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  1. The Kerry-Frege Debate About Object and Concept: Some Remarks on Kerry’s Position.Carlo Proietti - unknown
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  2. Frege's Distinction Between Concepts and Objects: A Descendant of Kant's Distinction Between Concepts and Intuitions.Teri Rae Merrick - 2004 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
    Gottlob Frege is a significant figure in the philosophy of mathematics and logic insofar as he is the founder of modern symbolic logic and the articulator of the key distinctions and problems that have come to define much of contemporary analytic philosophy. Frege's concept-object distinction plays a major role in underwriting his thesis that numbers must be objects of a particular kind. Fregean numbers are generally interpreted as archetypal abstract objects, demanding some explanation as to how we come to know (...)
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  3. The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's Logic.Marco Ruffino - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 56 (1):73-90.
    The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis (i.e., the assumption that judgeable contents are prior to concepts) does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.
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  4. Frege on Concepts as Functions: A Fundamental Ambiguity.Herbert Hochberg - 1971 - Theoria 37 (1):21-32.
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  5. Frege on Predication.Richard L. Mendelsohn - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):69-82.
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  6. Frege’s Use of Function-Argument Analysis and His Introduction of Truth-Values as Objects.Michael Beaney - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):93-123.
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  7. An Apparent Difficulty in Frege's Ontology.Charles E. Caton - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (4):462-475.
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  8. Frege's Metaphysical Argument.Gregory Currie - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):329-342.
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  9. The Sense and Reference of Predicates: A Running Repair to Frege's Doctrine and a Plea for the Copula.David Wiggins - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):311-328.
Frege: The Concept Horse Problem
  1. The Concept Horse is a Concept.Ansten Klev - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):547-572.
    I offer an analysis of the sentence "the concept horse is a concept". It will be argued that the grammatical subject of this sentence, "the concept horse", indeed refers to a concept, and not to an object, as Frege once held. The argument is based on a criterion of proper-namehood according to which an expression is a proper name if it is so rendered in Frege's ideography. The predicate "is a concept", on the other hand, should not be thought of (...)
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  2. The Unnameable: Limits of Language in Early Analytic Philosophy.Michael Price - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    It is a remarkable fact about the early history of the analytic tradition that its three most important protagonists all held, at least during significant intervals of their respective careers, that there are entities that cannot be named. This shared commitment on the part of Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein is the topic of this thesis. I first clarify the particular form this commitment takes in the work of these three authors. I also illustrate a distinctive cluster of philosophical (...)
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  3. A Quasi-Fregean Solution to ‘The Concept Horse’ Paradox.Mihail Petrisor Ivan - 2015 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):7-22.
    In this paper I offer a conceptually tighter, quasi-Fregean solution to the concept horse paradox based on the idea that the unterfallen relation is asymmetrical. The solution is conceptually tighter in the sense that it retains the Fregean principle of separating sharply between concepts and objects, it retains Frege’s conclusion that the sentence ‘the concept horse is not a concept’ is true, but does not violate our intuitions on the matter. The solution is only ‘quasi’- Fregean in the sense that (...)
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  4. Once Moore Unto the Breach! Frege and the Concept ‘Horse’ Paradox.Kelly Dean Jolley - 2015 - Philosophical Topics 43 (1-2):113-124.
    In this essay, I respond to A. W. Moore’s instructive chapter on Frege. I respond by asking various questions, and I question particularly Moore’s claim that Frege, in reacting to Benno Kerry, falls into Hegelian excess. I toy with responding to my question by regarding Frege as anticipating a Wittgensteinian-Heideggerian exaction. It remains unclear whether this constitutes progress.
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  5. Why Frege Would Not Be a Neo‐Fregean.Marco Ruffino - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):51-78.
    In this paper, I seek to clarify an aspect of Frege's thought that has been only insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical objects. I adduce some elements of Frege's philosophy that elucidate why he saw extensions as natural candidates for paradigmatic cases of logical objects. Moreover, I argue (against the suggestion of some contemporary scholars, in particular, Wright and Boolos) that Frege could not have taken Hume's Principle instead of Axiom V as a fundamental law of (...)
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  6. Frege's Problems with 'the Concept Horse'.Edwin Martin - 1971 - Critica 5 (15):45-64.
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  7. Naming the Concept Horse.Michael Price - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2727-2743.
    Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties confronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such claim—that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a singular term—has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set out Trueman’s argument for this (...)
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  8. The Concept Horse with No Name.Robert Trueman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906.
    In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful.
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  9. Putting Davidson’s Semantics to Work to Solve Frege’s Paradox on Concept and Object.Philippe Rouilhan - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag.
    What Frege’s paradox on concept and object (FP) consists in and the manner in which Frege coped with it (the ladder strategy) are briefly reviewed (§ 1). An idea for solving FP inspired by Husserl’s semantics is presented; it results in failure, for it leads to a version of Russell’s paradox, the usual solution of which implies something like a resurgence of FP (§ 2). A generalized version of Frege’s paradox (GFP) and an idea for solving it inspired by Davidson’s (...)
