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  1. Justification Épistémique.Arturs Logins - 2018 - L’Encyclopédie Philosophique (Version Grand Public).
    Certaines croyances sont justifiées tandis que d’autres ne le sont pas. Si je crois que la Terre est ronde, on peut considérer que ma croyance est justifiée, alors que si je crois qu’elle est plate, elle ne l’est pas. Qu’est-ce qui différencie les unes des autres ? Une croyance justifiée doit-elle toujours être fondée sur une autre croyance justifiée ? Comment pouvons-nous éviter la conclusion sceptique selon laquelle nous ne sommes pas justifiés à croire quoi que ce soit ? Ces (...)
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  2. Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Analysis:any063.
    Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, i.e., it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion grounded knowledge (...)
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  3. What It's Like To Have a Cognitive Home.Matt Duncan - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):66-81.
    Many people believe that the mind is an epistemic refuge of sorts. The idea is that when it comes to certain core mental states, one’s being in such a state automatically puts one in a position to know that one is in that state. This idea has come under attack in recent years. One particularly influential attack comes from Timothy Williamson (2000), who argues that there is no central core of states or conditions—mental or otherwise—to which we are guaranteed epistemic (...)
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  4. Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge.Mark McBride - 2017 - Open Book Publishers.
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  5. A Myth Resurgent: Classical Foundationalism and the New Sellarsian Critique.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4155-4169.
    One important strand of Sellars’s attack on classical foundationalism from Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is his thesis about the priority of is-talk over looks-talk. This thesis has been criticized extensively in recent years, and classical foundationalism has found several contemporary defenders. I revisit Sellars’s thesis and argue that is-talk is epistemically prior to looks-talk in a way that undermines classical foundationalism. The classical foundationalist claims that epistemic foundations are constituted by the agent’s set of looks-judgments. However, I argue (...)
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  6. Bootstrapping and Dogmatism.Timothy Butzer - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2083-2103.
    Dogmatists claim that having a perceptual experience as of p can provide one with immediate and defeasible warrant to believe that p. A persistent complaint against this position is that it sanctions an intuitively illicit form of reasoning: bootstrapping. I argue that dogmatism has no such commitments. Dogmatism is compatible with a principle that disallows the final non-deductive inference in the bootstrapping procedure. However, some authors have maintained that such strategy is doomed to failure because earlier stages of in the (...)
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  7. Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.
    While recent discussions of contextualism have mostly focused on other issues, some influential early statements of the view emphasized the possibility of its providing an alternative to both coherentism and traditional versions of foundationalism. In this essay, I will pick up on this strand of contextualist thought, and argue that contextualist versions of foundationalism promise to solve some problems that their non-contextualist cousins cannot. In particular, I will argue that adopting contextualist versions of foundationalism can let us reconcile Bayesian accounts (...)
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  8. Dissolving Some Dilemmas for Acquaintance Foundationalism.Cobb Ryan Daniel - unknown
    This essay purports to be a “negative” defense of acquaintance foundationalism. It is “negative” in that I do not do much in the way of advancing novel argument for the position, nor do I extend the position very much. Rather, I focus on demonstrating that the position has the resources to overcome objections that have been proposed to it. In particular, I argue that it can overcome the dilemma proposed by Wilfrid Sellars and developed by Laurence BonJour against foundationalism, as (...)
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  9. Coherence Without Conservation.Georgi Gardiner - 2016 - Syndicate Philosophy 1:1-8.
    In Reason and Explanation Ted Poston advances an explanatory coherentist view of justification, according to which the justification of a person’s beliefs consists in how well those beliefs fit within a virtuous explanatory system. Poston argues that epistemic conservatism, which holds that in at least some cases belief itself generates epistemic merit, plays an essential role in such an account. Poston’s version of conservatism holds that “mere belief” – belief in cases of empty symmetrical evidence, where the subject lacks any (...)
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  10. Foundational Evidentialism and the Problem of Scatter.Ted Poston - 2007 - Abstracta 3 (2):89-106.
    This paper addresses the scatter problem for foundational evidentialism. Reflection on the scatter problem uncovers significant epistemological lessons. The scatter problem is evaluated in connection with Ernest Sosa’s use of the problem as an argument against foundational evidentialism. Sosa’s strategy is to consider a strong intuition in favor of internalism—the new evil demon problem, and then illustrate how a foundational evidentialist account of the new evil demon problem succumbs to the scatter problem. The goal in this paper is to evaluate (...)
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  11. Faith After Foundationalism.Nicholas Wolterstorff & D. Z. Phillips - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):452.
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  12. Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
    Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception (...)
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  13. Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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  14. Epistemic Foundationalism and the Replaceability of Ordinary Language.Alan H. Goldman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):136-154.
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  15. Newman and Wittgenstein After Foundationalism.Angelo Bottone - 2005 - New Blackfriars 86 (1001):62-75.
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  16. Basic Beliefs and the Perceptual Learning Problem: A Substantial Challenge for Moderate Foundationalism.Bram Vaassen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):133-149.
    In recent epistemology many philosophers have adhered to a moderate foundationalism according to which some beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. Reliance on such ‘basic beliefs’ pervades both internalist and externalist theories of justification. In this article I argue that the phenomenon of perceptual learning – the fact that certain ‘expert’ observers are able to form more justified basic beliefs than novice observers – constitutes a challenge for moderate foundationalists. In order to accommodate perceptual learning cases, (...)
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  17. A Fatal Dilemma For Direct Realist Foundationalism.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:405-440.
    Direct realist versions of foundationalism have recently been advocated by Pryor, Huemer, Alston, and Plantinga. DRF can hold either that our foundational observation beliefs are about the simple perceptible qualities of objects, or that our foundational observation beliefs are more complex ones about objects in the world. I will show that whether our observational beliefs are simple or complex, the agent must possess other epistemically significant states in order for these observational beliefs to be justified. These other states are therefore (...)
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  18. A Refutation of Foundationalism?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):345-346.
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  19. Foundationalism and the External World.Laurence BonJour - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):229-249.
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  20. Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):151-176.
    Knowledge requires both freedom and friction . Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of (...)
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  21. Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support.Lydia McGrew & Timothy McGrew - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):55-77.
    The phenomenon of mutual support presents a specific challenge to the foundationalist epistemologist: Is it possible to model mutual support accurately without using circles of evidential support? We argue that the appearance of loops of support arises from a failure to distinguish different synchronic lines of evidential force. The ban on loops should be clarified to exclude loops within any such line, and basing should be understood as taking place within lines of evidence. Uncertain propositions involved in mutual support relations (...)
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  22. Empirical Knowledge.Alan H. Goldman - 1991 - University of California Press.
    This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist, counteracting the recently dominant trend that rejects that (...)
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  23. The Foundations of Knowledge.Timothy McGrew - 1995 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Contemporary epistemology has been moving away from classical foundationalism—the thesis that our empirical knowledge is grounded in perceptual beliefs we know with certainty. McGrew reexamines classical foundationalism and offers a compelling reconstruction and defense of empirical knowledge grounded in perceptual certainty. He articulates and defends a new version of foundationalism and demonstrates how it meets all the standard criticisms. The book offers substantial rebuttals of the arguments of Kuhn and Rorty and demonstrates the value of the classical analytic approach to (...)
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  24. Faith After Foundationalism.D. Z. Phillips - 2013 - Routledge.
    Foundationalism is the view that philosophical propositions are of two kinds, those which need supporting evidence, and those which in themselves provide the evidence which renders them irrefutable. This book, originally published 1988, describes the battle between foundationalism, which places belief in God in the first category, and various other approaches to the problem of faith – ‘Reformed Epistemology’, hermeneutics; and sociological analysis. In the concluding section of the book, an examination of concept formation in religious belief is used to (...)
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  25. Foundations of Knowledge.John P. Anton (ed.) - 1968 - State University of New York Press.
