This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

14 found
Order:
  1. added 2020-05-31
    Un Examen de la Argumentación de Frege Contra la Definibilidad de la Verdad (an Examination of Frege's Argumentation Against the Definability of Truth).Moreno Luis Fernandez - 1996 - Theoria 11 (3):165-176.
    La argumentación de Frege contra la definibilidad de la verdad pretende mostrar que una definición de verdad es circular o nos involucra en un regreso al infinito. En la obra de Frege cabe distinguir dos nociones de verdad: la verdad expresada mediante el termine “verdadero” y la verdad expresada mediante la aserción. La argumentación de Frege no muestra que el términe “verdadero” sea indefinible, pero, si se acepta la concepción de Frege acerca de la aserción, de su argumentación, adecuadamente reformulada, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-05-20
    Has the Correspondence Theory of Truth Been Refuted? From Gottlob Frege to Donald Davidson.Lorenz Krüger - 1995 - European Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):157-172.
  3. added 2020-05-17
    Primitive Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):503-519.
    Conceptual primitivism is the view that truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts. It cannot be defined, analyzed, or reduced into concepts that are more fundamental. Primitivism is opposed to both traditional attempts at defining truth (in terms of correspondence, coherence, or utility) and deflationary theories that argue that the notion of truth is exhausted by means of the truth schema. Though primitivism might be thought of as a view of last resort, I believe that the view is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2020-05-17
    Frege, Moore, Davidson: The Indefinability of Truth.Thomas Baldwin - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (2):1-18.
  5. added 2020-05-17
    Die Undefinierbarkeit der Wahrheit bei Frege.Luis Fernández Moreno - 1996 - Dialectica 50 (1):25-35.
    Dieser Aufsatz befasst sich mit Freges Argumentation gegen die Definierbarkeit der Wahrheit. Ich unterscheide in Freges Argumentation zwei Einwände. Der erste Einwand zielt darauf ab zu zeigen, dass eine Wahrheitsdefinition zirkulär ist; nach dem zweiten Einwand verwickelt uns eine Wahrheitsdefinition in einen unendlichen Regress. Die meisten Autoren, die sich mit Freges Argumentation auseinandergesetzt haben, haben sich hauptsachlich mit diesem zweiten Einwand beschäftigt und ihn als unzutreffend abgelehnt. Nachdem ich Freges Argumentation und die übliche Erwiderung darauf dargestellt und systematisiert habe, untersuche (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2020-05-17
    Frege's Regress.Peter Carruthers - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:17 - 32.
    In his essay 'Thoughts',' Frege is to be found employing a regress-argument against the correspondence theory of truth. He seems to have felt that the argument is not only completely destructive of the correspondence theory, but that it could be deployed equally well against any attempt to provide a general definition of the notion of truth. In my view neither conclusion is warranted. But Frege's Regress can, nevertheless, be developed into an argument of the greatest significance.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. added 2020-05-15
    A crítica de Frege a teoria da verdade como correspondência.Kariel Antonio Giarolo - 2013 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 18 (2):135-166.
    This paper has as main objective present and discuss Gottlob Frege critic to the attempt to define the concept of truth, especially, the attempt to define of truth as correspondence. The correspondence theories of truth sustain that truth can be defined in terms of correspondence between sentences, propositions or true thoughts and facts. However, in his posthumous writing Logic (1897) and, after, in The Thought (1918), Frege presents a severe critic to this kind of approach. He holds that truth is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2020-05-10
    Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth: An Introduction to the Practice of Interpreting Philosophical Texts.Ulrich Pardey - 2012 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book has two objectives: to be a contribution to the understanding of Frege's theory of truth – especially a defence of his notorious critique of the correspondence theory - and to be an introduction to the practice of interpreting philosophical texts.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2020-05-08
    Frege on the Indefinability of Truth.Hans Sluga - 2002 - In Erich H. Reck (ed.), From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  10. added 2020-05-07
    Freges Kritik an der Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit.Ulrich Pardey - 2004 - Paderborn: mentis.
    Gottlob Frege ist der Begründer der modernen Logik und Sprachanalyse, seine Schriften gelten "wegen ihrer vorbildlichen Klarheit und ihres Scharfsinns [als] eine außerordentlich anregende Lektüre" (Kutschera) und seine philosophische Bedeutung wird in der "Vorbildlichkeit seiner Argumentationsweise" (Patzig) gesehen. In seinem berühmten Aufsatz "Der Gedanke" kritisiert Frege im dritten Absatz die Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit und kommt dabei zu dem Ergebnis, dass nicht nur der "Versuch, die Wahrheit als eine Übereinstimmung zu erklären", scheitere, sondern auch "jeder andere Versuch, das Wahrsein zu definieren." (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2020-05-07
    Freges These der Undefinierbarkeit von Wahrheit.Dirk Greimann - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 47 (1):77-114.
    Der erste Teil des Aufsatzes untersucht den Inhalt der These. Im Zentrum steht dabei die Frage, was Frege unter ,,Wahrheit" versteht. Das Ergebnis der Untersuchung ist, daß Freges Undefinierbarkeitsthese (entgegen der üblichen Auffassung) sich nicht auf den „Inhalt des Wortes ,wahr'" (bzw. auf das Wahrheitsprädikat) bezieht, sondern auf „die Wahrheit, deren Anerkennung in der Form des Behauptungssatzes liegt" (bzw. auf den Urteilsstrich. Das Kernstück des zweiten Teils der Arbeit ist eine Rekonstruktion der Argumente Freges für die These in drei Versionen. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2020-05-06
    Why Frege Thought It to Be "Probable" That Truth is Indefinable.Markus Stepanians - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):331-345.
    Frege’s so-called “Regress Argument” is closely examined and it is argued that Dummett’s reconstruction of it is not satisfactory. Contra Dummett, the argument does not involve a regress, is not a reductio and not even a strictly deductive argument. Rather, what Frege tries to show is that any attempt to define truth fails to be epistemically fruitful and thus misses the very point of analytic definitions of concepts. The cause of this epistemic sterility is an inherent circularity, and it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. added 2020-05-04
    Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14. added 2020-05-03
    The Circularity Reading of Frege's Indefinability Argument.Junyeol Kim - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper criticizes the circularity reading of Frege's argument for the indefinability of truth. According to this reading, Frege is appealing to a sort of circularity in the argument. I argue that the circularity reading is interpretatively incorrect, or makes Frege's argument a non‐starter.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark