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  1. Peer Review: An Unflattering Picture.Kenneth M. Adams - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (1):135-136.
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  2. Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies.I. Alon - 2001 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 13 (4):138-139.
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  3. Discussions: Propositions and Judgments.John Anderson - 1926 - Mind 35 (138):237-241.
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  4. Propositions and Judgments.John Anderson - 1926 - Mind 35 (138):237-241.
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  5. Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.Horacio Arlo-Costa & Arthur Paul Pedersen - unknown
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the theory (...)
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  6. Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Arsenault & Zachary C. Irving - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):185-194.
    We present a family of counter-examples to David Christensen's Independence Criterion, which is central to the epistemology of disagreement. Roughly, independence requires that, when you assess whether to revise your credence in P upon discovering that someone disagrees with you, you shouldn't rely on the reasoning that lead you to your initial credence in P. To do so would beg the question against your interlocutor. Our counter-examples involve questions where, in the course of your reasoning, you almost fall for an (...)
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  7. Abstract Aggregations and Proximity Preservation: An Impossibility Result. [REVIEW]Nick Baigent & Daniel Eckert - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (4):359-366.
    An impossibility result for completely abstract social aggregation rules is presented. It is shown that non-imposition and a new no-veto property (two properties in the spirit of the Pareto principle and non-dictatorship respectively) are incompatible with an inter-profile consistency condition formulated in terms of proximity preservation.
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  8. Belief Dependence: How Do the Numbers Count?Zach Barnett - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    This paper is about how to aggregate outside opinion. If two experts are on one side of an issue, while three experts are on the other side, what should a non-expert believe? Certainly, the non-expert should take into account more than just the numbers. But which other factors are relevant, and why? According to the view developed here, one important factor is whether the experts should have been expected, in advance, to reach the same conclusion. When the agreement of two (...)
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  9. Review of Considered Judgement. [REVIEW]H. D. Battaly - 1998 - Social Epistemology 12:313-315.
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  10. A New Prospect for Epistemic Aggregation.Daniel Berntson & Yoaav Isaacs - 2013 - Episteme 10 (3):269-281.
    How should the opinion of a group be related to the opinions of the group members? In this article, we will defend a package of four norms pairs of prior probabilities and evidence. We show that there is a method of aggregating credal pairs that possesses all four virtues.
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  11. Preference Aggregation and Statistical Estimation.Jean-Marie Blin - 1973 - Theory and Decision 4 (1):65-84.
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  12. Realistic Opinion Aggregation: Lehrer-Wagner with a Finite Set of Opinion Values. [REVIEW]R. Bradley & Wagner - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):91-99.
    An allocation problem is a type of aggregation problem in which the values of individuals' opinions on some set of variables sum to a constant. This paper shows that for realistic allocation problems, namely ones in which the set of possible opinion values is finite, the only universal aggregation methods that satisfy two commonly invoked conditions are the dictatorial ones. The two conditions are, first, that the aggregate opinion on any variable depends only on the individuals' opinions on that variable (...)
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  13. Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning.Richard Bradley - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
    Richard Jeffrey espoused an antifoundationalist variant of Bayesian thinking that he termed ‘Radical Probabilism’. Radical Probabilism denies both the existence of an ideal, unbiased starting point for our attempts to learn about the world and the dogma of classical Bayesianism that the only justified change of belief is one based on the learning of certainties. Probabilistic judgment is basic and irreducible. Bayesian conditioning is appropriate when interaction with the environment yields new certainty of belief in some proposition but leaves one’s (...)
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  14. A (Mainly Epistemic) Case for Multiple-Vote Majority Rule.Richard Bradley & Christopher Thompson - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):63-79.
    Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.
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  15. The Normative Standing of Group Agents.Rachael Briggs - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):283-291.
    Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that groups of people can be agents – beings that believe, desire and act. Their account combines a non-reductive realist view of group attitudes, on which groups literally have attitudes that cannot be analyzed in terms of the attitudes of their members, with methodological individualism, on which good explanations of group-level phenomena should not posit forces above individual attitudes and behaviors. I then discuss the main normative conclusion that LP draw from the claim that (...)
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  16. The Disagreement on the Definition of Religion.Andrzej Bronk - 1995 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 43 (2):114.
