About this topic
Summary Most philosophers and laypeople believe that under most conditions human beings, perhaps along with some other animals, possess a power of selecting and implementing actions which is special. This power is very widely held to be a necessary condition of responsibility for actions, for autonomy and for being entitled to take pride in (or to feel shame for) one's achievements. The free will debate in philosophy aims at elucidating the nature of that power as well as at identifying potential threats to it and explaining how it can exist. A major focus of the debate is the compatibility of free will with causal determinism. A minority of philosophers deny that we have free will because free will is incompatible with causal determinism.
Key works The free will debate is ancient in Western philosophy, but was first developed systematically by scholastic thinkers concerning about the relationship free will and God's foreknowledge (eg Ockham 1983). The rise of mechanistic science brought determinism to the forefront and played an important role in the development of compatibilism by philosophers like Hume (HUME 1751). The advent of Frankfurt-style cases (Frankfurt 1969) transformed the late 20th century debate, by allowing compatibilists to dispense with the principle of alternate possibilities (see Widerker & McKenna 2003 for important contributions to this debate). At the same time, important new libertarian views have been developed by thinkers like Robert Kane (Kane 1996) and Timothy O'Connor (O'Connor 2000). Very recently, there has been a revival of free will skepticism (Strawson 1994; Levy 2011).
Introductions O'Connor 2005;McKenna 2008; Clarke & Capes ms
Related categories

8728 found
1 — 50 / 8728
Material to categorize
  1. Fähigkeiten und Dispositionen (Draft).Romy Jaster - manuscript
    In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich für eine teleologische Fähigkeitstheorie, derzufolge Fähigkeiten Dispositionen zu zweckmäßigem Handeln sind.
  2. Can Life Be Meaningful Without Free Will?Drew Chastain - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.
    If we lack deep free agency, like that supposed by metaphysical libertarianism, should we view life as meaningless, pointless, or not worth living? Here I present a new argument in support of meaning-compatibilism, or the view that life can indeed be meaningful without our having deep free agency. I show that this argument secures meaning-compatibilism more effectively than an argument provided by Derk Pereboom. In the process, we learn that Susan Wolf’s hybrid theory of meaning in life is not equipped (...)
  3. La antropología del De opificio hominis de Gregorio de Nisa en la obra de Nicolás de Cusa.Francisco Bastitta-Harriet - 2015 - In Claudia D'Amico & Jorge Machetta (eds.), La cuestión del hombre en Nicolás de Cusa: fuentes, originalidad y diálogo con la modernidad. Buenos Aires: Biblos. pp. 43-55.
    Gregory of Nyssa’s treatise 'De opificio hominis' was one of the only Greek anthropological texts translated into latin during the early Middle Ages, by Dionysius Exiguus between the late 5th and early 6th centuries and by John Scotus Eriugena in the 9th century. Nicholas of Cusa certainly became acquainted with this work indirectly through the extensive citations in Eriugena’s 'Periphyseon' and through their partial reproduction in the 'Clavis physicae' of Honorius Augustodunensis. Our paper will analyse these and other possible ways (...)
  4. Contribution à la Théorie de la Conscience, Conçue comme Activite du Cerveau.Gilberto Gomes - 1998 - Dissertation, Université Paris 7
    This thesis explores the possibility of theoretically conceiving consciousness as an activity of the brain. Objections, based on the concept of qualia, to the identification of consciousness with a brain activity are refuted. Phenomenal consciousness is identified with access-consciousness. Consciousness is conceived as a higher order processing of informational states of the brain. The state of consciousness represents an integration of prior nonconscious states. Libet’s research on the timing of conscious experience is reviewed and analyzed. His hypothesis of backward referral (...)
  5. Motte-and-Bailey Incompatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - manuscript
    In this essay, I argue that free-will incompatibilism is a motte-and-bailey doctrine and that fallacious motte-and-baileying permeates the contemporary free-will literature. Moreover, I provide a preemptive response to those who would insist that such charges, even if technically correct, are philosophically insignificant or uninteresting. I begin (s2) by identifying the motte thesis associated with the term “incompatibilism”, and then (s3) turn to the bailey thesis which goes by the same name. Next (s4), I offer textual evidence for the empirical claim (...)
  6. A Probabilistic Argument for the Reality of Free Personal Agency.Ľuboš Rojka - 2017 - Studia Neoaristotelica 14 (1):39-57.
