Franz Brentano

This paper offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception. Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section (...) 1 addresses Brentano’s claim that IP is one mark of the mental alongside intentionality. Sections 2 and 3 present support for a phenomenological interpretation of IP. And Section 4 briefly discusses two objections. (shrink)

This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological (...) procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano’s concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive-psychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki’s and Bandrowski’s—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein’s—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden’s method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski’s legacy within early phenomenology in Poland. (shrink)

Entry on the influence of Stumpf et Brentano on Husserl's early phenomenology during the Halle period.

Marx Textor's Brentano's Mind begins with a short, illuminating introduction which clearly sets out the author's main aims. The two questions Textor wants to consider are, "What is the nature of mind?" and, "What is the structure of consciousness?" From the outset, Textor explicitly states that his intent is not to provide a historically plausible exegesis of "Brentano's often dense and difficult texts", but to take his "bold, suggestive, and influential" answers to these questions as an inspiration for new systematic (...) analyses. The book is then divided in two parts, corresponding to the two questions.The central concept at stake in the first part is intentionality, or rather "Brentano's thesis" that "all... (shrink)

Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind. Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can be simultaneously thought of, or framed, equally accurately as an awareness of a tree or an awareness of an awareness of (...) a tree. (shrink)

In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, Franz Brentano is known mostly for his thesis that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental.’ Among Brentano scholars, there are also lively debates on his theory of consciousness and his theory of judgment. Brentano’s theory of will and emotion is less widely discussed, even within the circles of Brentano scholarship. In this paper, I want to show that this is a missed opportunity, certainly for Brentano scholars but also for contemporary philosophy of mind. (...) Brentano’s accounts of the will and of emotion are, I will argue, both insightful, creative, and surprising, on the one hand, and strikingly plausible, upon reflection, on the other. (shrink)

Uriah Kriegel presents a rich exploration of the philosophy of the great nineteenth-century thinker Franz Brentano. He locates Brentano at the crossroads where the Anglo-American and continental European philosophical traditions diverged. At the centre of this account of Brentano's philosophy is the connection between mind and reality. Kriegel aims to develop Brentano's central ideas where they are overly programmatic or do not take into account philosophical developments that have taken place since Brentano's death a century ago; and to offer a (...) partial defense of Brentano's system as quite plausible and in any case extraordinarily creative and thought-provoking. Brentano's system grounds a complete metaphysics and value theory in a well-developed philosophy of mind, and accordingly the book is divided into three parts, devoted to Brentano's philosophy of mind, his metaphysics, and his moral philosophy. The book's fundamental ambition is to show how Brentano combines the clarity and precision of the analytic philosopher with the sweeping vision of the continental philosopher. Brentano pays careful attention to important distinctions, conscientiously defines key notions, presents precise arguments for his claims, judiciously considers potential objections, and in general proceeds very methodically - yet he does so not as an end in itself, but as a means only. His end is the crafting of a grand philosophical system in the classical sense, attempting to produce nothing less than a unified theory of the true, the good, and the beautiful. (shrink)

My paper is divided into three parts. The first examines the different versions of phenomenology that Husserl used during the Freiburg period, including genetic phenomenology, which is considered, in Experience and Judgment, as the basis for his genealogy of logic. I also examine the doxa-episteme opposition, which is one of the central topics of this book, and I claim that Brentano's epistemic asymmetry between internal and external perception can be considered as a special case of this opposition, which Husserl seeks (...) to overcome. The second part consists in an account of the genesis of the concept of primary content, such as it was first introduced in his Habilitationsschrift in order to replace Brentano's notion of physical phenomenon, to Ideas I where Husserl seems to have abandoned this notion, and replaced it with that of hyle which he conceived in a way similar to that of traditional atomism. The third part shows that the lectures and the working manuscripts of the Freiburg period, including Experience and Judgment, dispel the impression left by Ideas I by providing an original analysis of the dimension of sensory experience. Our starting point is an analysis of the cases of misperception that serve as arguments against Brentano's theory of external perception and whose function here is to uncover several distinctions relating to the modes of consciousness which are directly related to primary contents and to the qualitative dimension of experience. I conclude on the subject of passive syntheses and argue that they refer to a multiplicity of relations that structure phenomenal experience. (shrink)

