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Summary Free will seems to require powers of rational choice. Some philosophers have looked to empirical psychology to tell us whether we have these powers. A range of experimental evidence has been interpreted as showing that we are less rational than we believe, that our actions are profoundly influenced by factors outside us in ways we do not realise and that consciousness is not directly involved in producing actions. Both the experimental data and its proper interpretation are very controversial. 
Key works The work of John Bargh has convinced some philosophers that we are influenced by factors of which we are unaware in a way that threatens freedom; Bargh 1994 reviews some of the evidence. Caruso 2013 advances this argument more philosophically. Wegner 2002 is an extended argument that consciousness plays no direct role in behaviour. The situationist literature and its challenge to free will is a focus of Doris 2014Bayne 2004 is representative of philosophical criticism of Wegner. 
Introductions Mele 2011;Mele 2008
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384 found
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  1. Goal-Directed Behavior.Henk Aarts & Andrew J. Elliot (eds.) - 2012 - Psychology Press.
    This volume presents chapters from internationally renowned scholars in the area of goals and social behavior.
  2. Goal-Directed Systems.Frederick Ray Adams - 1982 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    This essay attempts to resurrect a cybernetic model of goal-directed systems. Since the inception of cybernetic, there has been wide agreement that it holds--in its notions of information and feedback control--the clues to solving the mystery of teleological behavior. Unfortunately, early attempts to piece together the puzzle portrayed goal-direction as a matter of a system's receiving information from a predetermined goal, and then directing itself towards that goal. This version of a cybernetic model faced crippling objections concerning the intentionality of (...)
  3. Breakdown of Will.George Ainslie - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Ainslie argues that our responses to the threat of our own inconsistency determine the basic fabric of human culture. He suggests that individuals are more like populations of bargaining agents than like the hierarchical command structures envisaged by cognitive psychologists. The forces that create and constrain these populations help us understand so much that is puzzling in human action and interaction: from addictions and other self-defeating behaviors to the experience of willfulness, from pathological over-control and self-deception to subtler forms of (...)
  4. Human Freedom and the Science of Psychology.Wayne K. Andrew - 1980 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 1 (2):271-290.
  5. The Will to Be Human.Silvano Arieti - 1972 - [New York]Quadrangle Books.
  6. The Act of Will.Roberto Assagioli - 1973 - New York: Viking Press.
  7. B.F. Skinner on Freedom, Dignity, and the Explanation of Behavior.Robert N. Audi - 1976 - Behaviorism 4 (2):163-186.
  8. Psychology and Free Will.J. Baer, J. Kaufman & R. Baumeister (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
  9. Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will.John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Do people have free will, or this universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? How and why might a sense of free will have evolved? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like (...)
  10. Introduction: Psychology and Free Will.John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister - 2008 - In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oup Usa.
  11. Ending the Stigma: How a Causal Deterministic View of Free Will Can Inform Both Healthy and Pathological Cognitive Function and Increase Compassion.Cristina Balaita - unknown
    Depression is the leading cause of disability around the world, and in Canada, 8% of adults will experience depression in their lifetimes. Nearly half of those with depression will not seek treatment, one of the major barriers being the social stigma associated with depression and other mental illnesses. Some of this stigma results from a mistaken understanding of free will and agency and the degree to which these are compromised in mental disorders. This thesis aims to show that free will (...)
  12. Reconstrual of "Free Will" From the Agentic Perspective of Social Cognitive Theory.Albert Bandura - 2008 - In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oup Usa.
  13. 7 Free Will Is Un-Natural.John A. Bargh - 2008 - In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 128.
  14. The Problem of Negligent Omissions: Medieval Action Theories to the Rescue.Michael Barnwell - 2010 - Brill.
    Introduction : what's the problem? -- The problem may lurk in Aristotle's ethics -- Aristotle's akratic : foreshadowing a solution -- A negligent omission at the root of all sinfulness : Anselm and the Devil -- Negligent vs. non-negligent : a Thomistic distinction directing us toward a solution -- Can I have your divided attention? : Scotus, indistinct intellections, and type-1 negligent omissions almost solved -- I can't get you out of my mind : Scotus, lingering indistinct intellections, and type-2 (...)
