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Summary This category is a catch-all for papers that do not fit - or much more commonly, have aspects that do not fit - anywhere else in the taxonomy. Most papers in this category are also categorized under some other heading as well. 
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Siblings:History/traditions: Free Will, Misc

243 found
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1 — 50 / 243
  1. added 2020-05-17
    Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to Do Otherwise From a Causal Modeler's Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Strong notions of free will are closely connected to the possibility to do otherwise as well as to an agent's ability to causally influence her environment via her decisions controlling her actions. In this paper we employ techniques from the causal modeling literature to investigate whether a notion of free will subscribing to one or both of these requirements is compatible with naturalistic views of the world such as non-reductive physicalism to the background of determinism and indeterminism. We argue that (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-14
    The Value of Perception.Keith Allen - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):633-656.
  3. added 2020-05-11
    Between Heteronomy and Authonomy. The Presage of Intention.Elisa Grimi - 2017 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 19 (Special Issue, Moral Heteronomy.).
  4. added 2020-04-14
    Ability and Possibility.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20.
    According to the classical quantificational analysis of modals, an agent has the ability to perform an act iff relevant facts about the agent and her environment are compatible with her performing the act. The analysis faces a number of problems, many of which can be traced to the fact that it takes even accidental performance of an act as proof of the relevant ability. I argue that ability statements are systematically ambiguous: on one reading, accidental performance really is enough; on (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-03
    Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will.David Weissman - 2020 - Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers.
    There is agency in all we do: thinking, doing, or making. We invent a tune, play, or use it to celebrate an occasion. Or we make a conceptual leap and ask more abstract questions about the conditions for agency. They include autonomy and self-appraisal, each contested by arguments immersing us in circumstances we don’t control. But can it be true we that have no personal responsibility for all we think and do? Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will proposes that deliberation, (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-10
    Intention and Mental Causation.Rémi Clot-Goudard - forthcoming - Foundations of Science.
    Many philosophers nowadays take for granted a causalist view of action explanation, according to which intentional action is a movement caused by mental antecedents. For them, “the possibility of human agency evidently requires that our mental states – our beliefs, desires, and intentions – have causal effects in the physical world: in voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways” (Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge (MA), (...)
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  7. added 2020-03-10
    Tracing and Heavenly Freedom.Benjamin Matheson - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1):57-69.
    Accounts of heavenly freedom typically attempt to reconcile the claim that the redeemed have free will with the claim that the redeemed cannot sin. In this paper, I first argue that Pawl and Timpe :396–417, 2009) tracing account of heavenly freedom—according to which the redeemed in heaven have only ‘derivative’ free will—is untenable. I then sketch an alternative account of heavenly freedom, one which eschews derivative free will. On this account, the redeemed are able to sin in heaven.
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  8. added 2020-03-10
    L'Explication de l'action. Analyses contemporaines.Rémi Clot-Goudard - 2014 - Paris, France: Vrin.
    En quoi consiste l’explication des actions humaines? Au sein de la philosophie analytique, la réponse standard à cette question, que les travaux de Davidson ont largement contribué à façonner, est la conception causaliste : expliquer une action consiste à mentionner la raison pour laquelle l’agent l’a accomplie, conçue comme la combinaison particulière d’états mentaux (désir et croyance) dont l’occurrence est la cause des mouvements corporels constituant l’action. En identifiant les raisons à des causes, cette conception a fait ressurgir les questions (...)
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  9. added 2020-01-25
    Free Will: Real or Illusion - A Debate.Gregg D. Caruso, Christian List & Cory J. Clark - 2020 - The Philosopher 108 (1).
    Debate on free will with Christian List, Gregg Caruso, and Cory Clark. The exchange is focused on Christian List's book Why Free Will Is Real.
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  10. added 2020-01-15
    Free Will of an Ontologically Open Mind.Jan Scheffel - manuscript
    The problem of free will has persistently resisted a solution throughout centuries. There is reason to believe that new elements need to be introduced into the analysis in order to make progress. In the present physicalist approach, these elements are emergence and information theory in relation to universal limits set by quantum physics. Furthermore, the common, but vague, characterization of having free will as "being able to act differently" is, in the spirit of Carnap, rephrased into an explicatum more suitable (...)
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  11. added 2020-01-03
    Special Issue of EuJAP: Free Will and Epistemology.Robert Lockie, László Bernáth, András Szigeti & Timothy O’Connor - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):5-12.
    Preface to the Special Issue on Free Will and Epistemology written by Robert Lockie.
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  12. added 2019-12-18
    Can Self-Determined Actions Be Predictable?Amit Pundik - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):121-140.
    This paper examines Lockie’s theory of libertarian self-determinism in light of the question of prediction: “Can we know (or justifiably believe) how an agent will act, or is likely to act, freely?” I argue that, when Lockie's theory is taken to its full logical extent, free actions cannot be predicted to any degree of accuracy because, even if they have probabilities, these cannot be known. However, I suggest that this implication of his theory is actually advantageous, because it is able (...)
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  13. added 2019-12-18
    Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.
    In a recent book entitled Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom, Robert Lockie argues that the belief in determinism is self-defeating. Lockie’s argument hinges on the contention that we are bound to assess whether our beliefs are justified by relying on an internalist deontological conception of justification. However, the determinist denies the existence of the free will that is required in order to form justified beliefs according to such deontological conception of justification. As a (...)
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  14. added 2019-12-18
    How Do We Know That We Are Free?Timothy O’Connor - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):79-98.
    We are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others that we are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ‘up to us’ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from doing one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In this article, I probe thesource and epistemic justification of our ‘freedom belief’. I propose an account that (unlike most) does not lean heavily on our first-personal experience of (...)
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  15. added 2019-12-18
    Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):55-78.
    Free will sceptics deny the existence of free will, that is the command or control necessary for moral responsibility. Epicureans allege that this denial is somehow self-defeating. To interpret the Epicurean allegation charitably, we must first realise that it is propositional attitudes like beliefs and not propositions themselves which can be self-defeating. So, believing in free will scepticism might be self- defeating. The charge becomes more plausible because, as Epicurus insightfully recognised,there is a strong connection between conduct and belief—and so (...)
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  16. added 2019-11-03
    Karma Theory, Determinism, Fatalism and Freedom of Will.Ricardo Sousa Silvestre - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (1):35-60.
    The so-called theory of karma is one of the distinguishing aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. At the same time that the theory can be seen as closely connected with the freedom of will and action that we humans supposedly have, it has many times been said to be determinist and fatalist. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in some deepness the relations that are between the theory of karma on one side and determinism, fatalism and (...)
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  17. added 2019-10-18
    The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition.Robert Kane (ed.) - 2011 - Oup Usa.
  18. added 2019-09-19
    Two Kinds of Awareness: Foucault, the Will, and Freedom in Somatic Practice.Cressida Heyes - 2018 - Human Studies 41 (4):527-544.
    This essay identifies two kinds of awareness of one’s body that occur in a variety of literatures: awareness as psychologically or spiritually enabling or therapeutic, and awareness as undesirable self-consciousness of the body. Drawing on Foucault’s account of normalizing judgment, it argues that these two forms of awareness are impossible to separate, if that separation is into authentic versus extrinsic somatic experience. Nonetheless, awareness is an important component of embodied freedom, but a freedom understood with Spinoza and Nietzsche as grounded (...)
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  19. added 2019-09-12
    Fate, Time and Language: An Essay on Free Will.Steven M. Cahn & Maureen Eckert (eds.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    In 1962, the philosopher Richard Taylor used six commonly accepted presuppositions to imply that human beings have no control over the future. David Foster Wallace not only took issue with Taylor's method, which, according to him, scrambled the relations of logic, language, and the physical world, but also noted a semantic trick at the heart of Taylor's argument. _Fate, Time, and Language_ presents Wallace's brilliant critique of Taylor's work. Written long before the publication of his fiction and essays, Wallace's thesis (...)
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  20. added 2019-08-29
    ¿Comprender la libertad?: entre la biología y la metafísica.José Ignacio Murillo - 2009 - Anuario Filosófico 42 (2):391-418.
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  21. added 2019-08-13
    Electromecánicas IV - Despliegue y activación de un espacio-tiempo barroco.Renzo Christian Filinich Orozco & Monica Salinero Rates - 2018 - Enclave Sonora Espacio, Editorial Sonec.
