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  1. added 2020-05-20
    Frege, the Identity of Sinn and Carnap's Intension.I. Hanzel - 2006 - History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (3):229-247.
    The paper analyses Frege's approach to the identity conditions for the entity labelled by him as Sinn. It starts with a brief characterization of the main principles of Frege's semantics and lists his remarks on the identity conditions for Sinn. They are subject to a detailed scrutiny, and it is shown that, with the exception of the criterion of intersubstitutability in oratio obliqua, all other criteria have to be discarded. Finally, by comparing Frege's views on Sinn with Carnap's method of (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-15
    Slicing Thoughts.Vojislav Bozickovic - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):3-13.
    According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different if it is at the same time possible for a rational subject to take conflicting epistemic attitudes toward them. But applying this criterion to perception-based demonstrative thoughts seems to slice thoughts too finely and lead to their proliferation which makes the criterion implausible. I argue that such a proliferation of thoughts is blocked by transforming this criterion into a related one that is shown to be (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-13
    Some Aspects of Meaning in Non-Contingent Language.John Francis Horty - 1986 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Frege's writings on meaning are often interpreted within the framework of possible worlds semantics. The resulting theories rely on contingency to account for a variety of linguistic phenomena, such as the behavior of expressions in propositional attitude contexts, or the idea that a definition might fix the reference of an expression without establishing its meaning. In this thesis, I interpret Frege's ideas within a different framework, to provide a semantic theory that is able to account for some of these same (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-08
    Proof-Theoretical Semantics and Fregean Identity Criteria for Propositions.Göran Sundholm - 1994 - The Monist 77 (3):294-314.
    In his Grundgesetze, §32, Frege launched the idea that the meaning of a sentence is given by its truth condition, or, in his particular version, the condition under which it will be a name of the True. This, indeed, was only one of the many roles in which truth has to serve within the Fregean system. In particular, truth is an absolute notion in the sense that bivalence holds: every Gedanke is either true or false, in complete independence of any (...)
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  5. added 2020-05-08
    Frege on Sense Identity.J. Van Heijenoort - 1977 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):103-108.
  6. added 2020-05-05
    Frege on the Individuation of Thoughts.Leora Weitzman - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (3):563-574.
    It is easy to think of Frege as having offered two unintentionally discordant criteria for the identity of senses—one tied to the truth conditions of sentences, and one meant to capture relations of cognitive discriminability. This reading, however, is doubly mistaken; the discord between these two ways of thinking of senses has a Fregean resolution, but neither the resolution nor either of the original two pictures affords a genuine criterion for the identity of senses.
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  7. added 2020-05-04
    On Frege's Two Notions of Sense.Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock - 1986 - History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (1):31-41.
    Frege had not one but two different notions of sense, namely, that of ?Über Sinn und Bedeutung? and one implicit in a letter to Husserl of 1906 and elsewhere. This last one originates in Frege's notion of conceptual content. The distinction is used to clarify some obscurities in Frege's thought. In the last section a sort of ?explicans? of Frege's notion of conceptual content is introduced and applied to the semantic analysis of mathematics.
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  8. added 2020-05-03
    Frege’s Recognition Criterion for Thoughts and its Problems.Mark Textor - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2677-2696.
    According to Frege, we need a criterion for recognising when different sentences express the same thought to make progress in logic. He himself hedged his own equipollence criterion with a number of provisos. In the literature on Frege, little attention has been paid to the problems these provisos raise. In this paper, I will argue that Fregeans have ignored these provisos at their peril. For without these provisos, Frege’s criterion yields wrong results; but with the provisos in place, it is (...)
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  9. added 2020-05-03
    Frege on Sense Identity, Basic Law V, and Analysis.Philip A. Ebert - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):9-29.
    The paper challenges a widely held interpretation of Frege's conception of logic on which the constituent clauses of basic law V have the same sense. I argue against this interpretation by first carefully looking at the development of Frege's thoughts in Grundlagen with respect to the status of abstraction principles. In doing so, I put forth a new interpretation of Grundlagen §64 and Frege's idea of ‘recarving of content’. I then argue that there is strong evidence in Grundgesetze that Frege (...)
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  10. added 2020-05-03
    Freges Kriterien der Sinngleichheit.Thorsten Sander - 2016 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98 (4):395-432.
    Frege's mature writings apparently contain two different criteria of sense identity. While in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892) and in "Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehren" (1906?) he seems to advocate a psychological criterion, his letter to Husserl of December 12, 1906 offers a thoroughly logical criterion of sense identity. It is argued that the latter proposal is not a "momentary aberration", but rather Frege's official criterion; his psychological criteria only serve as a way of illustrating questions of sense identity by (...)
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  11. added 2020-05-03
    Sameness of Fregean Sense.Susanna Schellenberg - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):163-175.
    This paper develops a criterion for sameness of Fregean senses. I consider three criteria: logical equivalence, intensional isomorphism, and epistemic equipollence. I reject the first two and argue for a version of the third.
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  12. added 2020-05-03
    Frege’s Criteria of Synonymy.Massimo Grassia - 2005 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):25-49.
    In §1 of this paper I will present the two criteria, which I will call respectively the coextensionality and the recognitional criteria of synonymy. An established tendency in the literature is to ascribe to Frege only the recognitional criterion, discounting the coextensionality criterion as inconsistent with some of his other views. My aim in the paper will be to contribute to the reversal of this tendency. First, I wish to show that the recognitional criterion is flawed in a way that (...)
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  13. added 2020-05-03
    Frege, Sense and Limited Rationality.Carlo Penco - 2003 - History of Modern Logic 9:53-65.
    In this paper, I will discuss a well-known oscillation in Frege’s conception of sense. My point is only partially concerned with his two different criteria of sense identity, and touches upon a more specific point: what happens if we apply Frege’s intuitive criterion for the difference of thoughts to logically equivalent sentences? I will try to make a schematic argument here that will preempt any endeavor to make Frege more coherent than he really is. In sections A and B, I (...)
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  14. added 2020-05-03
    Frege: Two Theses, Two Senses.Carlo Penco - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):87-109.
    One particular topic in the literature on Frege’s conception of sense relates to two apparently contradictory theses held by Frege: the isomorphism of thought and language on one hand and the expressibility of a thought by different sentences on the other. I will divide the paper into five sections. In (1) I introduce the problem of the tension in Frege’s thought. In (2) I discuss the main attempts to resolve the conflict between Frege’s two contradictory claims, showing what is wrong (...)
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  15. added 2020-05-03
    A Note on Dummett and Frege on Sense‐Identity.Eva Picard - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):69-80.
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