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Summary Free will is partially an issue in the philosophy of mind, so growing knowledge of the brain - which obviously has some kind of intimate relationship with the mind - might prove relevant to our understanding of free will. Most of the interest in neuroscience by philosophers and scientists has concerned whether neuroscience might show that free will is an illusion; the focus has especially been on whether conscious intentions are epiphenomenal. Neuroscientist might also illuminate how the powers required for free will - rational reflection and decision-making, centrally - are implemented.
Key works Benjamin Libet's [Libet 1999 ] claims about the timing of conscious states has been a central focus of work on this topic. This work has spawned a mini-industry; landmarks here include the papers collected in Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel 2010 and - especially - Mele 2009, a monograph that carefully sets out the limits ofLibet's claims. Some neuroscientists have argued that neuroscience eliminates responsibility because the brain is deterministic; Balaguer 2009 is a book-length examination of this claim.
Introductions Banks & Pockett 2007;Mele 2011
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  1. added 2020-05-11
    Neurowetenschappen En de Illusie van Vrije Wil.Lieke Asma - 2019 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 111 (3):339-358.
    Neuroscience and the Illusion of Free WillCurrently, few neuroscientists and philosophers still defend the claim that neuroscience has shown the brain ‘decides’ what we do and that free will is an illusion. This does not imply, however, that this kind of neuroscientific research could not say anything about the existence of free will. Neuroscience can offer insights in the unconscious causes and underlying processes of our actions and, because of this, could perhaps show whether we act out of free will (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-19
    Free Will and (in)Determinism in the Brain: A Case for Naturalized Philosophy.Louis Vervoort & Tomasz Blusiewicz - manuscript
    In this article we study the question of free will from an interdisciplinary angle, drawing on philosophy, neurobiology and physics. We start by reviewing relevant neurobiological findings on the functioning of the brain, notably as presented in (Koch 2009); we assess these against the physics of (in)determinism. These biophysics findings seem to indicate that neuronal processes are not quantum but classical in nature. We conclude from this that there is little support for the existence of an immaterial ‘mind’, capable of (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-18
    Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience.Gregg Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.) - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Neuroexistentialism brings together some of the world's leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion, autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral responsibility, criminal punishment, meaning in life, and purpose.
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  4. added 2020-03-18
    Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Scientific Epiphenomenalism.Alfred R. Mele - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    This article addresses two influential lines of argument for what might be termed “scientific epiphenomenalism” about conscious intentions – the thesis that neither conscious intentions nor their physical correlates are among the causes of bodily motions – and links this thesis to skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. One line of argument is based on Benjamin Libet’s neuroscientific work on free will. The other is based on a mixed bag of findings presented by social psychologist Daniel Wegner. It is (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-18
    Is Conscious Will an Illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.
    In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will. I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This (...)
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  6. added 2019-12-04
    Scientismo sobre los esteroides: un resena de ‘Freedom Evolves’ (Libertad Evoluciona) por Daniel Dennett (2003) (revisión revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4a Edición. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 189-204.
    "La gente dice una y otra vez que la filosofía no progresa realmente, que todavía estamos ocupados con los mismos problemas filosóficos que los griegos. Pero la gente que dice esto no entiende por qué tiene que ser así. Es porque nuestro lenguaje ha permanecido igual y nos sigue seduciendo para que hagan las mismas preguntas. Mientras siga habiendo un verbo "ser" que parezca como si funciona de la misma manera que "comer y beber", siempre y cuando todavía tengamos los (...)
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  7. added 2019-10-18
    The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition.Robert Kane (ed.) - 2011 - Oup Usa.
  8. added 2019-10-18
    Dynamic Neurons, Santiago Ramón y Cajal.PhD Tanya Kelley - unknown
    Santiago Ramón y Cajal practice what became neuroscience in the remote town of Ayerbe, Aragón Spain. He struggled to travel to conferences in northern Europe to share his remarkable discovery.
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  9. added 2019-09-24
    Consciousness, Naturalism, and Human Flourishing.Christian Coseru - 2020 - In Bongrae Seok (ed.), Naturalism, Human Flourishing, and Asian Philosophy. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 113–130.
    This chapter pursues the question of naturalism in the context of non-Western philosophical contributions to ethics and philosophy of mind: First, what conception of naturalism, if any, is best suited to capture the scope of Buddhist Reductionism? And second, whether such a conception can still accommodate the distinctive features of phenomenal consciousness (e.g., subjectivity, intentionality, first-person givenness, etc.). The first section reviews dominant conceptions of naturalism, and their applicability to the Buddhist project. In the second section, the author provides an (...)
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  10. added 2019-09-09
    Control, Choice, and the Convergence/Divergence Dynamics: A Compatibilistic Probabilistic Theory of Free Will.Marius Usher - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):188-213.
  11. added 2019-08-21
    Dalla filosofia dell’azione alla filosofia della mente – Riflessioni in onore di Sandro Nannini.Christoph Lumer & Giacomo Romano (eds.) - 2018 - Roma; Messina (Italy): corisco.
    “Dalla filosofia dell’azione alla filosofia della mente” è stato il percorso di alcuni filosofi di nazionalità varia degli anni 1980 – come Paul Churchland negli Stati Uniti o Ansgar Beckermann in Germania – che prima si sono interessati agli aspetti più teorici nella filosofia dell’azione, come il modo di funzionamento delle azioni e la loro spiegazione scientifica, e che poi, con l’arrivo e la diffusione dei personal computers e delle scienze cognitive, hanno ampliato e approfondito questo interesse di ricerca e (...)
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  12. added 2019-08-12
    La hipótesis del marcador somático y la neurobiología de las decisiones.Fabio Morandín-Ahuerma - 2019 - Psycological Writings 12 (1):20-29.
    La hipótesis del marcador somático (SMH) ha sido una de las teorías más influyentes en las neurociencias desde principios de los años 90s en que fue formulada por Antonio Damasio en su libro El error de Descartes (1994). Desde entonces, diversos estudios, a favor y en contra se han escrito, sin un veredicto. En este trabajo se propone una explicación abarcadora de lo que es la hipótesis del marcador somático. En segundo lugar, se hace una valoración sucinta del peso que (...)
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  13. added 2019-07-29
    Brain Interventions, Moral Responsibility, and Control Over One’s Mental Life.Gabriel De Marco - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (3):221-229.
    In the theoretical literature on moral responsibility, one sometimes comes across cases of manipulated agents. In cases of this type, the agent is a victim of wholesale manipulation, involving the implantation of various pro-attitudes along with the deletion of competing pro-attitudes. As a result of this manipulation, the agent ends up performing some action unlike any that she would have performed were it not for the manipulation. These sorts of cases are sometimes thought to motivate historical views of responsibility, on (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-18
    Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will.Nancey Murphy & Warren S. Brown - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
    If humans are purely physical, and if it is the brain that does the work formerly assigned to the mind or soul, then how can it fail to be the case that all of our thoughts and actions are determined by the laws of neurobiology? If this is the case, then free will, moral responsibility, and, indeed, reason itself would appear to be in jeopardy. Murphy and Brown present an original defence of a non-reductive version of physicalism whereby humans are (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – An Overview.Christoph Lumer - 2014 - In Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. Boston; Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 3-42.
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Kein Gehirnereignis Kann Ein Späteres Festlegen. von Wachter - 2012 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 66 (3):393--408.
    The claim of this article is that no event can determine a later event and that in this sense there cannot be sufficient causes. Therefore the causal structure of the world does not exclude free will, even if there are no chance processes.
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  17. added 2019-06-06
    Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. By Mark Balaguer. (Cambridge, MS: MIT Press, 2010. Pp. 202. Price £24.95 Hb, £12.95 Pb.).C. G. Pulman - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):640-642.
  18. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality and Intentional Action.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):319-326.
    Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exercise of free will.
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    Science in a Free Society. [REVIEW]H. S. R. - 1981 - Review of Metaphysics 35 (2):383-385.
    Science in a Free Society is the sequel to Feyerabend's earlier iconoclastic, provocative book, Against Method. As he states in the preface: "Like the earlier book this volume has one aim: to remove obstacles intellectuals and specialists create for traditions different from their own and to prepare the removal of the specialists themselves from the life centers of society". The book is divided into three parts: Part 1 resumes the argument presented in Against Method; part 2 extends the implications of (...)
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  20. added 2019-04-08
    Libet-Like Experiments and the Efficacy of the Will.Sofia Bonicalzi - 2015 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (1):130-144.