    En Electromecánicas IV, – Despliegue y activación de un espacio-tiempo barroco, Mónica Salinero socióloga y Renzo Filinich artista, se sumergen en el trabajo de análisis de la obra de Raúl Díaz, “Electromecánicas IV, poniendo en valor la diferencia conceptual y la diversidad del universo latinoamericano como espacio de creación situado. Inspirados en las teorías de Bolivar Echevarria, discuten la complejidad simbólica que rodea a esta experiencia estética, deteniéndose en los valores y funciones que se encuentran dentro del espectro cultural andino (...)
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  22. added 2019-08-10
    The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.
    This paper argues for a view of free will that I will call the conceptual impossibility of the truth of free will error theory - the conceptual impossibility thesis. I will argue that given the concept of free will we in fact deploy, it is impossible for our free will judgements - judgements regarding whether some action is free or not - to be systematically false. Since we do judge many of our actions to be free, it follows from the (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    Concerning the Resilience of Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument.Michael Anthony Istvan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):399-420.
    Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no (...)
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  24. added 2019-06-06
    Necessity, Volition, and Love. [REVIEW]Basil Smith - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):411-411.
    This is an insightful and clear group of essays which continues the work of an earlier collection called The Importance of What We Care About. In the earlier book, Frankfurt attempted to develop a theory of ideals independent of moral concerns. As he put it, “there is nothing distinctly moral about ideals such as being steadfastly loyal to a family tradition, or selflessly pursuing mathematical truth”. In Necessity, Volition, and Love, Frankfurt extends this theme. He says philosophers should pay attention (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    Hans Jonas: Freedom and Determinism in the Ancient World.Emidio Spinelli - 2001 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 23 (1):71-84.
  26. added 2019-06-06
    Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.
    In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge. Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, Icontest Hunt’s (...)
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  27. added 2019-06-06
    Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology.Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.) - 1987 - Cambridge University Press.
    This volume of original essays addresses a range of issues concerning the responsibility individuals have for their actions and for their characters. Among the central questions considered are the following: What scope is there for regarding a person as responsible for his or her character given genetic and environmental factors? Does an account of responsibility provide a legitimate basis for the retributive emotions? Are we ever justified in feeling guilty for occurences over which we have no control? Does responsibility for (...)
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  28. added 2019-06-05
    Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment.Gregg D. Caruso - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):13-28.
    Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible (...)
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  29. added 2019-06-05
    Toward a Demarcation of Forms of Determinism.Vladimir Marko - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24 (1):54-84.
    In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to demarcating its various forms.
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  30. added 2019-06-05
    Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (1):61-75.
    Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationality, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical rationality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality (...)
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  31. added 2019-06-05
    Holton, Richard . Willing, Wanting, Waiting . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 203. $49.95 (Cloth).Helen Steward - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):604-608.
  32. added 2019-03-15
    What Time Travelers Cannot Not Do (but Are Responsible for Anyway).Joshua Spencer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):149-162.
    The Principle of Alternative Possibilities is the intuitive idea that someone is morally responsible for an action only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt has famously presented putative counterexamples to this intuitive principle. In this paper, I formulate a simple version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a course-grained notion of actions. After warming up with a Frankfurt-Style Counterexample to this principle, I introduce a new kind of counterexample based on the possibility of time travel. At (...)
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  33. added 2019-03-14
    The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will, and Evolution. [REVIEW]Bernard Harrison - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):765-770.
  34. added 2019-03-09
    He Never Willed to Have the Will He Has: Historicist Narratives, “Civilized” Blame, and the Need to Distinguish Two Notions of Free Will.Michael J. Gill & Stephanie C. Cerce - 2017 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 112 (3):361-382.
    Harsh blame can be socially destructive. This article examines how harsh blame can be “civilized.” A core construct here is the historicist narrative, which is a story-like account of how a person came to be the sort of person she is. We argue that historicist narratives regarding immoral actors can temper blame and that this happens via a novel mechanism. To illuminate that mechanism, we offer a novel theoretical perspective on lay beliefs about free will. We distinguish 2 senses of (...)
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  35. added 2019-03-09
    Unifying Causality and Psychology: Being, Brain, and Behavior.Gerald Young (ed.) - 2016 - Springer, Cham.
