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  1. Fast-Collapsing Theories.Samuel Alexander - 2013 - Studia Logica (1):1-21.
    Reinhardt’s conjecture, a formalization of the statement that a truthful knowing machine can know its own truthfulness and mechanicalness, was proved by Carlson using sophisticated structural results about the ordinals and transfinite induction just beyond the first epsilon number. We prove a weaker version of the conjecture, by elementary methods and transfinite induction up to a smaller ordinal.
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  2. A Machine That Knows Its Own Code.Samuel A. Alexander - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (3):567-576.
    We construct a machine that knows its own code, at the price of not knowing its own factivity.
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  3. Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology. [REVIEW]Patrick Allo - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):427-432.
    As Vincent Hendricks remarks early on in this book, the formal and mainstream traditions of epistemic theorising have mostly evolved independently of each other. This initial impression is confirmed by a comparison of the main problems and methods practitioners in each tradition are concerned with. Mainstream epistemol- ogy engages in a dialectical game of proposing and challenging definitions of knowledge. Formal epistemologists proceed differently, as they design a wide variety of axiomatic and model-theoretic methods whose consequences they investigate independently of (...)
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  4. Formal Models of Coherence and Legal Epistemology.Amalia Amaya - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):429-447.
    This paper argues that formal models of coherence are useful for constructing a legal epistemology. Two main formal approaches to coherence are examined: coherence-based models of belief revision and the theory of coherence as constraint satisfaction. It is shown that these approaches shed light on central aspects of a coherentist legal epistemology, such as the concept of coherence, the dynamics of coherentist justification in law, and the mechanisms whereby coherence may be built in the course of legal decision-making.
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  5. Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief.Brad Armendt - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):758-768.
    Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think a theory (...)
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  6. Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory.Brad Armendt - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):1-20.
    One guide to an argument's significance is the number and variety of refutations it attracts. By this measure, the Dutch book argument has considerable importance.2 Of course this measure alone is not a sure guide to locating arguments deserving of our attention—if a decisive refutation has really been given, we are better off pursuing other topics. But the presence of many and varied counterarguments at least suggests that either the refutations are controversial, or that their target admits of more than (...)
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  7. On Causal and Constructive Modeling of Belief Change.Dr Ravishankar Ayyadevara - manuscript
    The process of changing beliefs as a result of accepting the new information is often called Belief revision. It occupies a central position in the area of philosophy, theoretical computer science and logic. However, problem of Belief revision in general is how an agent revises her current beliefs when new information obtained from reliable and evidential source contradicts some of the old beliefs, while preserving the core beliefs. One of the key aspects of the problem of changing beliefs is to (...)
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  8. Handbook of the Philosophy of Statistics.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.) - forthcoming - Elsevier.
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  9. A Probabilistic Defense of Proper De Jure Objections to Theism.Brian C. Barnett - manuscript
    A common view among nontheists combines the de jure objection that theism is epistemically unacceptable with agnosticism about the de facto objection that theism is false. Following Plantinga, we can call this a “proper” de jure objection—a de jure objection that does not depend on any de facto objection. In his Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga has produced a general argument against all proper de jure objections. Here I first show that this argument is logically fallacious (it makes subtle probabilistic fallacies (...)
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  10. The Species Problem and its Logic: Inescapable Ambiguity and Framework-Relativity.Steven James Bartlett - 2015 - Willamette University Faculty Research Website, ArXiv.Org, and Cogprints.Org.
    For more than fifty years, taxonomists have proposed numerous alternative definitions of species while they searched for a unique, comprehensive, and persuasive definition. This monograph shows that these efforts have been unnecessary, and indeed have provably been a pursuit of a will o’ the wisp because they have failed to recognize the theoretical impossibility of what they seek to accomplish. A clear and rigorous understanding of the logic underlying species definition leads both to a recognition of the inescapable ambiguity that (...)
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  11. The Metamathematics–Popperian Epistemology Connection and its Relation to the Logic of Turing's Programme.Jean-Roch Beausoleil - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):307-322.