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  17. On the Aggregation of Wadsley Defects in Slightly Reduced Rutile.L. A. Bursill & B. G. Hyde - 1971 - Philosophical Magazine 23 (181):3-15.
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  18. A Disagreement Over Agreement and Consensus in Constructionist Sociology.Graham Button & Wes Sharrock - 1993 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1):1–25.
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  19. Peer Gynt.V. C. C. - 1956 - Review of Metaphysics 9 (3):519-519.
  20. More Equal Than Others: A View From the Grassroots.John Cable - 2013 - Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal 27.
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  21. Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.
    Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality. It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. This (...)
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  22. Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.David Coady - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):101-113.
    I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.
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  23. When Experts Disagree.David Coady - 2006 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):68-79.
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  24. A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.
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  25. Disagreeing About Disagreement in Law: The Argument From Theoretical Disagreement.Tim Dare - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):1-15.
    Ronald Dworkin argues that disagreement in hard cases is ‘theoretical’ rather than empirical and of central importance to our understanding of law, showing ‘plain fact’ theories such as H. L. A. Hart’s sophisticated legal positivism to be false. The argument from theoretical disagreement targets positivism’s commitment to idea that the criteria a norm must meet to be valid in a given jurisdiction are constituted by a practice of convergent behavior by legal officials. The ATD suggests that in hard cases there (...)
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  26. Knowing Our Degrees of Belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...)
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  27. Uniqueness Revisited.Igor Douven - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):347 - 361.
    Various authors have recently argued that you cannot rationally stick to your belief in the face of known disagreement with an epistemic peer, that is, a person you take to have the same evidence and judgmental skills as you do. For, they claim, because there is but one rational response to any body of evidence, a disagreement with an epistemic peer indicates that at least one of you is not responding rationally to the evidence. Given that you take your peer (...)
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  28. The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):301-319.
    List and Pettit have stated an impossibility theorem about the aggregation of individual opinion states. Building on recent work on the lottery paradox, this paper offers a variation on that result. The present result places different constraints on the voting agenda and the domain of profiles, but it covers a larger class of voting rules, which need not satisfy the proposition-wise independence of votes.
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  29. Achieving Consensus Among Agents - an Opinion-Dynamics Model.Bruce Edmonds - manuscript
    The paper considers the problem of how a distributed system of agents (who communicate only via a localised network) might achieve consensus by copying beliefs (copy) from each other and doing some belief pruning themselves (drop). This is explored using a social simulation model, where beliefs interact with each other via a compatibility function, which assigns a level of compatibility (which is a sort of weak consistency) to a set of beliefs. The probability of copy and drop processes occurring is (...)
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  30. What Is Common Knowledge?Zachary Ernst - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):209-226.
    Common knowledge is usually defined as a state in which everyone knows that p, everyone knows that everyone knows that p, and so on, ad infinitum. This definition is usually attributed to David Lewis, despite the fact that his own formulation bears no resemblance to common knowledge as it is usually understood. In this paper, I argue that this concept of common knowledge requires revision. Contrary to usual practice, it turns out to be difficult to model formally because existing models (...)
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  31. Beyond Anarchy: Self-Organized Topology for Peer-to-Peer Networks.S. Fabrice & R. Ghanea-Hercock - 2004 - Complexity 9 (2):49-53.
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  32. Sequential Voting by Veto: Extending the Applicability of the Mueller-Moulin Algorithm.D. S. Felsenthal & M. Machover - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33:223-240.
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  33. Algebraic Aggregation Theory.Perm C. Fishburn - unknown
    An aggregation procedure merges a list of objects into a representative object. This paper considers the problem of aggregating n rows in an n-by-m matrix into a summary row, where every entry is an element in an algebraic field. It focuses on consistent aggregators, which require each entry in the summary row to depend only on its column entries in the matrix and to be the same as the column entry if the column is constant. Consistent aggregators are related to (...)
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  34. Majority Efficiencies for Simple Voting Procedures: Summary and Interpretation. [REVIEW]Peter C. Fishburn & William V. Gehrlein - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (2):141-153.
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  35. On Defining Library and Information Science as Applied Philosophy of Information.Luciano Floridi - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (1):37 – 49.
