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  1. Laws of Credence and Laws of Choice.Sophie Horowitz - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):31-37.
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  2. Sarah Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge.Tim Smartt - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):430-438.
  3. Inquiry in Conversation: Towards a Modelling in Inquisitive Pragmatics.Yacin Hamami - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 228:637-661.
    Conversation is one of the main contexts in which we are conducting inquiries. Yet, little attention has been paid so far in pragmatics or epistemology to the process of inquiry in conversation. In this paper, we propose to trigger such an investigation through the development of a formal modelling based on inquisitive pragmatics—a framework offering a semantic representation of questions and answers, along with an analysis of the pragmatic principles that govern questioning and answering moves in conversations geared towards information (...)
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  4. Obligation, Permission, and Bayesian Orgulity.Michael Nielsen & Rush Stewart - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point (...)
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  5. Bayesian Norms and Non-Ideal Agents.Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy Evidence. Routledge.
    Bayesian epistemology provides a popular and powerful framework for modeling rational norms on credences, including how rational agents should respond to evidence. The framework is built on the assumption that ideally rational agents have credences, or degrees of belief, that are representable by numbers that obey the axioms of probability. From there, further constraints are proposed regarding which credence assignments are rationally permissible, and how rational agents’ credences should change upon learning new evidence. While the details are hotly disputed, all (...)
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  6. Good Questions.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - In Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford, UK: pp. 123-145.
    Pérez Carballo adopts an epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief, and rationality consists in maximizing expected epistemic utility. Within this framework he seeks to show that we can make sense of the intuitive idea that some true beliefs—say true beliefs about botany—are more valuable than other true beliefs—say true beliefs about the precise number of plants in North Dakota. To do so, however, Pérez Carballo argues that we must (...)
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  7. Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Mind:fzy044.
    Recent objections to epistemic permissivism have a metaepistemic flavor. Impermissivists argue that their view best accounts for connections between rationality, planning and deference. Impermissivism is also taken to best explain the value of rational belief and normative assessment. These objections pose a series of metaepistemic explanatory challenges for permissivism. In this paper, I illustrate how permissivists might meet their explanatory burdens by developing two permissivist metaepistemic views which fare well against the explanatory challenges.
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  8. Evidential Reasoning.Marcello Di Bello & Bart Verheij - 2018 - In G. Bongiovanni, G. Postema, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, C. Valentini & D. Walton (eds.), Handbook in Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 447-493.
    The primary aim of this chapter is to explain the nature of evidential reasoning, the characteristic difficulties encountered, and the tools to address these difficulties. Our focus is on evidential reasoning in criminal cases. There is an extensive scholarly literature on these topics, and it is a secondary aim of the chapter to provide readers the means to find their way in historical and ongoing debates.
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  9. Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.
    Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses to the evidence. Given plausible assumptions about the relationship between your first- and higher-order attitudes, it can't be rational to adopt a credence on the edge of that range. But Permissivism says that, for some such range, any credence in that range is rational. Permissivism, in its traditional form, cannot be right. I consider some (...)
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  10. Ideal Language.Steven Laporte - forthcoming - Knowledge Organization.
    This contribution discusses the notion of an ideal language and its implications for the development of knowledge organization theory. We explore the notion of an ideal language from both a historical and a formal perspective and seek to clarify the key concepts involved. An overview of some of the momentous attempts to produce an ideal language is combined with an elucidation of the consequences the idea had in modern thought. We reveal the possibilities that the idea opened up and go (...)
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  11. Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism.Julia Staffel - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    I argue that in order to account for normative uncertainty, an expressivist theory of normative language and thought must accomplish two things: Firstly, it needs to find room in its framework for a gradable conative attitude, degrees of which can be interpreted as representing normative uncertainty. Secondly, it needs to defend appropriate rationality constraints pertaining to those graded attitudes. The first task – finding an appropriate graded attitude that can represent uncertainty – is not particularly problematic. I tackle the second (...)
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  12. Attitudes in Active Reasoning.Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.
    Active reasoning is the kind of reasoning that we do deliberately and consciously. In characterizing the nature of active reasoning and the norms it should obey, the question arises which attitudes we can reason with. Many authors take outright beliefs to be the attitudes we reason with. Others assume that we can reason with both outright beliefs and degrees of belief. Some think that we reason only with degrees of belief. In this paper I approach the question of what kinds (...)
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  13. Convergence, Continuity and Recurrence in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Dominik Klein & Rasmus K. Rendsvig - 2017 - In Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman & Tomoyuki Yamada (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2017, Sapporo, Japan). Springer. pp. 108-122.