    If the influence of libertarian free will on human behaviour is real, the frequency of certain freely chosen actions will differ from the probability of their occurrences deduced from the statistical calculations and neuroscientific observations and laws. According to D. Pereboom, contemporary science does not prove the efficacy of libertarian free will. According to P. van Inwagen, there is always a random element in free decisions, and hence the effect of the free will remains unknown. Swinburne observes that it is (...)
  7. Free Will: Interpretations, Implementations and Assessments.López-Corredoira Martín - forthcoming - Nova Science Publ..
  8. Vrijeme, slobodno od čega i za što?: Time: Free from What and What for?Milan Polić & Rajka Polić - 2009 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 29 (2):255-270.
    S razvitkom kapitalizma sve više se govori i piše o slobodnom vremenu, a njegovim komercijaliziranjem razvile su se unosne gospodarske grane: »industrija zabave«, turizam i sport. Kapital, međutim, slobodno vrijeme najprije prepoznaje kao vrijeme slobodno od rada, tj. kao besposlicu, a tek u najnovije doba – kada je naučio kako od njega profitirati – i kao vrijeme slobodno za učenje i stvaralaštvo, tj. kao dokolicu.Razlika između besposlice koja teži potrošnji i dokolice koja se ispunjava samodjelatnošću mnogima je još nejasna. A (...)
  9. LEVY-BRUHL, LUCIEN. Morceaux Choisis. [REVIEW]Harry Alpert - 1939 - Journal of Social Philosophy and Jurisprudence 5:192.
  10. Simone de Beauvoir and Jean–Paul Sartre: Woman, Man, and the Desire to Be God.Debra B. Bergoffen - 2002 - Constellations 9 (3):409-418.
  11. Abolición Gradual y Libertades Vigiladas En El Río de la Plata. La Política de Control de Libertos de 1813Gradual Abolition and Supervised Freedom in the Rio de la Plata. The Freedmen Control Policy.Magdalena Candioti - 2016 - Corpus 6 (1).
  12. Recension av Ann Heberlein, Etik: människa, moral, mening. [REVIEW]Gustav Alexandrie - 2015 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 36 (1):43-48.
  13. The Triangle Model of Responsibility.Barry R. Schlenker, Thomas W. Britt, John Pennington & Rodolfo Murphy - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):632-652.
  14. Free Time as a Necessary Condition of Free Life.Jeff Noonan - 2009 - Contemporary Political Theory 8 (4):377-393.
    Human life is finite. Given that lifetime is necessarily limited, the experience of time in any given society is a central ethical problem. If all or most of human lifetime is consumed by routine tasks then human beings are dominated by the socially determined experience of time. This article first examines time as the fundamental existential framework of human life. It then goes on to explore the determination of time today by the ruling value system that underlies advanced capitalist society. (...)
  15. Introduction: Through Contexts to Actions.Anton Leist - 2007 - In .
  16. Claudia Portioli (ed.), Natura e libertà (Perugia: Morlacchi, 2009). [REVIEW]Lorenzo Greco - 2011 - Rivista di Filosofia 102 (2):322-23.
  17. Social Responsibility and the Scientist in Modern Western Society.Ernst Boris Chain - 1971 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 14 (3):347-369.
  18. A Note on the Problem of Free Will.V. Siomopoulos - 1972 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 15 (2):309-310.
  19. Epistemic Aspects of Action Systems.Janusz Czelakowski - 2015 - In Freedom and Enforcement in Action. Springer Verlag.
  20. Freedom of Mind and Other Essays. [REVIEW]Harry G. Frankfurt - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):418-421.
  21. Faiblesse de la Volonté Et Autonomie.Christine Tappolet - 2009 - In René Lefebvre & Alonso Tordesillas (eds.), Faiblesse de la volonté et maîtrise de soi. Presses Universitaires de Rennes. pp. 191-203.
    Autonomy seems to require self-control. It also seems that acratic action results from a lack of self-control. Such actions would thus lack autonomy. However, there are reasons to think that acratic actions can be free. Since it is plausible to think that free actions necessarily are autonomous, one would have to conclude that acratic actions are autonomous. My aim is to evaluate the main solutions to this paradox.
  22. L'acte Gratuit.André Berge - 1985
  23. Kierkegaards Phänomenologie der Freiheitserfahrung.Jörg Disse - 1994 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 56 (4):782-783.
