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1 — 50 / 156
  1. added 2020-05-22
    Expert Knowledge by Perception.Madeleine Ransom - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Does the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed, or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expertise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-24
    Moral Responsibility and Foundationalism.Stephen Kershnar - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):381-402.
    If an individual is morally responsible, then there is a responsibility-foundation that makes him morally responsible, but there is no responsibility-foundation that makes him responsible. This rested on the notion that if there were a responsibility-foundation, it would be either an ungrounded choice or an ungrounded character state and that neither can serve as the foundation. The paper then considered three types of objections. First, moral responsibility does not require a responsibility-foundation. Second, a character state can serve as the foundation. (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-12
    Knowledge, Perception, and Memory.Don Locke - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):279-280.
  4. added 2020-02-11
    Epistemic Justification.Nicholas Everitt - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):572-575.
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  5. added 2019-11-21
    "Introduction" - Ch 1 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this introduction I present the topic of the investigation carried out in this book and the central theses defended in it. I also clarify some assumption of my research, specify the intended audience of this book and summarize its structure.
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  6. added 2019-11-12
    "Concluding Remarks" - Ch 6 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify (...)
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  7. added 2019-08-26
    Do Psychological Defeaters Undermine Foundationalism in Moral Epistemology? - a Critique of Sinnott-Armstrong’s Argument Against Ethical Intuitionism.Philipp Schwind - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):941-952.
    Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already constitute (...)
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  8. added 2019-08-19
    "Phenomenal Conservatism" - Ch 2 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    In this chapter I introduce and analyse the tenets of phenomenal conservatism, and discuss the problem of the nature of appearances. After that, I review the asserted epistemic merits phenomenal conservatism and the principal arguments adduced in support of it. Finally, I survey objections to phenomenal conservatism and responses by its advocates. Some of these objections will be scrutinised and appraised in the next chapters.
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  9. added 2019-08-08
    Hugo Dingler.Gereon Wolters - 1988 - Science in Context 2 (2):359-367, 406-408.
    This is an introduction to the English translation of Hogo Dingler's (1881-1954) grounsbreaking paper "Methodik statt Erkenntnistheorie und Wissenschaftslehre". Dingler is the founder of operationalism in physics and relatively little know in the Anglophone world.
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  10. added 2019-07-25
    Givens and Foundations in Aristotle’s Epistemology.Miguel García-Valdecasas - 2014 - Studia Neoaristotelica 11 (2):205-231.
    Aristotle’s epistemology has sometimes been associated with foundationalism, the theory according to which a small set of premise-beliefs that are deductively valid or inductively strong provide justification for many other truths. In contemporary terms, Aristotle’s foundationalism could be compared with what is sometimes called “classical foundationalism”. However, as I will show, the equivalent to basic beliefs in Aristotle’s epistemology are the so-called first principles or “axiómata”. These principles are self-evident, but not self-justificatory. They are not justified by their act of (...)
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  11. added 2019-07-08
    Incorrigibilidade nas circunstâncias adequadas: “qualquer tipo de enunciado pode oferecer evidências para qualquer outro tipo”.Eros Carvalho - 2014 - Analytica (Rio) 18 (2):41-65.
    In this paper, I present the discussion between Ayer and Austin about whether sentences or utterances can be incorrigible and I argue in favor of Austin position. I defend Austin against objections from Ayer presented after the publication of Sense & Sensibilia. Unlike what was sustained by Ayer, experiential sentences and material object sentences are not epistemically asymmetrical. A material object sentence can be incorrigible if uttered in appropriated circumstances, and an experiential sentence can be corrigible if uttered in unappropriated (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Probability Without Certainty: Foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach Debate.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
    Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C. I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguous, but (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    Faith After Foundationalism: Plantiga, Rorty, Lindbeck, and Berger, Critiques and Alternatives. [REVIEW]Hendrik Hart - 1999 - International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):123-124.
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic Stewart Shapiro Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, Xx + 277 Pp. [REVIEW]James Robert Brown - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (3):624-626.
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Conventional Foundationalism and the Origins of the Norms.Ann E. Cudd - 1990 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):485-504.
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Foundationalism and Permanence in Descartes’ Epistemology.Andrew D. Cling - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):145-156.