    “The inquiry into the foundations of knowledge is a systematic inquiry into the problem of truth. This problem constitutes one of the three main concerns of philosophical analysis, the others being the problem of beauty and the problem of goodness.” Thus Evangelos P. Papanoutsos, Greece’s leading contemporary philosopher, introduces this third book of his “Trilogy of the Mind.” The first two volumes covered aesthetics and ethics; this one is a major work in epistemology. Combining rigorous analysis with thorough-going scholarship, displaying (...)
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  26. Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism.Michael DePaul (ed.) - 2000 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    The contributions in this volume make an important effort to resurrect a rather old fashioned form of foundationalism. They defend the position that there are some beliefs that are justified, and are not themselves justified by any further beliefs. This epistemic foundationalism has been the subject of rigorous attack by a wide range of theorists in recent years, leading to the impression that foundationalism is a thing of the past. DePaul argues that it is precisely the volume and virulence of (...)
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  27. Chapter 8. Foundations Without Foundationalism.John P. Reeder Jr - 1992 - In John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 191-214.
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  28. Modernist Radicalism and its Aftermath Foundationalism and and Anti-Foundationalism in Radical Social Theory.Stephen Crook - 1991
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  29. Foundationalism.Richard Alan Legum - 1980 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    I proceed by examining the versions of foundationalism advanced by C. I. Lewis and Roderick Chisholm. In presenting their views, Lewis and Chisholm have attempted to give answers to three fundamental questions: Why must the structure of empirical knowledge be foundational? What is the nature of the foundation of knowledge? and How does the foundation serve as the justification of nonfoundational beliefs? Their answers to these questions are the subject of examination in this dissertation. ;Foundationalism may be characterized as the (...)
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  30. Tom Rockmore & Beth Singer , "Anti-Foundationalism Old and New".Ann K. Clark - 1994 - Metaphilosophy 25 (4):396.
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  31. Michael Williams. "Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology". [REVIEW]O. A. Johnson - 1978 - Metaphilosophy 9:69.
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  32. The Case Against Foundationalism: An Examination of Some Main Anti-Foundational Arguments.Jay Everett Harker - 1981 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    The primary purpose of this study is to critically assess some of the main objections that have been raised against foundational theories of epistemic justification. Toward this end I begin in the Introduction by defining some key terms, giving a first characterization of foundationalism, and providing a list of ten sorts of anti-foundational arguments to be considered. ;Chapter I is devoted to a study of the so-called "regress argument." This study is essential for my purposes, since I am defining foundationalism (...)
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  33. Foundations: An Essay in the Possibility of Knowledge.Timothy Joel Mcgrew - 1992 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
    The traditional project of answering skepticism has fallen out of favor in recent years due to both piecemeal criticism of traditionally motivated projects and increasing pessimism about the concepts, methods and goals which constitute traditional epistemology. After characterizing that approach, I argue that global criticisms levelled by Kuhn, Rorty and Quine at objectivity and analyticity--two concepts commonly taken to be central to traditional epistemology--are question-begging at best, and that in consequence there is good reason to reexamine the case-by-case arguments against (...)
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  34. The Antifoundationalism of Hermeneutic-Pragmatic Philosophy and the Foundationalism of Classical Philosophy.Andrzej Bronk - 1988 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 36 (1):182.
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  35. Laurence BonJour, "the Structure of Empirical Knowledge". [REVIEW]William Barthelemy - 1990 - Dialogue 29 (2):311.
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  36. Does Foundationalism Work?Timm Ashford Triplett - 1982 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Chapter I. The tenets essential to any foundationalist theory are stated. These tenets make reference to the concept of a basic proposition. Literature discussing and attempting to define this concept is surveyed and assessed. ;Chapter II. The definitions surveyed are seen to make use of the concept of epistemic justification. Two senses of justification--external and internal--are distinguished and discussed. A definition of basic propositions is offered using the external sense of justification. ;Chapter III. A variety of theories, all satisfying the (...)