  15. Voli͡a Kak Predmet Funkt͡sionalʹnoĭ Psikhologii.M. I͡A Basov - 2007 - Aleteĭi͡a.
  16. Mental Causation and Free Will After Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency.Alexander Batthyany - 2009 - In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
    There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental causation. But in recent years, Libet‘s experiment on readiness potentials (Libet, Wright, and Gleason 1982; Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl 1983), and a more recent replication by a research team led by John Dylan Haynes (Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.-D. [2008]) are often singled out because they appear to demonstrate empirically that consciousness is not causally involved in our choices and actions. (...)
  17. Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness.Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) - 2009 - Winter.
  18. Free Willpower: A Limited Resource Theory of Volition, Choice, and Self-Regulation.R. F. Baumeister, M. T. Gailliot & D. M. Tice - 2009 - In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 487--508.
  19. 3 Understanding Free Will and Consciousness on the Basis ofCurrent Research Findings in Psychology.Roy F. Baumeister - 2010 - In Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele & Kathleen D. Vohs (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? University Press. pp. 24.
  20. Free Will, Consciousness, and Cultural Animals.Roy F. Baumeister - 2008 - In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oup Usa.
  21. Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture.Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni & Jessica L. Alquist - 2011 - Neuroethics 4 (1):1-11.
    Free will can be understood as a novel form of action control that evolved to meet the escalating demands of human social life, including moral action and pursuit of enlightened self-interest in a cultural context. That understanding is conducive to scientific research, which is reviewed here in support of four hypotheses. First, laypersons tend to believe in free will. Second, that belief has behavioral consequences, including increases in socially and culturally desirable acts. Third, laypersons can reliably distinguish free actions from (...)
  22. Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work?Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele & Kathleen D. Vohs (eds.) - 2010 - University Press.
    This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating ...
  23. What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism?Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (8):2025-2049.
    Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features. We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were possible (...)
  24. Time and Free Will.Henri Bergson - 1971 - New York: Humanities Press.
  25. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.Henri Bergson - 1913 - Dover Publications.
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
  26. Decision Utility, Incentive Salience, and Cue-Triggered Wanting.Kent C. Berridge & J. Wayne Aldridge - 2009 - In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.
  27. Free Will, Consciousness, and Self: Anthropological Perspectives on Psychology.Preben Bertelsen - 2003 - Berghahn Books.
    Introduction General Anthropology What is it to be human? Human existence means human co-existence; this is an inevitable part of the human condition. ...
  28. Free Time: A Challenge to Later Maturity.Paul Bloomfield - 1959 - The Eugenics Review 51 (2):106.
  29. Consciousness as a Trouble Shooting Device? The Role of Consciousness in Goal Pursuit.Karin C. A. Bongers & Ap Dijksterhuis - 2009 - In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.
  30. Implicit Attitudes and the Social Capacity for Free Will.Daphne Brandenburg - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1215-1228.
    In this paper I ask what implicit attitudes tell us about our freedom. I analyze the relation between the literature on implicit attitudes and an important subcategory of theories of free will—self-disclosure accounts. If one is committed to such a theory, I suggest one may have to move to a more social conceptualization of the capacity for freedom. I will work out this argument in five sections. In the first section, I discuss the specific theories of free will that are (...)
  31. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions (...)
  32. Action is Goal-Directed.Michael Brenner - 1985 - In G. P. Ginsburg, Marylin Brenner & Mario von Cranach (eds.), Discovery Strategies in the Psychology of Action. Academic Press. pp. 35--207.
  33. Is Mental Life Possible Without the Will? A Review of Daniel M. Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will. [REVIEW]Bruce Bridgeman - 2003 - Psyche 9.
    Though we share an irresistible introspection that we possess a will governing our behavior and not controlled by outside forces or previous states, empirical research shows that such a will does not exist. Rather, actions are triggered unconsciously, and a memory-related part of the brain produces a narrative to explain the behavior after the fact.
  34. The Development of Intentional Action: Cognitive, Motivational, and Interactive Processes.Merry Bullock (ed.) - 1991 - Karger.
  35. Genezis Volevoĭ Reguli͡at͡sii: Monografii͡a.A. V. Bykov - 2007 - I͡ugo-Vostok-Servis.
  36. Free Will and Responsibility. A Guide for Practitioners.John S. Callender - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This book is aimed primarily at the practitioners of morals such as psychiatrists,lawyers and policy-makers. My professional background is clinical psychiatry It is divided into three parts. The first of these provides an overview of moral theory, morality in non-human species and recent developments in neuroscience that are of relevance to moral and legal responsibility. In the second part I offer a new paradigm of free action based on the overlaps between free will, moral value and art. In the overlap (...)