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  17. added 2019-06-06
    Relativism and Foundationalism: Some Distinctions and Strategies.Michael Krausz - 1984 - The Monist 67 (3):395-404.
    Various issues are characteristically associated with discussions about relativism. The first concerns defining relativism—which is not an easy matter, since there seems to be no clear and well established usage to which one might appeal. Some stipulation is required, though this need not be arbitrary. One may proceed by distinguishing relativism from its putative contrast: absolutism, although defining this latter notion is as difficult as defining the former. Absolutism, however, at least, holds that the truth or the truth value of (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    Epistemic Foundationalism and the Replaceability of Ordinary Language.Alan H. Goldman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):136-154.
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    Peirce’s Critique of Foundationalism.C. F. Delaney - 1973 - The Monist 57 (2):240-251.
    Epistemological foundationalism can be generally characterized as the thesis that in order for there to be any genuine knowledge at all, there must be some self-authenticating instances of knowledge which epistemically ground the whole edifice. This position can be seen to involve three distinct claims: there are self-authenticating, noninferential pieces of knowledge; these privileged instances can be infallibly recognized as such so as to be able to function in grounding other knowledge claims; and without some such instances functioning in this (...)
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  20. added 2019-06-05
    Semantic Empiricism and Direct Acquaintance in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.Audre Jean Brokes - 2000 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 20 (1):33-65.
    In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Russell defends a version of semantic empiricism according to which direct acquaintance with logical atoms is the source of our semantic capacities. Previous commentators have construed Russellian acquaintance in one of two ways: either as an act of de re designation involving neither conceptualization nor propositional content, or as a species of belief de re, which does involve conceptualization or classification. I argue that two further, interim possibilities have been overlooked: that direct acquaintance involves (...)
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  21. added 2019-06-05
    Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Peter Klein & Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  22. added 2019-06-05
    Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.Richard Boyd - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1):127-148.
  23. added 2019-02-03
    Inerrancy Is Not a Strong or Classical Foundationalism.Mark J. Boone - forthcoming - Themelios 44.
    The general idea of strong foundationalism is that knowledge has a foundation in well warranted beliefs which do not derive any warrant from other beliefs and that all our other beliefs depend on these foundational ones for their warrant. Although inerrancy posits Scripture as a solid foundation for theology, the idea that the doctrine of biblical inerrancy involves a strong foundationalist epistemology is deeply problematic. In fact, inerrancy does not require any particular view of the structure of knowledge, and notable (...)
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  24. added 2018-12-30
    Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):121-138.
    Several arguments attempt to show that if traditional, acquaintance-based epistemic internalism is true, we cannot have foundational justification for believing falsehoods. I examine some of those arguments and find them wanting. Nevertheless, an infallibilist position about foundational justification is highly plausible: prima facie, much more plausible than moderate foundationalism. I conclude with some remarks about the dialectical position we infallibilists find ourselves in with respect to arguing for our preferred view and some considerations regarding how infallibilists should develop their account (...)
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  25. added 2018-12-20
    Alguma Luz para O fundacionismo?Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2008 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 13 (1):35-65.
    The foundationalist needs to deal with two fundamental problems: (i) to explain how a justificator grants justification without itself need justification and (ii) to determine the justificator’s epistemic status. Burdzinski (Burdzinski 2007), following Sellars and Bonjour, argues that the perceptive experience could not be a response to the first problem, because if its content was not propositional it would not grant justification and if its content was propositional it would grant justification and would require justification. My proposal is that perceptual (...)
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  26. added 2018-12-10
    Gottes notwendige Existenz stiftet Sinn. Versuch eines transzendental-modallogischen Beweises.Gregor Damschen - 2014 - In Martina Bär & Maximilian Paulin (eds.), Macht Glück Sinn? Theologische und philosophische Erkundungen. Ostfildern, Germany: Matthias Grünewald Verlag. pp. 96-111.
    God's necessary existence makes sense. Attempt at a transcendental modal proof. - In this essay I outline a novel three-stage proof of God's necessary existence using transcendental and deductive methods. In the first step of the proof, by retorsion, it is proved that there is at least one sentence that is necessary and inescapable. In the second step, the inescapability of the modal logic supposed in the proof is shown. This step also contains a new argument in favour of epistemic (...)
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  27. added 2018-09-20
    Where Are You Going, Metaphysics, and How Are You Getting There? - Grounding Theory as a Case Study.Gila Sher - forthcoming - In Quo Vadis, Metaphysics? Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter Studium.
    The viability of metaphysics as a field of knowledge has been challenged time and again. But in spite of the continuing tendency to dismiss metaphysics, there has been considerable progress in this field in the 20th- and 21st- centuries. One of the newest − though, in a sense, also oldest − frontiers of metaphysics is the grounding project. In this paper I raise a methodological challenge to the new grounding project and propose a constructive solution. Both the challenge and its (...)
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  28. added 2018-08-09
    Inferential, Coherential, and Foundational Warrant: An Eclectic Account of the Sources of Warrant.Mark J. Boone - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):377-398.
    A warranted belief may derive inferential warrant from warranted beliefs which support it. It may possess what I call coherential warrant in virtue of beingconsistent with, or lacking improbability relative to, a large system of warranted beliefs. Finally, it may have foundational warrant, which does not derive from other beliefs at all. I define and distinguish these sources of warrant and explain why all three must be included in the true and complete account of the structure of knowledge, and why (...)
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  29. added 2018-07-15
    Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy.Bernardo Kastrup - 2018 - Constructivist Foundations 13 (3):341-361.
    > Context • The alleged dichotomy between mind and matter is pervasive. Therefore, the attempt to explain mat- ter in terms of mind (idealism) is often considered a mirror image of that of explaining mind in terms of mat- ter (mainstream physicalism), in the sense of being structurally equivalent despite being reversely arranged. > Problem • I argue that this is an error arising from language artifacts, for dichotomies must reside in the same level of abstraction. > Method • I (...)
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  30. added 2018-02-17
    Foundational Evidentialism and the Problem of Scatter.Ted Poston - 2007 - Abstracta 3 (2):89-106.
    This paper addresses the scatter problem for foundational evidentialism. Reflection on the scatter problem uncovers significant epistemological lessons. The scatter problem is evaluated in connection with Ernest Sosa’s use of the problem as an argument against foundational evidentialism. Sosa’s strategy is to consider a strong intuition in favor of internalism—the new evil demon problem, and then illustrate how a foundational evidentialist account of the new evil demon problem succumbs to the scatter problem. The goal in this paper is to evaluate (...)
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  31. added 2017-11-14
    Descartes's Method of Doubt.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Enlightenment philosopher, René Descartes, set out to establish what could be known with certainty, untainted by a deceiving demon. With his method of doubt, he rejected all previous beliefs, allowing only those that survived rigorous scrutiny. In this essay, Leslie Allan examines whether Descartes's program of skeptical enquiry was successful in laying a firm foundation for our manifold beliefs. He subjects Descartes's conclusions to Descartes's own uncompromising methodology to determine whether Descartes escaped from a self-imposed radical skepticism.
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  32. added 2017-06-26
    BonJour and the Myth of the Given.Ted Poston - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):185-201.
    The Sellarsian dilemma is a powerful argument against internalistic foundationalist views that aim to end the regress of reasons in experiential states. LaurenceBonJour once defended the soundness of this dilemma as part of a larger argument for epistemic coherentism. BonJour has now renounced his earlier conclusions about the dilemma and has offered an account of internalistic foundationalism aimed, in part, at showing the errors of his former ways. I contend that BonJour’s early concerns about the Sellarsian dilemma are correct, and (...)
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  33. added 2017-05-07
    Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2009 - Princípios 16 (25):231-263.
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how the perceptualexperience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that the perceptual experience justifiesnon-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discussthis question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But (...)
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  34. added 2017-02-15
    Kripke's Account of the Rule‐Following Considerations.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
    This paper argues that most of the alleged straight solutions to the sceptical paradox which Kripke ascribed to Wittgenstein can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. The dilemma is proved to be a by‐product of a foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification, as applied to linguistic behaviour. It is maintained that the assumption is unnecessary and that the dilemma is therefore spurious. To this end, an alternative conception of the (...)
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  35. added 2017-02-15
    Il Mito del Dato.Andrea Guardo - 2009 - Milano-Udine: Mimesis.
