Freedom of Religion

According to the standard liberal egalitarian approach, religious exemptions from generally applicable laws can be justified on the grounds of equal respect for each citizen’s conscience. I contend that claims of conscience cannot justify demands for exemptions, since they do not meet even the most inclusive standards of public justification. Arguments of the form “My conscience says so” do not explicate the rationale behind the practices that the claimants seek to protect. Therefore, such arguments do not constitute even pro tanto (...) reasons for exemptions. Rather, they are what Francis Bacon called idola fori — “idols of the marketplace” — conventional justifications that are deemed rational and even self-evident, while in fact they are not. (shrink)

In this book I examine the philosophical, motivational, and practical challenges of education theory, policy, and practice in the twenty-first century. There is a loud and persistent drum beat of support for schools, for citizenship, for diversity and inclusion, and increasingly for labor market readiness with very little critical attention to the assumptions underlying these agendas, let alone to their many internal contradictions. I argue that we must constructively critique some of our most cherished beliefs about education if we are (...) to save the hope of real justice from the rhetoric of imagined justice. (shrink)

Uma breve revisão da vida e autobiografia espiritual do único americano místico Adi da (Franklin Jones). O adesivo na capa de algumas edições diz "a mais profunda autobiografia espiritual de todos os tempos" e isso pode muito bem ser verdade. Eu estou no meu 70 ́s e ter lido muitos livros por professores espirituais e na espiritualidade, e este é um dos maiores. Certamente, é by distante a conta a mais completa e a mais clara do processo da iluminação que (...) eu vi nunca. Mesmo se você não tem nenhum interesse em tudo no mais fascinante de todos os processos psicológicos humanos, é um documento surpreendente que revela uma grande quantidade de religião, yoga, e psicologia humana e sonda as profundezas e os limites das possibilidades humanas. Descrevo-o em alguns detalhes e comparar o seu ensinamento com o do contemporâneo místico indiano Osho. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) e outras. (shrink)

Many religious freedom laws provide exemptions to persons who refuse to comply with certain laws on religious grounds. But these exemptions are increasingly used (by claimants and others) to advance political goals. For example, religious freedom lawsuits helped to undermine the Affordable Care Act’s guarantee of coverage for contraceptives. And the recent Masterpiece Cakeshop case was part of a broader effort to protest the right to same-sex marriage. This paper argues that the state should not grant religious exemptions when they (...) are used to advance political goals. A religious exemption creates a legal inequality between citizens that can only be justified if the protection is not used politically. As such, the state should ensure that laws providing religious exemptions are written, interpreted, and enforced so as to prevent their political misuse. (shrink)

There are some churches in Nigeria that have an African outlook and characteristics. These churches are fully under African leadership, most of them were founded in the 1960s and 1950s. Most of them broke off from the orthodox and white dominated churches as a result of oppression by the whites and a desire for freedom and independence. These churches make up the African church movement. They played an important role in the attainment of Nigeria’s independence. This paper looks at the (...) meaning, the role of the movement in Nigeria’s independence and the place of other factors in Nigeria’s independence. (shrink)

To date, both the United States federal government and twenty-one individual states have passed Religious Freedom Restoration Acts that aim to protect religious persons from having their sincere beliefs substantially burdened by governmental interests. RFRAs accomplish this by offering a three-pronged exemption test for religious objectors that is satisfied only when (1) an objector has a sincere belief that is being substantially burdened; (2) the government has a very good reason (e.g., health or safety) to interfere; and (3) there is (...) a reasonable alternative to serve the compelling interest. Legal balancing tests like those found in RFRA are content neutral insofar as they sideline the belief-content of conscientious objections as irrelevant when determining the permissibility of granting legal accommodations. However, some theorists worry that this legal picture may be backward: perhaps balancing tests should be content non-neutral given the usual features of conscientious objections. For example, Yossi Nehushtan contends that, contrary to their typical codification, religious conscience beliefs seem undeserving of special legal accommodations because they possess uniquely strong empirical and theoretical ties to intolerance. Thus, the illiberally intolerant content of these conscientious objections might actually give the state a reason to refuse to grant legal exemptions. In this paper, I offer a cursory defense of content neutrality with respect to balancing tests like those found in RFRA. To begin, I outline Nehushtan’s argument for content non-neutrality. The cornerstone of his argument is that illiberal intolerance is intolerable such that conscientious objections that are based upon illiberally intolerant values provide the state with strong, normally prevailing reason not to grant an exemption. I argue that, even when the illiberally intolerant content of one’s conscience constitutes a weighty and relevant factor in determining the permissibility of granting a legal exemption, there remain significant problems. It is difficult, for example, to determine which views are illiberally intolerant and difficult to say whether illiberally intolerant views can effectively serve as the principled demarcating line in balancing tests. To conclude, I offer several cursory arguments in favor of adopting content-neutral approaches without necessarily making a comprehensive case. By drawing on the work of Amy Sepinwall, Nadia Sawicki, and Nathan Chapman, I show that content-neutral approaches can help to safeguard robust protections for conscience by permitting atypical exercises of conscience, protect minority thoughts and practices from being coercively supplanted by majoritarian understandings of morality, appropriately maintain the skepticism and humility that we owe each other as compatriots in a pluralistic society, and allow the kind of justifiable civil disobedience that has an important place in political history among other things. (shrink)

