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  1. Saying Something About a Concept: Frege on Statements of Number.Mark Textor - 2020 - History and Philosophy of Logic 42 (1):60-71.
    The paper gives a historically informed reconstruction of Frege's view of statements of number. The reconstruction supports Frege's claim that a statement can be 'about a concept' although it does...
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  2. Frege Über Existenz Und Die Hierarchie der Funktionen.Joachim Bromand - 2019 - In Andreas Luckner & Sebastian Ostritsch (eds.), Philosophie der Existenz: Aktuelle Beiträge von der Ontologie Bis Zur Ethik. J.B. Metzler. pp. 29-45.
    Frege unterscheidet bekanntlich zwischen Gegenständen und Funktionen. Im Falle Letzterer nimmt er eine ganze Hierarchie solcher Funktionen an, von der anzunehmen ist, dass sie ins Unendliche reicht. Für Begriffe, die nur auf eine Stufe anwendbar sind, bleibt deren Einordnung in diese Hierarchie im Wesentlichen folgenlos. Für Begriffe wie den der Existenz, die Entsprechungen auf allen Stufen der Hierarchie besitzen, resultieren aber Konsequenzen etwa in Hinblick auf ihre Ausdrückbarkeit in natürlichen Sprachen: Existenz schlechthin bzw. unabhängig von der Stufe der Entitäten, deren (...)
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  3. What Frege Asked Alex the Parrot: Inferentialism, Number Concepts, and Animal Cognition.Erik Nelson - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (2):206-227.
    While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...)
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  4. Sellars and Frege on Concepts and Laws.Danielle Macbeth - 2018 - In Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 138-156.
  5. Frege’s Unmanageable Thing.Michael Price - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 3, pp 368 - 413 Frege famously maintained that concepts are not objects. A key argument of Frege’s for this view is, in outline, as follows: if we are to account for the unity of thought, concepts must be deemed _unsaturated_; since objects are, by contrast, saturated entities, concepts cannot be objects. The author investigates what can be made of this argument and, in particular, of the unsaturated/saturated distinction it invokes. Systematically exploring a range of (...)
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  6. Denoting and Disquoting.Michael Rieppel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):548-561.
    ABSTRACTFregeans hold that predicates denote things, albeit things different in kind from what singular terms denote. This leads to a familiar problem: it seems impossible to say what any given predicate denotes. One strategy for avoiding this problem reduces the Fregean position to form of nominalism. I develop an alternative strategy that lets the Fregean hold on to the view that predicate denote things by reconceiving the nature of singular denotation and of Fregean objects.
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  7. Frege and Propositional Unity.Silver Bronzo - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (4):750-771.
    This paper identifies a tension in Frege’s philosophy and offers a diagnosis of its origins. Frege’s Context Principle can be used to dissolve the problem of propositional unity. However, Frege’s official response to the problem does not invoke the Context Principle, but the distinction between ‘saturated’ and ‘unsaturated’ propositional constituents. I argue that such a response involves assumptions that clash with the Context Principle. I suggest, however, that this tension is not generated by deep-seated philosophical commitments, but by Frege’s occasional (...)
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  8. Putting Davidson’s Semantics to Work to Solve Frege’s Paradox on Concept and Object.Philippe Rouilhan - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag.
    What Frege’s paradox on concept and object (FP) consists in and the manner in which Frege coped with it (the ladder strategy) are briefly reviewed (§ 1). An idea for solving FP inspired by Husserl’s semantics is presented; it results in failure, for it leads to a version of Russell’s paradox, the usual solution of which implies something like a resurgence of FP (§ 2). A generalized version of Frege’s paradox (GFP) and an idea for solving it inspired by Davidson’s (...)
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  9. Frege, Russell, Ramsey and the Notion of an Arbitrary Function.Gabriel Sandu - 2015 - In Gabriel Sandu, Marco Panza & Hourya Benis-Sinaceur (eds.), Functions and Generality of Logic. Springer Verlag.
    The paper argues that unlike Ramsey, Frege and Russell lacked the idea of an arbitrary function and this had important consequences for their foundational programs.
