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  1. Connotation and Frege's Semantic Dualism.Michael R. Hicks - 2019 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (4):377-398.
    The traditional distinction between Millian and Fregean theories of names presupposes that what Mill calls ‘connotation’ lines up with what Frege calls ‘sense.’ This presupposition is false. Mill’s talk of connotation is an attempt to bring into view the line of thought that crystallizes in Frege’s distinction between concept and object. This latter is the semantic dualism of my title.
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  2. Bradley, Frege and Relatedness.Francisco Rodríguez-Consuegra - 1999 - Bradley Studies 5 (2):113-125.
    I expose and discuss here the different arguments Bradley used against the tenability of relations as genuine entities, as well as the corresponding arguments against predicates, both in metaphysical and logical terms, and this always in the framework of his semantic general ideas on judgment and truth. Also, I have found useful to try to find similar arguments in Frege, in order to show that, no matter how different their respective goals and methods may have been, both philosophers tried to (...)
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  3. Husserl and Frege on Functions.Claire Ortiz Hill - 2016 - In Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (ed.), Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 89-118.
    Abstract: Groundwork is lain for answering questions as to how to situate Husserl’s theory of functions in relation to Frege’s. I examine Husserl’s ideas about analyticity and mathematics, logic and mathematics, formalization, calculating with concepts and propositions, the foundations of arithmetic, extensions to show that, although he knew, studied and lauded Frege’s ideas about functions and concepts, each man approached the issues from different angles. Seduced by the siren of transcendental phenomenology Husserl did not pursue the issues, implications, and consequences (...)
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  4. Russell And Frege On The Logic of Functions.Bernard Linsky - 2008 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4.
    I compare Russell’s theory of mathematical functions, the “descriptive functions” from Principia Mathematica ∗30, with Frege’s well known account of functions as “unsaturated” entities. Russell analyses functional terms with propositional functions and the theory of definite descriptions. This is the primary technical role of the theory of descriptions in P M. In Principles of Mathematics and some unpublished writings from before 1905, Russell offered explicit criticisms of Frege’s account of functions. Consequenly, the theory of descriptions in “On Denoting” can be (...)
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  5. A Pinch of Salt for Frege.Karen Green - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):209-228.
    Michael Dummett has argued that a formal semantics for our language is inadequate unless it can be shown to illuminate to our actual practice of speaking and understanding. This paper argues that Frege’s account of the semantics of predicate expressions according to which the reference of a predicate is a concept (a function from objects to truth values) has exactly the required characteristics. The first part of the paper develops a model for understanding the distinction between objects and concepts as (...)
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  6. The Kerry-Frege Debate About Object and Concept: Some Remarks on Kerry’s Position.Carlo Proietti - unknown
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  7. Frege's Distinction Between Concepts and Objects: A Descendant of Kant's Distinction Between Concepts and Intuitions.Teri Rae Merrick - 2004 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
    Gottlob Frege is a significant figure in the philosophy of mathematics and logic insofar as he is the founder of modern symbolic logic and the articulator of the key distinctions and problems that have come to define much of contemporary analytic philosophy. Frege's concept-object distinction plays a major role in underwriting his thesis that numbers must be objects of a particular kind. Fregean numbers are generally interpreted as archetypal abstract objects, demanding some explanation as to how we come to know (...)
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  8. The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's Logic.Marco Ruffino - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 56 (1):73-90.
    The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis (i.e., the assumption that judgeable contents are prior to concepts) does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.
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  9. Frege on Concepts as Functions: A Fundamental Ambiguity.Herbert Hochberg - 1971 - Theoria 37 (1):21-32.
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  10. Frege on Predication.Richard L. Mendelsohn - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):69-82.
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  11. Frege’s Use of Function-Argument Analysis and His Introduction of Truth-Values as Objects.Michael Beaney - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):93-123.
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  12. An Apparent Difficulty in Frege's Ontology.Charles E. Caton - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (4):462-475.
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  13. Frege's Metaphysical Argument.Gregory Currie - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):329-342.
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  14. Frege's Theory of Concepts and Objects and the Interpretation of Second-Order Logic.William Demopoulus & William Bell - 1993 - Philosophia Mathematica 1 (2):139-156.