Religion is often singled out for special legal treatment in Western societies - which raises an important question: what, if anything, is special about religious conscience beliefs that warrants such special legal treatment? In this paper, I will offer an answer to this specialness question by investigating the relationship between religious conscientious objections and their insulation from relevant evidence. I will begin my analysis by looking at Brian Leiter’s arguments that religious beliefs are insulated from evidence and not worthy of (...) special legal treatment as a result. I will argue that he fails to show that religious conscience beliefs are both in principle responsive to empirical evidence and in practice typically more insulated from this evidence than secular conscience beliefs. If I am right about this, then Leiter fails to answer the “central puzzle” of his recent book and fails to sufficiently distinguish the religious conscience from the secular conscience. Second, I will look at whether or not it is plausible to understand the religious conscience as insulated from other forms of evidence. Following the research of social-psychologist Jonathan Haidt, I will argue that, typically, both forms of conscience seem to be similarly insulated from moral argumentation. I will also show that, while it seems as though the religious conscience usually draws from a larger set of moral values when compared to the secular conscience, this should make no legal difference overall. To conclude, I will explain that the arguments in this paper can be understood as evidence in support of an egalitarian response to religion’s specialness. (shrink)

En mi opinión, un comportamientoi es una expresión de nuestra psicología evolucionada y tan íntimamente relacionada con la religión, la moral y la ética, si uno sabe cómo mirarlos. -/- A muchos les resultará extraño que dedique poco tiempo a discutir los temas comunes a la mayoría de las discusiones de la religión, pero en mi opinión es esencial entender primero las generalidades del comportamiento y esto requiere una buena comprensión de la biología y la psicología que son en su (...) mayoría notables por su ausencia en obras sobre religión, política, historia, moral y ética, etc. En mi opinión, la mayoría de estos esfuerzos no tienen ninguna comprensión en absoluto del funcionamiento del Sistema 2, las funciones corticales lentas del cerebro que pueden equipararse al comportamiento linguístico o a la mente, y que yo llamo la Psicología Descriptiva del Pensamiento de Orden Superior y que considero como el pro vince de la filosofía en el sentido estrecho. -/- Es mi afirmación que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que presenta prominentemente aquí describe más o menos con precisión, o al menos sirve como heurística para, cómo pensamos y nos comportamos, y por lo tanto no abarca meramente filosofía y psicología, pero todo lo demás (religión, historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo veo, incluye tanto el Sistema 2 deliberativo consciente como las acciones o reflejos automatizados inconscientes del Sistema 1. -/- Esta colección de artículos fue escrita en los últimos 10 años y revisada para ponerlos al día (2019). Todos los artículos son sobre el comportamiento humano (como todos los artículos de cualquier persona sobre cualquier cosa), y así sobre las limitaciones de tener una ascendencia de mono reciente (8 millones de años o mucho menos dependiendo del punto de vista) y palabras y hechos manifiestos en el marco de nuestra psicología innata como se presenta en la tabla de intencionalidad. Como dice el famoso evolucionista Richard Leakey, es fundamental tener en cuenta no que evolucionamos de simios, sino que en todas las maneras importantes, somos simios. Si a todos se les diera una comprensión real de esto (es decir, de la ecología humana y la psicología para darles un cierto control sobre sí mismos), tal vez la civilización tendría una oportunidad. Como las cosas son, sin embargo, los líderes de la sociedad no tienen más comprensión de las cosas que sus electores y por lo tanto el colapso en la anarquía es inevitable es a pesar de los puntos de vista casi universales de que la religión, la política o la tecnología pueden salvarnos. Vea mi Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en los Siglo 21 5ª Ed (2019), para una exposición detallada de este punto de vista. -/- Es fundamental entender por qué nos comportamos como lo hacemos y por eso empiezo con una breve revisión de la estructura lógica de la racionalidad, que proporciona cierta heurística para la descripción del lenguaje (mente, racionalidad, personalidad) y da algunas sugerencias sobre cómo esto se relaciona con la evolución del comportamiento social. Esto se centra en los dos escritores que he encontrado los más importantes en este sentido, Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle, cuyas ideas combino y extiendo dentro del marco de sistema dual (dos sistemas de pensamiento) que ha demostrado ser tan útil en el pensamiento reciente y investigación de razonamiento. Como observo, en mi opinión existe esencialmente una superposición completa entre la filosofía, en el sentido estricto de las preguntas perdurables que conciernen a la disciplina académica, y la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (comportamiento). Una vez que uno ha comprendido la idea de Wittgenstein de que sólo existe la cuestión de cómo se va a jugar el juego de idiomas, se determinan las condiciones de satisfacción (lo que hace que una declaración sea verdadera o satisfecha, etc.) y que es el final de la discusión. Sin neurofisiología, sin metafísica, sin posmodernismo, sin teología. -/- Junto con muchos, lo veo como la cuestión religiosa o moral básica de nuestros tiempos que Estados Unidos y el mundo están en proceso de colapso por el crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayor parte de ella durante el siglo pasado, y ahora todo, debido a la gente del tercer mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de 3.000 millones más alrededor de 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y provocarán hambre, enfermedades, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su suelo superior cada año, por lo que a medida que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es muy segura. En Estados Unidos, esto está siendo enormemente acelerado por la inmigración masiva y la reproducción de inmigrantes, combinado con los abusos que hacen posible la democracia. La depravada naturaleza humana convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla del crimen y la pobreza. China seguirá abrumando a Estados Unidos y al mundo, mientras mantenga la dictadura que limita el egoísmo y permite la planificación a largo plazo. La causa fundamental del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes (lo que sugiero puede ser considerado como un no reconocido -- pero el más común y más grave -- problema psicológico -- Trastorno de Fitness Inclusivo). Esto, además de la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a los delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si ayudas a una persona, dañas a otra persona, no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. En consecuencia, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y una a una todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en anarquía o dictadura. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanza de evitar el colapso de Estados Unidos, o cualquier país que siga un sistema democrático, especialmente ahora que los Neomarxistas del Tercer Mundo Supremacistas están tomando el control de los EE.UU. y otros Democracias occidentales, y ayudar a los Siete Sociópatas que dirigen China a tener éxito en su plan para eliminar la paz y la libertad y la religión en todo el mundo. De ahí mi ensayos finales. Por supuesto, es un punto de vista fácilmente defendible que los investigadores de Inteligencia Artificial (también conocido como Estupidez Artificial o Sociopatía Artificial) son aún más malvados que los demócratas y el PCC, y hago breves comentarios al respecto también. -/- Varios artículos tocan The One Big Happy Family Delusion, es decir, que estamos genéticamente seleccionados para cooperar con todos, y que los eufóricos ideales de Democracia, Diversidad, Igualdad y Religión nos llevarán a la utopía, si sólo manejamos las cosas correctamente (la posibilidad de la política). Una vez más, el Principio de No Almuerzo Libre debe advertirnos que no puede ser verdad, y vemos a lo largo de la historia y en todo el mundo contemporáneo, que sin estrictos controles, egoísmo y estupidez ganar la ventaja y pronto destruir cualquier nación que abraza estos Delirios. Además, la mente del mono descuenta el futuro, por lo que cooperamos en la venta de la herencia de nuestros descendientes para las comodidades temporales, exacerbando en gran medida los problemas. -/- Describo versiones de este engaño (es decir, que somos básicamente "amistosos" si se nos da una oportunidad) como aparece en algunos libros recientes sobre sociología/biología/economía. Incluso el excelente "Behave" (2017) de Sapolsky abraza la política izquenta y la selección de grupos y da espacio a una discusión sobre si los seres humanos son innatamente violentos. Termino con dos ensayossobre la gran tragedia que se está desarrollando en Estados Unidos y el mundo, que puede ser visto como un resultado directo de nuestra psicología evolucionada manifestada como las maquinaciones inexorables del Sistema 1. Nuestra psicología, eminentemente adaptativa y eugenógena en las llanuras de Africa desde hace unos 6 millones de años, cuando nos dividimos de los chimpancés, hasta hace unos 50.000 años, cuando muchos de nuestros antepasados abandonaron Africa (es decir, en el EEE o el Entorno de la Adaptación Evolutiva), es ahora la maladaptiveización y la disgenicidad y la fuente de nuestros delirios utópicos suicidas. Así, como todas las discusiones de comportamiento (teología, filosofía, psicología, sociología, biología, antropología, política, derecho, literatura, historia, economía, estrategias de fútbol, reuniones de negocios, etc.), este libro trata sobre la evolutiva estrategias, genes egoístas y fitness inclusivo (selección de parentescos, selección natural), aunque por supuesto pocos entienden esto, independientemente de si son académicos o campesinos, ateos o fundamentalistas. (shrink)