    Turing's programme, the idea that intelligence can be modelled computationally, is set in the context of a parallel between certain elements from metamathematics and Popper's schema for the evolution of knowledge. The parallel is developed at both the formal level, where it hinges on the recursive structuring of Popper's schema, and at the contentual level, where a few key issues common to both epistemology and metamathematics are briefly discussed. In light of this connection Popper's principle of transference, akin to Turing's (...)
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  12. Decision Theory and Rationality.Jos Luis Bermdez - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Decision Theory and Rationality offers a challenging new interpretation of a key theoretical tool in the human and social sciences. This accessible book argues, contrary to orthodoxy in politics, economics, and management science, that decision theory cannot provide a theory of rationality.
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  13. On Conceiving the Inconsistent.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):103-121.
    I present an approach to our conceiving absolute impossibilities—things which obtain at no possible world—in terms of ceteris paribus intentional operators: variably restricted quantifiers on possible and impossible worlds based on world similarity. The explicit content of a representation plays a role similar in some respects to the one of a ceteris paribus conditional antecedent. I discuss how such operators invalidate logical closure for conceivability, and how similarity works when impossible worlds are around. Unlike what happens with ceteris paribus counterfactual (...)
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  14. Petitio Principii and Circular Argumentation as Seen From a Theory of Dialectical Structures.Gregor Betz - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):327-349.
    This paper investigates in how far a theory of dialectical structures sheds new light on the old problem of giving a satisfying account of the fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question. It defends that (i) circular argumentation on the one hand and petitio principii on the other hand are two distinct features of complex argumentation, and that (ii) it is impossible to make general statements about the defectiveness of an argumentation that exhibits these features. Such an argumentation, in (...)
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  15. The Logic of Strategy.Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.) - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form (...)
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  16. Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    In a possible world framework, an agent can be said to know a proposition just in case the proposition is true at all worlds that are epistemically possible for the agent. Roughly, a world is epistemically possible for an agent just in case the world is not ruled out by anything the agent knows. If a proposition is true at some epistemically possible world for an agent, the proposition is epistemically possible for the agent. If a proposition is true at (...)
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  17. When Propriety Is Improper.Kevin Blackwell & Daniel Drucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    We attempt to distinguish epistemic decision theory from epistemic consequentialism, and in the process rebut arguments for the constraint on epistemic utility functions known in the literature as "Propriety". We also argue directly against that principle, by looking at an analogous principle for practical (orthodox) decision theory.
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  18. Why There Cannot Be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):361-374.
    Bayesian Coherence Theory of Justification or, for short, Bayesian Coherentism, is characterized by two theses, viz. (i) that our degree of confidence in the content of a set of propositions is positively affected by the coherence of the set, and (ii) that coherence can be characterized in probabilistic terms. There has been a longstanding question of how to construct a measure of coherence. We will show that Bayesian Coherentism cannot rest on a single measure of coherence, but requires a vector (...)
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  19. Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-Trivial Extensions. [REVIEW]Luc Bovens & Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):137 - 150.
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  20. Scientific Collaboration: Do Two Heads Need to Be More Than Twice Better Than One?Thomas Boyer-Kassem & Cyrille Imbert - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):667-688.
    Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong. We present a deliberately crude model with unfavorable hypotheses. We show that, even then, when the priority rule is applied, large differences in successfulness can emerge from small differences in efficiency, with sometimes increasing marginal returns. We emphasize that success is sensitive to the structure of competing communities. Our results suggest (...)
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  21. Four Problems About Self-Locating Belief.D. Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177.
    This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.
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  22. A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology.Darren Bradley - 2015 - London: Bllomsbury.
  23. Multiple Universes and Observation Selection Effects.Darren Bradley - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):72.
    The fine-tuning argument can be used to support the Many Universe hypothesis. The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy objection seeks to undercut the support for the Many Universe hypothesis. The objection is that although the evidence that there is life somewhere confirms Many Universes, the specific evidence that there is life in this universe does not. I will argue that the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy is not committed by the fine-tuning argument. The key issue is the procedure by which the universe with life (...)