    This paper casts doubt on a recent criticism of Frege's theory of concepts and extensions by showing that it misses one of Frege's most important contributions: the derivation of the infinity of the natural numbers. We show how this result may be incorporated into the conceptual structure of Zermelo- Fraenkel Set Theory. The paper clarifies the bearing of the development of the notion of a real-valued function on Frege's theory of concepts; it concludes with a brief discussion of the claim (...)
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  15. Frege on Functions: A Reply.Michael Dummett - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):96-107.
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  16. Frege's Ontology.Reinhardt Grossmann - 1961 - Philosophical Review 70 (1):23-40.
  17. Frege's Ontology.Howard Jackson - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (3):394-395.
  18. Frege's Theory of Number and the Distinction Between Function and Object.Michael Kremer - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (3):313 - 323.
  19. Frege's Theory of Functions and Objects.William Marshall - 1953 - Philosophical Review 62 (3):374-390.
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  20. El Argumento de la Identidad Y la Nominación de Funciones En Frege (the Argument on Identity Statements and the Problem of Referring to Functions in Frege's Philosophy).Pedro Ramos - 1997 - Theoria 12 (2):293-315.
    En este articulo relaciono dos asuntos que no se relacionan comunmente en la literatura sobre Frege: el argumento de Frege sobre la interpretacion de las oraciones de identidad y su problema de referirse a las funciones. Primero expongo el argumento y concluyo que es plausible. Luego caracterizo las relaciones semanticas que el argumento le permite introducir. A continuacion trato el problema antes mencionado y muestro corno afecta a la semantica de Frege: esas relaciones semanticas se vuelven innominables y, por tanto, (...)
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  21. Frege's Theory of Incomplete Entities.Michael David Resnik - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):329-341.
    This paper examines four arguments in support of Frege's theory of incomplete entities, the heart of his semantics and ontology. Two of these arguments are based upon Frege's contributions to the foundations of mathematics. These are shown to be question-begging. Two are based upon Frege's solution to the problem of the relation of language to thought and reality. They are metaphysical in nature and they force Frege to maintain a theory of types. The latter puts his theory of incomplete entities (...)
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  22. Concepts, Extensions, and Frege's Logicist Project.Matthias Schirn - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):983-1006.
    Although the notion of logical object plays a key role in Frege's foundational project, it has hardly been analyzed in depth so far. I argue that Marco Ruffino's attempt to fill this gap by establishing a close link between Frege's treatment of expressions of the form ‘the concept F’ and the privileged status Frege assigns to extensions of concepts as logical objects is bound to fail. I argue, in particular, that Frege's principal motive for introducing extensions into his logical theory (...)
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  23. 'Saturated' and 'Unsaturated': Frege and the Nyāya.J. L. Shaw - 1989 - Synthese 80 (3):373 - 394.
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  24. The Sense and Reference of Predicates: A Running Repair to Frege's Doctrine and a Plea for the Copula.David Wiggins - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):311-328.
Frege: The Concept Horse Problem
  1. The Concept Horse is a Concept.Ansten Klev - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):547-572.
    I offer an analysis of the sentence "the concept horse is a concept". It will be argued that the grammatical subject of this sentence, "the concept horse", indeed refers to a concept, and not to an object, as Frege once held. The argument is based on a criterion of proper-namehood according to which an expression is a proper name if it is so rendered in Frege's ideography. The predicate "is a concept", on the other hand, should not be thought of (...)
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  2. The Unnameable: Limits of Language in Early Analytic Philosophy.Michael Price - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    It is a remarkable fact about the early history of the analytic tradition that its three most important protagonists all held, at least during significant intervals of their respective careers, that there are entities that cannot be named. This shared commitment on the part of Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein is the topic of this thesis. I first clarify the particular form this commitment takes in the work of these three authors. I also illustrate a distinctive cluster of philosophical (...)
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  3. A Quasi-Fregean Solution to ‘The Concept Horse’ Paradox.Mihail Petrisor Ivan - 2015 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):7-22.