    This magistral treatise approaches the integration of psychology through the study of the multiple causes of normal and dysfunctional behavior. Causality is the focal point reviewed across disciplines. Using diverse models, the book approaches unifying psychology as an ongoing project that integrates genetics, experience, evolution, brain, development, change mechanisms, and so on. The book includes in its integration free will, epitomized as freedom in being. It pinpoints the role of the self in causality and the freedom we have in determining (...)
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  36. added 2019-03-09
    The Freedom to Excel: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Academic Performance.Gilad Feldman, Subramanya Prasad Chandrashekar & Kin Fai Ellick Wong - 2016 - Personality and Individual Differences 90:377-383.
    Increasing evidence supports the importance of beliefs in predicting positive outcomes in life. We examined the performance implications of the belief in free will as an abstract, philosophical belief that views the self as free from internal and external constraints and capable of choosing and directing one's own path. In Study 1 (N = 116, undergraduates), belief in free will was associated with higher performance on an academic proofreading task. In Study 2 (N = 614, undergraduates), we examined performance in (...)
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  37. added 2019-03-09
    This Isn’T the Free Will Worth Looking For: General Free Will Beliefs Do Not Influence Moral Judgments, Agent-Specific Choice Ascriptions Do.Andrew E. Monroe, Garrett L. Brady & Bertram F. Malle - 2016 - Social Psychological and Personality Science 8 (2):191-199.
    According to previous research, threatening people’s belief in free will may undermine moral judgments and behavior. Four studies tested this claim. Study 1 used a Velten technique to threaten people’s belief in free will and found no effects on moral behavior, judgments of blame, and punishment decisions. Study 2 used six different threats to free will and failed to find effects on judgments of blame and wrongness. Study 3 found no effects on moral judgment when manipulating general free will beliefs (...)
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  38. added 2019-03-09
    You Didn’T Have to Do That: Belief in Free Will Promotes Gratitude.Michael J. Mackenzie, Kathleen D. Vohs & Roy Baumeister - 2014 - Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40 (11):1423-1434.
    Four studies tested the hypothesis that a weaker belief in free will would be related to feeling less gratitude. In Studies 1a and 1b, a trait measure of free will belief was positively correlated with a measure of dispositional gratitude. In Study 2, participants whose free will belief was weakened (vs. unchanged or bolstered) reported feeling less grateful for events in their past. Study 3 used a laboratory induction of gratitude. Participants with an experimentally reduced (vs. increased) belief in free (...)
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  39. added 2019-03-09
    Free Will and Experimental Philosophy: An Intervention.Tamler Sommers - 2014 - In J. Clausen & Neil Levy (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer. pp. 273-286.
    This chapter reviews and then criticizes the dominant approach that experimental philosophers have adopted in their studies on free will and moral responsibility. Section “Experimental Philosophy and Free Will” reviews the experimental literature and the shared approach: probing for intuitions about the so-called compatibility question, whether free will is compatible with causal determinism. Section “The Intervention” argues that this experimental focus on the compatibility question is fundamentally misguided. The critique develops in the form of a dialogue: a staged “intervention” for (...)
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  40. added 2019-03-09
    The Making of Might-Have-Beens: Effects of Free Will Belief on Counterfactual Thinking.Jessica L. Alquist, Sarah E. Ainsworth & Roy Baumesiter - 2014 - Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 41 (2):268-283.
    Counterfactual thoughts are based on the assumption that one situation could result in multiple possible outcomes. This assumption underlies most theories of free will and contradicts deterministic views that there is only one possible outcome of any situation. Three studies tested the hypothesis that stronger belief in free will would lead to more counterfactual thinking. Experimental manipulations (Studies 1-2) and a measure (Studies 3-4) of belief in free will were linked to increased counterfactual thinking in response to autobiographical (Studies 1, (...)
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  41. added 2019-03-09
    The Self as a Moral Agent: Preschoolers Behave Morally but Believe in the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Nadia Chernyak & Tamar Kushnir - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Development 15 (3):453-464.