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  10. Freges Begriffslehre, ohne ihr angebliches Paradox.Andreas Kemmerling - 2004 - In Mark Siebel & Markus Textor (eds.), Semantik Und Ontologie: Beiträge Zur Philosophischen Forschung. Ontos Verlag. pp. 2--39.
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  11. Freges Begrifflehre, Ohne Ihr Angebliches Paradox.A. Kemmerling - 2004 - In Mark Siebel & Mark Textor (eds.), Semantik Und Ontologie. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 39--62.
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  12. Horse Sense.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):85-131.
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  13. Why Frege Did Not Deserve His Granum Salis.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:239-263.
    The „Paradox of the Concept Horse" arises on the assumption of the Reference Principle: that co-referential expressions should be cross-substitutable salva veritate in extensional contexts and salva congruitate in all. Accordingly no singular term can co-refer with an unsaturated expression. The paper outlines a number of desiderata for a satisfactory response to the problem and argues that recent treatments by Dummett and Wiggins fall short by their lights. It is then pointed out that a more consistent perception of the requirements (...)
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  14. What is Frege's "Concept Horse Problem" ?Ian Proops - 2013 - In Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 76-96.
    I argue that Frege's so-called "concept 'horse' problem" is not one problem but many. When these separate sub-problems are distinguished, some are revealed to be more tractable than others. I further argue that there is, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption originating with Peter Geach, little evidence that Frege was concerned with the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions in writings available to Wittgenstein. In consequence, Geach is mistaken in thinking that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein simply accepts (...)
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  15. Why Frege Should Not Have Said "The Concept Horse is Not a Concept".Terence Parsons - 1986 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):449 - 465.
    Frege held various views about language and its relation to non-linguistic things. These views led him to the paradoxical-sounding conclusion that "the concept horse is NOT a concept." A key assumption that led him to say this is the assumption that phrases beginning with the definite article "the" denote objects, not concepts. In sections I-III this issue is explained. In sections IV-V Frege's theory is articulated, and it is shown that he was incorrect in thinking that this theory led to (...)
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  16. Frege's Problems with 'the Concept Horse'.Edwin Martin Jr - 1971 - Critica 5 (15):45 - 64.
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  17. Kerry und Frege über Begriff und Gegenstand.Eva Picardi - 1994 - History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):9-32.
    After describing the philosophical background of Kerry's work, an account is given of the way Kerry proposed to supplement Bolzano's conception of logic with a psychological account of the mental acts underlying mathematical judgements.In his writings Kerry criticized Frege's work and Kerry's views were then attacked by Frege.The following two issues were central to this controversy: (a) the relation between the content of a concept and the object of a concept; (b) the logical roles of the definite article. Not only (...)
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  18. Frege and Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Irving M. Copi - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (3-4):447-461.
    The purpose of the article is to explain two curious doctrines maintained by frege and rejected by wittgenstein in the 'tractatus logico-philosophicus'. that a special assertion sign is necessary was maintained by frege because he wanted to apply his concept-writing to ordinary language, and it was rejected by wittgenstein because his concern in the 'tractatus' was with scientific assertions only. frege's paradoxical notion that 'the concept horse is not a concept' was a consequence of his symbolizing functions by 'unsaturated' expressions. (...)
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  19. Frege, Geach, and `the Concept Horse'.William Gustason - 1972 - Mind 81 (321):125-130.
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  20. Paradoxien und die Vergegenständlichung von Begriffen – zu Freges Unterscheidung zwischen Begriff und Gegenstand.Rosemarie Rheinwald - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (1):7-35.
    In this paper I discuss Frege's distinction between objects and concepts and suggest a solution of Frege's paradox of the concept horse. The expression ''the concept horse'' is not eliminated and the concept is not identified with its extension, but the concept is identified with the sense of the corresponding predicate. This solution fits better into a fregean ontology and philosophy of language than alternative solutions and allows for a general answer to the question why Frege's system is infected with (...)
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  21. Frege and Dummett on the Problem with the Concept Horse.I. Susan Russinoff - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):63-78.
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  22. Note on “a Paradox in Frege's Semantics”.Robert Sternfeld - 1965 - Philosophical Studies 16 (1-2):12 - 14.
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Frege: Vagueness
  1. Frege and Vagueness.Jan van Heijenoort - 1986 - In Leila Haaparanta & Jaakko Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized: Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of Gottlob Frege. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 31-45.
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  2. Frege's View on Vagueness.Marco Ruffino - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):253-277.
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss Frege’s view on vagueness, and to draw some relevant consequences of it. By examining what exactly Frege has in mind each time he complains about vagueness and advocates the sharpness requirement, I argue that he shows preoccupation with different kinds of vagueness in different periods of his thought. I also discuss the scope of the sharpness requirement, and argue that it is intended as applying primarily to mathematics and logic. Finally, I try (...)
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  3. Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language.Stephen Puryear - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):120-140.
