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  1. Modeling Epistemic Communities.Samuli Reijula & Jaakko Kuorikoski - forthcoming - In Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.
    We review the most prominent modeling approaches in social epistemology aimed at understand- ing the functioning of epistemic communities and provide a philosophy of science perspective on the use and interpretation of such simple toy models, thereby suggesting how they could be integrated with conceptual and empirical work. We highlight the need for better integration of such models with relevant findings from disciplines such as social psychology and organization studies.
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  2. Belief Dependence: How Do the Numbers Count?Zach Barnett - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):297-319.
    This paper is about how to aggregate outside opinion. If two experts are on one side of an issue, while three experts are on the other side, what should a non-expert believe? Certainly, the non-expert should take into account more than just the numbers. But which other factors are relevant, and why? According to the view developed here, one important factor is whether the experts should have been expected, in advance, to reach the same conclusion. When the agreement of two (...)
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  3. Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In James Chase & David Coady (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge.
    In order to perform certain actions – such as incarcerating a person or revoking parental rights – the state must establish certain facts to a particular standard of proof. These standards – such as preponderance of evidence and beyond reasonable doubt – are often interpreted as likelihoods or epistemic confidences. Many theorists construe them numerically; beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often construed as 90 to 95% confidence in the guilt of the defendant. -/- A family of influential cases suggests (...)
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  4. Up and Down with Aggregation.Bradford Hooker - unknown
  5. Knowing Our Degrees of Belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...)
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  6. Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.
    Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality. It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. This (...)
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  7. On the Aggregation of Wadsley Defects in Slightly Reduced Rutile.L. A. Bursill & B. G. Hyde - 1971 - Philosophical Magazine 23 (181):3-15.
  8. Aggregation Pheromone System: A Real-Parameter Optimization Algorithm Using Aggregation Pheromones as the Base Metaphor.Shigeyosi Tsutsui - 2005 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 20:76-83.
  9. Discussion: Judgment as "the Collective Becoming Abstract.".A. H. Lloyd - 1894 - Psychological Review 1 (3):283-285.
  10. Levels of Aggregation and the Generalized Matching Law.C. Donald Heth - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (2):306-321.
  11. Aggregation of Value Judgments Differs From Aggregation of Preferences.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2016 - In .
  12. Aggregating Judgement in Scientifc Practice.Raphaël Künstler - unknown
    This paper argues that standard theories of judgment aggregation cannot apply to scientific practice, since science is a temporally extended process that involves both different individuals and different hypotheses during that process. Thus, for example, we seem to have no idea how to determine the judgments of dead scientists about theoretical alternatives that were proposed after their death. The paper then proposes an algorithm for judgment aggregation to try to address some of these challenges.
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  13. When Experts Disagree.David Coady - 2006 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):68-79.
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  14. SIGRAD 2010 – Content Aggregation and Visualization.Kai-Mikael Jää-Aro & Thomas Larsson (eds.) - 2010 - Linköping University Electronic Press.
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  15. How to Condorcet a Goldman.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):413-425.
    In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
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  16. Disagreement and the Value of Self-Trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.
    Controversy over the epistemology of disagreement endures because there is an unnoticed factor at work: the intrinsic value we give to self-trust. Even if there are many instances of disagreement where, from a strictly epistemic or rational point of view, we ought to suspend belief, there are other values at work that influence our all-things considered judgments about what we ought to believe. Hence those who would give equal-weight to both sides in many cases of disagreement may be right, from (...)
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  17. Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism.Andrew Rotondo - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):251-271.
    Several philosophers have recently argued that disagreement with others undermines or precludes epistemic justification for our opinions about controversial issues. This amounts to a fascinating and disturbing kind of intellectual scepticism. A crucial piece of the sceptical argument, however, is that our opponents on such topics are epistemic peers. In this paper, I examine the reasons for why we might think that our opponents really are such peers, and I argue that those reasons are either too weak or too strong, (...)
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  18. Argumentation and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Harvey Siegal - unknown
    When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous arguer do? Several options have been defended in the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, which connects interestingly to the controversy launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement.’ I will argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen in that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for argumentation theory than it once seemed.
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  19. Epistemic Modals and Credal Disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.
    Considerations involving disagreement, as well as related considerations involving correction and retraction, have played an important role in recent debates about epistemic modals. For instance, it has been argued that contextualist views about epistemic modals have problems when it comes to explaining cases of disagreement. In response to these challenges, I explore the idea that the relevant cases of disagreement may involve credal disagreement. In a case of credal disagreement, the parties have different degrees of belief or credences. There does (...)
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  20. David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, Eds. , The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays . Reviewed By.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (1):4-6.
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  21. Applying Formal Social Epistemology to the Real World.Carlo Martini - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (2):383-398.
    The claim that diversity and independence have a net positive epistemic effect on the judgments of groups has been recently defended formally by Scott Page, among others, and popularized in Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of Crowds. In Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds Thorn and Schurz take issue with the claim that more diversity and independence in groups leads to better collective judgments. I argue that Thorn and Schurz’s arguments are helpful in clarifying a number of over-generalizations about diversity and independence (...)
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  22. Social Choice Theory.Christian List - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting system (...)
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  23. Conciliationism Without Uniqueness.Matthew Lee - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):161-188.
    I defend Conciliationism: rationality requires belief revision of epistemic peers who find themselves in disagreement and lack dispute-independent reason to suspect each other of error. (Kelly 2010) argues that Conciliationists are committed to the Uniqueness Thesis: a given body of evidence rationalizes a unique degree of confidence for a given proposition. (Ballantyne & Coffman 2012) cogently critique Kelly's argument and propose an improved version. I contend that their version of the argument is unsound, and I offer some friendly amendments. But (...)