    Skepticism about free will is increasingly often associated with the results of some empirical tests – launched by Libet’s trailblazing experiments on the timing of conscious intentions – aiming to teach us that our apparently free choices are originated unconsciously. In the present paper, I present some theoretical reasons to doubt if the upshots of Libet-like experiments purport to the revolutionary consequences they envisage. I will isolate a couple of points I wish to discuss, since they gained much attention in (...)
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  21. added 2019-03-07
    Introduction to the Special Theme on Philosophy and Science of Mind.Daniel Lim - 2018 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 13 (3):297-299.
  22. added 2019-02-24
    Review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’ by John Searle (2008) (Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 425-444.
    Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. (...)
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  23. added 2019-02-23
    The Logical Structure of Consciousness (Behavior, Personality, Rationality, Higher Order Thought, Intentionality) (Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 1-7.
    After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his logical successor John Searle, I have created the following table as a heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary (...)
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  24. added 2019-01-31
    Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, by Levy, Neil: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. Xv + 157, £27.50. [REVIEW]Nomy Arpaly - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):829-831.
  25. added 2018-10-25
    Free Will, Self-Governance and Neuroscience: An Overview.Alisa Carse, Hilary Bok & Debra J. H. Mathews - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):237-244.
    Given dramatic increases in recent decades in the pace of scientific discovery and understanding of the functional organization of the brain, it is increasingly clear that engagement with the neuroscientific literature and research is central to making progress on philosophical questions regarding the nature and scope of human freedom and responsibility. While patterns of brain activity cannot provide the whole story, developing a deeper and more precise understanding of how brain activity is related to human choice and conduct is crucial (...)
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  26. added 2018-10-25
    Experimental Philosophy, Robert Kane, and the Concept of Free Will.J. Neil Otte - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):281-296.
    Trends in experimental philosophy have provided new and compelling results that are cause for re-evaluations in contemporary discussions of free will. In this paper, I argue for one such re-evaluation by criticizing Robert Kane’s well-known views on free will. I argue that Kane’s claims about pre-theoretical intuitions are not supported by empirical findings on two accounts. First, it is unclear that either incompatibilism or compatibalism is more intuitive to nonphilosophers, as different ways of asking about free will and responsibility reveal (...)
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  27. added 2018-09-27
    Gilberto Gomes é mesmo um compatibilista?Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3):179-188.
    This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...)
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  28. added 2018-09-18
    Placing Pure Experience of Eastern Tradition Into the Neurophysiology of Western Tradition.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2019 - Cognitive Neurodynamics 13 (1):121-123.
    While the presence or absence of consciousness plays the central role in the moral/ethical decisions when dealing with patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), recently it is criticized as not adequate due to number of reasons, among which are the lack of the uniform definition of consciousness and consequently uncertainty of diagnostic criteria for it, as well as irrelevance of some forms of consciousness for determining a patient’s interests and wishes. In her article, Dr. Specker Sullivan reexamined the meaning of (...)
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  29. added 2018-08-20
    Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):617-631.
    Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hypothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence. The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a (...)
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  30. added 2018-08-20
    Reflections on Sam Harris' "Free Will".Daniel C. Dennett - 2017 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 8 (3):214-230.
    : In his book Free Will Sam Harris tries to persuade us to abandon the morally pernicious idea of free will. The following contribution articulates and defends a more sophisticated model of free will that is not only consistent with neuroscience and introspection but also grounds a variety of responsibility that justifies both praise and blame, reward and punishment. This begins with the long lasting parting of opinion between compatibilists and incompatibilists. While Harris dismisses compatibilism as a form of theology, (...)
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  31. added 2018-08-20
    Neurobiology and Free Will: A Dialogue Between Mariano Artigas and John Eccles.Javier Bernácer - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (2):437-445.
    In this article, I discuss the importance of multidisciplinary research to tackle the questions that empirical sciences, and in particular neuroscience, ultimately encounter. The last decades have witnessed an enormous progress in brain research, mainly because of the improvement of neuroimaging techniques and neurogenetics, and the development of optogenetics. Furthermore, the US Government and European Union have launched the BRAIN Initiative and Human Brain Project, respectively, to promote a better understanding of brain functioning and its disorders. Unfortunately, their gates appear (...)
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  32. added 2018-08-20
    Epistemological Remarks on Libet's Experiments on Free Will: Between Voluntarism and Will.Giampaolo Ghilardi - 2015 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (1):110-119.
