- Moral Responsibility and the Strike Back Emotion: Comments on Bruce Waller’s The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - forthcoming - Syndicate Philosophy 1 (1).details
- Free Will and Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - In Joseph Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), A Companion to Free Will.details
- Responsibility-Foundation: Still Needed and Still Missing.Stephen Kershnar & Robert M. Kelly - forthcoming - Science, Religion and Culture.details
- An Asymmetrical Approach to Kant's Theory of Freedom.Benjamin Vilhauer - forthcoming - In Dai Heide and Evan Tiffany (ed.), The Idea of Freedom: New Essays on the Interpretation and Significance of Kant's Theory of Freedom.details
- Free Will Skepticism and Criminals as Ends in Themselves.Benjamin Vilhauer - forthcoming - In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment. New York:details
- Retributivism, Free Will Skepticism, and the Public Health-Quarantine Model: Replies to Kennedy, Walen, Corrado, Sifferd, Pereboom, and Shaw.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 (46):161-216.details
- Precis of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 (46):120-125.details
- Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes.Paul Russell - 2022 - In Dana K. Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York City, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 519-543.details
- A Puzzle Concerning Gratitude and Accountability.Robert H. Wallace - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics (Online First):1-26.details
- Do free will skeptics swallow their own medicine?: Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso: Just deserts. Debating free will. Cambridge: Polity, 2021, 223 pp, $15.99 PB.Maarten Boudry - 2021 - Metascience 30 (3):365-369.details
- What Should we Believe About Free Will?Jeremy Byrd - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):505-522.details
- Just Deserts: Debating Free Will.Gregg D. Caruso & Daniel C. Dennett - 2021 - 2021: Polity.details
- Quantum Propensities in the Brain Cortex and Free Will.Danko D. Georgiev - 2021 - Biosystems 208:104474.details
- Free Will, Determinism, and the Right Levels of Description.Leonhard Menges - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):1-18.details
- Just Deserts: Debating Free Will (Review; Invited). [REVIEW]Kristin M. Mickelson - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3):408-412.details
- Review of Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice, by Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom, Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2019. [REVIEW]Jelena Mijić - 2021 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 41 (3):672-676.details
- Responsibility Skepticism and Strawson’s Naturalism: Review Essay on Pamela Hieronymi, Freedom, Resentment & The Metaphysics of Morals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020).Paul Russell - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):754-776.details
- The Tension in Critical Compatibilism.Robert H. Wallace - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):321-332.details
- Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism.Gregg Caruso - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw (ed.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society. New York: pp. 43-72.details
- Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: An Overview.Gregg D. Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw & Derk Pereboom - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-26.details
- Hard Incompatibilism and the Participant Attitude.D. Justin Coates - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):208-229.details
- Free Will Fallibilism and the “Two-Standpoints” Account of Freedom.Michael Louis Corrado - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):1967-1982.details
- The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.details
- Paradigm Case Arguments.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:NA.details
- Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.details
- Spinoza's Dream Argument: A Response to Introspective Arguments for Freedom.J. Petrik & D. Rose - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (11-12):157-181.details
- Just Deserts: Can We Be Held Morally Responsible for Our Actions? Yes, Says Daniel Dennett. No, Says Gregg Caruso.Gregg D. Caruso & Daniel C. Dennett - 2018 - Aeon 1 (Oct. 4):1-20.details
- A Critique of Alfred R Mele’s Work on Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy: Oxford University Press, New York, 1995. [REVIEW]Pujarini Das - 2018 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (3):603-617.details
- How Should Free Will Skeptics Pursue Legal Change?Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (1):47-54.details
- Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life. [REVIEW]Sofia Jeppsson - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):241-244.details
- Hard Theological Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will: Sri Ramakrishna Meets Lord Kames, Saul Smilansky, and Derk Pereboom.Ayon Maharaj - 2018 - Journal of World Philosophies 3 (2):24-48.details
- The Implications of Rejecting Free Will: An Empirical Analysis.Stephen Morris - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):299-321.details
- Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.details
- The Basic Argument and Modest Moral Responsibility.D. Justin Coates - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (2):156-170.details
- My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What’s Wrong with It.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2017 - In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock & H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Why We Should(N’T) Be Discretionists About Free Will.Kelly McCormick - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2489-2498.details
- Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Michael McKenna - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):575-589.details
- On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.details
- Determinism, compatibilism and free will scepticism.Rafael Miranda-Rojas - 2017 - Cinta de Moebio 60:295-305.details
- Response to Dennett on Free Will Skepticism.Derk Pereboom - 2017 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 8 (3):259-265.details
- Why Free Will Is Logically Not Possible Within Naturalism.Michael Prost - 2017 - Philosophy Study 7 (2).details
- Is Ultimate Moral Responsibility Metaphysically Impossible? A Bergsonian Critique of Galen Strawson's Argument.Mark Ian Thomas Robson - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (4):519-538.details
- “Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich’s Third Way”.Paul Russell - 2017 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. Pp. 159-79..details
- The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays.Paul Russell - 2017 - Oxford University Press.details
- Free Will Pessimism.Paul Russell - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 4. New York, NY, USA: pp. 93-120..details
- Pereboom on Punishment: Funishment, Innocence, Motivation, and Other Difficulties.Saul Smilansky - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):591-603.details
- Freedom and Thought.Michael Bourke - 2016 - Modern Horizons:1-22.details
- Free Will Skepticism and the Question of Creativity: Creativity, Desert, and Self-Creation.D. Caruso Gregg - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
- Pereboom, Derk, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning In Life: New York, U.S.A.: Oxford, 2014, ISBN 978-0199685516 $40.50 Hb.Shane George - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):255-259.details
- Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism.Sofia Jeppsson - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):793-808.details
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