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  1. On Frege's Supposed Hierarchy of Senses.Nicholas Georgalis - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues against the claim that Frege is committed to an infinite hierarchy of senses. Carnap and Kripke, along with many others, argue the contrary; I expose where all such arguments go astray. Invariably these arguments assume (without citation) that Frege holds that sense and reference are always distinct. This is the fulcrum upon which the hierarchy is hoisted. The counter to this assumption is based on two important but neglected passages. The locution ‘indirect sense’ has no ontological significance (...)
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  2. Frege’s Bedeutung.Jonas Dagys - 2020 - Problemos 97.
    The article raises the question what is the content of Frege’s infamous notion of Bedeutung? It is claimed that the so–called standard interpretation of this notion – Bedeutung as referential relation between a name and an object – was developed and established evaluating Frege’s ideas in philosophy of language in isolation from his logicist ideas. However, precisely his logicist concerns have motivated Frege’s interest in semantic issues. A broader consideration of Frege’s works reveals an internalist and rationalist notion of meaning, (...)
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  3. Indicating a Translation for ‘Bedeutung’.Karen Green - 2019 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (2):114-127.
    The translation of both ‘bedeuten’ and ‘Bedeutung’ in Frege's works remains sufficiently problematic that some contemporary authors prefer to leave these words untranslated. Here a case is made for returning to Russell's initial choice of ‘to indicate’ and ‘indication’ as better alternatives than the more usual ‘meaning’, ‘reference’, or ‘denotation’. It is argued that this choice has the philosophical payoff that Frege's controversial doctrines concerning the semantic values of sentences and predicative expressions are rendered far more comprehensible by it, and (...)
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  4. Semantics with Only One Bedeutung.Sergey Pavlov - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:81-85.
    The modification of Frege's semantics that consists in using only one reference (Bedeutung, denotate) truth instead of two references truth and falsity is proposed. According to Frege 1) every true sentence stands for truth, 2) every false sentence stands for falsity. We modify the second statement: 2*) every false sentence doesn't stand for truth. The modification of sentential logic interpretation will consist in change of semantic rules: a) every formula A stands either for truth or falsity, b.1) the formula A (...)
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  5. Referentiality in Frege and Heidegger.Barbara Fultner - 2005 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (1):37-52.
    A juxtaposition of Frege’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of reference (Bedeutung and Verweisung) shows them to be complementary. The thesis that meaning determines reference has been attributed to both Frege and Heidegger. Contrary to the view that this commits them to linguistic idealism, I defend a weak version of the determination thesis according to which both Fregean and Heideggerian reference allow for the possibility of error and for the objectivity of discourse. Thus, what we refer to is accessible to us only (...)
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  6. Frege's Proof of Referentiality.Øystein Linnebo - 2004 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 45 (2):73-98.
    I present a novel interpretation of Frege’s attempt at Grundgesetze I §§29-31 to prove that every expression of his language has a unique reference. I argue that Frege’s proof is based on a contextual account of reference, similar to but more sophisticated than that enshrined in his famous Context Principle. Although Frege’s proof is incorrect, I argue that the account of reference on which it is based is of potential philosophical value, and I analyze the class of cases to which (...)
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  7. Frege’s ‘Bedeutung’ and Mill’s ‘Denotatlon’.Michael Losonsky - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1):139-145.
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  8. Frege’s ‘Bedeutung’ and Mill’s ‘Denotatlon’.Michael Losonsky - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1):139-145.
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  9. Bolzano, Frege and Husserl on Reference and Object.Dagfinn Føllesdal - 2001 - In Juliet Floyd & Sanford Shieh (eds.), Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 67-80.
  10. Was Frege Wrong When Identifying Reference with Truth-Value?Jean-Yves Béziau - 1999 - Sorites 11:15-23.
    We discuss Sengupta's argumentation according to which Frege was wrong identifying reference with truth-value.After stating various possible interpretations of Frege's principle of substitution, we show that there is no coherent interpretation under which Sengupta's argumentation is valid.Finally we try to show how Frege's distinction can work in the context of modern mathematics and how modern logic grasps it.
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  11. Davidson, Correspondence Truth and the Frege-Gödel-Church Argument.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Manuel Otero - 1998 - History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (2):63-81.
    This paper argues for a conditional claim concerning a famous argument—developed by Church in elucidation of some remarks by Frege to the effect that the bedeutung of a sentence is the sentence's truth-value—the Frege-Gödel-Church argument, or FGC for short. The point we make is this :if, and just to the extent that, Arthur Smullyan's argument against Quine's use of FGC is sound, then essentially the same rejoinder disposes also of Davidson's use of FGC against 'correspondence' theories of truth. We thus (...)
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  12. Davidson, Correspondence Truth and the Frege-Gödel—Church Argument.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Manuel Pérez Otero - 1998 - History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (2):63-81.
    This paper argues for a conditional claim concerning a famous argument?developed by Church in elucidation of some remarks by Frege to the effect that the bedeutung of a sentence is the sentence?s truth-value?the Frege?Gödel?Church argument, or FGC for short. The point we make is this :if, and just to the extent that, Arthur Smullyan?s argument against Quine's use of FGC is sound, then essentially the same rejoinder disposes also of Davidson's use of FGC against ?correspondence? theories of truth. We thus (...)