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  24. Preference Aggregation.Paul Douglas Lyon - 1980 - Dissertation, Washington University
    In the final part, Arrow's own formal treatment of the social choice problem is examined and its relation to the preference aggregation model is analyzed. Particular attention is paid to Arrow's discussion of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and, with the aid of some additional formal work, much of what has been found problematic in this is resolved. Finally, this analysis is used as the basis of a critique of the "received view" in the literature about independence of irrelevant alternatives. ;In (...)
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  25. The Significance of Disagreement Among Philosophers.William Gerber - 1958 - Hibbert Journal 57:368.
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  26. The Disagreement on the Definition of Religion.Andrzej Bronk - 1995 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 43 (2):114.
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  27. A Conciliatory Approach to Morals.Betsy Carol Postow Latta - 1970 - Dissertation, Yale University
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  28. Constitutions, Disagreement and Rationality: A Reply to Cerar.Carl Lebeck - 2005 - Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 91 (2):266-272.
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  29. Dealing with Disagreement: Uniqueness and Conciliation.Jonathan D. Matheson - 2010 - Dissertation, Proquest
  30. More Equal Than Others: A View From the Grassroots.John Cable - 2013 - Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal 27.
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  31. Moral Aggregation.Iwao Hirose - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    This book elucidates the theoretical structure and scope of interpersonal and intra-personal aggregation--a trade-off between benefits to a group of individuals and losses to another group of individuals--and defends a form of aggregation -- formal aggregation -- that resolves a variety of outstanding problems arising from the conventional understanding of aggregation, including the Number Problem concerning the moral relevance of the number of individuals.
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  32. An Impossibility Theorem for Allocation Aggregation.Carl Wagner & Mark Shattuck - unknown
    In axiomatic approaches to expert opinion aggregation, so-called independence conditions have been ubiquitous. Such conditions dictate that the group value assigned to each decision variable should depend only on the values assigned by individuals to that variable, taking no account of values that they assign to other variables. This radically anti-holistic stricture on the synthesis of expert opinion severely limits the set of allowable aggregation methods. As we show, the limitations are particularly acute in the case of three or more (...)
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  33. Structured Arguments and Their Aggregation: A Reply to Selinger.Chris Reed - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (3):395-399.
    Selinger provides a new take on what is being referred to in the computational literature as ‘structured argumentation’. In this commentary the differences and similarities with existing work are highlighted as a way of demonstrating how philosophical and computational approaches to argumentation are increasingly coming together and complementing one another.
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  34. Diego E. Machuca (Ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Stephen Wright - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1157-1160.
  35. Sequential Voting by Veto: Extending the Applicability of the Mueller-Moulin Algorithm.D. S. Felsenthal & M. Machover - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33:223-240.
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  36. The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.Franz Dietrich & List & Christian - 2010 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 3. Oxford University Press.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to …lling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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  37. Review of Considered Judgement. [REVIEW]H. D. Battaly - 1998 - Social Epistemology 12:313-315.
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  38. Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies.I. Alon - 2001 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 13 (4):138-139.
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  39. Beyond Anarchy: Self-Organized Topology for Peer-to-Peer Networks.S. Fabrice & R. Ghanea-Hercock - 2004 - Complexity 9 (2):49-53.
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  40. Political Epistemology, Experts, and the Aggregation of Knowledge.Stephen Turner - 2007 - Spontaneous Generations 1 (1):36.
    Expert claims routinely “affect, combat, refute, and negate” someone or some faction or grouping of persons. When scientists proclaim the truth of Darwinism, they refute, negate, and whatnot the Christian view of the creation, and thus Christians. When research is done on racial differences, it affects, negates, and so on, those who are negatively characterized. This is why Phillip Kitcher argues that it should be banned. Some truths are too dangerous to ever inquire into, because, he reasons, even by inquiring (...)
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  41. A Puzzle About the Agnostic Response to Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1253-1261.
    The paper argues that the view to the effect that one should suspend judgment in the face of a disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer results in a puzzle when applied to disagreements in which one party is agnostic. The puzzle is this: either the agnostic party retains her suspension of judgment, or she suspends it. The former option is discarded by proponents of the agnostic response; the latter leads the agnostic response to undermine itself.
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  42. Aggregation on Bipolar Scales.Michel Grabisch - 2006 - In Harrie de Swart, Ewa Orlowska, Gunther Smith & Marc Roubens (eds.), Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments Ii. Springer. pp. 355--371.
  43. Aggregation Problems and Models: What Comes First?Gabriella Pigozzi - 2010 - In F. Stadler, D. Dieks, W. Gonzales, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 141--152.
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  44. A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.
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  45. The Impact of Collective Opinion on Online Judgment.Yasuaki Sakamoto - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1869--1874.
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  46. Democratic Disagreement.Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson - 1999 - In Stephen Macedo (ed.), Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. Oxford University Press. pp. 243.
  47. Amount of Information Transmitted in Absolute Judgments of Pitch Calculated According to the Majority Rule.Ante Fulgosi, Zvonimir KnezoviĆ & Predrag Zarevski - 1983 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 21 (3):193-194.
  48. Appendix: The Jury Theorem and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit & Wlodek Rabinowicz - unknown
  49. Peer Review: An Unflattering Picture.Kenneth M. Adams - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (1):135-136.
  50. Familial Aggregation of Consanguineous Marriages in Japan.Yoko Imaizumi - 1988 - Journal of Biosocial Science 20 (1):99.
1 — 50 / 220