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  1. Symposium: Is There an Element of Immediacy in Knowledge?R. I. Aaron & C. M. Campbell - 1934 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 13:203 - 236.
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  2. Prospects for Skeptical Foundationalism.Scott F. Aikin - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):578-590.
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  3. Tom Rockmore's "On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism&Quot. [REVIEW]George Allan - 2005 - Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):196-8.
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  4. Descartes's Method of Doubt.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Enlightenment philosopher, René Descartes, set out to establish what could be known with certainty, untainted by a deceiving demon. With his method of doubt, he rejected all previous beliefs, allowing only those that survived rigorous scrutiny. In this essay, Leslie Allan examines whether Descartes's program of skeptical enquiry was successful in laying a firm foundation for our manifold beliefs. He subjects Descartes's conclusions to Descartes's own uncompromising methodology to determine whether Descartes escaped from a self-imposed radical skepticism.
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  5. Some Remarks on Chisholm's Epistemology.William P. Alston - 1980 - Noûs 14 (4):565-586.
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  6. Two Types of Foundationalism.William P. Alston - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
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  7. Epistemic Foundationalism.David B. Annis - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (5):345 - 352.
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  8. Probability Without Certainty: Foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach Debate.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
    Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C.I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguous, but argue (...)
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  9. Probability Without Certainty? Foundationalism and the Lewis.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 52:95-124.
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  10. The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  11. Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and Defeasibility.Robert Audi - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139.
    This paper is an examination of modest foundationalism in relation to some important criteria of epistemic dependence. The paper distinguishes between causal and epistemic dependence and indicates how each might be related to reasons. Four kinds of reasons are also distinguished: reasons to believe, reasons one has for believing, reasons for which one believes, and reasons why one believes. In the light of all these distinctions, epistemic dependence is contrasted with defeasibility, and it is argued that modest foundationalism is not (...)
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  12. Foundationalism and Epistemic Dependence.Robert Audi - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):612-613.
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  13. Rational Fundamentalism? An Explanatory Model of Fundamentalist Beliefs.Michael Baurmann - 2007 - Episteme 4 (2):150-166.
    Abstract The article sketches a theoretical model which explains how it is possible that fundamentalist beliefs can emerge as a result of an individual rational adaptation to the context of special living conditions. The model is based on the insight that most of our knowledge is acquired by trusting the testimony of some kind of authority. If a social group is characterized by a high degree of mistrust towards the outer society or other groups, then the members of this group (...)
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  14. A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism.Benjamin Bayer - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, (...)
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  15. What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
    One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism (...)
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  16. Foundationalism and the External World.Laurence BonJour - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):229-249.
    Outlines a tenable version of a traditional foundationalist account\nof empirical justification and its implications for the justification\nof beliefs about physical or material objects. Presupposing the acceptability\nof other beliefs about physical objects; Concept of a basic belief;\nMetabeliefs about one's own occurrent beliefs; Beliefs about sensory\nexperience.
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  17. Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.Richard Boyd - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):127-48.
  18. Sensory and Noetic Consciousness.Franz Clemens Brentano - 1981 - Routledge.
  19. Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought.Robert Greenleaf Brice - 2014 - Lexington Books.
    Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought considers how, where, and to what extent the thoughts and ideas found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty can be applied to other areas of thought, including: ethics, aesthetics, religious belief, mathematics, cognitive science, and political theory. Robert Greenleaf Brice opens new avenues of thought for scholars and students of the Wittgensteinian tradition, while introducing original philosophies about human knowledge and cognition.
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  20. Recognizing Targets: Wittgenstein's Exploration of a New Kind of Foundationalism in on Certainty.Robert Greenleaf Brice - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):1-22.
    Bringing the views of Grayling, Moyal-Sharrock and Stroll together, I argue that in On Certainty, Wittgenstein explores the possibility of a new kind of foundationalism. Distinguishing propositional language-games from non-propositional, actional certainty, Wittgenstein investigates a foundationalism sui generis . Although he does not forthrightly state, defend, or endorse what I am characterizing as a "new kind of foundationalism," we must bear in mind that On Certainty was a collection of first draft notes written at the end of Wittgenstein's life. The (...)
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  21. Semantic Empiricism and Direct Acquiantance in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.Audre Jean Brokes - 2000 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 20 (1):33-65.
    In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Russell defends a version of semantic empiricism according to which direct acquaintance with logical atoms is the source of our semantic capacities. Previous commentators have construed Russellian acquaintance in one of two ways: either as an act of de re designation involving neither conceptualization nor propositional content, or as a species of belief de re, which does involve conceptualization or classification. I argue that two further, interim possibilities have been overlooked: that direct acquaintance involves (...)
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  22. Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic Stewart Shapiro Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, Xx + 277 Pp. [REVIEW]James Robert Brown - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (3):624-.
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  23. Review: Skepticism and Foundationalism. [REVIEW]Anthony Brueckner - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):533 - 547.
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  24. Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2009 - Princípios 16 (25):231-263.
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how the perceptualexperience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that the perceptual experience justifiesnon-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discussthis question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But (...)
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  25. Tracking Inferences Is Not Enough: The Given as Tie-Breaker.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):129-135.
    Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and (...)
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  26. The Problem of Th Ec Riterion.Roderick Chisholm - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard & Ram Neta (eds.), Arguing About Knowledge. Routledge. pp. 441.
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  27. Schlick on the Foundations of Knowing.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 16:149-157.
    Schlick held that our knowledge is founded upon certain contingent apprehensions which he described as follows: "I grasp their meaning at the same time that I grasp their truth." He cites as an example the apprehension expressed by "Yellow here now." When such apprehensions are expressed in syntactically well-formed sentences, they can be seen to have certain psychological states as their objects - and therefore to be similar in all essential respects to what members of the Brentano school had called (...)
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  28. A Version of Foundationalism.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):543-564.
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  29. Contemporary "Foundationalism" and the Death of Epistemology.Drew Christie - 1989 - Metaphilosophy 20 (2):114–126.
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  30. Foundationalism and Permanence in Descartes' Epistemology.Andrew D. Cling - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):145-156.
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  31. Book Review: Stewart Shapiro. Foundations with Foundationalism. [REVIEW]Nino Cocchiarella - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (3):453-468.
  32. Rorty's Anti-Foundationalism and Fides Et Ratio.Ivo Coelho - 2008 - In Manimala, Varghese & J. (eds.), Fides Et Ratio in a Post-Modern Era: Indian Philosophical Studies, Xiii. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
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  33. Newman, Foundationalism and Teaching Philosophy.Peter M. Collins - 1991 - Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):143-161.
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  34. Review: Criterial Problems. [REVIEW]Earl Conee - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):417 - 426.
    The two main topics of the paper are an allegedly justified reliability requirement for knowledge and an alleged incoherence among three propositions asserted by Cartesian foundationalism. It is argued that neither the allegation of justified reliability nor the allegation of incoherence is correct.
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  35. Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception.Christian Coseru - 2009 - Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  36. Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception.Christian Coseru - 2009 - Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  37. Realism and Sociology: Anti-Foundationalism, Ontology, and Social Research.Justin Cruickshank - 2003 - Routledge.
    In recent years methodological debates in the social sciences have increasingly focused on issues relating to epistemology. Realism and Sociology makes an original contribution to the debate, charting a middle ground between postmodernism and positivism.
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  38. Conventional Foundationalism and the Origin of Norms.Ann E. Cudd - 1990 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):485-504.
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  39. Mediating Realism and Sociology. Review of Realism and Sociology: Anti-Foundationalism, Ontology and Social Research by Justin Cruikshank.Neil Curry - 2007 - Journal of Critical Realism 2 (1):157-160.