I put forward three reasons why religious exemptions from generally applicable laws are not publicly justifiable in a liberal democratic society. First, mere claims of the form “God says so and my conscience requires that I obey” do not explicate the rationale behind the legal provisions that they are expected to support. Therefore, such claims cannot be regarded even as pro tanto justificatory reasons for any legal provisions, be they laws or exemptions. Second, no matter how elaborate, reasons based on (...) religious faith cannot be allowed in public justification of exemptions because such reasons involve non-negotiable claims about final values, which is incompatible with respect for fellow citizens as equal co-legislators. Third, even if religious arguments are allowed in public justification, carving out religious exemptions from generally applicable laws is still impermissible because it arbitrarily bends the sovereign will of the people to the dictate of religious doctrines. (shrink)

Rawlsian liberals define legitimacy in terms of the public justification principle (PJP): the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that all may reasonably be expected to accept. Does PJP exclude religious reasons from public justification of legal provisions? I argue that the requirement of ‘reasonable acceptability’ is not clear enough to answer this question. Furthermore, it fails to address the problematic fact that justification on the grounds of religious faith involves (...) non-negotiable claims, which is incompatible with respect for fellow citizens as co-legislators. Accordingly, I reformulate PJP in fallibilistic terms: the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that can be subject to reasonable criticism. I show that reasons based on religious faith do not meet this principle, just like any other reasons that involve claims about final values. (shrink)

There are at present two ways in which to evaluate religiously-based claims to accommodation in the legal context. The first, objective approach holds that these claims should be grounded in « facts of the matter » about the religions in question. The second, subjective approach, is grounded in an appreciation by the courts of the sincerity of the claimant. The first approach has the advantage of accounting for the difference between two constitutional principles : freedom of conscience on the one (...) hand, and freedom of religion on the other. It has the disadvantage of transforming courts into expert bodies on religious matters. The subjective approach has a harder time accounting for the distinction. It also risks giving rise to a proliferation of claims. A plausible synthesis between the two approaches requires that we uncover the normative grounds justifying the granting by liberal democracies of religious accommodation. An analogous argument to that put forward by Kymlicka in the case of minority nations identifies the interest that citizens have in being able to exercise their « cultural agency » : the creative reappropriation and reinterpretation of the rituals, practices and norms of religious traditions.Il existe à l’heure actuelle dans le contexte juridique deux principales approches à l’évaluation de la légitimité des demandes d’accommodement pour des motifs religieux. La première, objective, affirme que ces demandes doivent pouvoir s’appuyer dans des faits concernant la religion en question. La seconde, subjective, s’appuie sur l’appréciation de la sincérité de la demande faite par le requérant. La première approche a l’avantage de rendre compte de la distinction entre les deux principes constitutionnels que sont, d’une part, la liberté de conscience, et de l’autre, la liberté de religion. Elle a l’inconvénient de tendre à ériger les tribunaux en « experts » sur des questions religieuses. L’approche subjective rend plus difficilement compte de la distinction entre les deux principes, et de plus risque de donner lieu à une prolifération de demandes. Pour atteindre une synthèse plausible de ces deux approches, il nous faut identifier les fondements normatifs justifiant l’intérêt que les démocraties libérales ont à reconnaître une telle catégorie d’accommodements. En prenant appui dans le célèbre argument de Kymlicka justifiant les droits de nations minoritaires, nous pouvons identifier un intérêt que ces types d’État ont à protéger les conditions permettant aux citoyens de manifester leur « agentivité culturelle », leur capacité à s’identifier en se les réappropriant et en les réinterprétant les normes, pratiques et rites issues de traditions religieuses. (shrink)