    Libet’s experimental setting has been criticized at length ever since its first appearance, under both methodological and empirical aspects. In this paper, the attention will be driven on a neglected underpinning theme which has not yet been investigated, central for the economy of the argument: the time of choices. The pivotal role played by mental chronometry at the beginning of psychology and neurophysiology will be pointed out, and how the lack of a proper definition of time affected the course of (...)
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  33. added 2018-08-20
    What Do Neurosciences Talk About When They Talk About Free Will?Federica Della Grotta - 2015 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (1):145-160.
    In this paper, I will take into account and criticize two of the most celebrated neuroscientific experiments about free will, which seem to deny that agents freely deliberate about simple choices of their everyday life: the pioneering experiment of Benjamin Libet and the more recent one of John Dylan Hayes. My aim is to reject the relevance of their empirical results, which deny the existence of free will. However, such a rejection will not rely on criticisms about how the experiments (...)
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  34. added 2018-08-20
    Free Will and the Readiness Potential.G. Gomes - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):S35 - S35.
    Talk at the ASSC4 conference (Brussels, 2000).
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  35. added 2018-04-12
    Freiheitsskepsis auf dem Prüfstand. Zu Sven Walters Neubewertung der empirischen Herausforderungen für die Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (3):418-424.
    In seinem Buch Illusion freier Wille? verfolgt Sven Walter zwei Hauptziele. Das erste besteht in dem detaillierten Nachweis, dass die in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten öffentlichkeitswirksam vorgetragene kognitions- und neurowissenschaftlich begründete Freiheitsskepsis durch die empirischen Befunde nicht gedeckt sei. Das zweite Hauptziel ist, aufzuzeigen, dass Willensfreiheit bzw. „unsere intuitive Freiheitsgewissheit“ durchaus empirisch erforschbaren Beeinträchtigungen unterliegt, aber anderen als von den Wortführern der neurobiologischen Freiheitskritik angeführten: „Unbewusste situationale Einflüsse“ auf unsere Willens- und Entscheidungsbildung seien zwar nicht per se, wohl aber dann (...)
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  36. added 2018-03-13
    Neuroscience and the Possibility of Locally Determined Choices: Reply to Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias.Marcelo Fischborn - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):198-201.
    In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their (...)
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  37. added 2018-03-11
    O livre-arbítrio e outras questões incômodas ao fisicalismo.Daniel P. Nunes & Everaldo Cescon - 2016 - Tábano 12 (1):61-70.
    Este artigo pretende caracterizar de forma geral os posicionamentos fisicalistas na filosofia da mente e indicar como a questão do livre-arbítrio surge e pode ser crucial para tal corrente de pensamento. Primeiramente pretende mostrar a diferença entre a posição reducionista e a não-reducionista e depois salientar suas potencialidades e dificuldades na abordagem da questão do livre-arbítrio. Enfim, mesmo que a questão ainda fique em aberto, verificar-se-á que o livre-arbítrio parece não encontrar espaço no cenário apresentado pelas correntes fisicalistas.
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  38. added 2018-03-10
    Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World.David Gordon Limbaugh & Robert Kelly - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):42-44.
    Saigle, Dubljevic, and Racine (2018) claim that Libet-style experiments are insufficient to challenge that agents have free will. They support this with evidence from experimen- tal psychology that the folk concept of freedom is consis- tent with monism, that our minds are identical to our brains. However, recent literature suggests that evidence from experimental psychology is less than determinate in this regard, and that folk intuitions are too unrefined as to provide guidance on metaphysical issues like monism. In light of (...)
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  39. added 2018-03-08
    Enhancing Responsibility: Directions for an Interdisciplinary Investigation.Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
    [Note: articles 1-5 are in English; Intro, Discussion, and Conclusion are in Portuguese.] Responsibility practices that are part of our daily lives involve, among other things, standards about how one should praise, blame, or punish people for their actions, as well as particular acts that follow those standards to a greater or lesser extent. A classical question in philosophy asks whether human beings can actually be morally responsible for what they do. This dissertation argues that addressing this classical question is (...)
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  40. added 2018-02-17
    Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Mark Balaguer - 2009 - Bradford.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he (...)
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  41. added 2018-02-17
    Der Raum der Gründe.Hans Flohr - 2005 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 53 (5):685-690.
  42. added 2018-02-17
    Brain Wise.Patricia Smith Churchland - 2002 - MIT Press.
    A neurophilosopher?s take on the self, free will, human understanding, and the experience of God, from the perspective of the brain.