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  40. Alstonian Foundationalism and Higher-Level Theistic Evidentialism.L. Czapkay Sudduth Michael - 1995 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37 (1):25-44.
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  41. Are There Ultimately Founded Propositions?Gregor Damschen - 2010 - Universitas Philosophica 27 (54):163-177.
    Can we find propositions that cannot rationally be denied in any possible world without assuming the existence of that same proposition, and so involving ourselves in a contradiction? In other words, can we find transworld propositions needing no further foundation or justification? Basically, three differing positions can be imagined: firstly, a relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are impossible; secondly, a meta-relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are possible but unnecessary; and thirdly, an absolute position, according (...)
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  42. Peirce's Critique of Foundationalism.C. F. Delaney - 1973 - The Monist 57 (2):240-251.
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  43. Liberal Exclusions and Foundationalism.Michael R. DePaul - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):103-120.
    Certain versions of liberalism exclude from public political discussions the reasons some citizens regard as most fundamental, reasons having to do with their deepest religious, philosophical, moral or political views. This liberal exclusion of deep and deeply held reasons from political discussions has been controversial. In this article I will point out a way in which the discussion seems to presuppose a foundationalist conception of human reasoning. This is rather surprising, inasmuch as one of the foremost advocates of liberalism, John (...)
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  44. In Defense of Classical Foundationalism: A Critical Evaluation of Plantinga's Argument That Classical Foundationalism is Self-Refuting.John M. DePoe - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):245-251.
    In numerous works, Alvin Plantinga argues that classical foundationalism is a failed theory of knowledge because of its self-referential incoherence. Plantinga's argument, however, fails to demonstrate that classical foundationalism is self-refuting. To bring this to light, I will review the form of Plantinga's argument in comparison with other examples of self-refutation. Upon closer inspection, it will be clear that classical foundationalism is not self-refuting, as Plantinga claims. Furthermore, I will expose another flaw in Plantinga's argument against classical foundationalism, which shows (...)
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  45. Wittgenstein: Uma Solução Fundacionista ao Problema do Regresso Epistêmico.Juliano Santos do Carmo & Eduardo Ferreira das Neves Filho - 2015 - Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia:109-127.
    As notas que compõem a obra Da Certeza (Über Gewissheit) expressam nitidamente a preocupação de Ludwig Wittgenstein com os problemas clássicos da epistemologia, em especial o uso dos termos epistêmicos tradicionais e os erros costumeiros dos filósofos que negligenciam suas profundas estruturas gramaticais. Em diversas passagens é fácil observar a tentativa de esclarecer os erros de realistas, idealistas e céticos no que diz respeito às nossas alegações ordinárias de conhecimento em contextos céticos moderados. A questão do ceticismo sobre a justificação (...)
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  46. Two Arguments Against Foundationalism.Jane Duran - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):241-252.
    Bringing to bear two major lines of argument, I claim that foundationalism is vitiated by its reliance (in its various forms) on privileged access, and by its noninstantiability. The notion of privileged access is examined, and the status of propositions said to be evocative of privileged access addressed. Noninstantiability is viewed through the current project of naturalizing epistemology, and naturalized alternatives to the rigorous foundationalism of the normative epistemologists are brought forward.
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  47. Reliabilism, Foundationalism, and Naturalized Epistemic Justification Theory.Jane Duran - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (2):113–127.
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  48. Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism.Coos Engelsma - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
    This paper evaluates Peter Klein’s objection to foundationalism. According to Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows arbitrariness “at the base.” I first explain that this objection can be interpreted in two ways: either as targeting dialectical foundationalism or as targeting epistemic foundationalism. I then clarify Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. An assertion or belief is assumed to be arbitrary if and only if it lacks a reason that is “objectively and subjectively available.” Drawing on this notion, I evaluate Klein’s objection. I (...)
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  49. On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness.Coos Engelsma - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.
    According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does (...)
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  50. Review: Epistemic Justification. [REVIEW]Nicholas Everitt - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):572-575.
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