Il s'agit d'une version courte, en portugais, de mon étude "Deux thèses de Brentano sur la conscience". Je propose une relecture des textes principaux de Franz Brentano sur la conscience. Mon point de départ est la formulation de deux thèses sur la conscience que Brentano avance au tout début du deuxième chapitre du deuxième livre de sa Psychologie et qui constituent le fondement de sa théorie des objets primaires et des objets secondaires. Mon hypothèse de travail s’appuie sur le principe (...) de l’unité de la conscience qui représente la clé à la plupart des problèmes que l’on associe généralement à la théorie de la conscience de Brentano. J’examine trois de ces problèmes dans la deuxième partie de cette étude, à savoir les problèmes de la duplication, de la régression et de la complexité. Dans la dernière partie de cette étude, je propose une analyse du principe de l’unité de la conscience qui tient compte des écrits de Brentano après la publication de sa Psychologie en 1874 et j’évalue, en conclusion, la portée des changements que Brentano apporte à sa théorie de la conscience dans ses écrits publiés à titre posthume. (shrink)

Cette étude a pour double objectif de retracer quelques éléments cartésiens dans la philosophie de Brentano et d'évaluer sa théorie de la conscience à la lumière des débats actuels dans la philosophie de l'esprit contemporaine. Les deux premières parties de cette étude évaluent la dette de Brentano à l'endroit de la philosophie de Descartes. Dans la première, je montre que Descartes est associé à plusieurs principes fondamentaux de la psychologie de Brentano, tandis que dans la deuxième, je propose une interprétation (...) de l'inexistence intentionnelle de Brentano à l'aide de la distinction cartésienne entre ens formale et ens objectivum. La troisième partie est un commentaire critique de l'évaluation par D. Rosenthal de la théorie de la conscience de Brentano dans sa Psychologie. Je m'intéresse plus particulièrement à la distinction que fait Rosenthal entre une conception aristotélicienne et une conception cartésienne de la conscience et me demande sous laquelle de ces deux catégories se range la théorie de Brentano. Dans la dernière partie, j'évalue la portée de quelques-unes des modifications importantes que Brentano fait subir à sa psychologie et à sa théorie de la conscience dans ses derniers travaux et j'avance l'hypothèse que ses positions sur la substance pensante et la conscience de soi le rapprochent encore davantage de Descartes. (shrink)

Reply to eight critical reviews of my paper "Franz Brentano and Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness" in the same issue of the journal Argumentos.

This article addresses the recent reception of Franz Brentano's writings on consciousness. I am particularly interested in the connection established between Brentano's theory of consciousness and higher-order theories of consciousness and, more specifically, the theory proposed by David Rosenthal. My working hypothesis is that despite the many similarities that can be established with Rosenthal's philosophy of mind, Brentano's theory of consciousness differs in many respects from higher-order theories of consciousness and avoids most of the criticisms generally directed to them. This (...) article is divided into eight parts. The first two sections expound the basic outline of Rosenthal's theory, and the third summarizes the principal objections that Rosenthal addresses to Brentano, which I, then, examine in sections 4 and 5. In sections 6 and 7, I discuss Brentano's principle of the unity of consciousness, and in section 8, I consider the scope of the changes that Brentano brings to his theory of consciousness in his later writings, which follow the 1874 publication of Psychology. I then draw the conclusion that Brentano's theory rests on a view of intransitive and intrinsic self-consciousness. (shrink)

Dans sa Psychologie du point de vue empirique Brentano fonde le caractère scientifique de la psychologie sur le geste qui délimite le domaine particulier de cette science aux seuls phénomènes psychiques, en excluant les phénomènes physiques. La distinction entre ces deux types de phénomènes devient ainsi essentielle pour le projet brentanien d’une psychologie scientifique. L’objectif de ce travail est de montrer d’une part que la critique que Husserl fait à la fin de ses Recherches logiques de la distinction brentanienne entre (...) phénomènes psychiques et phénomènes physiques ne tient pas compte entièrement de la finesse de la théorie brentanienne des phénomènes physiques. Il s’agira cependant, par la suite de montrer les difficultés qui découlent précisément de cette conception brentanienne complexe des phénomènes physiques, en particulier ceux qui se présentent sous la forme des sensations. Nous montrerons que la théorie brentanienne des sensations à l’époque de sa Psychologie donne à ces phénomènes un caractère double, à la fois physique et psychique, et met ainsi en danger le projet même de délimiter définitivement le domaine de la psychologie aux seuls phénomènes psychiques. (shrink)

Brentano’s views on psychology influenced the way philosophy was made at the beginning of the 20th century. But did this influence spread as far as to give place to Freud’s revolutionary discovery of the psychoanalytical unconscious? There are reasons to believe that Brentano had a profound influence on Freud. An attentive analysis of Freud’s vocabulary as well as his arguments against “philosophical” objections supports this point rather convincingly. However, Freud was not a philosopher and Brentano’s historical influence does not suffice (...) to transform the Freudian unconscious in a philosophical concept. It is the purpose of this paper to sketch a way to make a philosophical use of Freud’s unconscious by reconstructing the dialogue between Brentano and Freud on a conceptual level. Despite the explicit critique of the unconscious that we find in Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, I show that Freud never truly opposed Brentano. He rather took Brentano’s descriptive psychology a step further: he introduced a dynamic component to the analysis of the psyche that is complementary to Brentano’s descriptive psychology and could be considered a type of genetic psychology. (shrink)

In this paper, I will describe how Brentano was able to integrate descriptive philosophy and logical analysis fruitfully by pointing out Brentano’s concept of philosophy as a rigorous science. First I will clarify how Brentano attempted to turn philosophy into a rigorous descriptive science by applying scientific methods to philosophical questions. After spelling out the implications of such a descriptive understanding of philosophy, I will contrast this descriptive view of philosophy with a semantic-analytic understanding of philosophy as proposed by Frege. (...) After having thus set the stage I will argue that the current separation of philosophy into the seemingly antithetical strands of phenomenology and analytic philosophy may be seen as a consequence of how the term ‘rigorous science’ in ‘philosophy as a rigorous science’ is interpreted: Does a rigorous science grasp its object with as much exactitude as possible? Or is a science rigorous when its theories are expressed unambiguously, and their implications are drawn with precision? In the course of this investigation I will also point out how Brentano’s integrative use of descriptive philosophy and analysis can provide a suitable starting point for an equally successful integration of these methods in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Overview of the complex relationship between Brentano and Stumpf.

_ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 359 - 380 In this paper the author discusses and defends a theory of consciousness inspired by Franz Brentano, according to which every conscious experience involves a certain kind of immediate awareness of itself. All conscious experience is in a certain fundamental sense ‘self-intimating’—it constitutively involves awareness of that very awareness. The author calls this ‘the awareness of awareness thesis’, and she calls the phenomenon that it concerns ‘awareness of awareness’. The author attempts (...) to give a substantive description of what AOA consists in in two ways, first, by listing some of its positive features, and second, by comparing it and contrasting it with introspection. The idea is that there are many different ways we can be aware of our experiences, introspection being one way, AOA being another, distinct way. By clarifying the distinction between AOA and introspection, we can get a better grasp of both phenomena. (shrink)

Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as empirical psychology. Previous scholarship has typically understood this transcendental turn in light of the Ideen’s revised conception of the ἐποχή, and its distinction between noesa and noemata. This essay thematizes the evolution of the concept of mental acts in Husserl’s work as a way of understanding the shift. I show how the recognition of the pure ego in Ideen I and II enabled Husserl to radically alter his conception (...) of mental acts, coming to understand them all in terms of genuine acts in a way that had been essentially precluded for descriptive psychologists so long as the pure ego was denied. This reading challenges a widespread assumption in the secondary literature that “mental act” is a merely technical term or misnomer. (shrink)

This paper offers a reconstruction of Franz Brentano’s mereological solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness and explores some implications of this solution for the ontology of the mind. In section 1 I sketch Brentano’s ontological distinctions between things, collectives, and divisives. In section 2 I present Brentano’s mereological solution and in section 3 I review his main pro-arguments. Eventually, in section 4 I consider some Jamesian objections to the mereological approach. I argue the notion of ‘mental parts’ (...) can be given a rather innocuous meaning by being conceived of as the expression of conceptual distinctions grounded in similarity and contrast relations between total mental phenomena. (shrink)

Mark Textor presents a critical study of the work of Franz Brentano, one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work has influenced analytic philosophers like Russell as well as phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre, and continues to shape debates in the philosophy of mind. Brentano made intentionality a central topic in the philosophy of mind by proposing that 'directedness' is the distinctive feature of the mental. The first part of the book investigates Brentano's intentionalism as well (...) as attempts to improve or develop it. Textor argues that there is no plausible version of this doctrine, and rejects it in favour of a mark of the mental proposed by Brentano's student Husserl: mental phenomena have no appearances. The second part of the book develops and defends Brentano's view about the structure of perceptual awareness. Awareness of a mental activity and this mental activity are not distinct mental acts, the first representing the second. They are one and the same activity that has several objects. Textor shows that Brentano held that intentionality is plural - directedness is directedness on some objects - and shows how the plural conception solves thorny problems. The third part of the book is devoted to Brentano's view of pleasure and pain. Textor draws out parallels between enjoying an activity and awareness of it and argues that enjoying an activity and the activity enjoyed are not distinct. The final part of the book extends the plural view to the conscious mental life of a thinker at a time (the unity of synchronic consciousness): it is one mental act with many objects. (shrink)

Can we maintain that purple seems composed of red and blue without giving up the impenetrability of the red and blue parts that compose it? Brentano thinks we can. Purple, according to him, is a chessboard of red and blue tiles which, although individually too small to be perceived, are together indistinctly perceived within the purple. After a presentation of Brentano’s solution, we raise two objections to it. First, Brentano’s solution commits him to unperceivable intentional objects (the chessboard’s tiles). Second, (...) his chessboard account fails in the end to explain the phenomenal spatial continuity of compound colours. We then sketch an alternative account, which, while holding fast to the phenomenal compoundedness of the purple and to the impenetrability of component colours, avoids introducing inaccessible intentional objects and compromising on the continuity of the purple. According to our proposal, instead of being indistinctly perceived spatial parts of the purple, red and blue are distinctly perceived non- spatial parts of it. (shrink)

In this paper I consider Franz Brentano’s theory of emotion. I focus on three of its central claims: (i) emotions are sui generis intentional phenomena; (ii) emotions are essentially evaluative phenomena; (iii) emotions provide the basis of an epistemology of objective value. I argue that all three claims are correct, and I weave together Brentano’s arguments with some of my own to support them. In the course of defending these claims, Brentano argues that ‘feeling and will’ are united into the (...) same fundamental class. I summarize two of his arguments for this claim, what I call ‘the nature of desire’ argument and ‘the transition’ argument. I show how a central plank of these arguments relies crucially on Brentano’s epistemology of value. (shrink)

In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt Brentano proposed a view of consciousness that neither has room nor need for a subject of mental acts, a soul. Later he changed his mind: there is a soul that appears in consciousness. In this paper I will argue that Brentano’s change of view is not justified. The subjectless view of consciousness can be defended against Brentano’s argument and it is superior to its predecessor.

