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Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that everything is, in some important sense, physical. But in what sense is everything physical? Must everything reduce to physics? Must all terms be translatable into physical terms? What does it take for something to count as ''physical''? This category contains works that relate to the question ''What is physicalism?’’. These works utilize a wide variety of tools and approaches in their attempts to spell out what physicalism is.

Key works "Hempel's dilemma'' (Hempel 1969, Crane & Mellor 1990) claims that no non-trivial formulation of physicalism can be given. In this vein, Stoljar 2010 argues that there is no thesis that is both potentially true and deserving of the name 'physicalism'.  Discussions of Hempel's dilemma can also be found in Dowell, J. L. 2006, Melnyk 1997, and Wilson 2006. All the above works, in addition to Stoljar 2001a, 2001b, Chalmers 2003 (section 7), and Wilson 2006 discuss what it takes for something to count as ''physical''. Classic statements of an early form of materialism, the mind-brain identity theory, can be found in Place 1956, Feigl 1958 and Smart 1959. Chalmers 1996, Jackson 1994, Kim 1993, and Lewis 1983 use the tools of metaphysical modality and supervenience to formulate physicalism. Wilson 2005 provides reasons to be skeptical of such accounts. Melnyk 2003, 2006 formulates physicalism using the notion of realization, while Leuenberger 2008 uses ceteris absentibus sufficiency. Chalmers 2003 provides a useful taxonomy of physicalist positions, organized with respect to how they respond to the hard problem of consciousness. Kim 1998 covers a variety of topics relevant to both formulating and evaluating physicalism, including supervenience, reductive vs non-reductive physicalism, and the causal closure of the physical.
Introductions Stoljar 2001, Stoljar 2010, and Dowell, J. L. 2006 are good starting places for the difficulties surrounding formulating physicalism. Smart 2007 offers an overview of the development of the mind-brain identity theory. Crane & Mellor 1990 contains a pressing formulation of Hempel's dilemma. Stoljar 2010 covers a wide variety of attempts to characterize ''the physical''.
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  1. Virgil Aldrich (1977). Description and Expression: Physicalism Restricted. Inquiry 20 (1-4):149 – 164.
    'Material thing' is a two-level concept. In 'first-order extension' - the field of perceptual experience - it is a 'body' that may 'body forth' (show, express) a 'content', like the bodies of persons or pictures. In 'second-order extension' -the physical field or space - it is a 'physical object' whose micro-constitution is the target of the reference of theoretical terms or formulae. As such, it has no content - nothing to 'express'. In the description of a material thing in first-order (...)
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  2. Leonard Angel (2010). The Importance of Physicalism in the Philosophy of Religion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):141 - 156.
    First, some say that core physicalism is not anti-religion. I argue that this seems to be incorrect. Physical completeness is a core element of contemporary physicalism; (the evidence for physical completeness is strong); and physical completeness both logically and not strictly logically rejects many central religious views. Consequently, there is a sense in which core physicalism is, in an important way, anti-religion. Second, physical completeness positively supports one significant religious view; and physical completeness permits one to hold two others. The (...)
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  3. Joseph A. Baltimore (2013). Careful, Physicalists: Mind–Body Supervenience Can Be Too Superduper. Theoria 79 (1):8-21.
    It has become evident that mind–body supervenience, as merely specifying a covariance between mental and physical properties, is consistent with clearly non-physicalist views of the mental, such as emergentism. Consequently, there is a push in the physicalist camp for an ontologically more robust supervenience, a “superdupervenience,” that ensures that properties supervening on physical properties are physicalistically acceptable. Jessica Wilson claims that supervenience is made superduper by Condition on Causal Powers (CCP): each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is (...)
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  4. Joseph A. Baltimore (2013). Stoljar's Twin-Physics World. Philosophia 41 (1):127-136.
