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  1. added 2020-05-30
    Frege, the Proliferation of Force, and Non-Cognitivism.S. L. Hurley - 1984 - Mind 93 (372):570-576.
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  2. added 2020-05-24
    Semantic Deflationism and the Frege Point.Huw Price - 1994 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. Routledge.
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  3. added 2020-05-17
    On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning.Mitchell S. Green - 1997 - Mind 106 (422):217-243.
    Frege and many following him, such as Dummett, Geach, Stenius and Hare, have envisaged a role for illocutionary force indicators in a logically perpspicuous notation. Davidson has denied that such expressions are even possible on the ground that any putative force indicator would be used by actors and jokers to heighten the drama of their performances. Davidson infers from this objection a Thesis of the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning: symbolic representation necessarily breaks any close tie with extra-linguistic purpose. A modified (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-15
    Frege, Semantics, and the Double Definition Stroke.Juliet Floyd - 1998 - In Anat Biletzki & Anat Matar (eds.), The Story of Analytic Philosophy: Plot and Heroes. Routledge. pp. 141-166.
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  5. added 2020-05-08
    Frege on Negative Judgement and Assertion.Dirk Greimann - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):409-428.
    ABSTRACT In “Die Verneinung”, Frege discusses two types of negation, a semantic one and a pragmatic one. Semantic negation consists in the application of the logical function denoted by ‘it is false that p’ to a thought, and pragmatic negation in the act of asserting or judging a thought as false. According to the standard interpretation, Frege does not acknowledge pragmatic negation, because it is logically redundant. He therefore rejects the classical dualistic view that both truth and falsity are qualities (...)
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  6. added 2020-05-07
    Frege on Assertion.V. H. Dudman - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):61-64.
    It is urged (1) that geach is correct in his claim ("assertion", "philosophical review", 74, (1965), Page 449) that what he calls 'the frege point' is logically independent of frege's doctrine that sentences are names of objects, And (2) that frege's 'propositions of begriffsschrift' are neither truths nor falsehoods.
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  7. added 2020-05-06
    Frege und Husserl über Urteilen und Denken.Markus Stepanians - 1998 - Paderborn: Schöningh.
  8. added 2020-05-05
    Frege on Truth, Assertoric Force and the Essence of Logic.Dirk Greimann - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):272-288.
    In a posthumous text written in 1915, Frege makes some puzzling remarks about the essence of logic, arguing that the essence of logic is indicated, properly speaking, not by the word ‘true’, but by the assertoric force. William Taschek has recently shown that these remarks, which have received only little attention, are very important for understanding Frege's conception of logic. On Taschek's reconstruction, Frege characterizes logic in terms of assertoric force in order to stress the normative role that the logical (...)
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  9. added 2020-05-04
    The Force and the Content of Judgment.Sebastian Rödl - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  10. added 2020-05-04
    Wittgenstein and Frege on Assertion.Christoph C. Pfisterer - 2019 - In Paul Weingartner Gabriele M. Mras (ed.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin, Germany: pp. 169–182.
    In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously criticizes Frege’s conception of assertion. “Frege’s opinion that every assertion contains an assumption”, says Wittgenstein, rests on the possibility of parsing every assertoric sentence into two components: one expressing the assumption that is put forward for assertion, the other expressing that it is asserted. But this possibility does not entail that the “assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting” - any more than the possibility of rendering assertions as pairs of questions and affirmative (...)
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  11. added 2020-05-04
    Frege on Judgement and the Judging Agent.Maria van der Schaar - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):225-250.
    How is Frege able to claim that the notion of judgement is essential to his logic without introducing a form of psychologism? I argue first that Frege’s logical notion of judgement is to be distinguished from an empirical notion of judgement, that it cannot be understood as an abstract, idealized notion, and that there are doubts concerning a transcendental reading of Frege’s writings. Then, I explain that the logical notion of judgement has to be understood from a first-person perspective, to (...)
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  12. added 2020-05-04
    Merely Entertaining a Thought, Judging and Asserting.Wolfgang Künne - 2013 - In Mark Textor (ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Palgrave. pp. 52.
  13. added 2020-05-03
    The Content–Force Distinction.Peter W. Hanks - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):141-164.
  14. added 2020-05-03
    Frege und Husserl über Urteilen und Denken.Markus S. Stepanias - 1998 - Paderborn: mentis.
  15. added 2020-05-02
    ‘The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing Between Content and Force.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    Recently, the content/force distinction has had a bad press. It has been argued that the distinction is not properly motivated and that it makes the problem of the unity of the proposition intracta...
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