In this paper I examine in detail the continued – and curious – popularity of religious schools in an otherwise ‘secular’ twenty-first century Europe. To do this I consider a number of motivations underwriting the decision to place one’s child in a religious school and delineates what are likely the best empirically supported explanations for the continued dominant position of Protestant and Catholic schools. I then argue that institutional racism is an explanatory variable that empirical researchers typically avoid, though it (...) informs both parental assessments of school quality as well as selective mechanisms many mainstream religious schools use to function as domains of exclusion. I then distinguish between religious schools in a dominant position from those serving disadvantaged minorities and argue that the latter are able to play a crucially important function other schools only rarely provide and hence that vulnerable minorities may have reason to value. (shrink)

A discussion of the life and work of David Ricardo's forgotten sister, Sarah, the author of a social novel for boys on poverty, work, self-reliance, emigration and the coexistence between different ethnic groups as well as essays on educational subjects.

I argue that, in the second half of the second Millennium, three parallel processes took place. First, normative ethics, or natural morality, that had been a distinct subject in the education of European elites from the Renaissance times to the end of the eighteenth century, disappeared as such, being partly allotted to the Churches via the teaching of religion in State School, and partly absorbed by the study of history and literature, assumed to be channels for imbibing younger generations with (...) the shared values of the State, the Nation, or the People. Second, religion, or better the prevailing religion or, in most countries, the “State Religion,” became a compulsory subject in the State school. Both the State school and Religion as a discipline were indeed novelties. Third, a result of a tacit pact between two ruling groups was that the canon of European culture was transformed into something less consistent and less comprehensive than its previous post-Renaissance version had been. In more detail, the tradition to be transmitted to younger generations was construed around a fable, or better a lie, namely that the modern European is the ancient Greek’s grandson, and the ancient Hebrew had nothing to bequest to the Modern European. Besides, the canon was reduced to a bark without a kernel, in so far as literature and history took the place that used to belong to “philosophy” or to Studia Humanitatis. (shrink)

Religious exemptions have a long history in American law, but have become especially controversial over the last several years. The essays in this volume address the moral and philosophical issues that the legal practice of religious exemptions often raises.

This article turns to early modern and Enlightenment advocates of tolerance in order to discover and lay bare the line of argument that informed their commitment to free speech. This line of argument will subsequently be used to assess the shift from free speech to the contemporary ideal of free self-expression. In order to take this assessment one step further, this article will finally turn to Immanuel Kant’s famous defense of the public use of reason. In the wake of Katerina (...) Deligiorgi’s readings of Kant, it will show that the idea of free speech requires a specific disposition on behalf of speakers and writers that is in danger of being neglected in the contemporary prevailing conception of free speech as freedom of self-expression. (shrink)

Foreword from the Guest Editor to the special issue of Diametros – “Enlightenment and Secularism.”.

The Preamble to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms claims "Canada is grounded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God." This claim is hopelessly confused and it has no place in our constitution. This is true, moreover, whether you are a Christian, a Jew, a Muslim, a Pantheist, an atheist, or someone who has never given one moment's thought to "the supremacy of God" -- much less "recognized" it.

What are religions? Why is it important to understand them? One answer is that religions and religious believers are extremely bad news: they are deeply involved in conflicts around the globe; they harm people of whom they disapprove; and they often seem irrational. Another answer claims that they are in fact extremely good news: religious beliefs and practices are universal and so fundamental in human nature that they have led us to great discoveries in our explorations of the cosmos and (...) of who we are. The sciences began as part of that religious exploration. John Bowker demonstrates that there is truth in both answers and that we need both to understand what religion is and why it matters. He draws on many disciplines - from physics, genetics and the neurosciences to art, anthropology and the history of religions - to show how they shed entirely new light on religion in the modern world. (shrink)

Article 14 of the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child declares, “States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” In this paper I will consider whether signatory nation-states may be in breach of this article by permitting religious groups to communicate the concept of Hell to children in a particular way.