    In this paper I offer a conceptually tighter, quasi-Fregean solution to the concept horse paradox based on the idea that the unterfallen relation is asymmetrical. The solution is conceptually tighter in the sense that it retains the Fregean principle of separating sharply between concepts and objects, it retains Frege’s conclusion that the sentence ‘the concept horse is not a concept’ is true, but does not violate our intuitions on the matter. The solution is only ‘quasi’- Fregean in the sense that (...)
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  4. Once Moore Unto the Breach! Frege and the Concept ‘Horse’ Paradox.Kelly Dean Jolley - 2015 - Philosophical Topics 43 (1-2):113-124.
    In this essay, I respond to A. W. Moore’s instructive chapter on Frege. I respond by asking various questions, and I question particularly Moore’s claim that Frege, in reacting to Benno Kerry, falls into Hegelian excess. I toy with responding to my question by regarding Frege as anticipating a Wittgensteinian-Heideggerian exaction. It remains unclear whether this constitutes progress.
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  5. Why Frege Would Not Be a Neo‐Fregean.Marco Ruffino - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):51-78.
    In this paper, I seek to clarify an aspect of Frege's thought that has been only insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical objects. I adduce some elements of Frege's philosophy that elucidate why he saw extensions as natural candidates for paradigmatic cases of logical objects. Moreover, I argue (against the suggestion of some contemporary scholars, in particular, Wright and Boolos) that Frege could not have taken Hume's Principle instead of Axiom V as a fundamental law of (...)
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  6. Frege's Problems with 'the Concept Horse'.Edwin Martin - 1971 - Critica 5 (15):45-64.
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  7. Naming the Concept Horse.Michael Price - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2727-2743.
    Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties confronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such claim—that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a singular term—has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set out Trueman’s argument for this (...)
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  8. A Higher-Order Solution to the Problem of the Concept Horse.Nicholas K. Jones - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    This paper uses the resources of higher-order logic to articulate a Fregean conception of predicate reference, and of word-world relations more generally, that is immune to the concept horse problem. The paper then addresses a prominent style of expressibility problem for views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Linnebo, Hale, and Wright.
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  9. The Concept Horse with No Name.Robert Trueman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906.
    In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful.
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  10. Putting Davidson’s Semantics to Work to Solve Frege’s Paradox on Concept and Object.Philippe Rouilhan - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag.
    What Frege’s paradox on concept and object (FP) consists in and the manner in which Frege coped with it (the ladder strategy) are briefly reviewed (§ 1). An idea for solving FP inspired by Husserl’s semantics is presented; it results in failure, for it leads to a version of Russell’s paradox, the usual solution of which implies something like a resurgence of FP (§ 2). A generalized version of Frege’s paradox (GFP) and an idea for solving it inspired by Davidson’s (...)
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  11. Freges Begriffslehre, ohne ihr angebliches Paradox.Andreas Kemmerling - 2004 - In Mark Siebel & Markus Textor (eds.), Semantik Und Ontologie: Beiträge Zur Philosophischen Forschung. Ontos Verlag. pp. 2--39.
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  12. Freges Begrifflehre, Ohne Ihr Angebliches Paradox.A. Kemmerling - 2004 - In Mark Siebel & Mark Textor (eds.), Semantik Und Ontologie. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 39--62.
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  13. Horse Sense.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):85-131.
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  14. Why Frege Did Not Deserve His Granum Salis: A Note on the Paradox of "The Concept Horse" and the Ascription of Bedeutungen to Predicates.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 55 (1):239-263.
    The „Paradox of the Concept Horse" arises on the assumption of the Reference Principle: that co-referential expressions should be cross-substitutable salva veritate in extensional contexts and salva congruitate in all. Accordingly no singular term can co-refer with an unsaturated expression. The paper outlines a number of desiderata for a satisfactory response to the problem and argues that recent treatments by Dummett and Wiggins fall short by their lights. It is then pointed out that a more consistent perception of the requirements (...)
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  15. What is Frege's "Concept Horse Problem" ?Ian Proops - 2013 - In Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 76-96.
    I argue that Frege's so-called "concept 'horse' problem" is not one problem but many. When these different sub-problems are distinguished, some emerge as more tractable than others. I argue that, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption originating with Peter Geach, there is scant evidence that Frege engaged with the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions in writings available to Wittgenstein. In consequence, Geach is mistaken in his claim that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein simply accepts from Frege certain (...)