    A critique of John McDowell’s theory of content, with special emphasis on his reading of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations.
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  36. added 2017-02-15
    Su che cosa si pretende dal significato.Andrea Guardo - 2009 - Acme 62 (1):335-347.
    A defense of a relativist view of rule-following. The paper is a précis of “Il Mito del Dato”.
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  37. added 2017-02-15
    Praxeological Foundationalism.R. Haller - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31:339.
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  38. added 2017-02-14
    Foundationalism and Philosophy of Religion.John Greco - 1998 - In Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject. Georgetown University Press. pp. 35.
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  39. added 2017-02-13
    Review of Lars Bo Gundersen, Dispositional Theories of Knowledge: A Defense of Aetiological Foundationalism, Ashgate Publishers 2003, 150 Pp. [REVIEW]Peter J. Graham - 2005 - SATS 6 (1):166-172.
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  40. added 2017-02-12
    Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought.Robert Greenleaf Brice - 2014 - Lexington Books.
    Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought considers how, where, and to what extent the thoughts and ideas found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty can be applied to other areas of thought, including: ethics, aesthetics, religious belief, mathematics, cognitive science, and political theory. Robert Greenleaf Brice opens new avenues of thought for scholars and students of the Wittgensteinian tradition, while introducing original philosophies about human knowledge and cognition.
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  41. added 2017-02-12
    Pragmatism's Alternative to Foundationalism and Relativism.Jonathan Langseth - 2008 - Gnosis 9 (2):1-18.
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  42. added 2017-02-09
    What Makes Language Possible? Ethological Foundationalism in Reid and Wittgenstein.Rom Harré & Daniel N. Robinson - 1997 - Review of Metaphysics 50 (3):483 - 498.
    Thomas Reid in the eighteenth century and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the twentieth made strong cases for the existence of "communication systems" that must be in place if there is to be the acquisition of any language; language in the full sense of a system of words, displaying distinctions into word classes and ordered by a grammar that is sensitive to those word classes. Although their pre-languages have something of the character of language proper, Reid and Wittgenstein offer a very different (...)
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  43. added 2017-02-08
    A Mistake About Foundationalism.Steven Rappaport - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):111-125.
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  44. added 2017-02-02
    Faith After Foundationalism.D. Z. Phillips - 1988 - Routlege.
    1 Foundationalism and Religion: a Philosophical Scandal It has been one of the scandals of the philosophy of religion that foundationalism in epistemology ...
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  45. added 2017-01-23
    The Tradition in Retreat.Kai Nielsen - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1):195-200.
    The traditional ways in which philosophy is conceived are in retreat. Classical foundationalism, in both its epistemological and its semantical phrasing, not only rests on a mistake, its very self-image of philosophy is both presumptuous and unsound. Richard Rorty's work has done much to establish these things. Most of his critics have accepted his critique of classical foundationalism while continuing to espouse either some form of modest foundationalism or a coherentist naturalized epistemology. But in doing so they have, either explicitly (...)
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  46. added 2017-01-16
    Fichte: Foundationalism, Antifoundationalisrn, and the New Nihilism.Chernor M. Jalloh - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (10):542-543.
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  47. added 2017-01-08
    Tracing the Territory. A Unitary Foundationalist Account.Olga Ramírez Calle & Olga Ramirez - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):71-95.
    The paper offers an integrative interpretation of the different lines of thought Wittgenstein was inspecting in On Certainty and what he might have been looking for through them. It suggests that we may have been focusing our attention too strongly in the wrong place and comes to a new conclusion about where the real import of these reflections lies. This leads to an answer to the initially posed question of Foundationalism that revises the way in which there can be said (...)
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  48. added 2017-01-08
    Tracking Inferences Is Not Enough: The Given as Tie-Breaker.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):129-135.
    Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and (...)
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  49. added 2016-12-31
    Symposium: Is There an Element of Immediacy in Knowledge?R. I. Aaron & C. M. Campbell - 1934 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 13:203 - 236.
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  50. added 2016-12-08
    Alstonian Foundationalism and Higher-Level Theistic Evidentialism.Michael L. Czapkay Sudduth - 1995 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37 (1):25-44.
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