective is most primitive. However we can also think and express from others’ perspectives with a theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Kant and the significance of self-consciousness.Matthew Boyle - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. First-Person Propositions.Michael Caie & Dilip Ninan - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    A central dispute in discussions of self-locating attitudes is whether attitude relations like believing and knowing are relations between an agent and properties (things that vary in truth value across individuals) or between an agent and propositions (things that do not so vary). Proponents of the proposition view have argued that the property view is unable to give an adequate account of relations like communication and agreement. We agree with this critique of the property view, and in this essay we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. The First Person.James Cargile - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
    James Cargile ABSTRACT: Many languages have a first person singular subject pronoun. Fewer also have a first person singular object pronoun. The term ‘I’ is commonly used to refer to the person using the term. It has a variety of other uses. A normal person is able to refer...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Self-Reference: The Meta-Mathematics of the Liar Paradox.Richard Kimberly Heck - forthcoming - In TBA.
    Central to the liar paradox is the phenomenon of 'self-reference'. The paradox typically begins with a sentence like: -/- (L): (L) is not true -/- Historically, doubts about the intelligibility of self-reference have been quite common. In some sense, though, these doubts were answered by Kurt Gödel's famous 'diagonal lemma'. This paper surveys some of the methods by which self-reference can be achieved, focusing first on purely syntactic methods before turning attention to the 'arithmetized' methods introduced by Gödel. It's primary (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. When you isn't you. The attraction of self­-ascription in children’s interpretation of pronouns in reported speech.Franziska Köder & Maier Emar - forthcoming - Glossa.
    In language comprehension, 'you' is a de se pronoun, which means that its interpretation is guided by a simple de se rule ('you' = self-ascription by addressee), while the interpretation of other pronouns requires more complicated reasoning. This predicts that 'you' should be easier to process than 'I' or 'he', especially for children. But not all occurrences of 'you' can be correctly interpreted via self-ascription. We consider two cases where 'you' does not indicate self-ascription: interpretation as an eavesdropper and 'you' (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Pregnant Thinkers.David Mark Kovacs - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Do pregnant mothers have fetuses as parts? According to the “parthood view” they do, while according to the “containment view” they don’t. This paper raises a novel puzzle about pregnancy: if mothers have their fetuses as parts, then wherever there is a pregnant mother, there is also a smaller thinking being that has every part of the mother except for those that overlap with the fetus. This problem resembles a familiar overpopulation puzzle from the personal identity literature, known as the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Indexicality and de se reports.Philippe Schlenker - forthcoming - In Maienborn von Heusinger & Mouton Gruyter Portneder (eds.), Handbook of Semantics.
  15. Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About It: Confusions, Virtues and Challenges of Higher-order Theories (in) Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal.Miguel Angel Sebastian - forthcoming - Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.
  16. What if We Seem to Seem and Not Seem? Estimating the Unreasonable Price of Illusionism.Biplab Karak - 2024 - Problemos 105:180-195.
    With its strategic consideration of phenomenal consciousness illusorily seeming to us, illusionism claims to deny phenomenality and thereby obviate the hard problem of consciousness. The problem with illusionism, however, is that, although its thesis appears persuasively simple, it strikes as absurd insofar as the phenomenal illusions themselves also seem as much as phenomenality, keeping no fundamental differences between the two. In short, it reinforces the same phenomenon/issue, i.e., phenomenality, that it claims to deny/avoid. This single absurdity is reflective of its (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Transparency and the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis.Victor Lange & Thor Grünbaum - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):822-843.
    Many philosophers endorse the Transparency Thesis, the claim that by introspection one cannot become aware of one's experience. Recently, some authors have suggested that the Transparency Thesis is challenged by introspective states reached under mindfulness. We label this the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis. The present paper develops the hypothesis in important new ways. First, we motivate the hypothesis by drawing on recent clinical psychology and cognitive science of mindfulness. Secondly, we develop the hypothesis by describing the implied shift in experiential perspective, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action.David Lumsden & Joseph Ulatowski - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):399-414.
    Virtues can be considered to play a causal role in the production of behaviour and so too can our self-narratives. We identify a point of connection between the two cases and draw a parallel between them. But, those folk psychological notions, virtues and self-narratives, fail to reduce smoothly to the underlying human physiology. As a first step towards handling that failure to connect with the scientific framework that is the familiar grounding for our understanding of causation, we consider the causal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Cogito and Moore.David James Barnett - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.