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  10. From Lagrange to Frege: Functions and Expressions.Gabriel Sandu, Marco Panza & Hourya Benis-Sinaceur - 2015 - In Gabriel Sandu, Marco Panza & Hourya Benis-Sinaceur (eds.), Functions and Generality of Logic. Springer Verlag.
    Both Frege's Grundgesetze, and Lagrange's treatises on analytical functions pursue a foundational purpose. Still, the former's program is not only crucially different from the latter's. It also depends on a different idea of what foundation of mathematics should be like . Despite this contrast, the notion of function plays similar roles in their respective programs. The purpose of my paper is emphasising this similarity. In doing it, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of Frege's logicism, especially in relation (...)
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  11. The Priority Principle From Kant to Frege.Jeremy Heis - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):268-297.
    In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode […] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought (...)
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  12. The Function is Unsaturated.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    An investigation of what Frege means by his doctrine that functions (and so concepts) are 'unsaturated'. We argue that this doctrine is far less peculiar than it is usually taken to be. What makes it hard to understand, oddly enough, is the fact that it is so deeply embedded in our contemporary understanding of logic and language. To see this, we look at how it emerges out of Frege's confrontation with the Booleans and how it expresses a fundamental difference between (...)
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  13. On Frege's Notion of Predicate Reference.Palle Leth - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (4):335 - 350.
    Frege's extension of his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung to predicate terms is widely considered to be problematic. Interpreters generally assume that the notion of Bedeutung comprises the name/bearer relation as a prototype and that the extension is justified only in so far as the relation of predicate terms to their alleged referents is analogous to the relation of names to their bearers. However, interpreters have generally paid insufficient attention to Frege's own dealing with the issue. By examining the relevant (...)
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  14. Frege On Shared Belief and Total Functions.Patricia A. Blanchette - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):9-39.
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  15. The Myth of Concept Publicity.Laura Duhau Girola - 2012 - Ideas Y Valores 61 (148):101-113.
    In this paper I defend the claim that concepts are not public. I argue that two of the main constraints for theories of concepts, namely (1) that concepts are public and (2) that they serve to explain Frege Cases, are in tension. (1) requires concepts to be individuated coarsely, while (2) requires ..
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  16. Sense and Reference of Predicates: Comments on Frege's Theory of Sense-Reference.Chen Xiaoping - 2012 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 7 (2):270-283.
  17. Functions in Frege, Bolzano and Husserl.Stefania Centrone - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (4):315-336.
    This explorative article is organized around a set of questions concerning the concept of a function. First, a summary of certain general facts about functions that are a common coin in contemporary logic is given. Then Frege's attempt at clarifying the nature of functions in his famous paper Function and Concept and in his Grundgesetze is discussed along with some questions which Freges' approach gave rise to in the literature. Finally, some characteristic uses of functional notions to be found in (...)
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  18. Gottlob Frege, Philosophy of Language, and Predication.Piotr Stalmaszczyk - 2010 - In Objects of Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Ontos Verlag. pp. 295.
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  19. Frege's Concept Paradox and the Mirroring Principle.Mark Textor - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):126-148.
    Frege held that singular terms can refer only to objects, not to concepts. I argue that the counter-intuitive consequences of this claim ('the concept paradox') arise from Frege's mirroring principle that an incomplete expression can only express an incomplete sense and stand for an incomplete reference. This is not, as is sometimes thought, merely because predicates and singular terms cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate ( congruitate ). The concept paradox, properly understood, poses therefore a different, harder, challenge. An investigation of (...)
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  20. From Plato to Frege: Paradigms of Predication in the History of Ideas. [REVIEW]Uwe Meixner - 2009 - Metaphysica 10 (2):199-214.
    One of the perennial questions of philosophy concerns the simple statements which say that an object is so and so or that such and such objects are so and so related: simple predicative statements. Do such statements have an ontological basis, and if so, what is that basis? The answer to this question determines—or in any case, is expressive of—a specific fundamental outlook on the world. In the course of the history of Western philosophy, various philosophers have given various answers (...)
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  21. Gedanken Beleuchten. Frege Und Davidson Zum Problem der Prädikation.Christoph C. Pfisterer - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (4):583-595.