Religious freedom is often thought to protect, not only religious practices, but also the underlying religious beliefs of citizens. But what should be said about religious beliefs that oppose religious freedom itself or that deny the concept of equal citizenship? The author argues here that such beliefs, while protected against coercive sanction, are rightly subject to attempts at transformation by the state in its expressive capacities. Transformation is entailed by a commitment to publicizing the reasons and principles that justify the (...) basic rights of citizens. (shrink)

In ‘Aeon’ magazine (2 August 2017), Professor Paul Russell claims that tolerance demands that criticism of ideologies be permitted; but it also demands that criticism of natural identities be suppressed. He says that the Left’s failure to distinguish ideological from non-ideological identities has led identity politics into intolerance. I argue that Russell’s position is self-contradictory, implying that his (ideological) liberal identity both should and should not be open to criticism. Tolerance must be extended to criticism of non-ideological identities. Laws against (...) ‘hate speech’ are incompatible with tolerance. (shrink)

In the eyes of many, liberalism requires the aggressive secularization of social institutions, especially public media and public schools. The unfortunate result is that many Americans have become alienated from the liberal tradition because they believe it threatens their most sacred forms of life. This was not always the case: in American history, the relation between liberalism and religion has often been one of mutual respect and support. In Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation , Kevin Vallier attempts to (...) reestablish mutual respect by developing a liberal political theory that avoids the standard liberal hostility to religious voices in public life. He claims that the dominant form of academic liberalism, public reason liberalism, is far friendlier to religious influences in public life than either its proponents or detractors suppose. The best interpretation of public reason, convergence liberalism, rejects the much-derided "privatization" of religious belief, instead viewing religious contributions to politics as a resource for liberal political institutions. Many books reject privatization, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation is unique in doing so on liberal grounds. (shrink)

This article argues that secularism is not neutral. Secularization is a process, the secular state is a structure, whereas secularism is a political philosophy. Secularism takes two main forms: first, a “benevolent” secularism that endeavours to treat all religious and nonreligious belief systems even-handedly, and, second, a “hostile” kind that privileges unbelief and excludes religion from the public sphere. I analyze the European Court of Human Rights decision in Lautsi v Italy, which illustrates these types. The article concludes that secularism (...) as a political philosophy cannot be neutral, and the secular state is not neutral in its effects, standpoint, governing assumptions or treatment of religious truth claims. (shrink)

The criteria of “forced, live, and momentous options,” as William James utilized them in his pragmatic defense of religious belief, cannot, I argue, both support religious pluralism and acknowledge lessons about failure of epistemic responsibility in Heaven’s Gate-followers. But I attempt to re-vitalize the pragmatic argument, showing it capable of walking this narrow line. I proceed (1) by developing the distinction and relationship between a commitment to a particular religious system or community, and a commitment to the generic “religious hypothesis” (...) itself; and (2) by explicating and expanding upon the “experimental” status—and associated pragmatic criteria for success or failure—that James already recognized for commitments to particular religious communities. I thus show how the “pragmatic argument” takes on heightened significance—and renewed promise—in light of problems associated with New Age and so-called “cult” religiosity. (shrink)

This is part of a symposium on conscientious objection and religious freedom inspired by the US Catholic Church's claim that being forced to pay for health insurance that covers abortions (the effect of 'Obamacare')is the equivalent of forcing pacifists to fight. This article takes issue with this claim, and shows that while it would be unjust on democratic principles to force pacifists to fight, given their willingness to serve their country in other ways, there is no democratic objection to forcing (...) those who believe abortion to be murder to pay for health insurance coverage that includes abortion. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the main arguments in John Locke’s first political writings, the highly rhetorical, and often obscure, Two Tracts on Government . The Tracts support the government’s right to impose religious ceremonies on its people, an astonishing fact given Locke’s famous defense of toleration in his later works. The reconstruction of the Tracts developed here allows us to see that rather than a pessimistic view of the prospects for peace under religious diversity, what mainly animates the young Locke is (...) a desire to defend the rule of law against an anarchical conception of religious freedom. The article also argues that the evolution of Locke’s thinking on religious freedom was in large part governed by Locke’s attempt to interpret religious freedom in a way that avoids its having anarchical implications. (shrink)

This paper discusses the Swiss minaret ban as a threat to equal citizenship rather than a threat to freedom of religion. The main argument of the paper is that cultural differences can threaten the fair value of equal political participation rights as well as socio-economic ones. These differences are morally troubling despite legitimate emphasis on the need for a shared (political) culture. To ensure that the state treats its citizens as equals with regard to cultural differences requires a form of (...) liberal neutrality which consists of two elements. Equal citizenship requires, first, justificatory neutrality in deciding which matters are legitimate concerns for legislation. It requires also—as a second safeguard—institutional arrangements which ensure that in the process of implementing justificatory neutral decisions the interests of all affected citizens receive a fair hearing. This means that the factors which tend to undermine the equal standing of citizens in society should be counteracted. (shrink)

This paper is a reflection of Indian culture and civilization in the lights of holy Vedas. The author in this paper considers the Holy Vedas as the origin of enriched and spiritual civilization of India. The Vedas ("knowledge") are a large body of texts originating in ancient India. Composed in Vedic Sanskrit, the texts constitute the oldest layer of Sanskrit literature and the oldest scriptures of India. The Vedas are apauruṣeya ("not of human agency").They are supposed to have been directly (...) revealed, and thus are called śruti ("what is heard"), distinguishing them from other religious texts, which are called smṛti ("what is remembered"). The Rigveda, containing hymns to be recited by the hotar, or presiding priest; The Yajurveda, containing formulas to be recited by the adhvaryu or officiating priest; The Samaveda, containing formulas to be sung by the udgatar or priest that chants; The Atharvaveda, a collection of spells and incantations, apostrophic charms and speculative hymns. (shrink)

The article provides an analysis of the European Court of Human Rights judgments in the case of Lautsi v. Italy (application no. 30814/06), also known as the Italian crucifix case. The applicant claimed that displaying crucifixes in the Italian State-school classrooms attended by her children was contrary to the principle of secularism, by which she wished to bring up her children, and therefore infringed her right to ensure their education and teaching in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions, and (...) also breached her freedom of conviction and religion, as protected by Article 9 of the Convention. In its judgment of November 3, 2009, the seven-judge Chamber declared that there had been a violation of Article 2 (right to education) of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken together with Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) of the Convention. The judgment was given unanimously and none of the judges appended a separate opinion. The Italian Government asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention. In the judgment of the Grand Chamber, delivered on March 18, 2011, the Court held, by fifteen votes to two (and with separate opinions of six judges), that there had been no violation of Protocol No. 1 and no violation of the Convention itself. The analysis in the article is focused on selected principal factors determining the Court's decision. It shows that the proposal for the Court to recognize secular convictions as those protected by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 or Article 9 of the Convention has no sufficient basis in the Convention itself and in earlier Court's case-law and, even, may be considered as promotion of religious intolerance, threatening the freedom to publicly manifest a religion or belief, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. -/- Opracowanie zawiera analizę wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału, które zapadły w sprawie Soile Lautsi (app. 30814/06), zwaną „włoska sprawa krzyża” (Italian Crucifix Case). W sprawie tej skarżąca zarzucała, że okazywanie znaku krzyża w klasach włoskich szkół państwowych, do których uczęszczały jej dzieci, jest sprzeczne z zasadą sekularyzmu, zgodnie z którą chciała ona wychować swoje dzieci i dlatego stanowi naruszenie jej prawa do wychowania i nauczania zgodnego z jej religijnymi i filozoficznymi (moralnymi) przekonaniami, oraz stanowi naruszenie wolności religijnej, gwarantowanej art. 9 Konwencji. W wyroku siedmioosobowej izby ogłoszonym 3 listopada 2009 r. izba uznała naruszenie art. 2 (Prawo do nauki) Protokołu dodatkowego nr 1 do Konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności w powiązaniu z art. 9 (Wolność myśli, sumienia i wyznania) Konwencji. Wyrok zapadł jednomyślnie i żaden z sędziów nie dołączył do wyroku swoich uwag. Rząd Włoch złożył wniosek w trybie przewidzianym art. 43 Konwencji o przekazanie sprawy do Wielkiej Izby. W wyroku Wielkiej Izby ogłoszonym 18 marca 2011 r. Trybunał uznał zdecydowaną większością głosów – 15 za wobec 2 przeciw (sześciu sędziów dołączyło swoje uwagi), że nie doszło do naruszenia ani Protokołu nr 1, ani samej Konwencji. Analizy koncentrują się na wybranych zagadnieniach, kluczowych dla argumentacji Trybunału. Analizy te pokazują, że postulowanie przez izbę uznania za prawo podmiotowe radykalnie pojętej negatywnej wolności religijnej, oraz postulowanie - tak przez izbę, jak i przez Wielką Izbę - ochrony przekonań sekularystycznych jako przekonań chronionych art. 2 Protokołu dodatkowego nr 1 lub art. 9 Konwencji, nie posiada należytego uzasadnienia ani w samej Konwencji, ani w dotychczasowym orzecznictwie Trybunału, a co więcej – może być uznane za propagowanie nietolerancji religijnej, godzącej przede wszystkim chronioną art. 9 Konwencji wolność publicznego uzewnętrzniania przekonań religijnych i filozoficznych. (shrink)