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  24. Bayesianism And Self-Locating Beliefs.Darren Bradley - 2007 - Dissertation, Stanford University
    How should we update our beliefs when we learn new evidence? Bayesian confirmation theory provides a widely accepted and well understood answer – we should conditionalize. But this theory has a problem with self-locating beliefs, beliefs that tell you where you are in the world, as opposed to what the world is like. To see the problem, consider your current belief that it is January. You might be absolutely, 100%, sure that it is January. But you will soon believe it (...)
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  25. Correlation and Truth.Peter Brössel - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 41--54.
  26. Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...)
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  27. Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering.Lara Buchak - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.
    This paper addresses the question of whether gathering additional evidence is always rationally required, both from the point of view of instrumental rationality and of epistemic rationality. It is shown that in certain situations, it is not instrumentally rational to look for more evidence before making a decision. These are situations in which the risk of “misleading” evidence – a concept that has both instrumental and epistemic senses – is not offset by the gains from the possibility of non-misleading evidence. (...)
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  28. Epistemology Dehumanized.Panayot Butchvarov - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 301.
    Fundamental disagreements in epistemology arise from legitimate differences of interest, not genuine conflict. It is because of such differences that there are three varieties of epistemology: naturalistic, subjective, and what I shall call epistemology-as-logic. All three have been with us at least since Socrates. My chief concern will be with the third, but I must begin with the first and second, which constitute standard epistemology.
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  29. Agreement and Updating for Self-Locating Belief.Michael Caie - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-35.
    In this paper, I argue that some plausible principles concerning which credences are rationally permissible for agents given information about one another’s epistemic and credal states have some surprising consequences for which credences an agent ought to have in light of self-locating information. I provide a framework that allows us to state these constraints and draw out these consequences precisely. I then consider and assess the prospects for rejecting these prima facie plausible principles.
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  30. A Problem for Credal Consequentialism.Michael Caie - forthcoming - In Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism.
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  31. Agreement Theorems for Self-Locating Belief.Michael Caie - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):380-407.
  32. Chance, Credence and Circles.Fabrizio Cariani - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):49-58.
    This is a discussion of Richard Pettigrew's book "Accuracy and the Laws of Credence". I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that go beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.
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  33. Chancy Accuracy and Imprecise Credence.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):67-81.
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  34. Epistemic Expansions.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):217-236.
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  35. The Imprecise Impermissivist’s Dilemma.Clinton Castro & Casey Hart - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    Impermissivists hold that an agent with a given body of evidence has at most one rationally permitted attitude that she should adopt towards any particular proposition. Permissivists deny this, often motivating permissivism by describing scenarios that pump our intuitions that the agent could reasonably take one of several attitudes toward some proposition. We criticize the following impermissivist response: while it seems like any of that range of attitudes is permissible, what is actually required is the single broad attitude that encompasses (...)
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  36. Ideal Counterpart Theorizing and the Accuracy Argument for Probabilism.Clinton Castro & Olav Vassend - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):207-216.
    One of the main goals of Bayesian epistemology is to justify the rational norms credence functions ought to obey. Accuracy arguments attempt to justify these norms from the assumption that the source of value for credences relevant to their epistemic status is their accuracy. This assumption and some standard decision-theoretic principles are used to argue for norms like Probabilism, the thesis that an agent’s credence function is rational only if it obeys the probability axioms. We introduce an example that shows (...)
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  37. Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):201-217.
    As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number (...)
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  38. The Transmission of Support: A Bayesian Re-Analysis.Jake Chandler - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):333-343.
    Crispin Wright’s discussion of the notion of ‘transmission-failure’ promises to have important philosophical ramifications, both in epistemology and beyond. This paper offers a precise, formal characterisation of the concept within a Bayesian framework. The interpretation given avoids the serious shortcomings of a recent alternative proposal due to Samir Okasha.
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  39. Epistemic Self-Respect.David Christensen - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.
  40. Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.
