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  1. added 2020-05-11
    Bayesian Coherentism.Lisa Cassell - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    This paper considers a problem for Bayesian epistemology and proposes a solution to it. On the traditional Bayesian framework, an agent updates her beliefs by Bayesian conditioning, a rule that tells her how to revise her beliefs whenever she gets evidence that she holds with certainty. In order to extend the framework to a wider range of cases, Jeffrey (1965) proposed a more liberal version of this rule that has Bayesian conditioning as a special case. Jeffrey conditioning is a rule (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-24
    From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):225-270.
    What is the relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former—a so-called “belief-binarization rule”—without running into difficulties such as the lottery paradox? We show that this problem can be usefully analyzed from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some formal similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the connection between the two problems has not yet been studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-13
    A Uniform Logic of Information Dynamics.Wesley H. Holliday, Tomohiro Hoshi & Thomas F. Icard - 2012 - In Thomas Bolander, Torben Braüner, Silvio Ghilardi & Lawrence Moss (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic 9. College Publications. pp. 348-367.
    Unlike standard modal logics, many dynamic epistemic logics are not closed under uniform substitution. A distinction therefore arises between the logic and its substitution core, the set of formulas all of whose substitution instances are valid. The classic example of a non-uniform dynamic epistemic logic is Public Announcement Logic (PAL), and a well-known open problem is to axiomatize the substitution core of PAL. In this paper we solve this problem for PAL over the class of all relational models with infinitely (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-10
    Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.
    Accuracy‐first epistemology is an approach to formal epistemology which takes accuracy to be a measure of epistemic utility and attempts to vindicate norms of epistemic rationality by showing how conformity with them is beneficial. If accuracy‐first epistemology can actually vindicate any epistemic norms, it must adopt a plausible account of epistemic value. Any such account must avoid the epistemic version of Derek Parfit's “repugnant conclusion.” I argue that the only plausible way of doing so is to say that accurate credences (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-10
    A Uniform Logic of Information Dynamics.Wesley H. Holliday, Tomohiro Hoshi & Thomas F. Icard Iii - 2012 - In Thomas Bolander, Torben Braüner, Silvio Ghilardi & Lawrence Moss (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic, Volume 9. CSLI Publications. pp. 348-367.
    Unlike standard modal logics, many dynamic epistemic logics are not closed under uniform substitution. A distinction therefore arises between the logic and its substitu- tion core, the set of formulas all of whose substitution instances are valid. The classic example of a non-uniform dynamic epistemic logic is Public Announcement Logic (PAL), and a well-known open problem is to axiomatize the substitution core of PAL. In this paper we solve this problem for PAL over the class of all relational models with (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-02
    Rational Requirements for Suspended Judgment.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    How does rationality bind the agnostic, that is, the one who suspends judgment about whether a given proposition is true? In this paper I explore two alternative ways of establishing what the rational requirements of agnosticism are: the Lockean–Bayesian framework and the doxastic logic framework. Each of these proposals faces strong objections. Fortunately, however, there is a rich kernel of requirements of agnosticism that are vindicated by both of them. One can then endorse the requirements that belong to that kernel (...)
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  7. added 2020-03-02
    Logical Omnipotence and Two Notions of Implicit Belief.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2019 - In Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.), Epistemologia Analítica: Debates Contemporâneos. Santa Maria: Editora Fi. pp. 29-46.
    The most widespread models of rational reasoners (the model based on modal epistemic logic and the model based on probability theory) exhibit the problem of logical omniscience. The most common strategy for avoiding this problem is to interpret the models as describing the explicit beliefs of an ideal reasoner, but only the implicit beliefs of a real reasoner. I argue that this strategy faces serious normative issues. In this paper, I present the more fundamental problem of logical omnipotence, which highlights (...)
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  8. added 2020-02-25
    Vulnerability in Social Epistemic Networks.Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
    Social epistemologists should be well-equipped to explain and evaluate the growing vulnerabilities associated with filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in social media. However, almost all social epistemology has been built for social contexts that involve merely a speaker-hearer dyad. Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization all presuppose much larger and more complex network structures. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for a properly social epistemology that gives the role and structure of networks their due. In particular, (...)
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  9. added 2020-02-20
    How to Avoid Maximizing Expected Utility.Bradley Monton - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    The lesson to be learned from the paradoxical St. Petersburg game and Pascal’s Mugging is that there are situations where expected utility maximizers will needlessly end up poor and on death’s door, and hence we should not be expected utility maximizers. Instead, when it comes to decision-making, for possibilities that have very small probabilities of occurring, we should discount those probabilities down to zero, regardless of the utilities associated with those possibilities.
