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  1. What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?William P. Alston - 1983 - Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
    Immediate knowledge is here construed as true belief that does not owe its status as knowledge to support by other knowledge (or justified belief) of the same subject. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a criticism of attempts to show the impossibility of immediate knowledge. I concentrate on attempts by Wilfrid Sellars and Laurence Bonjour to show that putative immediate knowledge really depends on higher-level knowledge or justified belief about the status of the beliefs involved in the putative (...)
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  2. Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?William P. Alston - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (5):295.
    It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be successfully disposed of (...)
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  3. Two Types of Foundationalism.William P. Alston - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
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  4. The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  5. Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism.Robert Audi - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:407-442.
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  6. Foundationalism and Epistemic Dependence.Robert Audi - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):612-613.
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  7. Does Knowledge Have an Indubitable Foundation?Bruce Aune - 1967 - In Knowledge, Mind and Nature. Random House.
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  8. Representación, empirismo y triangulación. Comentario a Conocer sin representar. El realismo epistemológico de Donald Davidson de William Duica.Ignacio Avila - 2016 - Ideas Y Valores 65 (161):315-329.
    En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...)
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  9. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge Laurence Bonjour Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985, Vii + 258 P. US$22.50.William Barthelemy - 1990 - Dialogue 29 (2):311-.
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  10. Coherentism Via Graphs.Selim Berker - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.
    Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...)
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  11. Foundationalism and Coherentism From a Contextualist Point of View.Michael Bloome-Tillman - unknown
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  12. Apriority and Metajustification in BonJour Structure of Empirical Knowledge-Reply.L. Bonjour - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):779-782.
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  13. The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism.Laurence BonJour - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. pp. 117-144.
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  14. Reply to Steup.Laurence BonJour - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):57 - 63.
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  15. Inferential, Coherential, and Foundational Warrant: An Eclectic Account of the Sources of Warrant.Mark J. Boone - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):377-398.
    A warranted belief may derive inferential warrant from warranted beliefs which support it. It may possess what I call coherential warrant in virtue of beingconsistent with, or lacking improbability relative to, a large system of warranted beliefs. Finally, it may have foundational warrant, which does not derive from other beliefs at all. I define and distinguish these sources of warrant and explain why all three must be included in the true and complete account of the structure of knowledge, and why (...)
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  16. The Foundationalism–Coherentism Opposition Revisited: The Case for Complementarism. [REVIEW]Yves Bouchard - 2007 - Foundations of Science 12 (4):325-336.
    In this paper, I show the complementarity of foundationalism and coherentism with respect to any efficient system of beliefs by means of a distinction between two types of proposition drawn from an analogy with an axiomatic system. This distinction is based on the way a given proposition is acknowledged as true, either by declaration (F-proposition) or by preservation (C-proposition). Within such a perspective, i.e., epistemological complementarism, not only can one see how the usual opposition between foundationalism and coherentism is irrelevant, (...)
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  17. Perspectives on Coherentism.Yves Bouchard (ed.) - 2002 - Editions du Scribe.
  18. Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Probabilistic models have much to offer to philosophy. We continually receive information from a variety of sources: from our senses, from witnesses, from scientific instruments. When considering whether we should believe this information, we assess whether the sources are independent, how reliable they are, and how plausible and coherent the information is. Bovens and Hartmann provide a systematic Bayesian account of these features of reasoning. Simple Bayesian Networks allow us to model alternative assumptions about the nature of the information sources. (...)
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  19. Putnam and Davidson on Coherence, Truth, and Justification.Lajos L. Brons - 2016 - The Science of Mind 54:51-70.
    Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward. There are interesting similarities between these theories, and Putnam’s philosophical development lead to further convergence in the 1990s. The most conspicuous difference between Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories is that they appear to fundamentally disagree on the role and nature of conceptual schemes, but a closer look reveals that they are not as far apart on this issue as usually assumed. The veridicality of perceptual beliefs is a (...)
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  20. Prodigal Epistemology: Coherence, Holism, and the Sellarsian Tradition.Matthew Burstein - 2006 - In M. P. Wolf & M. N. Lance (eds.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Rodopi. pp. 197-216.