    In his recent book Physicalism, Daniel Stoljar argues that there is no version of physicalism that is both true and deserving of the name. His argument employs a variation of Hilary Putnam’s famous twin-earth story, which Stoljar calls “the twin-physics world.” In this paper, I challenge Stoljar’s use of the twin-physics world. The upshot of that challenge, I argue, is that Stoljar fails to show, concerning the versions of physicalism for which he grants the possibility of being true, that none (...)
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  5. Joseph A. Baltimore (2013). Type Physicalism and Causal Exclusion. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:405-418.
    While concerns of the mental being causally excluded by the physical have persistently plagued non-reductive physicalism, such concerns are standardly taken to pose no problem for reductive type physicalism. Type physicalists have the obvious advantage of being able to countenance the reduction of mental properties to their physical base properties by way of type identity, thereby avoiding any causal competition between instances of mental properties and their physical bases. Here, I challenge this widely accepted advantage of type physicalism over non-reductive (...)
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  6. Matteo Benocci (2015). Benedikt Paul Goecke, Ed., After Physicalism. Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 35 (4):198-200.
    This is a review of After Phyiscalism (ed. B. P. Göcke, University of Notre Dame Press 2012), a collection of eleven essays addressing the mind-body problem from a non-physicalist point of view.
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  7. Fernando Birman (2009). Quantum Mechanics and the Plight of Physicalism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):207-225.
    The literature on physicalism often fails to elucidate, I think, what the word physical in physical ism precisely means. Philosophers speak at times of an ideal set of fundamental physical facts, or they stipulate that physical means non-mental , such that all fundamental physical facts are fundamental facts pertaining to the non-mental. In this article, I will probe physicalism in the very much tangible framework of quantum mechanics. Although this theory, unlike “ideal physics” or some “final theory of non-mentality”, is (...)
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  8. James Blachowicz (2013). The Constraint Interpretation of Physical Emergence. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):21-40.
    I develop a variant of the constraint interpretation of the emergence of purely physical (non-biological) entities, focusing on the principle of the non-derivability of actual physical states from possible physical states (physical laws) alone. While this is a necessary condition for any account of emergence, it is not sufficient, for it becomes trivial if not extended to types of constraint that specifically constitute physical entities, namely, those that individuate and differentiate them. Because physical organizations with these features are in fact (...)
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  9. Ned Block (2015). The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground. In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-133.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  10. Ben Blumson & Weng Hong Tang (2015). A Note on the Definition of Physicalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):10-18.
    Physicalism is incompatible with what is known as the possibility of zombies, that is, the possibility of a world physically like ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences. But it is compatible with what is known as the possibility of ghosts, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which there are additional nonphysical entities. In this paper we argue that a revision to the traditional definition of physicalism designed to accommodate the (...)
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  11. P. Bokulich (2011). Hempel's Dilemma and Domains of Physics. Analysis 71 (4):646-651.
    Hempel's Dilemma is the claim that physicalism is an ill-formed thesis because it can offer no account of the physics that it refers to: current physics will be discarded in the future, and we don't yet know the nature of future physics. This article confronts the first horn of the dilemma, and argues that our knowledge of current physics is sufficient for offering a physicalist ontology of the mind. We have good scientific evidence that future physics will be irrelevant to (...)
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  12. A. Botterell (2005). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk's _A Physicalist Manifesto_ (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
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  13. Andrew Botterell (1998). Analysis in Mind. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    From the time of Descartes to about the 1960s, a certain epistemological idea dominated the philosophy of mind, namely the idea that theses about the relation between mind and body are, if true, a priori truths. Much of recent philosophy of mind is devoted to the question whether that idea is right. My research is largely an attempt to argue that some recent defenses of it are unsuccessful. ;For example, Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that every actual psychological event, property, (...)
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  14. Robin Brown (2009). On Difficulties Facing the Formulation of the Doctrine of Supervenience. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):191-200.