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  10. added 2020-02-17
    Belief Gambles in Epistemic Decision Theory.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Don't form beliefs on the basis of coin flips or random guesses. More generally, don't take belief gambles: if a proposition is no more likely to be true than false given your total body of evidence, don't go ahead and believe that proposition. Few would deny this seemingly innocuous piece of epistemic advice. But what, exactly, is wrong with taking belief gambles? Philosophers have debated versions of this question at least since the classic dispute between William Clifford and William James (...)
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  11. added 2020-02-07
    What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.
    Two different programmes are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness programme and the epistemic utility programme. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. Truthlikeness theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of credal states. Both assume we can make cognitive progress in an (...)
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  12. added 2020-02-04
    Epistemic Modal Credence.Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Triviality results threaten plausible principles governing our credence in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state-world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account (...)
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  13. added 2020-01-13
    Logical Principles of Agnosticism.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1263-1283.
    Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer to it. In particular, I advance two logical (...)
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  14. added 2019-12-09
    Discrimination-Conduciveness and Observation Selection Effects.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    We conceptualize observation selection effects by considering how a shift from one process of observation to another affects discrimination-conduciveness, by which we mean the degree to which possible observations discriminate between hypotheses, given the observation process at work. OSEs in this sense come in degrees and are causal, where the cause is the shift in process, and the effect is a change in degree of discrimination-conduciveness. We contrast our understanding of OSEs with others that have appeared in the literature. After (...)
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  15. added 2019-12-09
    Confirmation, Transitivity, and Moore: The Screening-Off Approach.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):797-817.
    It is well known that the probabilistic relation of confirmation is not transitive in that even if E confirms H1 and H1 confirms H2, E may not confirm H2. In this paper we distinguish four senses of confirmation and examine additional conditions under which confirmation in different senses becomes transitive. We conduct this examination both in the general case where H1 confirms H2 and in the special case where H1 also logically entails H2. Based on these analyses, we argue that (...)
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  16. added 2019-11-15
    Wigner’s Puzzle on Applicability of Mathematics: On What Table to Assemble It?Cătălin Bărboianu - 2019 - Axiomathes 1:1-30.
    Attempts at solving what has been labeled as Eugene Wigner’s puzzle of applicability of mathematics are still far from arriving at an acceptable solution. The accounts developed to explain the “miracle” of applied mathematics vary in nature, foundation, and solution, from denying the existence of a genuine problem to designing structural theories based on mathematical formalism. Despite this variation, all investigations treated the problem in a unitary way with respect to the target, pointing to one or two ‘why’ or ‘how’ (...)
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  17. added 2019-10-29
    Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    It is natural to think that there is something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this natural thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk-avoidance that is both wide-spread and intuitively rational. More specifically, we argue that if the kind of risk-avoidance recently defended by Lara Buchak is rational, avoiding evidence can be epistemically commendable. In the course of our argument we also lay some foundations for studying epistemic value, or accuracy, when considering (...)
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  18. added 2019-10-21
    Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926.
    Recent objections to epistemic permissivism have a metaepistemic flavor. Impermissivists argue that their view best accounts for connections between rationality, planning and deference. Impermissivism is also taken to best explain the value of rational belief and normative assessment. These objections pose a series of metaepistemic explanatory challenges for permissivism. In this paper, I illustrate how permissivists might meet their explanatory burdens by developing two permissivist metaepistemic views which fare well against the explanatory challenges.
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  19. added 2019-10-08
    Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Paul Allen (ed.), The T&T Clark Encyclopedia of Christian Theology. New York: T&T Clark/Bloomsbury.
    Epistemology is the study of knowledge. This entry covers epistemology in two parts: one historical, one contemporary. The former provides a brief theological history of epistemology. The latter outlines three categories of contemporary epistemology: traditional epistemology, social epistemology, and formal epistemology, along with corresponding theological questions that arise in each.
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  20. added 2019-10-07
    How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.
  21. added 2019-09-18
    Believing Probabilistic Contents: On the Expressive Power and Coherence of Sets of Sets of Probabilities.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Jason Konek - forthcoming - Analysis Reviews:anz076.
    Moss (2018) argues that rational agents are best thought of not as having degrees of belief in various propositions but as having beliefs in probabilistic contents, or probabilistic beliefs. Probabilistic contents are sets of probability functions. Probabilistic belief states, in turn, are modeled by sets of probabilistic contents, or sets of sets of probability functions. We argue that this Mossean framework is of considerable interest quite independently of its role in Moss’ account of probabilistic knowledge or her semantics for epistemic (...)