    The paper analyzes dynamic epistemic logic from a topological perspective. The main contribution consists of a framework in which dynamic epistemic logic satisfies the requirements for being a topological dynamical system thus interfacing discrete dynamic logics with continuous mappings of dynamical systems. The setting is based on a notion of logical convergence, demonstratively equivalent with convergence in Stone topology. Presented is a flexible, parametrized family of metrics inducing the latter, used as an analytical aid. We show maps induced by action (...)
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  14. Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Although expected utility theory has proven a fruitful and elegant theory in the finite realm, attempts to generalize it to infinite values have resulted in many paradoxes. In this paper, we argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory. To that end, we prove a surreal representation theorem and show that our surreal decision theory respects dominance reasoning even in the case of infinite values. We then bring our theory (...)
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  15. On a No Defeat Evidence Principle of Tal and Comesaña.Randall G. Mccutcheon - forthcoming - Episteme:1-4.
    We offer a critical evaluation of a recent proposal of E. Tal and J. Comesa\~na on the topic of when evidence of evidence constitutes evidence. After establishing that attempts of L. Moretti and W. Roche to discredit the proposal miss their mark, we fashion another, which does not.
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  16. The Interplay Between Models and Observations.Claudio Masolo, Alessander Botti Benevides & Daniele Porello - 2018 - Applied Ontology 13 (1):41-71.
    We propose a formal framework to examine the relationship between models and observations. To make our analysis precise,models are reduced to first-order theories that represent both terminological knowledge – e.g., the laws that are supposed to regulate the domain under analysis and that allow for explanations, predictions, and simulations – and assertional knowledge – e.g., information about specific entities in the domain of interest. Observations are introduced into the domain of quantification of a distinct first-order theory that describes their nature (...)
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  17. Outline of a Logic of Knowledge of Acquaintance.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - forthcoming - Analysis:any005.
    The verb ‘to know’ can be used both in ascriptions of propositional knowledge (e.g., ‘Mary knows that Smith smokes’) and ascriptions of knowledge of acquaintance (e.g., ‘Mary knows Smith’). In the formal epistemology literature, the former use of ‘know’ has attracted considerable attention, while the latter is typically (dis)regarded as derivative. This attitude may be unsatisfactory for those philosophers who, like Russell, are not willing to think of knowledge of acquaintance as a subsidiary or dependent kind of knowledge. In this (...)
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  18. Steadfastness, Deference, and Permissive Rationality.Jaemin Jung - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):5093-5112.
    Recently, Levinstein has offered two interesting arguments concerning epistemic norms and epistemic peer disagreement. In his first argument, Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and steadfast attitudes in the face of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second argument, he argues that, given an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. However, in this paper, I show that when we clearly distinguish among several types of Permissivism, Permissivism\, and Permissivism\), we (...)
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  19. “Agreement” in the IPCC Confidence Measure.William Rehg & Kent Staley - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 57:126-134.
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  20. Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
    We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to (...)
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  21. Carnap’s Relevance Measure as a Probabilistic Measure of Coherence.Jakob Koscholke - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):339-350.
    Tomoji Shogenji is generally assumed to be the first author to have presented a probabilistic measure of coherence. Interestingly, Rudolf Carnap in his Logical Foundations of Probability discussed a function that is based on the very same idea, namely his well-known relevance measure. This function is largely neglected in the coherence literature because it has been proposed as a measure of evidential support and still is widely conceived as such. The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate Carnap’s measure (...)
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  22. Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy.Sarah Moss - 2015 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 172--94.
    This paper defines and defends time-slice epistemology, according to which there are no essentially diachronic norms of rationality. First I motivate and distinguish two notions of time-slice epistemology. Then I defend time-slice theories of action under indeterminacy, i.e. theories about how you should act when the outcome of your decision depends on some indeterminate claim. I raise objections to a theory of action under indeterminacy recently defended by Robbie Williams, and I propose some alternative theories in its place. Throughout this (...)
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  23. Extensive Philosophical Agreement and Progress.Bryan Frances - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):47-57.
    This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the (...)
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  24. Reasoning Biases, Non‐Monotonic Logics and Belief Revision.Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):29-52.
    A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way (...)
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  25. Modellings for Belief Change: Base Contraction, Multiple Contraction, and Epistemic Entrenchment.Rott Hans - unknown
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  26. On the Logic of Theory Change: More Maps Between Different Kinds of Contraction Function.Rott Hans - unknown
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  27. Updating and Expanding the World Handbook Data Collection.C. L. Taylor & D. A. Jodice - 1980 - Social Science Information 19 (4-5):885-901.
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  28. Reasoning Biases, Non‐Monotonic Logics and Belief Revision.Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4).
    A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way (...)
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  29. Knowledge-Based or Knower-Based?M. W. L. Eickemeyer - unknown
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  30. Which Kind of Legal Order? Logical Coherence and Praxeological Coherence.Mario J. Rizzo - 1999 - Journal de Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 9 (4):497-510.
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  31. Which Kind of Legal Order? Logical Coherence and Praxeological Coherence.Mario J. Rizzo - 1999 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 9 (4).
    Nous proposons dans cet article un développement de l’idée proposée par F.A. Hayek selon laquelle l’ordre du droit coutumier est un ordre d’action, une coordination des plans individuels dans un système d’échange régi par ce droit. Cette conception s’oppose à l’idée suivant laquelle l’ordre légal doit être avant tout fondé sur la cohérence logique des concepts et doctrines de ce droit. Un exemple important de cette approche est celui de la structure de maximisation des richesses de William Landes et Richard (...)
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  32. DCFR and Property Law: The Need for Consistency and Coherence.Reiner Schulze - 2009 - In Common Frame of Reference and Existing Ec Contract Law. Sellier de Gruyter.
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  33. A Mixed Radix Approach to the Pooling of Evidence.D. A. Bell, J. A. C. Webb & J. W. Guan - 1995 - Journal of Intelligent Systems 5 (1):1-18.
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  34. Kohärenzbegriffe in der Ethikconcepts of Coherence in Ethics.Martin Hoffmann - unknown
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  35. Open Math: Communicating Mathematical Information Between Co-Operating Agents in a Knowledge Network.J. Abbott, A. van Leuwen & A. Strotman - 1998 - Journal of Intelligent Systems 8 (3-4):401-426.
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  36. Reply to Palmira.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):361-365.
    In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to dropthe ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does (...)
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  37. Nascimentos da Psicologia: A Natureza E o Espírito.Paul Mengal & Miotto - 2015 - Ideação 32:259-288.
    Desde sua constituição como domínio do saber no fim do século XVI, a psicologia divide-se rapidamente em duas tendências com orientações diferentes. A primeira, de inspiração naturalista, situa-se no prolongamento do comentário da Física aristotélica e se desenvolve principalmente nas universidades protestantes de Marburgo e Leiden. Nesses estabelecimentos onde reinava então um espírito humanista, racionalista e tolerante, toma lugar a primeira forma de dualismo da alma e do corpo. Mas na mesma época, em círculos místicos e herméticos, desenvolve-se uma outra (...)
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  38. Sustainable Growth of the Kenyan Dairy Sector : A Quick Scan of Robustness, Reliability and Resilience.Corné J. Rademaker, Bockline Omedo Bebe, Jan Lee, Catherine Kilelu & Charles Tonui - unknown
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  39. Une Éthique En Désir de Cohérence.Raymond Mengus - 1983 - Revue des Sciences Religieuses 57 (2):147-159.
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  40. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Christopher Hitchcock & Judea Pearl - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):639.
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  41. Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States.Peter Menzies & Peter Gardenfors - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):159.
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  42. The Rationality of Science.David Christensen & W. H. Newton-Smith - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):471.
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  43. Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.E. J. Lemmon & Jaakko Hintikka - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (3):381.
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  44. The Continuum of Inductive Methods.William H. Hay & Rudolf Carnap - 1953 - Philosophical Review 62 (3):468.
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  45. Tummu and Par-Ṣeḫru. Note on Two Measures of Weight at NuziTummu and Par-Sehru. Note on Two Measures of Weight at Nuzi.Carlo Zaccagnini - 1976 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 96 (2):273.
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  46. Evidential Diversity and the Negation of H: A Probabilistic Account of the Value of Varied Evidence.Lydia McGrew - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
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  47. Conservatism and Uniqueness.Jaemin Jung - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2233-2248.
    Credal Conservatism says that an agent’s credal states should be conserved as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness says that for any given total evidence, there is a unique credal state that any agent with that total evidence should have. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that there are no significant differences between intrapersonal and interpersonal rationality requirements when determining what credal states one ought to have for purposes of epistemic evaluation. I construe Epistemic Impartiality as a (...)
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  48. Belief Merging with the Aim of Truthlikeness.Simon D’Alfonso - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2013-2034.
    The merging/fusion of belief/data collections in propositional logic form is a topic that has received due attention within the domains of database and AI research. A distinction can be made between two types of scenarios to which the process of merging can be applied. In the first type, the collections represent preferences, such as the voting choices of a group of people, that need to be aggregated so as to give a consistent result that in some way best represents the (...)
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  49. A Pragmatic Approach to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Paul Egré - unknown
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  50. Postcripts to "A Pragmatic Approach to the Problem of Logical Omniscience".Paul Egré - unknown
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