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  43. added 2017-12-13
    Quantum Information and Consciousness: A Gentle Introduction.Danko Georgiev - 2017 - Boca Raton: CRC Press.
    This book addresses the fascinating cross-disciplinary field of quantum information theory applied to the study of brain function. It offers a self-study guide to probe the problems of consciousness, including a concise but rigorous introduction to classical and quantum information theory, theoretical neuroscience, and philosophy of the mind. It aims to address long-standing problems related to consciousness within the framework of modern theoretical physics in a comprehensible manner that elucidates the nature of the mind-body relationship. The reader also gains an (...)
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  44. added 2017-12-12
    Conscious Willing and the Emerging Sciences of Brain and Behavior.Timothy O'Connor - 2009 - In Nancey Murphy, George Ellis, O. ’Connor F. R. & Timothy (eds.), Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. Springer Verlag. pp. 173--186.
    Recent studies within neuroscience and cognitive psychology have explored the place of conscious willing in the generation of purposive action. Some have argued that certain findings indicate that the commonsensical view that we control many of our actions through conscious willing is largely or wholly illusory. I rebut such arguments, contending that they typically rest on a conflation of distinct phenomena. Nevertheless, I also suggest that traditional philosophical accounts of the will need to be revised: a raft of studies indicate (...)
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  45. added 2017-11-07
    The Agent as Her Self: How Taking Agency Seriously Leads to Emergent Dualism.Maria Joana Rigato - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):48-60.
    : To act is to be the author of an intentional bodily movement. I will show that, in order for that authorship to be assured, the agent must both amount to more than the mereological sum of her mental or neural states and events, and have an irreducible causal power over, at least, some of them. Hence, agent-causalism is the best position for any realist about action to assume. I will contend that, contrary to what many have claimed, agent-causalism is (...)
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  46. added 2017-11-07
    Spontaneous Decisions and Free Will: Empirical Results and Philosophical Considerations.Joana Rigato, Masayoshi Murakami & Zachary Mainen - 2014 - Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 79:177-184.
    Spontaneous actions are preceded by brain signals that may sometimes be detected hundreds of milliseconds in advance of a subject's conscious intention to act. These signals have been claimed to reflect prior unconscious decisions, raising doubts about the causal role of conscious will. Murakami et al. (2014. Nat Neurosci 17: 1574–1582) have recently argued for a different interpretation. During a task in which rats spontaneously decided when to abort waiting, the authors recorded neurons in the secondary motor cortex. The neural (...)
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  47. added 2017-10-05
    Media Portrayal of a Landmark Neuroscience Experiment on Free Will.Eric Racine, Valentin Nguyen, Victoria Saigle & Veljko Dubljevic - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (4):989-1007.
    The concept of free will has been heavily debated in philosophy and the social sciences. Its alleged importance lies in its association with phenomena fundamental to our understandings of self, such as autonomy, freedom, self-control, agency, and moral responsibility. Consequently, when neuroscience research is interpreted as challenging or even invalidating this concept, a number of heated social and ethical debates surface. We undertook a content analysis of media coverage of Libet’s et al.’s :623–642, 1983) landmark study, which is frequently interpreted (...)
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  48. added 2017-09-07
    Drawing on a Sculpted Space of Actions: Educating for Expertise While Avoiding a Cognitive Monster.Machiel Keestra - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 51 (3):620-639.
    Philosophers and scientists have across the ages been amazed about the fact that development and learning often lead to not just a merely incremental and gradual change in the learner but sometimes to a result that is strikingly different from the learner’s original situation: amazed, but at times also worried. Both philosophical and cognitive neuroscientific insights suggest that experts appear to perform ‘different’ tasks compared to beginners who behave in a similar way. These philosophical and empirical perspectives give some insight (...)
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  49. added 2017-08-23
    Why Science Does Not Refute Free Will.Whitley R. P. Kaufman - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):219-225.
  50. added 2017-08-22
    The Biology of Free Will.Mae-Wan Ho - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):231-244.
    According to Bergson , the traditional problem of free will is misconceived and arises from a mismatch between the quality of authentic, subjective experience and its description in language, in particular, the language of the mechanistic science of psychology. Contemporary western scientific concepts of the organism, on the other hand, are leading us beyond conventional thermodynamics as well as quantum theory and offering rigorous insights which reaffirm and extend our intuitive, poetic, and even romantic notions of spontaneity and free will. (...)
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