    The paper examines Davidson′s discussion of Frege on the problem of predication. Simple declarative sentences are unities that are true or false; how do predicates contribute to this kind of semantic unity? According to Davidson, the problem cannot be solved by assigning referents to predicates, since this leads to an infinite regress. Frege famously contributes the idea that predicates are “incomplete” or “unsaturated” functional expressions, mapping objects to truth-values. However, he takes predicates to refer to concepts and thus is exposed (...)
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  22. Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's challenge, Frege's answer.Mark Textor - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82.
    Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.
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  23. Russell And Frege On The Logic of Functions.Bernard Linsky - 2008 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4:1-17.
    I compare Russell’s theory of mathematical functions, the “descriptive functions” from Principia Mathematica ∗30, with Frege’s well known account of functions as “unsaturated” entities. Russell analyses functional terms with propositional functions and the theory of definite descriptions. This is the primary technical role of the theory of descriptions in P M . In Principles of Mathematics and some unpublished writings from before 1905, Russell offered explicit criticisms of Frege’s account of functions. Consequenly, the theory of descriptions in “On Denoting” can (...)
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  24. The Unnameable.Alasdair Urquhart - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):119-135.
    Hans Herzberger as a philosopher and logician has shown deep interest both in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, and in the topic of the inexpressible and the ineffable. In the fall of 1982, he taught at the University of Toronto, together with André Gombay, a course on Frege's metaphysics, philosophy of language, and foundations of arithmetic. Again, in the fall of 1986, he taught a seminar on the philosophy of language that dealt with 'the limits of discursive symbolism in several (...)
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  25. A Critique of Frege on Common Nouns.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):148–155.
    Frege analyzed the grammatical subject-term 'S' in quantified subject-predicate sentences, 'q S are P', as being logically predicative. This is in contrast to Aristotelian Logic, according to which it is a logical subject-term, like the proper name 'a' in 'a is P' – albeit a plural one, designating many particulars. I show that Frege's arguments for his analysis are unsound, and explain how he was misled to his position by the mathematical concept of function. If common nouns in this grammatical (...)
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  26. Predicate Reference.Fraser MacBride - 2006 - In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 422--475.
    Whether a predicate is a referential expression depends upon what reference is conceived to be. Even if it is granted that reference is a relation between words and worldly items, the referents of expressions being the items to which they are so related, this still leaves considerable scope for disagreement about whether predicates refer. One of Frege's great contributions to the philosophy of language was to introduce an especially liberal conception of reference relative to which it is unproblematic to suppose (...)
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  27. Some Fregean Considerations on Predicates and Their Reference.Ari Maunu - 2006 - Tabula Rasa 25.
    The aim of this paper is (i) to defend Frege's view that the referents of predicates are certain kinds of functions, or "concepts", i.e. incomplete entities, and not their extensions (i.e. sets of objects described by those predicates); and (ii) to justify, by a natural augmentation of Frege's semantic theory with modal ingredients, Frege's position that the sameness between concepts, or property-sharing, turns only on the sameness of extensions. Several problems with the doctrine that a predicate's extension is its referent (...)
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  28. Against Fantology.Barry Smith - 2005 - In Johann C. Marek & Maria E. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis. Vienna: HPT&ÖBV. pp. 153-170.
    The analytical philosophy of the last hundred years has been heavily influenced by a doctrine to the effect that the key to the correct understanding of reality is captured syntactically in the ‘Fa’ (or, in more sophisticated versions, in the ‘Rab’) of standard first order predicate logic. Here ‘F’ stands for what is general in reality and ‘a’ for what is individual. Hence “f(a)ntology”. Because predicate logic has exactly two syntactically different kinds of referring expressions—‘F’, ‘G’, ‘R’, etc., and ‘a’, (...)
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  29. 'Function' in Frege's Begriffsschrift: Dissolving the Problem.Gordon Baker - 2001 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (3):525 – 544.
  30. Extensions as Representative Objects in Frege's Logic.Marco Ruffino - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (2):239-252.
