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Summary Free will is partially an issue in the philosophy of mind, so growing knowledge of the brain - which obviously has some kind of intimate relationship with the mind - might prove relevant to our understanding of free will. Most of the interest in neuroscience by philosophers and scientists has concerned whether neuroscience might show that free will is an illusion; the focus has especially been on whether conscious intentions are epiphenomenal. Neuroscientist might also illuminate how the powers required for free will - rational reflection and decision-making, centrally - are implemented.
Key works Benjamin Libet's [Libet 1999 ] claims about the timing of conscious states has been a central focus of work on this topic. This work has spawned a mini-industry; landmarks here include the papers collected in Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel 2010 and - especially - Mele 2009, a monograph that carefully sets out the limits ofLibet's claims. Some neuroscientists have argued that neuroscience eliminates responsibility because the brain is deterministic; Balaguer 2009 is a book-length examination of this claim.
Introductions Banks & Pockett 2007;Mele 2011
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  1. added 2018-10-25
    Free Will, Self-Governance and Neuroscience: An Overview.Alisa Carse, Hilary Bok & Debra J. H. Mathews - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):237-244.
    Given dramatic increases in recent decades in the pace of scientific discovery and understanding of the functional organization of the brain, it is increasingly clear that engagement with the neuroscientific literature and research is central to making progress on philosophical questions regarding the nature and scope of human freedom and responsibility. While patterns of brain activity cannot provide the whole story, developing a deeper and more precise understanding of how brain activity is related to human choice and conduct is crucial (...)
  2. added 2018-10-25
    Experimental Philosophy, Robert Kane, and the Concept of Free Will.J. Neil Otte - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):281-296.
    Trends in experimental philosophy have provided new and compelling results that are cause for re-evaluations in contemporary discussions of free will. In this paper, I argue for one such re-evaluation by criticizing Robert Kane’s well-known views on free will. I argue that Kane’s claims about pre-theoretical intuitions are not supported by empirical findings on two accounts. First, it is unclear that either incompatibilism or compatibalism is more intuitive to nonphilosophers, as different ways of asking about free will and responsibility reveal (...)
  3. added 2018-09-27
    Gilberto Gomes é mesmo um compatibilista?Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3):179-188.
    This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...)
  4. added 2018-09-18
    Placing Pure Experience of Eastern Tradition Into the Neurophysiology of Western Tradition.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - forthcoming - Cognitive Neurodynamics.
    While the presence or absence of consciousness plays the central role in the moral/ethical decisions when dealing with patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), recently it is criticized as not adequate due to number of reasons, among which are the lack of the uniform definition of consciousness and consequently uncertainty of diagnostic criteria for it, as well as irrelevance of some forms of consciousness for determining a patient’s interests and wishes. In her article, Dr. Specker Sullivan reexamined the meaning of (...)
  5. added 2018-08-20
    Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-15.
    Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hypothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence. The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a (...)
  6. added 2018-08-20
    Reflections on Sam Harris' "Free Will".Daniel C. Dennett - 2017 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 8 (3):214-230.
    : In his book Free Will Sam Harris tries to persuade us to abandon the morally pernicious idea of free will. The following contribution articulates and defends a more sophisticated model of free will that is not only consistent with neuroscience and introspection but also grounds a variety of responsibility that justifies both praise and blame, reward and punishment. This begins with the long lasting parting of opinion between compatibilists and incompatibilists. While Harris dismisses compatibilism as a form of theology, (...)
  7. added 2018-08-20
    Neurobiology and Free Will: A Dialogue Between Mariano Artigas and John Eccles.Javier Bernácer - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (2):437-445.
    In this article, I discuss the importance of multidisciplinary research to tackle the questions that empirical sciences, and in particular neuroscience, ultimately encounter. The last decades have witnessed an enormous progress in brain research, mainly because of the improvement of neuroimaging techniques and neurogenetics, and the development of optogenetics. Furthermore, the US Government and European Union have launched the BRAIN Initiative and Human Brain Project, respectively, to promote a better understanding of brain functioning and its disorders. Unfortunately, their gates appear (...)
  8. added 2018-08-20
    What Do Neurosciences Talk About When They Talk About Free Will?Federica Della Grotta - 2015 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (1):145-160.
    In this paper, I will take into account and criticize two of the most celebrated neuroscientific experiments about free will, which seem to deny that agents freely deliberate about simple choices of their everyday life: the pioneering experiment of Benjamin Libet and the more recent one of John Dylan Hayes. My aim is to reject the relevance of their empirical results, which deny the existence of free will. However, such a rejection will not rely on criticisms about how the experiments (...)
  9. added 2018-08-20
    Epistemological Remarks on Libet's Experiments on Free Will: Between Voluntarism and Will.Giampaolo Ghilardi - 2015 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (1):110-119.
    Libet’s experimental setting has been criticized at length ever since its first appearance, under both methodological and empirical aspects. In this paper, the attention will be driven on a neglected underpinning theme which has not yet been investigated, central for the economy of the argument: the time of choices. The pivotal role played by mental chronometry at the beginning of psychology and neurophysiology will be pointed out, and how the lack of a proper definition of time affected the course of (...)
  10. added 2018-08-20
    Free Will and the Readiness Potential.G. Gomes - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):S35 - S35.
  11. added 2018-04-12
    Freiheitsskepsis auf dem Prüfstand. Zu Sven Walters Neubewertung der empirischen Herausforderungen für die Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (3):418-424.
    In seinem Buch Illusion freier Wille? verfolgt Sven Walter zwei Hauptziele. Das erste besteht in dem detaillierten Nachweis, dass die in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten öffentlichkeitswirksam vorgetragene kognitions- und neurowissenschaftlich begründete Freiheitsskepsis durch die empirischen Befunde nicht gedeckt sei. Das zweite Hauptziel ist, aufzuzeigen, dass Willensfreiheit bzw. „unsere intuitive Freiheitsgewissheit“ durchaus empirisch erforschbaren Beeinträchtigungen unterliegt, aber anderen als von den Wortführern der neurobiologischen Freiheitskritik angeführten: „Unbewusste situationale Einflüsse“ auf unsere Willens- und Entscheidungsbildung seien zwar nicht per se, wohl aber dann (...)
  12. added 2018-03-13
    Neuroscience and the Possibility of Locally Determined Choices: Reply to Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias.Marcelo Fischborn - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):198-201.
    In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their (...)
  13. added 2018-03-11
    O livre-arbítrio e outras questões incômodas ao fisicalismo.Daniel P. Nunes & Everaldo Cescon - 2016 - Tábano 12 (1):61-70.
    Este artigo pretende caracterizar de forma geral os posicionamentos fisicalistas na filosofia da mente e indicar como a questão do livre-arbítrio surge e pode ser crucial para tal corrente de pensamento. Primeiramente pretende mostrar a diferença entre a posição reducionista e a não-reducionista e depois salientar suas potencialidades e dificuldades na abordagem da questão do livre-arbítrio. Enfim, mesmo que a questão ainda fique em aberto, verificar-se-á que o livre-arbítrio parece não encontrar espaço no cenário apresentado pelas correntes fisicalistas.
  14. added 2018-03-10
    Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World.David Gordon Limbaugh & Robert Kelly - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):42-44.
    Saigle, Dubljevic, and Racine (2018) claim that Libet-style experiments are insufficient to challenge that agents have free will. They support this with evidence from experimen- tal psychology that the folk concept of freedom is consis- tent with monism, that our minds are identical to our brains. However, recent literature suggests that evidence from experimental psychology is less than determinate in this regard, and that folk intuitions are too unrefined as to provide guidance on metaphysical issues like monism. In light of (...)
  15. added 2018-03-08
    Enhancing Responsibility: Directions for an Interdisciplinary Investigation.Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
    [Note: articles 1-5 are in English; Intro, Discussion, and Conclusion are in Portuguese.] Responsibility practices that are part of our daily lives involve, among other things, standards about how one should praise, blame, or punish people for their actions, as well as particular acts that follow those standards to a greater or lesser extent. A classical question in philosophy asks whether human beings can actually be morally responsible for what they do. This dissertation argues that addressing this classical question is (...)
  16. added 2018-02-17
    Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Mark Balaguer - 2009 - Bradford.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he (...)
  17. added 2018-02-17
    Der Raum der Gründe.Hans Flohr - 2005 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 53 (5):685-690.
  18. added 2018-02-17
    Brain Wise.Patricia Smith Churchland - 2002 - MIT Press.
    A neurophilosopher?s take on the self, free will, human understanding, and the experience of God, from the perspective of the brain.
  19. added 2017-12-13
    Quantum Information and Consciousness: A Gentle Introduction.Danko Georgiev - 2017 - Boca Raton: CRC Press.
    This book addresses the fascinating cross-disciplinary field of quantum information theory applied to the study of brain function. It offers a self-study guide to probe the problems of consciousness, including a concise but rigorous introduction to classical and quantum information theory, theoretical neuroscience, and philosophy of the mind. It aims to address long-standing problems related to consciousness within the framework of modern theoretical physics in a comprehensible manner that elucidates the nature of the mind-body relationship. The reader also gains an (...)
  20. added 2017-12-12
    Conscious Willing and the Emerging Sciences of Brain and Behavior.Timothy O'Connor - 2009 - In Nancey Murphy, George Ellis, O. ’Connor F. R. & Timothy (eds.), Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. Springer Verlag. pp. 173--186.
