This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

35 found
Order:
  1. added 2020-06-02
    Frege, as-If Platonism, and Pragmatism.Robert Arp - 2005 - Journal of Critical Realism 4 (1):1-27.
    This paper is divided into two main sections. In the first, I attempt to show that the characterization of Frege as a redundancy theorist is not accurate. Using one of Wolfgang Carl's recent works as a foil, I argue that Frege countenances a realm of abstract objects including truth, and that Frege's Platonist commitments inform his epistemology and embolden his antipsychologistic project. In the second section, contrasting Frege's Platonism with pragmatism, I show that even though Frege's metaphysical position concerning truth (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2. added 2020-05-31
    Burge's Literal Interpretation of Frege.Joan Weiner - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):585-597.
  3. added 2020-05-29
    II. Frege as Idealist and Then Realist.Michael D. Resnik - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):350-357.
    Michael Dummett argued that Frege was a realist while Hans Sluga countered that he was an objective idealist in the rationalist tradition of Kant and Lotze. Sluga ties Frege's idealism to the context principle which he argues Frege never gave up. It is argued that Sluga has correctly interpreted the pre?1891 Frege while Dummett is correct concerning the later period. It is also claimed that the context principle was dropped prior to 1891 to be replaced by the doctrine of unsaturated (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4. added 2020-05-29
    I. Frege as a Realist.Michael Dummett - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):455-468.
    H. Sluga (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975], No. 4) has criticized me for representing Frege as a realist. He holds that, for Frege, abstract objects were not real: this rests on a mistranslation and a neglect of Frege's contextual principle. The latter has two aspects: as a thesis about sense, and as one about reference. It is only under the latter aspect that there is any tension between it and realism: Frege's later silence about the principle is due, not to his (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. added 2020-05-26
    Frege, Carnap, and Explication: ‘Our Concern Here Is to Arrive at a Concept of Number Usable for the Purpose of Science’.Gregory Lavers - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):225-41.
    This paper argues that Carnap both did not view and should not have viewed Frege's project in the foundations of mathematics as misguided metaphysics. The reason for this is that Frege's project was to give an explication of number in a very Carnapian sense — something that was not lost on Carnap. Furthermore, Frege gives pragmatic justification for the basic features of his system, especially where there are ontological considerations. It will be argued that even on the question of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. added 2020-05-26
    Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. [REVIEW]Hartry Field - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):637-662.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. added 2020-05-22
    Frege's Definition of Number: No Ontological Agenda?Edward Kanterian - 2010 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 54 (4):76-92.
    Joan Weiner has argued that Frege’s definitions of numbers constitute linguistic stipulations that carry no ontological commitment: they don’t present numbers as pre-existing objects. This paper offers a critical discussion of this view, showing that it is vitiated by serious exegetical errors and that it saddles Frege’s project with insuperable substantive difficulties. It is first demonstrated that Weiner misrepresents the Fregean notions of so-called Foundations-content, and of sense, reference, and truth. The discussion then focuses on the role of definitions in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2020-05-22
    Was Frege a Platonist?Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer & W. P. Mendonça - 1987 - Ratio (Misc.) 29 (2):96-110.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Aberdeen University Press.
  10. added 2020-05-20
    Frege on Numbers: Beyond the Platonist Picture.Erich H. Reck - 2005 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (2):25-40.
    Gottlob Frege is often called a "platonist". In connection with his philosophy we can talk about platonism concerning three kinds of entities: numbers, or logical objects more generally; concepts, or functions more generally; thoughts, or senses more generally. I will only be concerned about the first of these three kinds here, in particular about the natural numbers. I will also focus mostly on Frege's corresponding remarks in The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), supplemented by a few asides on Basic Laws of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11. added 2020-05-20
    Platonism for Cheap? Crispin Wright on Frege's Context Principle.Hartry Field - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14:637--62.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  12. added 2020-05-20
    Frege's Theory of Numbers.Charles Parsons - 1965 - In M. Black (ed.), Philosophy in America. Cornell University Press. pp. 180-203.
  13. added 2020-05-18
    On Frege's Alleged Platonism.V. Kolman - 2000 - Filosoficky Casopis 48 (4):577-599.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2020-05-18
    Criteria of Abstractness. The Ontologies of Husserl, Frege and Strawson Against the Background of Classical Metaphysics.Wolfgang Künne - 1982 - In Barry Smith (ed.), Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology. Philosophia Verlag. pp. 401--437.
  15. added 2020-05-16
    Frege's Platonism.Bob Hale - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):225-241.
  16. added 2020-05-15
    Why and How Platonism?Guillermo Rosado Haddock - 2007 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 15 (5-6):621-636.
    Probably the best arguments for Platonism are those directed against its rival philosophies of mathematics. Frege's arguments against formalism, Gödel's arguments against constructivism and those against the so-called syntactic view of mathematics, and an argument of Hodges against Putnam are expounded, as well as some arguments of the author. A more general criticism of Quine's views follows. The paper ends with some thoughts on mathematics as a sort of Platonism of structures, as conceived by Husserl and essentially endorsed by the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. added 2020-05-13
    Individuating Abstract Objects: The Methodologies of Frege and Quine.Dirk Greimann - 2001 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 4.