    The introductory section discusses supervenience and the role it plays in formulating contemporary physicalism. The section concludes with the definition of local supervenience used by Kim in the causal-exclusion argument. The second section outlines an abstract model for the analysis of supervenience, associating total mental states with total states of the nervous system. It is argued that Kim’s formulation confuses two orders of necessity: a metaphysical necessity attaching to the supervenience of the total mental state, and a nomological necessity attaching (...)
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  15. Robin Brown & James Ladyman (2009). Physicalism, Supervenience and the Fundamental Level. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):20-38.
    We provide a formulation of physicalism, and show that this is to be favoured over alternative formulations. Much of the literature on physicalism assumes without argument that there is a fundamental level to reality, and we show that a consideration of the levels problem and its implications for physicalism tells in favour of the form of physicalism proposed here. Its hey elements are, fast, that the empirical and substantive part of physicalism amounts to a prediction that physics will not posit (...)
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  16. Lawrence Cahoone (2013). Physicalism, the Natural Sciences, and Naturalism. Philo 16 (2):130-144.
    The most common definitions of the physical lead to a problem for physicalism. If the physical is the objects of physics, then unique objects of other sciences are not physical and, if the causal closure of the physical is accepted, cannot cause changes in the physical. That means unique objects of chemistry, the Earth sciences, and biology cannot causally affect physical states. But physicalism’s most reliable claim, the nomological dependence of nonphysical entities and properties on the physical, can be accepted (...)
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  17. H. G. Callaway & Paul Gochet (2007). Filosofia, Scienza E Bioetica Nel Dibattito Contemperano, Studi Internazionali in Onore di Evandro Agazzi, Pp. 1105-1115. [REVIEW]
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  18. H. G. Callaway & Paul Gochet (2007). Quine's Physicalism. In Filosofia, Scienza e Bioetica nel dibattito contemperano, Studi internazionali in onore di Evandro Agazzi, pp. 1105-1115.
    In this paper we briefly examine and evaluate Quine’s physicalism. On the supposition, in accordance with Quine’s views, that there can be no change of any sort without a physical change, we argue that this point leaves plenty of room to understand and accept a limited autonomy of the special sciences and of other domains of disciplinary and common-sense inquiry and discourse. The argument depends on distinguishing specific, detailed programs of reduction from the general Quinean strategy of reduction by explication. (...)
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  19. Chapman Cohen (1943). Materialism Restated. London: Issued for the Secular Society, Limited, by the Pioneer Press.
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  20. Tim Crane (2000). Dualism, Monism, Physicalism. Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.
    Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism , but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena or it must give an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms . There is little reason (...)
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  21. Tim Crane (1993). Reply to Pettit. Analysis 53 (4):224-27.
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  22. Tim Crane (1991). All God has to Do. Analysis 51 (October):235-44.
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  23. Tim Crane, REVIEW: "Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations" by Jeffrey Poland.
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  24. Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor (1990). There is No Question of Physicalism. Mind 99 (394):185-206.
    Many philosophers are impressed by the progress achieved by physical sciences. This has had an especially deep effect on their ontological views: it has made many of them physicalists. Physicalists believe that everything is physical: more precisely, that all entities, properties, relations, and facts are those which are studied by physics or other physical sciences. They may not all agree with the spirit of Rutherford's quoted remark that 'there is physics; and there is stamp-collecting',' but they all grant physical science (...)
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  25. Seth Crook (2001). Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the 'Physical': Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):333-359.
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  26. Chris Daly (1998). What Are Physical Properties? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):196-217.
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  27. Chris Daly (1995). Does Physicalism Need Fixing? Analysis 55 (3):135-41.
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  28. Shamik Dasgupta (2014). The Possibility of Physicalism. Journal of Philosophy 111 (9/10):557-592.
    It has been suggested that many philosophical theses—physicalism, normative naturalism, phenomenalism, and so on—should be understood in terms of ground. Against this, Ted Sider (2011) has argued that ground is ill-suited for this purpose. Here I develop Sider’s objection and offer a response. In doing so I develop a view about the role of ground in philosophy, and about the content of these distinctively philosophical theses.
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  29. Kim Davies (2014). Emergence From What? A Transcendental Understanding of the Place of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (5-6):10-32.
    This paper argues that the standard formulations of the question of how consciousness emerges, both synchronically and diachronically, from the physical world necessarily use a concept of the physical without either a clear grasp of the concept or an understanding of the necessary conditions of its possibility. This concept will be elucidated and some of the necessary conditions of its possibility explored, clarifying the place of the mental and the physical as abstractions from the totality of an agent engaged in (...)
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  30. Erhan Demircioglu (2011). Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):25-35.
    Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional and scientific, (...)
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  31. Louis deRosset (2013). Grounding Explanations. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (7).
    A compelling idea holds that reality has a layered structure. We often disagree about what inhabits the bottom layer, but we agree that higher up we find chemical, biological, geological, psychological, sociological, economic, /etc./, entities: molecules, human beings, diamonds, mental states, cities, interest rates, and so on. How is this intuitive talk of a layered structure of entities to be understood? Traditionally, philosophers have proposed to understand layered structure in terms of either reduction or supervenience. But these traditional views face (...)
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  32. John Dewey, Sidney Hook & Ernest Nagel (1945). Are Naturalists Materialists? Journal of Philosophy 42 (September):515-530.
    Professor [H.W.] Sheldon's critique of contemporary naturalism as professed in the volume Naturalism and the Human Spirit consists of one central "accusation": naturalism is materialism pure and simple. This charge is supported by his further claim that since the scientific method naturalists espouse for acquiring reliable knowledge of nature is incapable of yielding knowledge of the mental or spiritual "nature" for the naturalist is definitionally limited to "physical nature." He therefore concludes that instead of being a philosophy which can settle (...)
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  33. Esa Diaz-Leon (2008). We Are Living in a Material World (and I Am a Material Girl). Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):85-101.
    In this paper I examine the question of whether the characterization of physicalism that is presupposed by some influential anti-physicalist arguments, namely, the so-called conceivability arguments, is a good characterization of physicalism or not. I compare this characterization with some alternative ones, showing how it can overcome some problems, and I defend it from several objections. I conclude that any arguments against physicalism characterised in that way are genuine arguments against physicalism, as intuitively conceived.
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  34. Jonathan E. Dorsey (2011). On the Supposed Limits of Physicalist Theories of Mind. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):207-225.
    Is physicalism compatible with either panpsychism or so-called fundamental mentality ? Minimal physicalism, I contend, is compatible with both. We should therefore jettison the No Fundamental Mentality constraint, a proposed constraint on the definition of the physical, not to mention the false limits it places on physicalist theories of mind.
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  35. Guy Dove (forthcoming). Redefining Physicalism. Topoi:1-10.
    Philosophers have traditionally treated physicalism as an empirically informed metaphysical thesis. This approach faces a well-known problem often referred to as Hempel’s dilemma: formulations of physicalism tend to be either false or indeterminate. The generally preferred strategy to address this problem involves an appeal to a hypothetical complete and ideal physical theory. After demonstrating that this strategy is not viable, I argue that we should redefine physicalism as an interdisciplinary research program seeking to explain the mental in terms of the (...)
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  36. J. L. Dowell, & Janice Dowell (2006). The Physical: Empirical, Not Metaphysical. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):25-60.
    2. The Contingency and A posteriority Constraint: A formulation of the thesis must make physicalism come out contingent and a posteriori. First, physicalism is a contingent truth, if it is a truth. This means that physicalism could have been false, i.e. there are counterfactual worlds in which physicalism is false, for example, counterfactual worlds in which there are miracle -performing angels.[9] Moreover, if physicalism is true, our knowledge of its truth is a posteriori. This is to say that there are (...)
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  37. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2006). Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23.
    Perhaps more controversial than whether physicalism is true is what exactly would have to be true for physicalism to be true. Everyone agrees that, intuitively at least, physicalism is the thesis that there is nothing over and above the physical. The disagreements arise in how to get beyond this intuitive formulation. Until about ten years ago, participants in this debate were concerned primarily with answering two questions. First, what is it for a property, kind, relation, or individual to be a (...)
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  38. Janice Dowell (2006). Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism: An Introduction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23.
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  39. John Earman (1975). What is Physicalism? Journal of Philosophy 72 (October):565-567.
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  40. Robert Feleppa (1990). Physicalism, Indeterminacy and Interpretive Science. Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):89-110.
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  41. Raphaël Fiorese (2016). Stoljar’s Dilemma and Three Conceptions of the Physical: A Defence of the Via Negativa. Erkenntnis 81 (2):201-229.
    Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. But what does it mean to say that everything is physical? Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that no account of the physical is available which allows for a formulation of physicalism that is both possibly true and deserving of the name. As against this claim, I argue that a version of the via negativa—roughly, the view that the physical is to be characterised in terms of the nonmental—provides just such an account.
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  42. Bryan Frances (2016). Ontology, Composition, Quantification and Action. Analysis 76 (2):137-142.
    The literature on material composition has largely ignored the composition of actions and events. I argue that this is a mistake. I present a set of individually plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims regarding the connection between quantification and existence, the composition of physical entities and the logical forms of action sentences.
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  43. Robert Francescotti (2014). Physicalism and the Mind. Springer.
    This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the question: Are mental properties identical with physical properties? An affirmative answer would seem to secure the truth of physicalism regarding the mind, i.e., the belief that all mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. If the answer is negative, then the question arises: Can this solely in virtue of relation be understood as some kind of dependence short of identity? And answering (...)
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  44. Robert Francescotti (2013). The Problem of Extras and the Contingency of Physicalism. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):1-14.
    Perhaps all concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. Even so, it seems that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that physicalism, if true, is contingently true. In fact, many believe that the actual truth of physicalism allows metaphysically possible worlds duplicating the actual world in all physical respects while containing immaterial extras, e.g. ghosts, spirits, or Cartesian souls, that no physicalist would believe actually exist. Here I focus on physicalism regarding mentality and argue that the (...)
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  45. Robert Francescotti (2000). Ontological Physicalism and Property Pluralism: Why They Are Incompatible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):349-362.
    To earn the title “ontological physicalist,” one must endorse an entailment thesis of the following sort: the physical properties that are had, together with the causal laws, determine which higher-level properties are had. I argue that if this thesis is to capture all that is essential to physicalist intuitions, the relevant set of causal laws must be restricted to purely physical laws. But then it follows that higher-level properties are physical properties. The conclusion is that one cannot consistently be an (...)
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  46. Thomas Gardner (2005). Supervenience Physicalism: Meeting the Demands of Determination and Explanation. Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208.
    Abstract Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism?perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism?is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by (...)
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  47. Carl Gillett (2001). The Methodological Role of Physicalism: A Minimal Skepticism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
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  48. Carl Gillett & D. Gene Witmer (2001). A "Physical" Need: Physicalism and the Via Negativa. Analysis 61 (272):302–309.
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  49. Carl Gillett & D. Gene Witmer (2001). A 'Physical' Need: Physicalism and the Via Negativa. Analysis 61 (4):302-309.
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  50. Benedikt Paul Göcke (2009). What is Physicalism? Ratio 22 (3):291-307.
    Although 'most contemporary analytic philosophers [endorse] a physicalist picture of the world' (A. Newen; V. Hoffmann; M. Esfeld, 'Preface to Mental Causation, Externalism and Self-Knowledge', Erkenntnis , 67 (2007), p. 147), it is unclear what exactly the physicalist thesis states. The response that physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical does not solve the problem but is a precise statement of the problem because 'the claim is hopelessly vague' (G. Hellman; F. Thompson, 'Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction', Journal of (...)
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