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  16. Impure Reference: A Way Around the Concept Horse Paradox.Fraser MacBride - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):297-312.
    This paper provides a new solution to the concept horse paradox. Frege argued no name co-refers with a predicate because no name can be inter-substituted with a predicate. This led Frege to embrace the paradox of the concept horse. But Frege got it wrong because predicates are impurely referring expressions and we shouldn’t expect impurely referring expressions to be intersubstitutable even if they co-refer, because the contexts in which they occur are sensitive to the extra information they carry about their (...)
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  17. Why Frege Should Not Have Said "The Concept Horse is Not a Concept".Terence Parsons - 1986 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):449 - 465.
    Frege held various views about language and its relation to non-linguistic things. These views led him to the paradoxical-sounding conclusion that "the concept horse is NOT a concept." A key assumption that led him to say this is the assumption that phrases beginning with the definite article "the" denote objects, not concepts. In sections I-III this issue is explained. In sections IV-V Frege's theory is articulated, and it is shown that he was incorrect in thinking that this theory led to (...)
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  18. Frege's Problems with 'the Concept Horse'.Edwin Martin Jr - 1971 - Critica 5 (15):45 - 64.
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  19. Frege, Dummett and the Philistines.Nicholas Measor - 1978 - Analysis 38 (1):10 - 16.
    The article raises an objection against michael dummett's defence of frege's thesis that incomplete expressions refer to concepts. Even if dummett has shown that predicates refer to concepts, He has not shown that the concepts referred to exist. Although dummett tries to justify the claim that concepts exist, The sense of 'exist' in this claim is not the customary one but is introduced by mere stipulation. Furthermore, Even if 'concepts exist' is true, It can be argued on fregean grounds that (...)
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  20. Kerry und Frege über Begriff und Gegenstand.Eva Picardi - 1994 - History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):9-32.
    After describing the philosophical background of Kerry's work, an account is given of the way Kerry proposed to supplement Bolzano's conception of logic with a psychological account of the mental acts underlying mathematical judgements.In his writings Kerry criticized Frege's work and Kerry's views were then attacked by Frege.The following two issues were central to this controversy: (a) the relation between the content of a concept and the object of a concept; (b) the logical roles of the definite article. Not only (...)
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  21. Frege and Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Irving M. Copi - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (3-4):447-461.
    The purpose of the article is to explain two curious doctrines maintained by frege and rejected by wittgenstein in the 'tractatus logico-philosophicus'. that a special assertion sign is necessary was maintained by frege because he wanted to apply his concept-writing to ordinary language, and it was rejected by wittgenstein because his concern in the 'tractatus' was with scientific assertions only. frege's paradoxical notion that 'the concept horse is not a concept' was a consequence of his symbolizing functions by 'unsaturated' expressions. (...)
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  22. A Paradox in Frege's Semantics.Milton Fisk - 1963 - Philosophical Studies 14 (4):56 - 63.
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  23. Frege, Geach, and `the Concept Horse'.William Gustason - 1972 - Mind 81 (321):125-130.
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  24. A Note on Frege's Semantics.Edwin Martin - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 25 (6):441 - 443.
    The fregean theory of meaning says how the meaningful parts of a meaningful expression contribute to that expression's sense and reference. But frege overlooks the fact that logical expressions play dual roles. The contributions of sentential connectives, For example, Are well described for contexts in which they connect sentences, But not for larger quantificational contexts. An obvious modification of the theory which might fill the abyss is considered, And it is maintained that it produces two difficulties: a replication of frege's (...)
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  25. Paradoxien und die Vergegenständlichung von Begriffen – zu Freges Unterscheidung zwischen Begriff und Gegenstand.Rosemarie Rheinwald - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (1):7-35.
    In this paper I discuss Frege's distinction between objects and concepts and suggest a solution of Frege's paradox of the concept horse. The expression ''the concept horse'' is not eliminated and the concept is not identified with its extension, but the concept is identified with the sense of the corresponding predicate. This solution fits better into a fregean ontology and philosophy of language than alternative solutions and allows for a general answer to the question why Frege's system is infected with (...)
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  26. Frege and Dummett on the Problem with the Concept Horse.I. Susan Russinoff - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):63-78.
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