  24. If the Coat of Moral Responsibility Fits, Wear It.Catherine Moran - 2003 - Ethics Education 9 (1).
  25. Freely Ye Have Inquired?Skipp Porteous - 1997 - Free Inquiry 17.
  26. Willensfreiheit und die Autonomie der Kulturwissenschaften.Dirk Hartmann - 2005 - E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 1.
  27. Rodzaje Determinacji a Rozw'oj Nauki.Jan Such - 1992
  28. Where is Science Going? With a Pref. By Albert Einstein. Translated and Edited by James Murphy.Max Planck & James Murphy - 1933 - Allen & Unwin.
  29. Interprétation Philosophique des Relations D'incertitude Et Déterminisme.Georges Matisse - 1937 - Journal of Philosophy 34 (8):220-220.
  30. The Nature of Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]G. M. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):155-156.
    In this book, Professor Ross attempts both to establish the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility and to explain the justificatory grounds for blame and punishment. Assuming that all actions have causal antecedents, he contends that traditional attempts to find a basis for ascribing responsibility to some men but not others is misguided. All men, regardless of the cause of their behavior, should be deemed responsible moral agents; and criteria should be developed for deciding which such agents should be (...)
  31. The Role and Responsibility of the Moral Philosopher. Edited by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Desmond J. Fitzgerald, John T. Noonan Jr. [REVIEW]Fernand Van Steenberghen - 1986 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 84 (61):127-127.
  32. Interview with Alvin Plantinga.A. Plantinga - 1998 - Krisis 1000 (7).
  33. Governing of the Self: Laws and Freedom.Richard Kuhns - 1987 - In Robert Stern (ed.), Theories of the Unconscious and Theories of the Self. Analytic Press. pp. 48.
  34. Responsibility and the Scientist.M. Forge - 1998 - In Martin Bridgstock (ed.), Science, Technology, and Society: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. pp. 40.
  35. Elbow Grease: When Action Feels Like Work.Jesse Preston & Daniel M. Wegner - 2009 - In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 569--586.
  36. 9 Captives of the Past The Questions of Responsibility.Balazs Szalontai - 2013 - In Jun-Hyeok Kwak (ed.), Inherited Responsibility and Historical Reconciliation in East Asia. Routledge. pp. 1--165.
  37. A Pie-Model of Moral Responsibility.Hans Lenk & Matthias Maring - 1991 - In Georg Schurz (ed.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. pp. 483--494.
  38. The Role and Responsibility of the Moral Philosopher.Douglas B. Rasmussen - 1982 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:162-172.
  39. The Role and Responsibility of the Moral Philosopher. Hallett - 1982 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:95-101.
  40. The Role and Responsibility of the Moral Philosopher.Denis F. Sullivan - 1982 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:102-108.
  41. The Role and Responsibility of the Moral Philosopher.John V. Wagner - 1982 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:146-153.
  42. Predictability in Human Affairs.G. P. Henderson - 1968 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 1:1-19.
    I Want to talk about a strong sense of the terms ‘predict’, ‘prediction’, ‘predictability’, and so on; to take up the question whether a social science may aspire to predict in the strong sense; and to consider some bearings of this question on the free-will problem.
  43. Responsibility-Repudiators Referring to the Divided Center of Action in the Physical Agent.D. Pears - 1991 - Filosoficky Casopis 39 (1):54-61.
  44. The Problem of Historical Responsibility.L. Heidbrink - 1996 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 103 (2):225-247.
  45. Mario Vargas Llosa. El Sueño Del Celta.Ewald Weitzdörfer - 2011 - Alpha (Osorno) 32:258-259.
  46. Mario VARGAS Llosa. Travesuras de la Niña Mala.Ewald Weitzdörfer - 2007 - Alpha (Osorno) 25.
  47. Recensie: Voerman en van de Laar: Vrije Wil. [REVIEW]Fleur Jongepier - 2011 - Wijsgerig Perspectief 51 (3):38-39.
  48. Libertad individual frente a determinación social.M. Francisco Pérez - 1990 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 4 (1):161-198.
    The paper explores different possibilities in order of maintaining a compatibilism between free will, in a strong sense, and determinism. The notion of determinism is analyzed in deep. It is defended a general conception of free will as a certain kind of mental causation in absence of fatalism. Also, it is argued that other compatibilist possibilities would be possible inside that general conception of free will, being some of them more radical than other ones.
  49. Hacia una sistematización de la relación entre determinismo y libertad.José Manuel Muñoz Ortega - 2012 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 56:5-19.
  50. The Very Idea of Free Will.John D. Glenn Jr - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):65-71.
1 — 50 / 8728