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  1. On Different Ways of Being Equal.Bruno Bentzen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    The aim of this paper is to present a constructive solution to Frege's puzzle (largely limited to the mathematical context) based on type theory. Two ways in which an equality statement may be said to have cognitive significance are distinguished. One concerns the mode of presentation of the equality, the other its mode of proof. Frege's distinction between sense and reference, which emphasizes the former aspect, cannot adequately explain the cognitive significance of equality statements unless a clear identity criterion for (...)
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  2. Kant, Frege, and the Normativity of Logic: MacFarlane 's Argument for Common Ground.Tyke Nunez - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    According to what was the standard view (Poincaré; Wang, etc.), although Frege endorses, and Kant denies, the claim that arithmetic is reducible to logic, there is not a substantive disagreement between them because their conceptions of logic are too different. In his “Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism,” John MacFarlane aims to establish that Frege and Kant do share enough of a conception of logic for this to be a substantive, adjudicable dispute. MacFarlane maintains that for both Frege and (...)
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  3. Are Rules of Inference Superfluous? Wittgenstein Vs. Frege and Russell.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):45-61.
    In Tractatus 5.132 Wittgenstein argues that inferential justification depends solely on the understanding of the premises and conclusion, and is not mediated by any further act. On this basis he argues that Frege’s and Russell’s rules of inference are “senseless” and “superfluous”. This line of argument is puzzling, since it is unclear that there could be any viable account of inference according to which no such mediation takes place. I show that Wittgenstein’s rejection of rules of inference can be motivated (...)
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  4. Sense, Reference, and Computation.Bruno Bentzen - 2020 - Perspectiva Filosófica 47 (2):179-203.
    In this paper, I revisit Frege's theory of sense and reference in the constructive setting of the meaning explanations of type theory, extending and sharpening a program–value analysis of sense and reference proposed by Martin-Löf building on previous work of Dummett. I propose a computational identity criterion for senses and argue that it validates what I see as the most plausible interpretation of Frege's equipollence principle for both sentences and singular terms. Before doing so, I examine Frege's implementation of his (...)
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  5. Extensions, Numbers and Frege’s Project of Logic as Universal Language.Nora Grigore - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (5):577-588.
    Frege’s famous definition of number famously uses the concept of “extension”. Extensions, in the Fregean framework, are susceptible to bringing many difficulties, and, some say, even paradoxes. Therefore, neo-logicist programs want to avoid the problems and to replace the classical Fregean definition of number with Hume’s Principle. I argue that this move, even if it makes sense from a computational point of view, is at odds with Frege’s larger philosophical project. For Frege, I claim, extensions were an important part of (...)
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  6. Extensions, Numbers and Frege’s Project of Logic as Universal Language.Nora Grigore - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (5):577-588.
    Frege’s famous definition of number famously uses the concept of “extension”. Extensions, in the Fregean framework, are susceptible to bringing many difficulties, and, some say, even paradoxes. Therefore, neo-logicist programs want to avoid the problems and to replace the classical Fregean definition of number with Hume’s Principle. I argue that this move, even if it makes sense from a computational point of view, is at odds with Frege’s larger philosophical project. For Frege, I claim, extensions were an important part of (...)
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  7. Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws.Jim Hutchinson - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy (2):1-18.
    Frege claims that the laws of logic are characterized by their “generality,” but it is hard to see how this could identify a special feature of those laws. I argue that we must understand this talk of generality in normative terms, but that what Frege says provides a normative demarcation of the logical laws only once we connect it with his thinking about truth and science. He means to be identifying the laws of logic as those that appear in every (...)
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  8. Formality of Logic and Frege’s Begriffsschrift.Daniele Mezzadri - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):182-207.
    This paper challenges a standard interpretation according to which Frege’s conception of logic (early and late) is at odds with the contemporary one, because on the latter’s view logic is formal, while on Frege’s view it is not, given that logic’s subject matter is reality’s most general features. I argue that Frege – in Begriffsschrift – retained the idea that logic is formal; Frege sees logic as providing the ‘logical cement’ that ties up together the contentful concepts of specific sciences, (...)
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  9. Freges Begriff der Logik.Tabea Rohr - 2019 - Paderborn: mentis.
    Frege ist bekannt für seinen Versuch, die Arithmetik aus der Logik herzuleiten. Doch welcher Begriff von Logik liegt diesem Projekt zugrunde? Wenn Logik die Grundlage der Arithmetik ist und die Arithmetik über Inhalte verfestigt, so muss die Logik selbst eine Wissenschaft mit eigenen Inhalten sein. Die Autorin zeigt, wie Frege logische Zeichen zu eigenständigen Begriffen aufwertet und dadurch eine inhaltliche Logikkonzeption überhaupt erst ermöglicht. In einem weiteren Schritt wird ein Kriterium vorgestellt, mit dessen Hilfe Frege logische Inhalte von den Inhalten (...)