    Self-verifying judgments like _I exist_ seem rational, and self-defeating ones like _It will rain, but I don’t believe it will rain_ seem irrational_._ But one’s evidence might support a self-defeating judgment, and fail to support a self-verifying one. This paper explains how it can be rational to defy one’s evidence if judgment is construed as a mental performance or act, akin to inner assertion. The explanation comes at significant cost, however. Instead of causing or constituting beliefs, judgments turn out to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Descartes on Selfhood, Conscientia, the First Person and Beyond.Andrea Christofidou - 2023 - In Andrea Strazzoni & Marco Sgarbi (eds.), Reading Descartes. Consciousness, Body, and Reasoning. Florence: Firenze University Press. pp. 9-40.
    I discuss Descartes’ metaphysics of selfhood, and relevant parts of contemporary philosophy regarding the first person. My two main concerns are the controversy that surrounds Descartes’ conception of conscientia, mistranslated as ‘consciousness’, and his conception of selfhood and its essential connection to conscientia. ‘I’-thoughts give rise to the most challenging philosophical questions. An answer to the questions concerning the peculiarities of the first person, self-identification and self-ascription, is to be found in Descartes’ notion of conscientia. His conception of selfhood insightfully (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’.Tadeusz Ciecierski & Jakub Rudnicki - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1100-1119.
    Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. Defending Moderate De Se Skepticism.Henry Clarke - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):661-677.
    Moderate skepticism about de se thought accepts that there is a kind of mental state which is about the thinker and is psychologically indispensable for intentional action, but rejects the claim that this kind employs an indexical way of referring. Morgan (2021) has proposed an explanatory argument meant to show that the psychological kind does employ an indexical way of referring to the thinker, on the basis of the special connection between these thoughts and the use of the first-person pronoun (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. A Puzzle About First-Person Imagination.Weber Clas - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (8):1-21.
    It is easy to imagine being someone else from the first-person point of view. Such imaginings give rise to a puzzle. In this paper I explain what the puzzle is and then consider several existing attempts of solving the puzzle. I argue that these attempts are unsuccessful. I propose a Lewisian account of first-person imagination and make the case that this account has the potential to solve the puzzle.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. De se thought and immunity to error through misidentification.Hongqing Cui - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
    _(MA thesis)_ Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) describes a sort of immunity against such a situation that the thinker wrongly identifies something as other things. Philosophers consider it as being especially relevant to first-person or de se judgments. Many philosophers seem to advance IEM as an alternative to a Cartesian method of defining first-person privilege and of circumscribing the first-person perspective. However, as more and more representative instances are substantiated as being vulnerable to error through misidentification, it is thus (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Vasubandhu on the First Person.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 93:23-53.
    In classical South Asia, most philosophers thought that the self (if it exists at all) is what the first-person pronoun ‘I’ stands for. It is something that persists through time, undergoes conscious thoughts and experiences, and exercises control over actions. The Buddhists accepted the ‘no self’ thesis: they denied that such a self is substantially real. This gave rise to a puzzle for these Buddhists. If there is nothing substantially real that ‘I’ stands for, what are we talking about when (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Kant on First-Person Speech and Personhood.Raphaël Ehrsam - 2023 - Kant Yearbook 15 (1):53-76.
    Kant stresses the presence, in all languages, of first-person formulas. In the Anthropology, § 1, he argues (i) that the use of ‘I’ (or any other linguistic form referring to the speaker) makes the human being “a person”, and (ii) that the use of the first-person pronoun enables the child to “think herself”. In the present paper, I claim that, in order to understand those assertions, first-person linguistic formulas should not be construed as mere expressions of an infra-discursive self-awareness; for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Contemplating on the Nature of Selfhood in DoC Patients: Neurophenomenological Perspective.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2023 - Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 22 (1):23.