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  37. Justification.Wayne Angus Backman - 1982 - Dissertation, University of Cincinnati
    This dissertation is an investigation into the nature of justification and rational belief. In Chapter I, four theories of the justification of belief are presented and criticized. These theories--classical foundationalism, modest foundationalism, coherentism, and the causal theory--are found to be similar in a certain respect. They each embody or are consistent with a certain conception of rationality, one in which beliefs are rational just in case they are backed by adequate justifications, and in which adequate justifications are thought to be (...)
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  38. Subjectivity in Justification.Jonathan Lee Kvanvig - 1982 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    The standard view concerning types of theories of justification is that there are two types of theories: foundational and coherence theories. Foundationalism is generally taken to be what I call Minimal Foundationalism, which is a weaker form of foundationalism than Classical Foundationalism. I argue that this taxonomical scheme is inadequate since it fails to separate theories that are intuitively different, and it places some theories that are avowedly of one sort in the other type of theory. ;A different classification scheme (...)
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  39. BonJour, L., "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge". [REVIEW]R. Kirk - 1986 - Mind 95:531.
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  40. Foundationalism and Epistemic Supervenience: A Study of the Foundationalist Theory of Epistemic Justification.Ill-Hwan Rim - 1988 - Dissertation, Brown University
    This study investigates the proper logical forms of theories of epistemic justification and defends the foundationalist theory by using the concept of epistemic supervenience. ;In chapters 1 and 2, I argue that due to the possibility of actual infinite regresses of justified beliefs, the traditional infinite regress argument for foundationalism is not eliminative enough to force us to adopt foundationalism and so we need more substantial solution to the regress problem to prevent the reemergence of total skepticism. ;In next two (...)
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  41. Foundationalism Defended.Olaf Tollefsen - 1990 - Lyceum 2 (2):52-64.
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  42. The Theory of Justification.James Richard Ciccotelli - 1981 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    Analytic epistemologists, over the last two decades, have been troubled by two vexing and seemingly unrelated problems. First they have been trying to describe the "structure" of justification of our knowledge claims; this enterprise has been called the "foundationalism debate." Secondly though, they have also been trying to formulate precisely the necessary and sufficient conditions for "knowing;" this difficulty has come to be known as the "Gettier Problem." The first project deals with epistemic justification and the second, with the analysis (...)
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  43. BONJOUR, L.: "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge". [REVIEW]B. Langtry - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65:218.
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  44. Foundationalism and the Genesis of Justification.Stephen Ronald Craig Hicks - 1992 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    This thesis presents a type foundationalism that is new on two counts. First, traditional foundationalists hold that because of perceptual relativity, illusions, and the standard skeptical arguments, external world propositions can be justified only indirectly by means of subjective states or propositions. By setting aside skepticism as wrong in principle and by arguing that perceptual illusions and relativity are compatible with perceptual direct realism, a nonrepresentationalist account of justification is advanced based upon direct realism. ;Second, antifoundationalists have argued that foundationalism (...)
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  45. PHILLIPS, D. Z. Faith After Foundationalism. [REVIEW]Colin Lyas - 1989 - Philosophy 64:419.
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  46. Dispositional Theories of Knowledge a Defence of Aetiological Foundationalism.Lars Bo Gundersen - 2003
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  47. Foundations of Knowledge.Alexander Thomas Ormond - 1901 - Philosophical Review 10 (1):57-62.
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  48. Epistemológia Ako Vedná Disciplína?Ján Rybár - 1994 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 1 (1):109-122.
    The epistemology is the analysis of principles, foundations, structures and conditions of the scientific knowledge. Is it possible to solve these problems by scientific means and ways only? The traditional empirical epistemology was refuted on ground of the scientific research of perception, behavior, language etc. In this respect N. Chomskyś contribution is considerable. But what his solution represents is the neocartesian interpretation of the language competence. J. Piaget and his followers do not agree with the conception of N. Chomsky. According (...)
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  49. Rorty's Foundationalism.Steven Yates - 1989 - Reason Papers 14:130-136.
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  50. Phenomenology and the Foundationalism Debate.John Drummond - 1991 - Reason Papers 16:45-71.
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