    This paper analyses the relations between philosophy of information (PI), library and information science (LIS) and social epistemology (SE). In the first section, it is argued that there is a natural relation between philosophy and LIS but that SE cannot provide a satisfactory foundation for LIS. SE should rather be seen as sharing with LIS a common ground, represented by the study of information, to be investigated by a new discipline, PI. In the second section, the nature of PI is (...)
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  36. Amount of Information Transmitted in Absolute Judgments of Pitch Calculated According to the Majority Rule.Ante Fulgosi, Zvonimir KnezoviĆ & Predrag Zarevski - 1983 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 21 (3):193-194.
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  37. Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In James Chase & David Coady (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge.
    In order to perform certain actions – such as incarcerating a person or revoking parental rights – the state must establish certain facts to a particular standard of proof. These standards – such as preponderance of evidence and beyond reasonable doubt – are often interpreted as likelihoods or epistemic confidences. Many theorists construe them numerically; beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often construed as 90 to 95% confidence in the guilt of the defendant. -/- A family of influential cases suggests (...)
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  38. Aggregating Opinions Through Logarithmic Pooling.C. Genest, S. Weerahandi & J. V. Zidek - 1984 - Theory and Decision 17 (1):61-70.
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  39. The Significance of Disagreement Among Philosophers.William Gerber - 1958 - Hibbert Journal 57:368.
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  40. Comment.Alvin Goldman & Moshe Shaked - 1993 - Social Epistemology 7 (3):249 – 253.
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  41. Rationalising Discursive Anomalies.Robert E. Goodin - 2009 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 56 (119):1-13.
    Sunstein's Infotopia offers four reasons for thinking that information-pooling via mechanical aggregation of votes is superior to discursive sharing of opinions. This article focuses on two of them—the Common Knowledge Effect and Group Polarisation—showing that both phenomena might have perfectly good Bayesian explanations. Far from constituting 'errors', both can actually contribute to truth-tracking in ways that cannot be accomplished via mechanical aggregation of votes alone.
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  42. Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted Weights.K. Gordon - 1924 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 7 (5):398.
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  43. Aggregation on Bipolar Scales.Michel Grabisch - 2006 - In Harrie de Swart, Ewa Orlowska, Gunther Smith & Marc Roubens (eds.), Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments Ii. Springer. pp. 355--371.
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  44. Democratic Disagreement.Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson - 1999 - In Stephen Macedo (ed.), Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. Oxford University Press. pp. 243.
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  45. Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology. [REVIEW]Stephan Hartmann, Carlo Martini & Jan Sprenger (eds.) - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL (special issue).
    Special issue. With contributions by Rogier De Langhe and Matthias Greiff, Igor Douven and Alexander Riegler, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger, Carl Wagner, Paul Weirich, and Jesús Zamora Bonilla.
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  46. Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-Tracking.Stephan Hartmann & Gabriella Pigozzi - 2006 - In Jerome Lang & Ulle Endriss (eds.), Computational Social Choice 2006. University of Amsterdam.
    The problem of the aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. The dificulty lies in the fact that a seemingly reasonable aggregation procedure, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective outcome. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such dilemmas as the discursive paradox. So far, three procedures have been proposed to overcome the paradox: the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures on the (...)
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  47. Levels of Aggregation and the Generalized Matching Law.C. Donald Heth - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (2):306-321.
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  48. Moral Aggregation.Iwao Hirose - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    This book elucidates the theoretical structure and scope of interpersonal and intra-personal aggregation--a trade-off between benefits to a group of individuals and losses to another group of individuals--and defends a form of aggregation -- formal aggregation -- that resolves a variety of outstanding problems arising from the conventional understanding of aggregation, including the Number Problem concerning the moral relevance of the number of individuals.
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  49. Up and Down with Aggregation.Bradford Hooker - unknown
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  50. Epistemic Modals and Credal Disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.
    Considerations involving disagreement, as well as related considerations involving correction and retraction, have played an important role in recent debates about epistemic modals. For instance, it has been argued that contextualist views about epistemic modals have problems when it comes to explaining cases of disagreement. In response to these challenges, I explore the idea that the relevant cases of disagreement may involve credal disagreement. In a case of credal disagreement, the parties have different degrees of belief or credences. There does (...)
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