  41. Sleeping Beauty Goes to the Lab: The Psychology of Self-Locating Evidence.Matteo Colombo, Jun Lai & Vincenzo Crupi - unknown - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-13.
    Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those advocating the “1/2 view” and those endorsing the “1/3 view”. The disagreement concerns the evidential relevance of self-locating information. Unlike halfers, thirders regard self-locating information as evidentially relevant in the Sleeping Beauty Problem. In the present study, we systematically manipulate the kind of information available in different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Our findings indicate that patterns of judgment on different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem do not fit (...)
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  42. 2007. Notes on the Founding of Logics and Metalogic: Aristotle, Boole, and Tarski. Eds. C. Martínez Et Al. Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy / Temas Actuales de Lógica y Filosofía Analítica. Imprenta Univeridade Santiago de Compostela.John Corcoran - 2007 - In C. Martínez (ed.), Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy /. pp. 145-178.
  43. Meanings of Implication.John Corcoran - 1973 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 9 (24):59-76.
    Thirteen meanings of 'implication' are described and compared. Among them are relations that have been called: logical implication, material implication,deductive implication, formal implication, enthymemic implication, and factual implication. In a given context, implication is the homogeneous two-place relation expressed by the relation verb 'implies'. For heuristic and expository reasons this article skirts many crucial issues including use-mention, the nature of the entities that imply and are implied, and the processes by which knowledge of these relations are achieved. This paper is (...)
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  44. Conceptual Structure of Classical Logic.John Corcoran - 1972 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (1):25-47.
    One innovation in this paper is its identification, analysis, and description of a troubling ambiguity in the word ‘argument’. In one sense ‘argument’ denotes a premise-conclusion argument: a two-part system composed of a set of sentences—the premises—and a single sentence—the conclusion. In another sense it denotes a premise-conclusion-mediation argument—later called an argumentation: a three-part system composed of a set of sentences—the premises—a single sentence—the conclusion—and complex of sentences—the mediation. The latter is often intended to show that the conclusion follows from (...)
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  45. A Modern Malignant Demon? Hume's Scepticism with Regard to Reason (Partly) Vindicated.George Couvalis - 2011 - In Craig Taylor Stephen Buckle (ed.), Hume and the Enlightenment. Chatto & Pickering. pp. 105-115.
  46. Transformative Experience L. A. PAUL Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; 189 Pp.; £18.99. [REVIEW]Irena Cronin - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (3).
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  47. A Correction to “Nonmonotonic Inconsistency” [Artificial Intelligence 149 (2003) 161–178].Charles B. Cross - 2004 - Artificial Intelligence 160 (1-2):191-192.
    This note corrects an error in the statement and proof of Propositions 9 and 10 of [C. Cross, Nonmonotonic inconsistency, Artificial Intelligence 149 (2) (2003) 161–178]. Both results turn out to depend on the postulate of Consistency Preservation.
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  48. Nonmonotonic Inconsistency.Charles B. Cross - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence 149 (2):161-178.
    Nonmonotonic consequence is the subject of a vast literature, but the idea of a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical inconsistency—the idea of a defeasible property representing internal conflict of an inductive or evidential nature—has been entirely neglected. After considering and dismissing two possible analyses relating nonmonotonic consequence and a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical inconsistency, this paper offers a set of postulates for nonmonotonic inconsistency, an analysis of nonmonotonic inconsistency in terms of nonmonotonic consequence, and a series of results showing that nonmonotonic (...)
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  49. No Rationality Through Brute-Force.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (3):195-200.
    All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit logical omniscience, which is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the models could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the models would describe maximum rationality, (...)
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  50. Accuracy and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-35.
    Recently, several epistemologists have defended an attractive principle of epistemic rationality, which we shall call Ur-Prior Conditionalization. In this essay, I ask whether we can justify this principle by appealing to the epistemic goal of accuracy. I argue that any such accuracy-based argument will be in tension with Evidence Externalism, i.e., the view that agent's evidence may entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. This is because any such argument will crucially require the assumption that, independently of all empirical evidence, (...)
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