  37. Risk-Taking Behavior; Concepts, Methods, and Applications to Smoking and Drug Abuse.Richard E. Carney - 1971 - Springfield, Ill., Thomas.
  38. He's Scared, She's Scared: Understanding the Hidden Fears That Sabotage Your Relationships.Steven Carter - 1993 - Delacorte Press.
    Available for the first time in paperback, this follow-up to the phenomenally successful Men Who Can't Love tackles the issue of commitmentphobia, that persistent obstacle to truly satisfying contemporary relationships. Authors Stephen Carter and Julia Sokol explore why modern men and women are torn between the desire for intimacy and the equally intense need for independence. Drawing on numerous interviews and real-life scenarios, and written with humor, insight, and the kind of wisdom gained by personal experience, He's Scared, She's Scared (...)
  39. Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will.Gregg Caruso - 2013 - Lexington Books.
    This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as free will—at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in free will can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology and a proper theoretical understanding of consciousness.
  40. Consciousness and Free Will.Gregg Caruso - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
  41. On the Self-Regulation of Behavior.Charles S. Carver - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book presents a thorough overview of a model of human functioning based on the idea that behavior is goal-directed and regulated by feedback control processes. It describes feedback processes and their application to behavior, considers goals and the idea that goals are organized hierarchically, examines affect as deriving from a different kind of feedback process, and analyzes how success expectancies influence whether people keep trying to attain goals or disengage. Later sections consider a series of emerging themes, including dynamic (...)
  42. Action, Affect, and Two-Mode Models of Functioning.Charles S. Carver & Michael F. Scheier - 2009 - In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 298--327.
  43. Goal Competition, Confl Ict, Coordination, and Completion : How Intergoal Dynamics Affect Self-Regulation.Justin V. Cavallo & Gráinne M. Fitzsimons - 2012 - In Henk Aarts & Andrew J. Elliot (eds.), Goal-Directed Behavior. Psychology Press.
  44. Mimicry: Its Ubiquity, Importance, and Functionality.Tanya L. Chartrand & Amy N. Dalton - 2009 - In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 458--483.
  45. Moral Responsibility and Mental Health: Applying the Standard of the Reasonable Person.Michelle Ciurria - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):1-12.
    It is contested whether and to what extent moral responsibility can be ascribed to persons with mental health disabilities. Will Cartwright (2006) evaluates two prevalent theories of responsibility in terms of their suitability for morally appraising sociopathic personality disorder, particularly as embodied in the famous homicidal bank robber Robert Harris. Cartwright argues that our intuitions about Harris conflict because we are instantly horrified by Harris’ actions, but we are forced to reconsider our initial moral reaction when we reflect on Harris’ (...)
  46. Creating Citizen-Consumers? Public Service Reform and (Un)Willing Selves.John Clarke, Janet Newman & Louise Westmarland - 2007 - In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-à-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan.
  47. Whodunnit? Unpicking the 'Seems' of Free Will.Guy Claxton - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):8-9.
    The cornerstone of the dominant folk theory of free will is the presumption that conscious intentions are, at least sometimes, causally related to subsequent ‘voluntary’ actions. Like all folk theories that have become ‘second nature', this model skews perception and cognition to highlight phenomena and interpretations that are consistent with itself, and pathologize or render invisible those that are not. A variety of experimental, neurological and everyday phenomena are reviewed that cumulatively cast doubt on this comforting folk model. An alternative (...)
  48. The Alternative a Study in Psychology.E. R. Clay - 1882 - Macmillan.
  49. The Problem of Psychological Determinism.Stephen S. Colvin - 1904 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (22):589-595.
  50. Contentsintroductionmorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind – an Overviewpart I: Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind1. Naturalizing Free Will – Empirical and Conceptual Issues2. Libet’s Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision3. The Effectiveness of Intentions – a Critique of Wegnerpart II: Naturalising Ethics? – Metaethical Perspectives4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide5. Experimental Ethics – a Critical Analysispart III: Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives6. Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy – is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection?Part IV: Neuroethics – Which Values?7. The Rationale Behind Surgery –Truth, Facts, Valuesbiographical Notes on the Authorsname Index. [REVIEW]Antonella Corradini - 2014 - In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 145-162.
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