First-Person Contents

Edited by Kristina Musholt (Universität Leipzig, Humboldt-University, Berlin)
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  1. Critiquing Strawsonian Selves.Klassen Abigail - 2015 - Appraisal: The Journal of the British Personalist Forum 10 (3):27-34.
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  2. Personal Identity, Passions, and "The True Idea of the Human Mind".Lilli Alanen - 2014 - Hume Studies 40 (1):3-28.
    Hume is famous for his criticism of substantial minds, free will, and self-consciousness—central elements in traditional philosophical accounts of persons. His empiricism dissolves self-inspecting minds into heaps of distinct perceptions and turns cognitive faculties into successions of causally related, discrete impressions and ideas. Whatever regularities the complex ideas and their bundles or heaps display are explained by laws of association of ideas, which are supposed to play the same role in the mental world as Newton’s laws of gravitation play in (...)
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  3. Intentionality and First Person Reference.Kelly Alberts - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:613-636.
    Roderick Chisholm contrasts semantic theories that presuppose “the primacy of the intentional” with those that presuppose “the primacy of the linguistic”. In The First Person he attempts to develop an analysis of first person singular reference that presupposes the primacy of the intentional. In this paper I attempt to develop a semantics of first person singular reference (what I call ‘I-reference’) that presupposes the primacy of the linguistic. I do three things in the paper. First, I criticize Chisholm’s (and Frege’s) (...)
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  4. Varieties of Priveleged Access.William P. Alston - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41.
    This paper distinguishes and interrelates a number of respects in which persons have been thought to be in a specially favorable epistemic position vis-A-Vis their own mental states. The most important distinction is a six-Fold one between infallibility, Omniscience, Indubitability, Incorrigibility, Truth-Sufficiency, And self-Warrant. Each of these varieties can then be sub-Divided as the kind of modality, If any, Involved. It is also argued that discussions of self-Knowledge have been hampered by a failure to recognize these distinctions.
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  5. The Inessential Quasi-Indexical.Peter Alward - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account (...)
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  6. The First Person.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 45–65.
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  7. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.S. Ashford - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):298 – 300.
    Book Information The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. By José Luis Bermúdez. Bradford/MIT. Cambridge, MA. 1998. Pp. xv + 338. $US30.00.
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  8. Content, Indexical.Kent Bach - unknown
    Many of our thoughts are about particular individuals (persons, things, places, etc.). For example, one can spot a certain Ferrari and think that it is red. What enables this thought to latch onto that particular object? It cannot be how the Ferrari looks, for this could not distinguish one Ferrari from another just like it. In general, how a thought represents something cannot determine which thing it represents. What a singular thought latches onto seems to depend also on features of (...)
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  9. From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness.L. R. Baker - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84:19--38.
  10. Objects and Persons.LR Baker - unknown
  11. Ganeri, Jonardon., The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness and the First-Person Stance.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):160-162.
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  12. Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us (...)
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  13. From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):19-38.
  14. Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  15. Harald Delius: Self-Awareness: A Semantical Inquiry. [REVIEW]Smith Barry - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46:170–173.
    The thesis of Delius's book is that statements of self-awareness such as "I am aware that I see a cat" possess what he calls 'Cartesian characteristics' of indubitability or absolute self-evidence. He argues that this is the case in virtue of the fact that such statements are not about anything independent of themselves. The book is described as a 'semantical inquiry', but it is not by any means a contribution to the philosophy of language of the predictable sort. Statements of (...)
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  16. From Kant to Hegel—Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Theory of Self-Consciousness.Gunnar Beck - 1996 - History of European Ideas 22 (4):275-294.
    This article emphasizes Fichte's role as a central figure in the period of transition from Kantian moral universalism to Hegelian ontological collectivism and _Sittlichkeitsethik. Echoing Rousseau's insights into the sociological determinants of human consciousness and drawing on Herder's more comprehensive theory of the linguistic and cultural conditions of all human thought, Fichte, in his writings from 1796 onward, develops a radical reformulation and extension of Kant's theory of reason and self-consciousness. Fichte's theory of the origins and nature of consciousness and (...)
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  17. The New Neo-Kantian and Reductionist Debate.Kathy Behrendt - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):331-350.
    Has Derek Parfit modified his views on personal identity in light of Quassim Cassam’s neo-Kantian argument that to experience the world as objective, we must think of ourselves as enduring subjects of experience? Both parties suggest there is no longer a serious dispute between them. I retrace the path that led to this truce, and contend that the debate remains open. Parfit’s recent work reveals a re-formulation of his ostensibly abandoned claim that there could be impersonal descriptions of reality. I (...)
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  18. Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, by Lynne Rudder Baker.Jacob Berger - 2015 - Mind 124 (493):317-321.
    A review of *Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective* by Lynne Rudder Baker.
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  19. The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.José Luis Bermúdez - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):631-634.
  20. 'I'-Thoughts and Explanation: Reply to Garrett.José Luis Bermúdez - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):432–436.
    Brian Garrett has criticized my diagnosis of the paradox of self-consciousness. In reply, I focus on the classification of 'I'-thoughts, and show how the notion of immunity to error through misidentification can be used to characterize 'I'-thoughts, even though an important class of 'I'-thoughts (those whose expression involves what Wittgenstein called the use of 'I' as object) are not themselves immune to error through misidentification. 'I'-thoughts which are susceptible to error through misidentification are dependent upon those which are not. The (...)
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  21. The Sources of Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):87-107.
    This paper explores the relation between two ways of thinking about the sources of self-consciousness. We can think about the sources of self-consciousness either in genetic terms (as the origins or precursors of self-conscious thoughts) or in epistemic terms (as the grounds of self-conscious judgements). Using Christopher Peacocke's account of self-conscious judgements in Being Known as a foil, this paper brings out some important ways in which we need to draw upon the sources of self-consciousness in the genetic sense for (...)
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  22. Nonconceptual Self-Awareness and the Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2000 - In Albert Newen & Kai Vogeley (eds.), Selbst und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbewusstsein und seine Neurobiologischen Grundlagen. Mentis.
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  23. Precis of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1999 - Psycoloquy 10 (35).
  24. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1998 - MIT Press.
  25. On Knowing One's Own Mind.Sven Bernecker - 1997 - Dissertation, Stanford University
    This paper raises two objections to Tyler Burge's externalist theory of privileged self-knowledge. The first point is that Burge owes us an account of external content-determining factors of our belief concept. The second point is that that Burge can reconcile externalism with self-knowledge only at the price of abandoning Frege's insight concerning the referential opacity of propositional attitudes.
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  26. Consciousness and Reflective Consciousness.Mark H. Bickhard - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):205-218.
    An interactive process model of the nature of representation intrinsically accounts for multiple emergent properties of consciousness, such as being a contentful experiential flow, from a situated and embodied point of view. A crucial characteristic of this model is that content is an internally related property of interactive process, rather than an externally related property as in all other contemporary models. Externally related content requires an interpreter, yielding the familiar regress of interpreters, along with a host of additional fatal problems. (...)
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  27. Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...)
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  28. Why Are We Certain That We Exist?Alexandre Billon - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
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  29. Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
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  30. The Properties of the Self: Idioms of Personal Identity From Locke to Boswell.Mark Raymond Blackwell - 1996 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    This dissertation examines the development of an explicit interest in personal identity beginning in the late seventeenth century. It argues that a blossoming attention to various modes of selfhood proceeded from the diversification of British society, from a burgeoning sense of possibility fueled by economic expansion, the growth of commodity culture, the erosion of fixed status categories, and the impact of print. A vibrant commercial culture put things and ideas into circulation in unprecedented numbers, and the resultant ethos of mobility (...)
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  31. Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness.Matthew Boyle - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
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  32. Gottfried Vosgerau, Mental Representation and Self‐Consciousness. From Basic Self‐Representation to Self‐Related Cognition, Paderborn: Mentis, 2009, 179 Pp., € 24.00, ISBN: 3897856271. [REVIEW]Cordula Brand - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):248-252.
