- A Case of Shared Consciousness.Tom Cochrane - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1019-1037.details
- Brain Death: What We Are and When We Die.Lukas J. Meier - 2020 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
- Successor Identity.Mihailis E. Diamantis - 2019 - Yale Journal on Regulation 36:1-44.details
- Esperimenti mentali in filosofia.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - Milano-Udine: Mimesis.details
- Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.details
- There is No Haecceitic Euthyphro Problem.Alexander Skiles - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):477-484.details
- The Unimportance of Being Any Future Person.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):745-750.details
- The Brave Officer Rides Again.Andreas Mogensen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):315-329.details
- Self-Consciousness and 'Split' Brains: The Mind's I.Elizabeth Schechter - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- Parfits Reduktionismus und die Möglichkeit struktureller Einheit: Vorarbeiten zu einer aristotelischen Theorie personaler Identität.Sascha Settegast - 2018 - In Sebastian Gäb, Dominic Harion & Peter Welsen (eds.), Person und Identität. Regensburg: S. Roderer. pp. 109-170.details
- Homunculi Are People Too! Lewis's Definition of Personhood Debugged.Cody Gilmore - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):54-60.details
- Fission, First Person Thought, and Subject-Body Dualism.Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):5-25.details
- Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming.Michael Otsuka - 2017 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1229-1243.details
- Fission May Kill You.Heather Demarest - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):565-582.details
- Embodied Mind Sparsism.S. Clint Dowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1853-1872.details
- There’s No Need to Rethink Desert: A Reply to Pummer.Benjamin Curtis - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):999-1010.details
- The Significance of Personal Identity for Death.Duncan Purves - 2015 - Bioethics 29 (9):681-682.details
- Baker's First-Person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem.Marc Andree Weber - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 7:158-168.details
- Does Division Multiply Desert?Theron Pummer - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):43-77.details
- Anscombe, Zygotes, and Coming‐to‐Be.Guy Rohrbaugh - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):699-717.details
- Reasoning Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason.Shieva Kleinschmidt - 2013 - In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Philosophy of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Routledge. pp. 64-79.details
- The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):684-701.details
- Die Zerlegung des Ichs. Über die Grundlagen personaler Identität.Marc Andree Weber - 2013 - Münster: Mentis.details
- The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects.Thomas Sattig - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):594-623.details
- How to Count People.Mark Bajakian - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.details
- Split Brains.Karol Polcyn - 2011 - Filozofia Nauki 19 (3).details
- Expectancy and Rational Action Prior to Personal Fission.Paul Tappenden - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):299 - 306.details
- Expectancy and Rational Action Prior to Personal Fission.Paul Tappenden - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):299-306.details
- Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity.Robert Francescotti - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-349.details
- Parfit on Fission.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):21 - 35.details
- Fission, Cohabitation and the Concern for Future Survival.Rebecca Roache - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):256-263.details
- Individuating Mental Tokens: The Split-Brain Case.Elizabeth Schechter - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):195-216.details
- Francescotti on Fission.Jens Johansson - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):476-481.details
- An Alternative to an Alternative to Brain Death.Peter Koch - 2009 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:89-98.details
- Persistence and the First-Person Perspective.Dilip Ninan - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (4):425-464.details
- Persons and Psychological Frameworks: A Critique of Tye.Elizabeth Schechter - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):141-163.details
- Careers and Quareers: A Reply to Burge.Sydney Shoemaker - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):87-102.details
- The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300.details
- The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity: Non-Branching and the Individuation of Person Stages: Dialogue.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):377-386.details
- Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint.Robert Francescotti - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21-31.details
- A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity.David B. Hershenov - 2008 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3):481-502.details
- A Survival Guide to Fission.Mark Moyer - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):299 - 322.details
- Branching and Uncertainty.Simon Saunders & David Wallace - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):293-305.details
- Saunders and Wallace Reply.Simon Saunders & David Wallace - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):315-317.details
- Three Forms of Psychological Discontinuity.Desheng Zong - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 18:103-127.details
- An Alternative to Brain Death.Jeff McMahan - 2006 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (1):44-48.details
- Split Brains and the Godhead.Trenton Merricks - 2006 - In Thomas Crisp, David Vander Laan & Matthew Davidson (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 299-326.details
- No Worries for Captain Kirk, Pace Brueckner.P. Tappenden - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):171-172.details
- Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel.John Wright - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):129-142.details
- Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction.Marvin Belzer - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):126-164.details
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