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  10. Frege, the Normativity of Logic, and the Kantian Tradition.Anssi Korhonen - 2018 - In Gisela Bengtsson, Simo Säätelä & Alois Pichler (eds.), New Essays on Frege: Between Science and Literature. Springer. pp. 47-74.
    This paper considers the role of constitutivity and normativity in Frege’s conception of logic. It outlines an historical interpretation with two goals. First, it traces these concepts back to their origins in Kant’s philosophy. Second, it considers some of the different ways in which the issue of normativity and its proper grounding was addressed in the neo-Kantian tradition and in early analytic philosophy. Some neo-Kantians worked out an epistemic-normative conception of objective judgment, according to which the objectivity of cognition is (...)
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  11. Logic as Science.Robert May - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis, and History. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 113-160.
  12. Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):143-162.
    In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the (...)
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  13. Comments on Patricial Blanchette's Book: Frege's Conception of Logic. [REVIEW]Roy T. Cook - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (7).
    All contributions included in the present issue were originally presented at an ‘Author Meets Critics’ session organised by Richard Zach at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in San Diego in the Spring of 2014.
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  14. Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought I.Daniele Mezzadri - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):583-591.
    This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege ’s philosophy of logic. In Section 1 of Part I, I discuss Frege ’s view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking and is therefore a normative science. In Section 2, I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence, the (...)
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  15. Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought II.Daniele Mezzadri - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):592-600.
    This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege's philosophy of logic. In Section 1 of Part I, I discuss Frege's view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking and is therefore a normative science. In Section 2, I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence, the tension the (...)
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  16. Critical Remarks on Frege’s Conception of Logic by Patricia Blanchette. [REVIEW]Kai F. Wehmeier - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (7).
    All contributions included in the present issue were originally presented at an ‘Author Meets Critics’ session organised by Richard Zach at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in San Diego in the Spring of 2014.
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  17. Frege’s Conception of Logic by Patricia A. Blanchette. [REVIEW]Danielle Macbeth - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):176-177.
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  18. Patricia A. Blanchette. Frege's Conception of Logic. Oxford University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-0-19-926925-9 (Hbk). Pp. Xv + 256. [REVIEW]Roy T. Cook - 2013 - Philosophia Mathematica (1):nkt029.
  19. Frege's Conception of Logic. [REVIEW]Wolfgang Kienzler - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (4):396 - 399.
  20. Frege's Approach to the Foundations of Analysis (1874–1903).Matthias Schirn - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):266-292.
    The concept of quantity (Größe) plays a key role in Frege's theory of real numbers. Typically enough, he refers to this theory as ?theory of quantity? (?Größenlehre?) in the second volume of his opus magnum Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege 1903). In this essay, I deal, in a critical way, with Frege's treatment of the concept of quantity and his approach to analysis from the beginning of his academic career until Frege 1903. I begin with a few introductory remarks. In Section (...)
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  21. Frege's Conception of Logic.Patricia A. Blanchette - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    In Frege's Conception of Logic Patricia A. Blanchette explores the relationship between Gottlob Frege's understanding of conceptual analysis and his understanding of logic.
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  22. Language and Logic in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Daniele Mezzadri - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
    This thesis discusses some central aspects of Wittgenstein's conception of language and logic in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and brings them into relation with the philosophies of Frege and Russell. The main contention is that a fruitful way of understanding the Tractatus is to see it as responding to tensions in Frege's conception of logic and Russell's theory of judgement. In the thesis the philosophy of the Tractatus is presented as developing from these two strands of criticism and thus as the (...)
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  23. Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on "the Essence of Logic".William W. Taschek - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):375-401.
    In the opening to his late essay, Der Gedanke, Frege asserts without qualification that the word "true" points the way for logic. But in a short piece from his Nachlass entitled "My Basic Logical Insights", Frege writes that the word true makes an unsuccessful attempt to point to the essence of logic, asserting instead that "what really pertains to logic lies not in the word "true" but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered". Properly understanding what Frege (...)
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  24. Review of “Frege's Logic”. [REVIEW]A. M. Ungar - 2008 - Essays in Philosophy 9 (2):1.
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  25. D. Macbeth, Frege's Logic. [REVIEW]N. B. Goethe - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (3):496-498.
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  26. Frege’s Logic. [REVIEW]Dale Jacquette - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):609-631.
    This is an engaging, controversial, and refreshingly well-written book about Frege’s logic from the Begriffsschrift to the Grundgesetze. Danielle Macbeth explains Frege’s complicated two-dimensional logical notation more patiently, accurately, and with a greater variety of examples than I have previously seen. She does so, moreover, not merely by relating Frege’s innovations to the linear Principia Mathematica style logical symbolism that most logicians these days take for granted, but by delving into the deeper reasons why Frege choose to represent logical relations (...)
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  27. Frege’s Logic. [REVIEW]Dale Jacquette - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):609-631.
    This is an engaging, controversial, and refreshingly well-written book about Frege’s logic from the Begriffsschrift to the Grundgesetze. Danielle Macbeth explains Frege’s complicated two-dimensional logical notation more patiently, accurately, and with a greater variety of examples than I have previously seen. She does so, moreover, not merely by relating Frege’s innovations to the linear Principia Mathematica style logical symbolism that most logicians these days take for granted, but by delving into the deeper reasons why Frege choose to represent logical relations (...)
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  28. Frege’s Logic.Danielle Macbeth - 2005 - Harvard University Press.
    The most enlightening examination to date of the developments of Frege's thinking about his logic, this book introduces a new kind of logical language, one that ...
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  29. Metatheory and Mathematical Practice in Frege.Jamie Tappenden - 2005 - In Michael Beaney & Erich H. Reck (eds.), Gottlob Frege: Critical assessments of leading philosophers, Vol. II. New York: pp. 190-228.
    A cluster of recent papers on Frege have urged variations on the themethat Frege’s conception of logic is in some crucial way incompatible with‘metatheoretic’ investigation. From this observation, significant consequencesfor our interpretation of Frege’s understanding of his enterprise are taken tofollow. This chapter aims to critically examine this view, and to isolate whatI take to be the core of truth in it. However, I will also argue that once wehave isolated the defensible kernel, the sense in which Frege was committedto (...)
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  30. Frege's Logic.Peter M. Sullivan - 2004 - In Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Akihiro Kanamori (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier. pp. 659-750.
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  31. Frege and the Idea of Formal Language.Taskashi Iida - 2003 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 12 (1):15-23.
  32. Frege's Conception of Logic: From Kant to Grundgesetze.Øystein Linnebo - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):235-252.
    I shall make two main claims. My first main claim is that Frege started out with a view of logic that is closer to Kant’s than is generally recognized, but that he gradually came to reject this Kantian view, or at least totally to transform it. My second main claim concerns Frege’s reasons for distancing himself from the Kantian conception of logic. It is natural to speculate that this change in Frege’s view of logic may have been spurred by a (...)
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  33. What is a Begriffsschrift?Jonathan Barnes - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (1):65–80.
    Before Frege, the term Begriffsschrift'was used to indicate a language the expressions of which adequately represent the structure of the judgements or concepts which they signify, and a language the written signs of which designate ideas rather than sounds. In 1879 Frege follows . Later he adopts —and with it the Aristotelian theory of language in which it is embedded.
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  34. Frege's Conception of Logic.Warren Goldfarb - 2001 - In Juliet Floyd (ed.), Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-41.
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  35. Frege's Notions of Self-Evidence.Robin Jeshion - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):937-976.
    Controversy remains over exactly why Frege aimed to estabish logicism. In this essay, I argue that the most influential interpretations of Frege's motivations fall short because they misunderstand or neglect Frege's claims that axioms must be self-evident. I offer an interpretation of his appeals to self-evidence and attempt to show that they reveal a previously overlooked motivation for establishing logicism, one which has roots in the Euclidean rationalist tradition. More specifically, my view is that Frege had two notions of self-evidence. (...)
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  36. Propositions and Reasoning in Russell and Frege.Gary Kemp - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):218–235.
    Both Russell and Frege were inclined to think that there is nothing essentially linguistic about thought: any actual reliance of ours upon language is a mere psychological contingency. If so then it should be possible to formulate logic in such a way that logical relationships are not represented or expressed as principles pertaining to linguistic forms. Russell and Frege take pains to achieve this, but fail. I explain this by looking at some features of Grundgesetz and Principia . Their failure, (...)
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  37. The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's Logic.Marco Ruffino - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 56 (1):73-90.
    The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis (i.e., the assumption that judgeable contents are prior to concepts) does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.
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  38. The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's Logic.Marco Ruffino - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 56 (1):73-90.
    The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.
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  39. Metatheory and Mathematical Practice in Frege.Jamie Tappenden - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (2):213-264.
    A cluster of recent papers on Frege have urged variations on the theme that Frege’s conception of logic is in some crucial way incompatible with ‘metatheoretic’ investigation. From this observation, significant consequences for our interpretation of Frege’s understanding of his enterprise are taken to follow. This chapter aims to critically examine this view, and to isolate what I take to be the core of truth in it. However, I will also argue that once we have isolated the defensible kernel, the (...)
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  40. Remarks on Frege's Conception of Inference.Gregory Currie - 1987 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (1):55-68.
  41. Frege's Early Conception of Logic.G. Bar-Elli - 1985 - Epistemologia 8 (1):125-40.
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  42. What Does a Concept Script Do?Cora Diamond - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):343-368.
  43. Frege's Realist Theory of Knowledge: The Construction of an Ideal Language and the Transformation of the Subject.Richard Eldridge - 1982 - Review of Metaphysics 35 (3):483 - 508.
    BY THE middle of the nineteenth century, serious difficulties in carrying out the Cartesian project of explaining through attention to our ideas how we may know things as they really are had become evident. A satisfactory account of the connection between occurrences of ideas in us and the properties of things apart from our ideas of them, an account promised by Descartes in the Meditations, had not been forthcoming. Descartes' claim that God's omnipotence guarantees that the members of some recognizable (...)
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