    Recent studies within neuroscience and cognitive psychology have explored the place of conscious willing in the generation of purposive action. Some have argued that certain findings indicate that the commonsensical view that we control many of our actions through conscious willing is largely or wholly illusory. I rebut such arguments, contending that they typically rest on a conflation of distinct phenomena. Nevertheless, I also suggest that traditional philosophical accounts of the will need to be revised: a raft of studies indicate (...)
  21. added 2017-11-07
    The Agent as Her Self: How Taking Agency Seriously Leads to Emergent Dualism.Maria Joana Rigato - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):48-60.
    : To act is to be the author of an intentional bodily movement. I will show that, in order for that authorship to be assured, the agent must both amount to more than the mereological sum of her mental or neural states and events, and have an irreducible causal power over, at least, some of them. Hence, agent-causalism is the best position for any realist about action to assume. I will contend that, contrary to what many have claimed, agent-causalism is (...)
  22. added 2017-11-07
    Spontaneous Decisions and Free Will: Empirical Results and Philosophical Considerations.Joana Rigato, Masayoshi Murakami & Zachary Mainen - 2014 - Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 79:177-184.
    Spontaneous actions are preceded by brain signals that may sometimes be detected hundreds of milliseconds in advance of a subject's conscious intention to act. These signals have been claimed to reflect prior unconscious decisions, raising doubts about the causal role of conscious will. Murakami et al. (2014. Nat Neurosci 17: 1574–1582) have recently argued for a different interpretation. During a task in which rats spontaneously decided when to abort waiting, the authors recorded neurons in the secondary motor cortex. The neural (...)
  23. added 2017-10-05
    Media Portrayal of a Landmark Neuroscience Experiment on Free Will.Eric Racine, Valentin Nguyen, Victoria Saigle & Veljko Dubljevic - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (4):989-1007.
    The concept of free will has been heavily debated in philosophy and the social sciences. Its alleged importance lies in its association with phenomena fundamental to our understandings of self, such as autonomy, freedom, self-control, agency, and moral responsibility. Consequently, when neuroscience research is interpreted as challenging or even invalidating this concept, a number of heated social and ethical debates surface. We undertook a content analysis of media coverage of Libet’s et al.’s :623–642, 1983) landmark study, which is frequently interpreted (...)
  24. added 2017-09-07
    Drawing on a Sculpted Space of Actions: Educating for Expertise While Avoiding a Cognitive Monster.Machiel Keestra - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 51 (3):620-639.
    Philosophers and scientists have across the ages been amazed about the fact that development and learning often lead to not just a merely incremental and gradual change in the learner but sometimes to a result that is strikingly different from the learner’s original situation: amazed, but at times also worried. Both philosophical and cognitive neuroscientific insights suggest that experts appear to perform ‘different’ tasks compared to beginners who behave in a similar way. These philosophical and empirical perspectives give some insight (...)
  25. added 2017-08-23
    Why Science Does Not Refute Free Will.Whitley R. P. Kaufman - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):219-225.
  26. added 2017-08-22
    The Biology of Free Will.Mae-Wan Ho - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):231-244.
    According to Bergson , the traditional problem of free will is misconceived and arises from a mismatch between the quality of authentic, subjective experience and its description in language, in particular, the language of the mechanistic science of psychology. Contemporary western scientific concepts of the organism, on the other hand, are leading us beyond conventional thermodynamics as well as quantum theory and offering rigorous insights which reaffirm and extend our intuitive, poetic, and even romantic notions of spontaneity and free will. (...)
  27. added 2017-08-22
    Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.G. N. Dolson, Henri Bergson & F. L. Pogson - 1911 - Philosophical Review 20 (3):345.
  28. added 2017-06-25
    Kumoaako tiede vapaan tahdon?Panu Raatikainen - 2017 - Niin and Näin 93 (2/2017):144-145.
    Kirjaarvio teoksesta Alfred R. Mele, Onko vapaa tahto illuusio? Dialogi vapaasta tahdosta ja tieteestä.2016.
  29. added 2017-05-12
    Is Neuroscience Relevant to Our Moral Responsibility Practices?Joseph Vukov - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (2):61-82.
    Some psychologists and philosophers have argued that neuroscience is importantly relevant to our moral responsibility practices, especially to our practices of praise and blame. For consider: on an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience presents us with a mechanistic account of human action. Furthermore, in uential studies – most notoriously, Libet et al. (1983) – seem to show that the brain decides to do things (so to speak) before we consciously make a decision. In light of these ndings, then – or so (...)
  30. added 2017-04-13
    Free Will and Neuroscience.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophic Exchange 43 (1).
    Has modern neuroscience shown that free will is an illusion? Those who give an affirmative answer often argue as follows. The overt actions that have been studied in some recent experiments do not have corresponding consciously made decisions or conscious intentions among their causes. Therefore no overt actions have corresponding consciously made decisions or conscious intentions among their causes. This paper challenges this inference, arguing that it is unwarranted.