    Frege, we are told, believes that vague predicates have no referent (Bedeutung). But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed to the suspect nihilism. In the process, (...)
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  4. Frege's Sharpness Requirement and Natural Language.Richard Vulich - 2009 - Florida Philosophical Review 9 (1):78-90.
    Controversy exists concerning the consequences of Frege's sharpness requirement for concepts and functions. Some say that the sharpness requirement, if taken to be a necessary condition for truth functional language use, renders most of our natural language discourse meaningless. This is because most if not all natural language concepts and predicates are not sharp. In this essay I argue first that Frege does indeed see the sharpness requirement as a necessary condition on a language's truth- functionality in all contexts in (...)
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  5. Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
    Vagueness provides the first comprehensive examination of a topic of increasing importance in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic and language. Timothy Williamson traces the history of this philosophical problem from discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece to modern formal approaches such as fuzzy logic. He illustrates the problems with views which have taken the position that standard logic and formal semantics do not apply to vague language, and defends the controversial realistic view that vagueness is a kind (...)
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  6. On the Coherence of Vague Predicates.Crispin Wright - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):325--65.
Frege: Functions and Concepts, Misc
  1. Sellars and Frege on Concepts and Laws.Danielle Macbeth - 2018 - In Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 138-156.
  2. Frege’s Unmanageable Thing.Michael Price - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 3, pp 368 - 413 Frege famously maintained that concepts are not objects. A key argument of Frege’s for this view is, in outline, as follows: if we are to account for the unity of thought, concepts must be deemed _unsaturated_; since objects are, by contrast, saturated entities, concepts cannot be objects. The author investigates what can be made of this argument and, in particular, of the unsaturated/saturated distinction it invokes. Systematically exploring a range of (...)
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  3. Denoting and Disquoting.Michael Rieppel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):548-561.
    ABSTRACTFregeans hold that predicates denote things, albeit things different in kind from what singular terms denote. This leads to a familiar problem: it seems impossible to say what any given predicate denotes. One strategy for avoiding this problem reduces the Fregean position to form of nominalism. I develop an alternative strategy that lets the Fregean hold on to the view that predicate denote things by reconceiving the nature of singular denotation and of Fregean objects.
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  4. Frege and Propositional Unity.Silver Bronzo - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (4):750-771.
    This paper identifies a tension in Frege’s philosophy and offers a diagnosis of its origins. Frege’s Context Principle can be used to dissolve the problem of propositional unity. However, Frege’s official response to the problem does not invoke the Context Principle, but the distinction between ‘saturated’ and ‘unsaturated’ propositional constituents. I argue that such a response involves assumptions that clash with the Context Principle. I suggest, however, that this tension is not generated by deep-seated philosophical commitments, but by Frege’s occasional (...)
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  5. Frege On Shared Belief and Total Functions.Patricia A. Blanchette - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):9-39.
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  6. Frege, Russell, Ramsey and the Notion of an Arbitrary Function.Gabriel Sandu, Marco Panza & Hourya Benis-Sinaceur - 2015 - In Gabriel Sandu, Marco Panza & Hourya Benis-Sinaceur (eds.), Functions and Generality of Logic. Springer Verlag.
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  7. Putting Davidson’s Semantics to Work to Solve Frege’s Paradox on Concept and Object.Philippe Rouilhan - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag.
    What Frege’s paradox on concept and object (FP) consists in and the manner in which Frege coped with it (the ladder strategy) are briefly reviewed (§ 1). An idea for solving FP inspired by Husserl’s semantics is presented; it results in failure, for it leads to a version of Russell’s paradox, the usual solution of which implies something like a resurgence of FP (§ 2). A generalized version of Frege’s paradox (GFP) and an idea for solving it inspired by Davidson’s (...)
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  8. It.Barry Smith - 1980 - In Rudolf Haller & Wolfgang Grassl (eds.), Language, Logic and Philosophy. Dordrecht: Reidel. pp. 342–345.
    A brief study of the logical, linguistic, psychological and ontological problem of ‘impersonalia’, which is to say of assertions such as ‘it’s raining’ or ‘es blitzt’ which seem to have no subject. Such assertions cause problems not only for defenders of traditional subject-predicate views of assertive sentences, but also for those, such as Frege, who defended a view in terms of functions and arguments.
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  9. Did Frege Really Have a Logicist Conception of Functionality?Frederik Truyen - 1993 - In Werner Stelzner (ed.), Philosophie Und Logik: Frege-Kolloquien 1989 Und 1991. De Gruyter. pp. 97-107.
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  10. Predication and Unsaturation: An Essay on Frege's Philosophy of Logic.William Harvey Walters - 1975 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Hampshire, Mount Holyoke and Smith Colleges
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  11. Funktion und Gegenstand: Eine Untersuchung in der Logik von Gottlob Frege.James Michael Bartlett - 1961 - Dissertation, Munich
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  12. Concept And Object In Frege.Hartley Slater - 2000 - Minerva 4.
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  13. Frege's Sharpness Requirement.Gary Kemp - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (2):219.
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