    Recent work suggests a strong connection between intuitions regarding our own free will and our moral behavior. We investigate the origins of this link by asking whether preschool-aged children construe their own moral actions as freely chosen. We gave children the option to make three moral/social choices (avoiding harm to another, following a rule, and following peer behavior) and then asked them to retrospect as to whether they were free to have done otherwise. When given the choice to act (either (...)
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  42. added 2019-03-09
    Recent Research on Free Will: Conceptualizations, Beliefs, and Processes.Roy Baumeister - 2014 - Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 50:1-52.
    This chapter summarizes research on free will. Progress has been made by discarding outmoded philosophical notions in favor of exploring how ordinary people understand and use the notion of free will. The concept of responsible autonomy captures many aspects of layperson concepts of free will, including acting on one's own (i.e., not driven by external forces), choosing, using reasons and personal values, conscious reflection, and knowing and accepting consequences and moral implications. Free will can thus be understood as form of (...)
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  43. added 2019-03-09
    If Free Will Doesn't Exist, Neither Does Water.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books. pp. 177-202.
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  44. added 2019-03-09
    Believing Versus Disbelieving in Free Will: Correlates and Consequences.Roy Baumeister - 2012 - Personality and Social Psychology Compass 6 (10):736-745.
    Some people believe more than others in free will, and researchers have both measured and manipulated those beliefs. Disbelief in free will has been shown to cause dishonest, selfish, aggressive, and conforming behavior, and to reduce helpfulness, learning from one’s misdeeds, thinking for oneself, recycling, expectations for occupational success, and actual quality of performance on the job. Belief in free will has been shown to have only modest or negligible correlations with other variables, indicating that it is a distinct trait. (...)
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  45. added 2019-03-09
    On the Foundations of Beliefs in Free Will: Intentional Binding and Unconscious Priming in Self-Agency.Henk Aarts & Kees van den Bos - 2011 - Psychological Science 22 (4):532-537.
    The concept of an ability to make choices and to determine one’s own outcomes fits well with experiences that most people have, and these experiences form the basis for beliefs in free will. However, the existence of conscious free will is challenged by modern research findings highlighting the unconscious origins of goal-directed behavior that gives rise to free-will beliefs. This report expands on these insights by revealing that both conscious and unconscious processes play an important role in free-will beliefs. Specifically, (...)
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  46. added 2019-03-09
    Free Will and the Obesity Epidemic.David A. Levitsky - 2011 - Public Health Nutrition 15 (1):126-141.
    The increase in body weight in the USA over the past several decades is now commonly referred to as the ‘obesity epidemic’. An empirical analysis of the literature suggests that the increased weight can be accounted for by an increase in food intake. The solution to the obesity epidemic, therefore, must centre on a reduction in food consumption, a position well accepted by the American population who think that they, as individuals, are responsible for their adiposity by holding the belief (...)
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  47. added 2019-03-09
    Free Will Perceptions and Religion in Patients with Schizophrenia and Their Caregivers.Amy G. Weisman - 2011 - Psychiatry Research Journal 2 (1-2):37-52.
    This manuscript explores how free will perceptions relate to religious beliefs and values and psychological functioning in patients with schizophrenia and their family members. The paper begins with a discussion of what free will means and where laypeople stand on the question of itsexistence (from the literature, it appears that the overwhelming majority of the general public do subscribe to a free will perspective). Next we review psychological research on free will. Studies suggest that belief in free will has benefits (...)
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  48. added 2019-01-31
    NATURE'S CAPACITIES: Schelling and Contemporary Power-Based Ontologies.Charlotte Alderwick - 2016 - Angelaki 21 (4):59-76.
    This paper draws a number of parallels between Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and contemporary work in the metaphysics of powers. This concept is being applied to a range of debates, however a distinct lack of work exists focusing on extending this concept to ontology as a whole. I argue that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie provides insight into what this kind of system would look like. I begin with a brief outline of the characterisation and use of powers in the contemporary literature to show the (...)
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  49. added 2019-01-30
    Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal Combatibilist Account, by Scott Sehon: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Pp. Xii + 239, £45. [REVIEW]Derek Baker - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):411-413.
    Baker reviews the book Free will and action explanation: A non-causal combatibilist account, by Scott Sehon.
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  50. added 2019-01-25
    Review of Peter van Inwagen's Thinking About Free Will. [REVIEW]Seth Shabo - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):554-557.
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