  31. added 2017-04-13
    Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study.Matthew Broome, Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli - 2010 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (2):179-187.
    Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense ways of attributing moral responsibility, if not the very notion of moral responsibility. In the case of actions that result in undesirable outcomes, the commonsense conception—which is reflected in sophisticated ways in the legal conception—tells us that there are circumstances in which the agent is entirely and fully (...)
  32. added 2017-04-13
    Review of Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy, Henrik Walter. [REVIEW]Kristin Andrews - 2001 - Philo 6 (1).
    The question of whether humans have free will, like the question of the meaning of life, is one whose answer depends on how the question itself is interpreted. In his recent book Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy, Henrik Walter examines whether free will is possible in a deterministic natural world, and he concludes that the answer is "It depends" (xi). He rejects a libertarian account of free will as internally inconsistent, but argues (...)
  33. added 2017-04-10
    7 Soft Selves and Ecological Control.Andy Clark - 2006 - In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. MIT Press. pp. 101.
    Advanced biological brains are by nature open-ended opportunistic controllers. Such controllers compute, pretty much on a moment-to-moment basis, what problem-solving resources are readily available and recruit them into temporary problem-solving wholes. Neural plasticity, exaggerated in our own species, makes it possible for such resources to become factored deep into both our cognitive and physical problem-solving routines. One way to think about this is to depict the biological brain as a master of what I shall dub ‘ecological control’. Ecological control is (...)
  34. added 2017-03-13
    The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for Voluntary Control of Behavior.Hyman Steven - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):8-11.
    There continues to be a debate on whether addiction is best understood as a brain disease or a moral condition. This debate, which may influence both the stigma attached to addiction and access to treatment, is often motivated by the question of whether and to what extent we can justly hold addicted individuals responsible for their actions. In fact, there is substantial evidence for a disease model, but the disease model per se does not resolve the question of voluntary control. (...)
  35. added 2017-03-01
    Can Neuroscience Show That Free Will Does Not Exist?Manuel Vargas - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine 64:46-53.
  36. added 2017-03-01
    Libertarianism and Skepticism About Free Will: Some Arguments Against Both.Manuel Vargas - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):403-426.
  37. added 2017-02-15
    Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind.Christoph Lumer (ed.) - 2014 - De Gruyter.
  38. added 2017-02-14
    The Just War: An American Reflection on the Morality of War in Our Times. By Peter S. Temes.R. M. Swain - 2005 - The European Legacy 10 (6):673.
  39. added 2017-02-14
    Review of Science in a Free Society'. [REVIEW]Richard H. Schlagel - 1981 - Review of Metaphysics 35.
  40. added 2017-02-13
    Action and Awareness of Agency.José Luis Bermúdez - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):576-588.
    Chris Frith's target chapters contain a wealth of interesting experiments and striking theoretical claims. In these comments I begin by drawing out some of the key themes in his discussion of action and the sense of agency. Frith's central claim about conscious action is that what we are primarily conscious of in acting is our own agency. I will review some of the experimental evidence that he interprets in support of this claim and then explore the following three questions about (...)
  41. added 2017-02-12
    Towards a New Experience of Free Time: Free Time as the Origin of Critical Consciousness.Miroslav Artić - 2009 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 29 (2):281-295.
  42. added 2017-02-12
    What is Conscious?Philip Kuberski - 2003 - Substance 32 (1):23-24.
  43. added 2017-02-07
    Moral Agency, Conscious Control, and Deliberative Awareness.Maureen Sie - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):516-531.
    Recent empirical research results in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences on the “adaptive unconscious” show that conscious control and deliberative awareness are not all-pervasive aspects of our everyday dealings with one another. Moral philosophers and other scientists have used these insights to put our moral agency to the test. The results of these tests are intriguing: apparently we are not always the moral agents we take ourselves to be. This paper argues in favor of a refinement of our common perception (...)
  44. added 2017-02-03
    Two Cheers for Naturalised Philosophy of Science - Or: Why Naturalised Philosophy of Science is Not the Cats's Whiskers.John Worrall - 1999 - Science & Education 8 (4):339-361.
  45. added 2017-01-29
    Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overview.Christoph Lumer - 2014 - In Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. Boston; Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 3-42.
  46. added 2017-01-29
    Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW]Michael Pauen - 2014 - In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 45-62.
  47. added 2017-01-29
    Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW]Arnaldo Benini - 2014 - In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 195-202.
  48. added 2017-01-29
    Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW]Massimo Reichlin - 2014 - In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 127-144.
  49. added 2017-01-29
    Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW]Maureen Sie - 2014 - In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 165-192.
  50. added 2017-01-29
    Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW]Antonella Corradini - 2014 - In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 145-162.
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