    Medical well-regarded policy recommendations for patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) are almost exclusively relied on behavioural examination and evaluation of higher-order cognition, and largely disregard the patients’ self. This is so because practically establishing the presence of self-awareness or Selfhood is even more challenging than evaluating the presence of consciousness. At the same time, establishing the potential (actual physical possibility) of Selfhood in DoC patients is crucialy important from clinical, ethical, and moral standpoints because Selfhood is the most central (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. The Selfhood-Components Dynamics in the Spectrum of Discrete Normotypical and Pathological Modes (2nd edition).Andrew and Alexander Fingelkurts - 2023 - Journal of Neurophilosophy 2 (2):402-431.
    In this first-of-its-kind neurophenomenological study we investigated the dynamic configuration and the levels of variability of the “Self”-, “Me”-, and “I”- components that comprise a complex experiential Selfhood across 16 distinct modes covering a range of healthy-normal, altered, and pathological brain states. The phenomenology was addressed by examining the mental structures of subjective self-experience, and for the neurophysiological counterpart, we used electroencephalogram analysis to gather data on three subnets of the self-referential brain network that correspond to the three components of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness.M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.) - 2023 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self—a self-experience—whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of the fact that it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness.M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.) - 2023 - Oxford University Press.
    Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self – a self-experience – whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts.Ali Hossein Khani - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):41-56.
    ABSTRACT A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. How Digital Technology Shapes Self-Consciousness in Work Relationships? Reference to Hegel.Albena Neschen - 2023 - Philosophy of Management 22 (2):261-273.
    Up to now, there is a big debate, about what self-consciousness is, what inhibits it, and how this is related to work. By referring to classical theories of mind by Hegel this paper advances the thesis of an apparent congruence of self-consciousness and work as a developmental process in social relationships. This paper aims to open up a wider philosophical horizon for the criticism of current digitalization and the increasing variety of new flexible forms of work design. For example, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Revisiting the Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness Based on the Meaning of “I”.Maik Niemeck - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1505-1523.
    A widely shared view in the literature on first-person thought is that the ability to entertain first-person thoughts requires prior non-conceptual forms of self-consciousness. Many philosophers maintain that the distinctive awareness which accompanies the use of the first person already presupposes a non-conceptual consciousness of the fact that oneself is the owner of a first-person thought. I call this argument The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness based on the Meaning of “I” and will demonstrate that most proponents of the presented argument (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Self-reference and type distinctions in Greek philosophy and mathematics.Ioannis M. Vandoulakis - 2023 - In Jens Lemanski & Ingolf Max (eds.), Historia Logicae and its Modern Interpretation. London: College Publications. pp. 3-36.
    In this paper, we examine a fundamental problem that appears in Greek philosophy: the paradoxes of self-reference of the type of “Third Man” that appears first in Plato’s 'Parmenides', and is further discussed in Aristotle and the Peripatetic commentators and Proclus. We show that the various versions are analysed using different language, reflecting different understandings by Plato and the Platonists, such as Proclus, on the one hand, and the Peripatetics (Aristotle, Alexander, Eudemus), on the other hand. We show that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Dotting the I think.Martijn Wallage - 2023 - In James Conant & Jesse M. Mulder (eds.), Reading Rödl: on Self-consciousness and objectivity. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness & Objectivity (SC&O) and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In a statement of the form “I think p”, the words “I think” do not contribute to the content and yet they are not redundant. What comes to the same, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 ed. by Francesco Bellucci (review).Cornelis de Waal - 2022 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (3):265-269.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 ed. by Francesco BellucciCornelis de WaalEdited by Francesco BellucciCharles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020; no index.With Francesco Bellucci's Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 and the Peirceana series, which Bellucci co-edits with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, the center of gravity in Peirce studies has dramatically shifted to Europe. The powerhouses of old, such as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Depersonalization Puzzle: A New View from the Neurophenomenological Selfhood Perspective.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2022 - Journal of Neurophilosophy 1 (2):181-202.
    While there is still a limited understanding of the Selfhood phenomenon, an emerging consensus is that the experiential Selfhood refers to a sense of the undergoing experience in its implicit first-person mode of givenness that is immediately and tacitly given as “mine”. It is also evident that there are phenomenological disruptions within self-consciousness ranging from normal everyday short-lived dissociative episodes to pathological, intense and prolonged forms of dissociative experience classified as depersonalization disorder (DD). In the present study we explored the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Self, Me and I in the repertoire of spontaneously occurring altered states of Selfhood: eight neurophenomenological case study reports.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - 2022 - Cognitive Neurodynamics 16:255–282.