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  13. El Argumento de la Identidad Y la Nominación de Funciones En Frege (the Argument on Identity Statements and the Problem of Referring to Functions in Frege's Philosophy).Pedro Ramos - 1997 - Theoria 12 (2):293-315.
    En este articulo relaciono dos asuntos que no se relacionan comunmente en la literatura sobre Frege: el argumento de Frege sobre la interpretacion de las oraciones de identidad y su problema de referirse a las funciones. Primero expongo el argumento y concluyo que es plausible. Luego caracterizo las relaciones semanticas que el argumento le permite introducir. A continuacion trato el problema antes mencionado y muestro corno afecta a la semantica de Frege: esas relaciones semanticas se vuelven innominables y, por tanto, (...)
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  14. The Sense of `a Name of a Truth-Value'.Peter M. Sullivan - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):476-481.
  15. Frege on Truth and Reference.Palle Yourgrau - 1987 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (1):132-138.
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  16. XI—The Path Back to Frege.Palle Yourgrau - 1987 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1):169-210.
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  17. Frege's Proof of Referentiality.Michael D. Resnik - 1986 - In L. Haaparanta & J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized. D. Reidel Publishing Co.. pp. 177--195.
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  18. Fregean Connection: Bedeutung, Value and Truth-Value.Gottfried Gabriel - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):372-376.
    It is shown how frege's problematic connection between truth-Value and "bedeutung" (of a sentence) becomes more plausible when set against the background of german language and philosophy, Especially by comparing frege's position with the value-Theoretical school of neo-Kantianism (w windelband).
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  19. Frege's Theory of Reference.Andrew Rein - 1984
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  20. Die Bedeutung von Bedeutung Bei Frege. Ein Philologischer Essay.E. Holenstein - 1983 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 17 (40-41):65-74.
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  21. Referentiality in Frege's Grundgesetze.Martin Edward - 1982 - History and Philosophy of Logic 3 (2):151-164.
    In §§28-31 of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Frege forwards a demonstration that every correctly formed name of his formal language has a reference. Examination of this demonstration, it is here argued, reveals an incompleteness in a procedure of contextual definition. At the heart of this incompleteness is a difference between Frege's criteria of referentiality and the possession of reference as it is ordinarily conceived. This difference relates to the distinction between objectual and substitutional quantification and Frege?s vacillation between the two.
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  22. Frege and the Determination of Reference.Gilead Bar-Elli - 1981 - Erkenntnis 16 (1):137 - 160.
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  23. On the Translation of Frege's "Bedeutung".David Bell & Alonso Church - 1980 - Analysis 40 (4):191.
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  24. On the Translation of Frege's "Bedeutung": A Reply to Dr Bell.Peter Long & Alonso Church - 1980 - Analysis 40 (4):196.
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  25. On the Translation of Frege's Bedeutung: A Reply to Dr. Bell.Peter Long & Roger White - 1980 - Analysis 40 (4):196 - 202.
    A defense of the translation of "bedeutung" by "meaning" in frege's "posthumous writings" (blackwell 1979). Objections made to such renderings as 'denotation' and 'reference'.
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  26. Frege and Husserl: The Ontology of Reference.Barry Smith - 1978 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 9 (2):111–125.
    Analytic philosophers apply the term ‘object’ both to concreta and to abstracta of certain kinds. The theory of objects which this implies is shown to rest on a dichotomy between object-entities on the one hand and meaning-entities on the other, and it is suggested that the most adequate account of the latter is provided by Husserl’s theory of noemata. A two-story ontology of objects and meanings (concepts, classes) is defended, and Löwenheim’s work on class-representatives is cited as an indication of (...)
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  27. Redundancy and Frege's Chosen Object Theory.William Ulrich - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (3):313 - 319.
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  28. A Note on the Frege Argument.Colin McGinn - 1976 - Mind 85 (339):422-423.
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  29. Frege et les termes sans référence.Eike-Henner W. Kluge - 1975 - Dialogue 14 (2):254-280.
    Une propriété décisive du langage quant à la fiabilité de l'expression des pensées, est sa disposition à créer des noms propres auxquels ne correspond aucun objet. Cela n'a pas de conséquences sérieuses quand cela arrive dans la fiction que tout le monde comprend comme telle. Il n'en est pas de même quand cela arrive dans un exposé qui se prétend strictement scientifique. Un exemple particulièrement singulier est ici la formation de noms propres sur le modèle de «l'extension du concept ‘a’», (...)
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  30. On a Special Stipulation of Frege.R. D. Gallie - 1973 - Mind 82 (327):445-449.
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  31. 'Bedeutung' in Frege: A Reply.V. H. Dudman - 1972 - Analysis 33 (1):21 - 27.
    It is argued that it is a misinterpretation of frege to construe his talk of the bedeutungen of sentences and of predicates in an ontologically innocent way.
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  32. The Meaning of 'Bedeutung' in Frege.Ernst Tugendhat - 1970 - Analysis 30 (6):177 - 189.
    Frege's notion of 'bedeutung' (b.) is here interpreted not as the object for which an expression stands but as its truth-Value potential. This is achieved by beginning with the b. Of sentences and defining the b. Of names as that property of them which remains constant when they are substituted in sentences without a change in truth-Value. This interpretation is shown to receive confirmation from what frege says in a recently published manuscript about the b. Of predicates; finally, It is (...)
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