    According to Frege, the introduction of a new sort of abstract object is methodologically sound only if its identity conditions have been satisfactorily explained. Ironically, this ontological restriction has come to be known by Quine's criticism of Frege's intensional semantics, as the precept "No entity without identity." The aim of the paper is to reconstruct Frege's methodology of the introduction of abstract objects in detail, and to defend it against the more restrictive methodology underlying Quine's criticism of the recognition of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2020-05-13
    Frege in Context.Delbert Pard Reed - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    In Part One of this dissertation I examine the relationship between reason and objectivity in Frege's thought, concentrating on the question of whether or not Frege should be interpreted as a platonist. By platonism I mean the view that objects such as numbers or propositions are objective, non-spatial and timeless, existing in a realm distinct from the external world of physical objects and the internal realm of the mind; and that statements about or involving such objects are true independently of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2020-05-13
    Frege's Notion of Logical Objects.Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino - 1996 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    In the dissertation I seek to clarify an aspect of Frege's thought that has been insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical object. It is well known that the core of Frege's philosophical enterprise up to Grundgesetze der Arithmetik was the reduction of arithmetic to logic. Since Frege regarded numbers as objects, logic must have an ontological basis, i.e., an adequate class of objects to which numbers are reducible. These objects are, for Frege, extensions of concepts and (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2020-05-12
    Was Frege a Realist? And, If so, in What Sense?Fred Wilson - 2014 - In Javier Cumpa, Greg Jesson & Guido Bonino (eds.), Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations. De Gruyter. pp. 141-196.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2020-05-12
    Frege, Objectivity, and the Three Realms.Carol Anne Mickett - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    For Frege the objective is independent of our inner world and the same for everyone. I argue that Frege's demand for objectivity is the result of his concern to make sense out of the practices of science. I point out that science, for Frege, requires agreement and purposeful disagreement among its participants. Without such interaction science reduces to useless, self-indulgent babble. It is the social nature of science that ushers in objectivity. I compare Frege's demand for objectivity with Locke's views (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2020-05-12
    WRIGHT, C.: "Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects". [REVIEW]A. Hazen - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:251.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. added 2020-05-10
    Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis.Nicholas Stang - 2019 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. Routledge. pp. 138–159.
    In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2020-05-10
    Why Frege Would Not Be a Neo‐Fregean.Marco Ruffino - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):51-78.
    In this paper, I seek to clarify an aspect of Frege's thought that has been only insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical objects. I adduce some elements of Frege's philosophy that elucidate why he saw extensions as natural candidates for paradigmatic cases of logical objects. Moreover, I argue (against the suggestion of some contemporary scholars, in particular, Wright and Boolos) that Frege could not have taken Hume's Principle instead of Axiom V as a fundamental law of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  25. added 2020-05-10
    Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. [REVIEW]Linda Wetzel - 1988 - Noûs 22 (1):147-149.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  26. added 2020-05-10
    Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. [REVIEW]Gregory Currie - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):475-479.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  27. added 2020-05-10
    Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. [REVIEW]Donald Gillies - 1984 - Mind 93 (372):613-617.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  28. added 2020-05-10
    WRIGHT, C. "Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects". [REVIEW]D. Gillies - 1984 - Mind 93:613.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2020-05-07
    Frege and Numbers as Self-Subsistent Objects.Gregory Lavers - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (16):97-118.
    En este artículo se argumenta que Frege noes el metafísico platónico sobre matemáticasq u e s e c o n s i d e r a n o r ma l me n t e . S emuestra que el proyecto fregeano tienedos etapas distintas: la identificación delo que es verdadero en nuestras nocionesordinarias, y luego la provisión de unaexplicación sistemática que comparte losaspectos identificados. Ninguna de estasetapas involucra mucha metafísica. Elartículo critica en detalle la interpretaciónque hace Dummett de l (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2020-05-07
    Our Knowledge of Numbers as Self-Subsistent Objects.William Demopoulos - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (2):141–159.
    A feature of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic that has elicited a great deal of attention in the recent secondary literature is his contention that numbers are ‘self‐subsistent’ objects. The considerable interest in this thesis among the contemporary philosophy of mathematics community stands in marked contrast to Kreisel's folk‐lore observation that the central problem in the philosophy of mathematics is not the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematics. Although Frege was undoubtedly concerned with both questions, a goal of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  31. added 2020-05-07
    Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. [REVIEW]John P. Burgess - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (4):638-640.
  32. added 2020-05-05
    Natural Numbers and Natural Cardinals as Abstract Objects: A Partial Reconstruction of Frege"s Grundgesetze in Object Theory.Edward N. Zalta - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):619-660.
    In this paper, the author derives the Dedekind-Peano axioms for number theory from a consistent and general metaphysical theory of abstract objects. The derivation makes no appeal to primitive mathematical notions, implicit definitions, or a principle of infinity. The theorems proved constitute an important subset of the numbered propositions found in Frege's *Grundgesetze*. The proofs of the theorems reconstruct Frege's derivations, with the exception of the claim that every number has a successor, which is derived from a modal axiom that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  33. added 2020-05-05
    Realism Bei Frege: Reply to Burge.Joan Weiner - 1995 - Synthese 102 (3):363 - 382.
    Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments and our thoughts; that there is a third realm containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. Until recently, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for most philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explication unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of several revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  34. added 2020-05-05
    Frege on Knowing the Third Realm.Tyler Burge - 1992 - Mind 101 (404):633-650.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  35. added 2020-05-03
    L’Existence des Objets Logiques Selon Frege.François Rivenc - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (2):291-320.
    Un trait du langage qui menace de saper la sûreté de la pensée est sa tendance à former des noms propres auxquels aucun objet ne correspond. [...] Un exemple particulièrement remarquable de cela est la formation d’un nom propre selon le schéma «l’extension du concept a», par exemple «l’extension du concept étoile». À cause de l’article défini, cette expression semble désigner un objet; mais il n’y a aucun objet pour lequel cette expression pour-rait être une désignation appropriée. De là les (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark