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  1. Action Without The First Person Perspective.Herman Cappelen & Joshua Dever - manuscript
    In our book The Inessential Indexical we argue that the various theses of essential indexicality all fail. Indexicals are not essential, we conclude. One essentiality thesis we target in the third chapter is the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action. Our strategy is to give examples of what we call impersonal action rationalizations , which explain actions without citing indexical attitudes. To defeat the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action, it suffices that there could be even (...)
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  2. Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness.Matthew Boyle - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
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  3. Putting I-Thoughts to Work.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    A traditional view holds that the self-concept is essentially indexical. In a highly influential article, Ruth Millikan famously held that the self-concept should be understood as a Millian name with a sui generis functional role. This article presents a novel explanatory argument against the Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The argument starts from a characterization of the self-concept as a device of information integration. It then shows that the indexical view yields a better explanation of the (...)
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  4. Davidson on Self‐Knowledge: A Transcendental Explanation.Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    Davidson has attempted to offer his own solution to the problem of self-knowledge, but there has been no consensus between his commentators on what this solution is. Many have claimed that Davidson’s account stems from his remarks on disquotational specifications of self-ascriptions of meaning and mental content, the account which I will call the “Disquotational Explanation”. It has also been claimed that Davidson’s account rather rests on his version of content externalism, which I will call the “Externalist Explanation”. I will (...)
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  5. When You Isn't You. The Attraction of Self­-Ascription in Children’s Interpretation of Pronouns in Reported Speech.Franziska Köder & Maier Emar - forthcoming - Glossa.
    In language comprehension, 'you' is a de se pronoun, which means that its interpretation is guided by a simple de se rule ('you' = self-ascription by addressee), while the interpretation of other pronouns requires more complicated reasoning. This predicts that 'you' should be easier to process than 'I' or 'he', especially for children. But not all occurrences of 'you' can be correctly interpreted via self-ascription. We consider two cases where 'you' does not indicate self-ascription: interpretation as an eavesdropper and 'you' (...)
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  6. Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the ‘Here- Replacement’ Account.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    According to the Self-Location Thesis certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person (or de se), spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an object toward the location of the perceiving subject. The main aim of (...)
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  7. The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non-Intentional Awareness.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The (...)
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  8. De Se Thought and Communication: An Introduction.Stephan Torre - forthcoming - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.
    This chapter provides a critical overview of various influential accounts of de se attitudes including those proposed by Frege, Lewis and Perry. It also addresses the charge that there is nothing distinctive about de se attitudes. The second half outlines a widely accepted and influential model of communication and various complications that arise in applying this model to the communication of de se thoughts. The final section provides an overview of the papers in this volume.
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  9. What is Special About De Se Attitudes?Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook on Linguistic Reference.
    De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.
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  10. Centred Propositions, What is Asserted, and Communication.Jakub Rudnicki - 2021 - Theoria 87 (1):187-206.
    In recent years there has been a heated debate on how to accommodate John Perry's observations about the essentiality of indexicality into our models of linguistic communication. This article is an attempt at providing a new perspective on this issue. I argue that we should jettison two elements taken for granted by the views I present, and criticize, here: no centring, uncentring, recentring and multicentring. These elements are: (1) taking the asserted content to be a part of the communication process (...)
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  11. Self-ascription and the de se.James Openshaw - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2039-2050.
    This paper defends Lewis’ influential treatment of de se attitudes from recent criticism to the effect that a key explanatory notion—self-ascription—goes unexplained The Blackwell companion to David Lewis, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 399–410, 2015). It is shown that Lewis’ treatment can be reconstructed in a way which provides clear responses. This sheds light on the explanatory ambitions of those engaged in Lewis’ project.
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  12. Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.
    In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various thought insertion-involving scenarios do not give (...)
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  13. Loar's Compromised Internalism.David Pitt - 2020 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, Language. New York: Routledge. pp. 203-224.
    According to Brian Loar, an adequate theory of intentionality must acknowledge the fundamental role phenomenology plays in the determination of intentional content. It must take into account individuals’ experience of their intentional states, from a subjective point of view. From this perspective, intentional content is internally determined (given that phenomenology is). On the other hand, Loar is convinced (by arguments given by Tyler Burge) that mental states also have externally determined contents, fixed by objective facts about thinkers’ sociolinguistic environments. This (...)
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  14. Elimination of Bias in Introspection: Methodological Advances, Refinements, and Recommendations.Radek Trnka & Vit Smelik - 2020 - New Ideas in Psychology 56.
    Building on past constructive criticism, the present study provides further methodological development focused on the elimination of bias that may occur during first-person observation. First, various sources of errors that may accompany introspection are distinguished based on previous critical literature. Four main errors are classified, namely attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, methodological recommendations for the possible elimination of these errors have been determined based on the analysis and focused excerpting of introspective scientific literature. The following groups of methodological (...)
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  15. What Do We Need to Know to Know That Animals Are Conscious of What They Know?Gary Comstock - 2019 - Animal Behavior and Cognition 6 (4):289-308.
    In this paper I argue for the following six claims: 1) The problem is that some think metacognition and consciousness are dissociable. 2) The solution is not to revive associationist explanations; 3) …nor is the solution to identify metacognition with Carruthers’ gatekeeping mechanism. 4) The solution is to define conscious metacognition; 5) … devise an empirical test for it in humans; and 6) … apply it to animals.
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  16. The Structure of I-Thoughts. Kant and Wittgenstein on the Genesis of Cartesian Self.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 3:535-548.
    The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same (...)
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  17. Gods of Transhumanism.Alex V. Halapsis - 2019 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 16:78-90.
    Purpose of the article is to identify the religious factor in the teaching of transhumanism, to determine its role in the ideology of this flow of thought and to identify the possible limits of technology interference in human nature. Theoretical basis. The methodological basis of the article is the idea of transhumanism. Originality. In the foreseeable future, robots will be able to pass the Turing test, become “electronic personalities” and gain political rights, although the question of the possibility of machine (...)
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  18. The Mind's "I". [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):255-265.
  19. The Problem of First-Person Aboutness.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy (57):521-541.
    The topic of this paper is the question of in virtue of what first-person thoughts are about what they are about. I focus on a dilemma arising from this question. On the one hand, approaches to answering this question that promise to be satisfying seem doomed to be inconsistent with the seeming truism that first-person thought is always about the thinker of the thought. But on the other hand, ensuring consistency with that truism seems doomed to make any answer to (...)
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  20. Drop It Like It’s HOT: A Vicious Regress for Higher-Order Thought Theories.Miguel Sebastián - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1563-1572.
    Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...)
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  21. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
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  22. The Concept of Persons in Kant and Fichte.Owen Ware - 2019 - In Antonia LoLordo (ed.), Persons: A History. Oxford University Press.
    It is well known that Kant seeks to discredit rational psychology on the grounds that we cannot access the nature of the soul by reflecting upon the ‘I think’ of self-consciousness. What is far less understood, however, is why Kant still believes the theorems of rational psychology are analytically true insofar as they represent the ‘I’ through the categories of substance, reality, unity, and existence. Early post-Kantian thinkers like Fichte would abandon this restriction and approach the concept of the ‘I’ (...)
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  23. Singular Truth-Conditions Without Singular Propositions.Gregory Bochner - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2741-2760.
    In this paper I argue that propositionalism is what generates a tension between referentialism and harmony. Harmony can be preserved if we replace propositionalism by centred referentialism, according to which referential thoughts and utterances about an object have descriptive contents that must be evaluated relative to a world centred on that object at the relevant time. By disentangling truth-conditions and contents, this move allows us to dissolve the tension between referentialism and descriptivism. The view that emerges has three main components: (...)
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  24. Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’.Tim Button - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:205-229.
    In the early-to-mid 1930s, Wittgenstein investigated solipsism via the philosophy of language. In this paper, I want to reopen Wittgenstein's ‘grammatical’ examination of solipsism.Wittgenstein begins by considering the thesis that only I can feel my pains. Whilst this thesis may tempt us towards solipsism, Wittgenstein points out that this temptation rests on a grammatical confusion concerning the phrase ‘my pains’. In §1, I unpack and vindicate his thinking.After discussing ‘my pains’, Wittgenstein makes his now famous suggestion that the word ‘I’ (...)
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  25. Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem in Indian Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 92-104.
    This chapter considers the literature associated with explorations of consciousness in Indian philosophy. It focuses on a range of methodological and conceptual issues, drawing on three main sources: the naturalist theories of mind of Nyaya and Vaisesika, the mainly phenomenological accounts of mental activity and consciousness of Abhidharma and Yogacara Buddhism, and the subjective transcendental theory of consciousness of Advaita Vedanta. The contributions of Indian philosophers to the study of consciousness are examined not simply as a contribution to intellectual history, (...)
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  26. Alterations in the Three Components of Selfhood in Persons with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms: A Pilot qEEG Neuroimaging Study.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2018 - Open Neuroimaging Journal 12:42-54.
    Background and Objective: Understanding how trauma impacts the self-structure of individuals suffering from the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms is a complex matter and despite several attempts to explain the relationship between trauma and the “Self”, this issue still lacks clarity. Therefore, adopting a new theoretical perspective may help understand PTSD deeper and to shed light on the underlying psychophysiological mechanisms. Methods: In this study, we employed the “three-dimensional construct model of the experiential selfhood” where three major components of selfhood (...)
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  27. Is Consciousness Reflexively Self‐Aware? A Buddhist Analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
    This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self-aware. Call this the Self-Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas historically advanced four main arguments against this thesis. In this paper I consider whether some contemporary defence of the Self-Awareness Thesis can withstand these Prāsaṅgika objections. A problem is that contemporary defenders of the Self-Awareness Thesis have subtly different accounts with different assessment (...)
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  28. Arithmetic Judgements, First-Person Judgements and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):155-172.
    The paper explores the idea that some singular judgements about the natural numbers are immune to error through misidentification by pursuing a comparison between arithmetic judgements and first-person judgements. By doing so, the first part of the paper offers a conciliatory resolution of the Coliva-Pryor dispute about so-called “de re” and “which-object” misidentification. The second part of the paper draws some lessons about what it takes to explain immunity to error through misidentification. The lessons are: First, the so-called Simple Account (...)
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  29. Age Peculiarities of Personalities Self-Consciousness Development in Youth.Liubov Spivak & Dmytro Spivak - 2018 - Psychology and Psychosocial Interventions 1:50-54.
    The article regards the age peculiarities of the development of personality’s self-consciousness in youth. -/- The conducted theoretical analysis and empirical research contribute to the definition of the following features of the formation of personality self-consciousness in youth: -/- – strengthening the integrative tendency in this process, which leads to an increase in the level of cognitive complexity, differentiation, integrity, and hierarchy of the “Self-image”, as well as the emergence of a holistic, integrated “I”; -/- – the ability of self-awareness (...)
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  30. In Defense of De Se Content.Stephan Torre - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):172-189.
    There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...)
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  31. Being Origins: The Way We Think About Ourselves.Florian Wüstholz - 2018 - Dissertation, Universität Freiburg
    De se thinking has several characteristic features which aren’t present in all instances of thinking about yourself but are at least potentially realised. As such, any feasible account needs to explain the potential for these features. Neither the two-dimensional accounts—stemming from the idea that mental states can be characterised using the notion of a proposition—nor the property theory—claiming that we self-ascribe a property in thinking—do full justice to the phenomenon at hand. Instead, we have to take the concept of primitive (...)
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  32. Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):732-763.
    Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...)
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  33. Stopping Points: ‘I’, Immunity and the Real Guarantee.Annalisa Coliva - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):233-252.
    The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the implications of (...)
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  34. Kant and the Simple Representation “I”.Luca Forgione - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194.
    The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It (...)
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  35. The Philosophical Significance of the De Se.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):253-276.
    Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’ – first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se – call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new ‘effect’ – new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is (...)
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  36. Perception, Nonconceptual Content, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Kristina Musholt & Arnon Cahen - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):703-723.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we clarify the notion of immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first-person pronoun. In particular, we set out to dispel the view that for a judgment to be IEM it must contain a token of a certain class of predicates. Rather, the importance of the IEM status of certain judgments is that it teaches us about privileged ways of coming to know about ourselves. We then turn to examine how (...)
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  37. Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):39-64.
    This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one's own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one's own thoughts. More specifically, I claim that the structure of (...)
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  38. First Personal Modes of Presentation and the Structure of Empathy.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):189-207.
    I argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem of lacking (...)
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  39. Apperception, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge in Kant.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Matthew Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Kant Handbook. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 139–61.
  40. Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo sin saber que las creo.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Critica 49 (146):37-60.
    En un artículo publicado recientemente en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusión que pone en jaque ciertas teorías de la consciencia, como él mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es sólido. (...)
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  41. Indicators and Depictors.Jim Slagle - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (1):91-107.
  42. De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness.Florian L. Wüstholz - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):401-422.
    De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue (...)
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  43. The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.José Luis Bermúdez - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):631-634.
  44. Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...)
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  45. Dilemma della prima persona e fenomenologia dell’azione: quanto è minimale l’autocoscienza?Mariaflavia Cascelli - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):61-74.
    Riassunto : Negli ultimi anni sempre maggiore attenzione viene data alla possibilità che una forma minima, pre-riflessiva di auto-coscienza preceda l’auto-coscienza introspettiva. Diversi sono stati i tentativi fatti per sostenere che questa forma “sottile” di auto-coscienza sia un prerequisito necessario della coscienza. Dopo una breve considerazione dei problemi semantici ed epistemologici relativi all’uso del pronome di prima persona, questo articolo si concentrerà sulla letteratura che analizza le eccezioni al principio di immunità dall’errore per misidentificazione dalla prospettiva della fenomenologia dell’agentività. Il (...)
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  46. ‘Spurious Egocentricity’ and the First Person.James Doyle - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11):3579-3589.
    I here adapt some ideas of Prior’s 1967 paper ‘On spurious egocentricity’ in the interest of seeing how much sense can be made of the doctrine that ‘I’ is not a referring-expression. I suggest how an account of ‘I’ might draw upon both Prior’s treatment of the operator ‘I believe that’ and of operators like ‘it is true that’ and ‘it is now the case that’, which Prior argues are logically very different from ‘I believe that’. In the final section (...)
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  47. Thinking of Oneself as the Thinker: The Concept of Self and the Phenomenology of Intellection.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):138-160.
    The indexical word “I” has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts or more generally phenomenally grounded concepts. I start with what I take to be the defining feature of the (...)
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  48. Somatoparaphrenia, the Body Swap Illusion, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shao-Pu Kang - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (9):463-471.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that a certain class of self-ascriptions is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. In their “Self-Consciousness and Immunity,” Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang question Shoemaker’s view. Lang and Liang present a clinical case and an experiment and argue that they are counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. This paper is a response to Lane and Liang’s challenge. I identify the desiderata that a counterexample to Shoemaker’s view must meet and show that somatoparaphrenia and the Body (...)
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  49. Lost Feeling of Ownership of One’s Mental States: The Importance of Situating Patient R.B.'s Pathology in the Context of Contemporary Theory and Empiricism.Stan Klein - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):490-493.
    In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature (...)
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  50. Spontaneous Activity in Default-Mode Network Predicts Ascriptions of Self-Relatedness to Stimuli.Pengmin Qin, Georg Northoff, Timothy Lane & et al - 2016 - Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience:xx-yy.
    Spontaneous activity levels prior to stimulus presentation can determine how that stimulus will be perceived. It has also been proposed that such spontaneous activity, particularly in the default-mode network (DMN), is involved in self-related processing. We therefore hypothesised that pre-stimulus activity levels in the DMN predict whether a stimulus is judged as self-related or not. Method: Participants were presented in the MRI scanner with a white noise stimulus that they were instructed contained their name or another. They then had to (...)
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