    Many philosophers have equated the denial of foundationalism with a call for coherentist approaches to epistemology. I think such equations are spurious, and to show why this is so I contrast the views of a paradigmatic coherentist with an antifoundationalist alternative. This article examines the coherentism of Laurence BonJour with an eye toward the way in which BonJour's views fail to fully adopt the insights of their Sellarsian roots. In particular, I argue that BonJour's view endorses the philosophy of mind (...)
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  21. Neither Tortoises nor Snakes: How to Be a Conscientious Objector in the Conflict Between Foundationalism and Coherentism.Matthew A. Burstein - 2003 - Dissertation, Georgetown University
    A great deal of ink has been spilt debating the relative merits of foundationalism and coherentism in contemporary epistemology. In this dissertation, I argue that the debate itself, lively as it's been, rides atop a fundamental mistake. Careful examination of the defenses of these views indicates that both sides rest on a set of problematic presuppositions about justification and the nature of mind. More specifically, they all assume, in one form or another, that epistemic dependence must be inferential, and, as (...)
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  22. On The Foundations of Pragmatic Arguments.John Cantwell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):383 - 402.
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  23. Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Edited by George Pappas.Lawrence R. Carleton - 1982 - Modern Schoolman 60 (1):60-61.
  24. Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone?Elgin Catherine & James Cleve - 2013 - In Matthias Steup, John Turri & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 244-273.
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  25. Disjunctivism and the Ethics of Disbelief.Marc Champagne - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):139-163.
    This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is a mode of direct access to the world. Since puts no bounds on what would constitute reasonable doubt, it invites skeptical concerns which overthrow. Conversely, since says that there are some experiences which we are entitled to trust, it (...)
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  26. Scientific Progress: Beyond Foundationalism and Coherentism.Hasok Chang - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 61:1-20.
    Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. This is not only because of the intrinsic importance of the topic, but also because of its immense difficulty. In what sense exactly does science makes progress, and how is it that scientists are apparently able to achieve it better than people in other realms of human intellectual endeavour? Neither philosophers nor scientists themselves have been able to answer these questions to general satisfaction.
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  27. A Critical Discussion of Bonjour's Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge.Soonok Choi - 1992 - Dissertation, The University of Iowa
    The debate between coherentism and foundationalism is familiar in the literature of epistemology. But neither position has been satisfactorily worked out. My project is to examine critically a specific type of coherence theory of justification, namely Laurence BonJour's internalist coherentism. In his book The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, he is willing to confront coherentism's difficulties as he tries to establish a coherence theory of justification, married to a correspondence theory of truth. ;My aim is to expose the inadequacies of BonJour's (...)
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  28. A Critical Examination of BonJour’s, Haack’s, and Dancy’s Theory of Empirical Justification.Dionysis Christias - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1): 7-34.
    In this paper, we shall describe and critically evaluate four contemporary theories which attempt to solve the problem of the infinite regress of reasons: BonJour's ‘impure’ coherentism, BonJour's foundationalism, Haack's ‘foundherentism’ and Dancy's pure coherentism. These theories are initially put forward as theories about the justification of our empirical beliefs; however, in fact they also attempt to provide a successful response to the question of their own ‘metajustification.’ Yet, it will be argued that 1) none of the examined theories is (...)
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  29. Epistemic Norms and the Sellarsian Dilemma for Foundationalism.Joseph Cruz - manuscript
    Foundationalists and coherentists disagree over the structure of the part of the mental state corpus that is relevant for epistemic achievement (Bonjour, 1999; Dancy, 1989; Haack, 1993; Sosa, 1980; Pollock and Cruz, 1999). Given the goals of a theory of epistemic justification and the trajectory of the debate over the last three decades, it is not difficult to see how structural questions possess a kind of immediacy. In order to undertake an epistemic evaluation of a belief, one intuitive and appealing (...)
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  30. Huang on Wittgenstein on Religious Epistemology.Jordan Curnutt - 1998 - Religious Studies 34 (1):81-89.
    Yong Huang has recently claimed that after the demise of foundationalism, philosophy and theology can turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein's non-foundationalist or coherentist religious epistemology where, it is said, religious beliefs are justified by a 'reflective equilibrium' with other kinds of beliefs, with action, and with different 'forms of life'. I argue that there are very good reasons to reject this reading of Wittgenstein: not only unsupported, it is seriously mistaken. Once the epistemological terms of the debate are properly understood, the (...)
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  31. Ted Poston, Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):117-124.
  32. Homeostatic Epistemology : Reliability, Coherence and Coordination in a Bayesian Virtue Epistemology.Susannah Kate Devitt - unknown
    How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of (...)
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  33. Wilfrid Sellars.Willem deVries - 2005 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    Wilfrid Sellars has been called "the most profound and systematic epistemological thinker of the twentieth century". He was in many respects ahead of his time, and many of his innovations have become widely acknowledged, for example, his attack on the "myth of the given", his functionalist treatment of intentional states, his proposal that psychological concepts are like theoretical concepts, and his suggestion that attributions of knowledge locate the knower "in the logical space of reasons". However, while many philosophers have begun (...)
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  34. Knowledge, Mind, and the Given Reading Wilfrid Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Including the Complete Text of Sellars's Essay.Willem A. deVries & Timm Triplett - 2000 - Hackett Publishing Company.
    "Sellars' s argument in EPM is enormously rich, subtle, and compelling. It is also, for the uninitiated, extraordinarily dense. Willem deVries and Timm Triplett’s comprehensive commentary _Knowledge, Mind, and the Given_ provides a much needed guide. Beginning with a general overview to introduce some main themes and difficulties, deVries and Triplett take the reader step by step through the sixteen parts of the essay, providing at each stage necessary background, illuminating connections, and insightful clarifications of the main lines of argument.... (...)
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  35. Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”.Willem A. deVries & Timm Triplett - 2000 - Hackett.
    This is a careful explication of and commentary on Wilfrid Sellars's classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM]. It is appropriate for upper-level undergraduates and beyond. The full text of EPM is included in the volume.
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  36. Considered Judgment.Catherine Elgin - 1996 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    The book contains a unique epistemological position that deserves serious consideration by specialists in the subject."--Bruce Aune, University of Massachusetts.
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  37. The Fact of the Given From a Realist Idealist Perspective.Gregor Flock - 2017 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 56-58.
    In his well-known Mind and World and in line with Wilfrid Sellars (1991) or “that great foe of ‘immediacy’” (ibid., 127) Hegel, McDowell claims that “when Evans argues that judgments of experience are based on non-conceptual content, he is falling into a version of the Myth of the Given” (1996, 114). In this talk and on the basis of a Berkeleyio-Kantian ‘realist idealist’ world view (sect. 1) and an explication of Kant’s concept of the “given manifold” (CPR, e.g. B138; sect. (...)
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  38. A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism.Sanford Goldberg - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
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  39. BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism.Thomas Grundmann - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):463-479.
    One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the internalist regress in (...)
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  40. Empirismo senza fondamenti - Cinque lezioni su "Empirismo e filosofia della mente".Andrea Guardo - 2007 - Milano: CUEM.
    A study guide to Wilfrid Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”.
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  41. The Relationship of Experience to Thought.Anil Gupta - 2013 - The Monist 96 (2):252-294.
  42. The False Dichotomy Between Coherentism and Foundationalism.Sven Ove Hansson - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (6):290-300.
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  43. Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.
    According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma – phenomenal (...)
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  44. What Justifies That?Patrick Hawley - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):47 - 61.
    I clarify and defuse an argument for skepticism about justification with the aid of some results from recent linguistic theory. These considerations illuminate debates about the structure of justification.
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  45. Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism is Not Just the Poor Person's Coherentism.David K. Henderson - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):627-649.
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  46. Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification.Kenneth Hobson - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.
    I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience (...)
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  47. Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues.Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (3):295-309.
    We argue, primarily by appeal to phenomenological considerations related to the experiential aspects of agency, that belief fixation is broadly agentive; although it is rarely voluntary, nonetheless, it is phenomenologically agentive because of its significant phenomenological similarities to voluntary-agency experience. An important consequence is that epistemic rationality, as a central feature of belief fixation, is an agentive notion. This enables us to introduce and develop a distinction between core and ancillary epistemic virtues. Core epistemic virtues involve several inter-related kinds of (...)
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  48. Foundationalism.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 37.
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There are (...)
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  49. BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument' and the Doctrine of the Given.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177.
    Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even (...)
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  50. Review of Erik Olsson, Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification[REVIEW]Michael Huemer - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5).
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