Franz Brentano’s theory of emotion is tightly bound up with many of his other central claims, in such a way that one has to work out how it relates to these other claims if one is to understand its distinctive character. There are two main axes of investigation. The first results from the fact that Brentano introduces his theory of emotion as part of his overall theory of mind, which consists of a number of closely interconnected theses concerning the nature (...) of mental phenomena, the nature of consciousness, and the classification of mental phenomena into fundamental kinds (Brentano 1874/1973a). The second derives from the fact that his theory of emotion also forms the foundation of his epistemology of objective value, which he elaborates in a framework constituted by an epistemic theory of truth and an extended analogy he draws between emotions and judgments (Brentano 1889/1969). I will consider both of these axes in what follows. (shrink)

This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities.

For many years, the importance and significance of Brentano’s conception of time-consciousness in contemporary philosophy was closely tied with Husserl’s adaptation of this conception in his own lectures on time-consciousness. These lectures, which Husserl held in Göttingen in 1904-05, were edited in the 1920s by the brilliant phenomenologist Edith Stein and are the source of many of the central ideas of transcendental phenomenology. In April 1926, Stein’s work was then taken over by Martin Heidegger, a young careerist who, after spending (...) some years as Husserl’s assistant in Freiburg, took over many of Husserl’s ideas and published a volume on being and time that would convince Husserl to choose him as his successor. Soon enough, and thanks to the publication of Husserl’s lectures, “Brentano’s conception of time-consciousness” became the heading of a supposedly surpassed and defective theory, which was to be replaced subsequently by transcendental phenomenology and its heirs in Freiburg and later in France. This brief and quite tragic history of the reception of Brentano’s conception of time-consciousness has meanwhile been rectified to some extent by a number of works that offer a less biased picture of Brentano’s various conceptions of time-consciousness. The picture remains incomplete, however, without a consideration of the motivations behind the different conceptions advocated by Brentano. By taking Brentano’s metaphysical views into account as his background motivation, it is possible to draw a comprehensive picture of the different conceptions he defended and to get around the uneasy division of his works into early and ‘mature’ views, which has often been taken as a starting point for assessing the importance of reism (see CHAP. 13) at the expense of the rest of his works. While such divisions may be historically justified, they tend to hide the forest behind the trees. For this reason, I will first start with a description of the forest (§§2-3) to finish with a classification of the trees (§4). (shrink)

This paper examines the phenomenon of music in relation to time and time-consciousness based on the philosophies of Augustine, Brentano and Husserl. They analyzed music, or more precisely, the melody of tones and rhythm in their theories of time and time-consciousness, because the process of perceiving music uncloaks the phenomenon of time-understanding.

This is a difficult book to review, primarily because it is, in a sense, not a book at all. This book not only does not but cannot yield clear and plain results; it is, I think, misconceived. It is simply a collection of some of Brentano's essays written, for the most part, in the years from 1914 to 1916. And while Kraus has been moderately successful in imposing an external unity of themes upon the work by juxtaposing thematically connected essays, (...) he has been less than successful in establishing the desired internal unity of a clearly argued and continuously developed position. (shrink)

The article exposes Husserl’s theory of time and provides its detailed comparison with theories of time of I. Kant and F. Brentano. The author first examines the general principles of the phenomenological theory of consciousness, and then analyzes the time concept of F. Brentano and Husserl’s criticism of these ideas, and eventually makes a comparison of Husserl’s and Kant’s theories of time. The author is inclined to conclude that progress in the interpretation of the time made by Husserl, is largely (...) external, based on unacceptable epistemological principles. Critique of these principles the author plans to carry out in one of the next issues of the magazine. (shrink)

Phenomenological accounts of intuition are often considered as significantly different from, or even incommensurable with most of the conception of intuitions defended in analytical philosophy. In this paper, I reject this view. Starting with what I consider to be a relatively neutral phenomenological account of intuition, I first present the main features of Husserl’s and Brentano’s accounts of intuition, showing the structural similarities and differences between these two views. After confronting them, I finally come back to what unites the two (...) views in order to outline a map of the problem of intuition in which both traditions, the analytical and the phenomenological, appear as two complementary takes on one and the same problem. (shrink)