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  22. added 2019-09-18
    IP Scoring Rules: Foundations and Applications.Jason Konek - 2019 - Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 103:256-264.
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  23. added 2019-09-16
    Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.Benjamin Lennertz - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper makes explicit the way in which many theorists of the epistemology of uncertainty, or formal epistemologists, are committed to a version of noncognitivism—one about thoughts that something is likely. It does so by drawing an analogy with metaethical noncognitivism. I explore the degree to which the motivations for both views are similar and how both views have to grapple with the Frege‐Geach Problem about complex thoughts. The major upshot of recognizing this noncognitivism is that it presents challenges and (...)
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  24. added 2019-09-16
    Bayesianism for Non-Ideal Agents.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Orthodox Bayesianism is a highly idealized theory of how we ought to live our epistemic lives. One of the most widely discussed idealizations is that of logical omniscience: the assumption that an agent’s degrees of belief must be probabilistically coherent to be rational. It is widely agreed that this assumption is problematic if we want to reason about bounded rationality, logical learning, or other aspects of non-ideal epistemic agency. Yet, we still lack a satisfying way to avoid logical omniscience within (...)
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  25. added 2019-08-26
    Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  26. added 2019-08-24
    Accuracy Monism and Doxastic Dominance: Reply to Steinberger.Matt Hewson - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Given the standard dominance conditions used in accuracy theories for outright belief, epistemologists must invoke epistemic conservatism if they are to avoid licensing belief in both a proposition and its negation. Florian Steinberger (2019) charges the committed accuracy monist — the theorist who thinks that the only epistemic value is accuracy — with being unable to motivate this conservatism. I show that the accuracy monist can avoid Steinberger’s charge by moving to a subtly different set of dominance conditions. Having done (...)
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  27. added 2019-08-23
    More Troubles for Comesaña and Tal.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    Comesaña and Tal have used a contentious account of evidence possession to claim that an ``evidence of evidence is evidence'' principle of R. Feldman (EEE3) is (true but) trivial. We demonstrate to the contrary that, on the Comesaña--Tal account of evidence possession, EEE3 is false.
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  28. added 2019-08-09
    Evidential Probabilities and Credences.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:1-21.
    Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...)
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  29. added 2019-07-10
    Reliable Credence and the Foundations of Statistics.Jesse Clifon - manuscript
    If the goal of statistical analysis is to form justified credences based on data, then an account of the foundations of statistics should explain what makes credences justified. I present a new account called statistical reliabilism (SR), on which credences resulting from a statistical analysis are justified (relative to alternatives) when they are in a sense closest, on average, to the corresponding objective probabilities. This places (SR) in the same vein as recent work on the reliabilist justification of credences generally (...)
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  30. added 2019-06-21
    Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.) - 2011 - Elsevier B.V..
  31. added 2019-06-06
    Jamesian Epistemology Formalised: An Explication of ‘the Will to Believe’.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):253-268.
    Famously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states – that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states – that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus (...)
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  32. added 2019-06-05
    Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.William Roche - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):212-215.
    Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem. By Atkinson David, Peijnenburg Jeanne.
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  33. added 2019-06-05
    Inconsistency as a Touchstone for Coherence Measures.Mark Siebel & Michael Schippers - 2015 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 30 (1):11-41.
    The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence has focused on evaluating sets of consistent propositions. In this paper we draw attention to the largely neglected question of whether such measures concur with intuitions on test cases involving inconsistent propositions and whether they satisfy general adequacy constraints on coherence and inconsistency. While it turns out that, for the vast majority of measures in their original shape, this question must be answered in the negative, we show that it is possible to adapt (...)
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  34. added 2019-06-05
    A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.
    Many epistemologists have responded to the lottery paradox by proposing formal rules according to which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson present an ingenious argument purporting to show that such rules invariably trivialise, in that they reduce to the claim that a probability of 1 warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson’s argument does, however, rest upon significant assumptions – amongst them a relatively strong structural assumption to the effect that the underlying probability space is both finite and uniform. In (...)
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  35. added 2019-06-03
    Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):199-221.
    This position paper advocates combining formal epistemology and the new paradigm psychology of reasoning in the studies of conditionals and reasoning with uncertainty. The new paradigm psychology of reasoning is characterized by the use of probability theory as a rationality framework instead of classical logic, used by more traditional approaches to the psychology of reasoning. This paper presents a new interdisciplinary research program which involves both formal and experimental work. To illustrate the program, the paper discusses recent work on the (...)