This essay on law and religion appears in the second edition of the Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, edited by Dennis Patterson. It is a revision of a similar entry in the book’s first edition. The essay opens by broadly discussing the complex relationships between law and religion writ large as movements in human history – social, cultural, intellectual, and institutional phenomena with distinct but often overlapping logics and concerns. It then hones in on the efforts (...) of secular law to make sense of religion and determine its place in the civil state. The essay argues that, while the questions raised by the American Bill of Rights’ religion clauses connect in some important respects to broader constitutional principles such as free expression and equality, the most interesting and theoretically excruciating conundrums involving religion need to be approached on their own unique terms. Two useful rubrics for such understanding are “separation” and “deference.” Any honest account must also admit, however, that there is an “intractable residue,” questions in the relation of religion and law to which there simply is no determinate or completely satisfactory answer. Finally, the essay emphasizes that the full texture of the legal imagination’s effort to grapple with religion only becomes apparent in the wider range of subconstitutional and nonconstitutional contexts beyond the standard litany of constitutional discourse. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present and analyse legal acts cited in the European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011 on the situation of Christians in the context of freedom of religion. The author presents the substance of the right to religious freedom and the position of religious freedom among other human rights. The paper also shows the formation of European law on religious freedom and grasps the development trends in this area. Because of the discrepancies that arise (...) when translating the same foreign terms into the Polish language, in order to better explain the content of the cited documents, the texts are also given in English language. The article is the summary of basic legal regulations relevant to reflect on religious freedom at EU level. Compiled materials may be useful to continue the reflection on religious freedom. (shrink)

This paper addresses the central moral issues regarding the burka ban in a liberal society: the freedoms of religion and expression, women's liberty, gender equality, state neutrality and public safety. The paper argues that the ban is unjustifiable in a liberal society for the following reasons: (1) liberal institutions increase the likelihood of voluntary decisions, (2) a legal measure that promotes a controversial conception of liberty is an undue interference with liberty, (3) the ban overrides women’s judgment regarding their own (...) interest rather than gives effect to it, (4) the principle of moral equality fails to support forced unveiling, and (5) the ban is discriminatory because it imposes a harsh burden on women by preventing religious observance. (shrink)

How far should religious practices be curtailed in pursuit of other social goals, such as equality and the removal of discrimination? This book reasons that religious freedom is one of our most precious freedoms, and essential to democracy, drawing on examples from across the Western world.

This paper examines whether religious reasons have a legitimate place in a liberal democracy's policy debates. Robert Audi, building from Rawlsian themes, contends that civic virtue obliges religious citizens who advocate for public policies to have sufficiently motivating secular reasons. Others contend it's unfair to exclude reasonable citizens from policy debates merely because their only reasons are religious ones. This essay seeks to reconcile the intuitions behind these competing views. I examine Audi's account of the differences between religious and secular (...) reasons to determine why he believes religious reasons are inappropriate to justify coercive policies. Of the distinctions he discusses, only one -- religious reasons are often grounded in an infallible authority -- is relevant for distinguishing suitable from unsuitable policy justifications. I develop an alternative to Audi's account: Individuals should refrain from bringing reasons held to be infallibly true to policy debates. On this view, not all religious reasons will warrant exclusion, though some may. (shrink)

MacDougall has argued that Rawls’s liberal social theory suggests that parents who hold certain religious convictions can legitimately refuse blood transfusion on their children’s behalf. This paper argues that this is wrong for at least five reasons. First, MacDougall neglects the possibility that true freedom of conscience entails the right to choose one’s own religion rather than have it dictated by one’s parents. Second, he conveniently ignores the fact that children in such situations are much more likely to die than (...) to survive without blood. Third, he relies on an ambiguous understanding of what is "rational" and treats children as mere extensions of their parents. Fourth, he neglects the fact that those in the original position would seek to protect themselves from persecution and enslavement and thus would not allow groups of children to be killed because of their parents’ beliefs. Finally, Rawls makes it clear that we should choose for children as we would choose for ourselves in the original position, with no particular conception of the good (such as that held by Jehovah’s Witnesses). (shrink)

There are many books on the market about religion in American thought and history, but the idea for a collection of essays focused directly upon pragmatist reconstructions of religious belief and sentiment is overdue. Stuart Rosenbaum’s reader admirably fills this need, and is bound to bring fresh insights to students and advanced researchers alike.