  33. Self-Identification and Self-Reference.Ingar Brinck - 1998 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
    [1] To know who one is, and also know whether one's experiences really belong to oneself, do not normally present any problem. It nevertheless happens that people do not recognise themselves as they walk by a mirror or do not understand that they fit some particular description. But there are situations in which it really seems impossible to be wrong about oneself. Of that, Ludwig Wittgenstein once wrote: " It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel pain (...)
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  34. The Indexical 'I' the First Person in Thought and Language.Ingar Brinck - 1997 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in (...)
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  35. Kant, Self-Awareness, and Self-Reference.Andrew Brook - 2001 - In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. pp. 9--30.
  36. Objects and Persons. [REVIEW]Michael B. Burke - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):586-588.
  37. Are We Our Brains?Stephen Burwood - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):113-133.
    My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as (...)
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  38. Introspective Knowledge of Experience and its Role in Consciousness Studies.Jesse Butler - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):128-145.
    In response to Petitmengin and Bitbol's recent account of first-person methodologies in the study of consciousness, I provide a revised model of our introspective knowledge of our own conscious experience. This model, which I call the existential constitution model of phenomenal knowledge, avoids the problems that Petitmengin and Bitbol identify with standard observational models of introspection while also avoiding an underlying metaphorical misconception in their own proximity model, which misconstrues first-person knowledge of consciousness in terms of a dichotomous epistemic relationship. (...)
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  39. Perception, Nonconceptual Content, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Arnon Cahen & Kristina Musholt - forthcoming - Inquiry:1-21.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we clarify the notion of immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first-person pronoun. In particular, we set out to dispel the view that for a judgment to be IEM it must contain a token of a certain class of predicates. Rather, the importance of the IEM status of certain judgments is that it teaches us about privileged ways of coming to know about ourselves. We then turn to examine how (...)
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  40. Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process.J. Campbell - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
  41. Past, Space, and Self.J. Campbell - 1994 - MIT Press.
    In this book John Campbell shows that the general structural features of human thought can be seen as having their source in the distinctive ways in which we...
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  42. What is It to Know What 'I' Refers To?John Campbell - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):206-218.
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  43. The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusion.
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  44. Review. Jose Luis Bermudez.P. Carruthers - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):483-486.
  45. Reply to Bermúdez.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Anthropology and Philosophy 6 (1/2):81-83.
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  46. Dilemma della prima persona e fenomenologia dell’azione: quanto è minimale l’autocoscienza?Mariaflavia Cascelli - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):61-74.
    Riassunto : Negli ultimi anni sempre maggiore attenzione viene data alla possibilità che una forma minima, pre-riflessiva di auto-coscienza preceda l’auto-coscienza introspettiva. Diversi sono stati i tentativi fatti per sostenere che questa forma “sottile” di auto-coscienza sia un prerequisito necessario della coscienza. Dopo una breve considerazione dei problemi semantici ed epistemologici relativi all’uso del pronome di prima persona, questo articolo si concentrerà sulla letteratura che analizza le eccezioni al principio di immunità dall’errore per misidentificazione dalla prospettiva della fenomenologia dell’agentività. Il (...)
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  47. Self-Knowledge.Quassim Cassam (ed.) - 1994 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume brings together some of the most important and influential recent writings on knowledge of oneself and of one's own thoughts, sensations, and experiences. The essays give valuable insights into such fundamental philosophical issues as personal identity, the nature of consciousness, the relation between mind and body, and knowledge of other minds. Contributions include "Introduction" by Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing One's Own Mind" by Donald Davidson, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" and "Introspection and the Self" by Sydney Shoemaker, "On the Observability of (...)
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  48. The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness.H. N. Castaneda, J. G. Hart & T. Kapitan (eds.) - 1999 - Indiana University Press.
    This unique volume will appeal to those interested in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence as well as students of Castaneda and Latin American philosophy.
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  49. The Reflexivity of Self-Consciousness: Sameness/Identity, Data for Artificial Intelligence.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):27-58.
  50. Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:405-454.
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