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  36. added 2019-05-16
    What is Conditionalization, and Why Should We Do It?Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-37.
    Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. In their standard formulations, each of the arguments I consider here depends on the same assumption, which I call Deterministic Updating. I will investigate whether it is possible to amend these arguments so that they no longer depend (...)
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  37. added 2019-04-24
    Plenty of Room Left for the Dogmatist.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):66-76.
    Barnett provides an interesting new challenge for Dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification. The challenge is that such accounts, by accepting that a perceptual experience can provide a distinctive kind of boost to one’s credences, would lead to a form of diachronic irrationality in cases where one has already learnt in advance that one will have such an experience. I show that this challenge rests on a misleading feature of using the 0–1 interval to express probabilities and show that if we (...)
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  38. added 2019-04-17
    Rational Understanding: Toward a Probabilistic Epistemology of Acceptability.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    To understand something involves some sort of commitment to a set of propositions comprising an account of the understood phenomenon. Some take this commitment to be a species of belief; others, such as Elgin and I, take it to be a kind of cognitive policy. This paper takes a step back from debates about the nature of understanding and asks when this commitment involved in understanding is epistemically appropriate, or `acceptable' in Elgin's terminology. In particular, appealing to lessons from the (...)
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  39. added 2019-04-08
    Varieties of Risk.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:01-24.
    The notion of risk plays a central role in economics, finance, health, psychology, law and elsewhere, and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. In recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016) has argued against the orthodox probabilistic conception of risk on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how probable it is, and in favour of a modal conception on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how modally close it is. (...)
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  40. added 2019-03-07
    Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.
    This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism’s implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it’s okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on the interpretation (...)
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  41. added 2019-03-06
    Bayesian Reasoning in Avalanche Terrain: A Theoretical Investigation.Philip A. Ebert - 2019 - Journal of Adventure Education and Outdoor Learning 19 (1):84-95.
    In this article, I explore a Bayesian approach to avalanche decision-making. I motivate this perspective by highlighting a version of the base-rate fallacy and show that a similar pattern applies to decision-making in avalanche-terrain. I then draw out three theoretical lessons from adopting a Bayesian approach and discuss these lessons critically. Lastly, I highlight a number of challenges for avalanche educators when incorporating the Bayesian perspective in their curriculum.
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  42. added 2018-12-15
    Accuracy and Epistemic Conservatism.Florian Steinberger - 2018 - Analysis:any094.
    Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with \emph{veritism}. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: Norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the (...)
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  43. added 2018-11-14
    Evidence and Rationalization.Ian Wells - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):845-864.
    Suppose that you have to take a test tomorrow but you do not want to study. Unfortunately you should study, since you care about passing and you expect to pass only if you study. Is there anything you can do to make it the case that you should not study? Is there any way for you to ‘rationalize’ slacking off? I suggest that such rationalization is impossible. Then I show that if evidential decision theory is true, rationalization is not only (...)
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  44. added 2018-10-23
    Recklessness and Uncertainty: Jackson Cases and Merely Apparent Asymmetry.Claire Field - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (4):391-413.
    Is normative uncertainty like factual uncertainty? Should it have the same effects on our actions? Some have thought not. Those who defend an asymmetry between normative and factual uncertainty typically do so as part of the claim that our moral beliefs in general are irrelevant to both the moral value and the moral worth of our actions. Here I use the consideration of Jackson cases to challenge this view, arguing that we can explain away the apparent asymmetries between normative and (...)
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  45. added 2018-10-04
    Higher-Order Uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.
    You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. I defend three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes how your first- and higher-order opinions should relate—a precise question that can be embedded within a general, tractable framework. Second, this question is nontrivial. Rational higher-order uncertainty is pervasive, and lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement. Third, the answer is (...)
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  46. added 2018-09-06
    On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol.6. Oxford University Press.
  47. added 2018-09-06
    Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):749-754.
  48. added 2018-07-29
    ‘Interview’, Probability and Statistics: 5 Questions.Luc Bovens - 2010 - In Vincent Hendricks & Alan Hajek (eds.), Probability and Statistics: 5 Questions. XX: Automatic Press. pp. 13-28.
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  49. added 2018-07-29
    Judy Benjamin is a Sleeping Beauty.Luc Bovens - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):23-26.
    I argue that van Fraassen's Judy Benjamin Problem and Elga's Sleeping Beauty Problem have the same structure.
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  50. added 2018-07-29
    Interview: Epistemology: 5 Questions.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemology: 5 Questions. XX: Automatic Press. pp. 47-61.
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