    This study investigates eight case reports of spontaneously emerging, brief episodes of vivid altered states of Selfhood (ASoSs) that occurred during mental exercise in six long-term meditators by using a neurophenomenological electroencephalography (EEG) approach. In agreement with the neurophenomenological methodology, first-person reports were used to identify such spontaneous ASoSs and to guide the neural analysis, which involved the estimation of three operational modules of the brain self-referential network (measured by EEG operational synchrony). The result of such analysis demonstrated that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Minimal Fregeanism.Aidan Gray - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):429-458.
    Among the virtues of relationist approaches to Frege’s puzzle is that they put us in a position to outline structural features of the puzzle that were only implicit in earlier work. In particular, they allow us to frame questions about the relation between the explanatory roles of sense and sameness of sense. In this paper, I distinguish a number of positions about that relation which have not been clearly distinguished. This has a few pay-offs. It allows us to shed light (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40. Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):241-294.
    Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse. This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems showing that, in this setting, any updating (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. The Essential Indexical and Self-Consciousness: ‘I’, ‘Now’, and ‘Here’ as Aspects of Self-Consciousness.Andrija Jurić - 2022 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 35 (2):31-52.
    This paper aims to analyse egocentric indexicals ‘I’, ‘now’, and ‘here’ as different aspects of the same self-conscious or self-referential act emphasising the underlying phenomenological structure of the essential indexical ‘I’. What makes an indexical essential is not its indexicality but the egocentric mental state indicated by its use. Therefore, interpreting them only in the confines of language severely limits the scope of the investigation. First, I will define the pure use of ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘I’, which will consequently lead (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Negotiating identities : First person pronominal use between Japanese university students.Judit Kroo - 2022 - Pragmatics and Society 13 (1):22-44.
    This study examines processes through which social personae are conveyed by male Japanese students at a public university in Yokohama. Focusing on the frame-setting function of first person pronominals in contexts where there is no intra/inter speaker variation in the choice of FPP, this paper analyzes how speakers manage identity-associated discursive alignments related to a shared Okinawa prefecture background. The common experience of being from Okinawa prefecture and attending university far from home is the primary reason that these speakers are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Selfless Memories.Raphaël Millière & Albert Newen - 2022 - Erkenntnis (3):0-22.
    Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of `selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44. First-Person Thought: Action, Identification and Experience.Maik Niemeck - 2022 - Leiden/Paderborn: Brill | mentis.
    The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):628-640.
    Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains that such a guarantee is explained by a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  46. Fichte’s Original Insight Reviewed.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio (ed.) - 2022 - Fichtean Studien.
    This paper addresses Fichte’s puzzle of self-consciousness. I propose a new reading of “Fichte’s original insight,” inspired by Pareyson’s general reading, which I call here the “Fichtean metaphysical turn in transcendental philosophy.” Against the mainstream view in Fichte’s scholarship, I argue that Fichte’s and Kant’s views do not concur regard- ing the primary reference of the “I”, namely spontaneous agency in thinking, which Fichte calls “Tathandlung”. Yet, their views do, in fact, concur when Fichte claims that this spontaneous agency in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):50-76.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Judge-Specific Sentences about Personal Taste, Indexical Contextualism, and Disagreement.Marián Zouhar - 2022 - Filozofia Nauki 30 (4):15-39.
    The paper aims to weaken a widespread argument against indexical contextualism regarding matters of personal taste. According to indexical contextualism, an utterance of “T is tasty” (where T is an object of taste) expresses the proposition that T is tasty for J (where J is a judge). This argument suggests that indexical contextualism cannot do justice to our disagreement intuitions regarding typical disputes about personal taste because it has to treat conversations in which one speaker utters “T is tasty” and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.
    Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p, but I don't believe that p>. If there were nothing irrational about failing to know one's own beliefs, they claim, then there would be nothing irrational about Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs. This article considers a few ways the data surrounding Moore's paradox might be marshaled to support rational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Locke on Being Self to My Self.Ruth Boeker - 2021 - In Patricia Kitcher (ed.), The Self: A History. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 118–144.
    John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what ‘I’ refers to. While we often do not distinguish the concept of a person from that of a human being in ordinary language, Locke emphasizes that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 950