    Matthias Schirn has argued on a number of occasions against the interpretation of Frege's ``objects of a quite special kind'' (i.e., the objects referred to by names like `the concept F') as extensions of concepts. According to Schirn, not only are these objects not extensions, but also the idea that `the concept F' refers to objects leads to some conclusions that are counter-intuitive and incompatible with Frege's thought. In this paper, I challenge Schirn's conclusion: I want to try and argue (...)
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  31. Concept And Object In Frege.Hartley Slater - 2000 - Minerva 4.
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  32. Bradley, Frege and Relatedness.Francisco Rodríguez-Consuegra - 1999 - Bradley Studies 5 (2):113-125.
    I expose and discuss here the different arguments Bradley used against the tenability of relations as genuine entities, as well as the corresponding arguments against predicates, both in metaphysical and logical terms, and this always in the framework of his semantic general ideas on judgment and truth. Also, I have found useful to try to find similar arguments in Frege, in order to show that, no matter how different their respective goals and methods may have been, both philosophers tried to (...)
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  33. Bolzano and Frege on Concepts.P. Materna - 1998 - Filosoficky Casopis 46 (6):959-965.
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  34. Is Frege's Theory of Concepts More Progressive Than Bolzano's.Pavel Materna - 1998 - Theoria 41 (4):19-30.
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  35. Frege's Sharpness Requirement.Gary Kemp - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):168-184.
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  36. Frege's Sharpness Requirement.Gary Kemp - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (2):219.
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  37. Frege and Arbitrary Functions.John P. Burgess - 1995 - In William Demopoulos (ed.), Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics. Harvard University Press. pp. 89--107.
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  38. Extending Knowledge and `Fruitful Concepts': Fregean Themes in the Foundations of Mathematics.Jamie Tappenden - 1995 - Noûs 29 (4):427-467.
  39. Frege's Theory of Predication: An Elaboration and Defense, with Some New Applications.Ian Rumfitt - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (4):599-637.
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  40. Hintikka Et Sandu Versus Frege in Re Arbitrary Functions.John P. Burgess - 1993 - Philosophia Mathematica 1 (1):50-65.
    Hintikka and Sandu have recently claimed that Frege's notion of function was substantially narrower than that prevailing in real analysis today. In the present note, their textual evidence for this claim is examined in the light of relevant historical and biographical background and judged insufficient.
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  41. Did Frege Really Have a Logicist Conception of Functionality?Frederik Truyen - 1993 - In Werner Stelzner (ed.), Philosophie Und Logik: Frege-Kolloquien 1989 Und 1991. De Gruyter. pp. 97-107.
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  42. Was Frege Right About Variable Objects?Marco Santambrogio - 1992 - In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 133--156.
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  43. Frege, Concepts, and the Design of Language.James Higginbotham - 1990 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 153--171.
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  44. Frege's Objects of a Quite Special Kind.Matthias Schirn - 1990 - Erkenntnis 32 (1):27 - 60.
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  45. Functional Operations in Frege's Begriffsschrift.Peter M. Simons - 1988 - History and Philosophy of Logic 9 (1):35-42.
    Frege uses Greek letters in two different ways in his Begriffsschrift. One way is the familiar use of bound variables, in conjunction with variable-binding operators, to mark and close argument-places. The other, which is quite unfamiliar, employs letters to mark places for operators to reach into, without thereby closing these places. Frege thereby invents a powerful and compact notation for functional operations which can be recommended even today. His regrettable double use of Greek letters obscured his invention, and this, together (...)
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  46. Frege on Extensions of Concepts, From 1884 to 1903.Tyler Burge - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):3-34.
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  47. Sluga über Freges These der Priorität von Urteilen gegenüber Begriffen.Matthias Schirn - 1984 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 66 (2):194-215.
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  48. Dummett's Purge: Frege Without Functions.G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (131):115-132.
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  49. It.Barry Smith - 1980 - In Rudolf Haller & Wolfgang Grassl (eds.), Language, Logic and Philosophy. Dordrecht: Reidel. pp. 342–345.
    A brief study of the logical, linguistic, psychological and ontological problem of ‘impersonalia’, which is to say of assertions such as ‘it’s raining’ or ‘es blitzt’ which seem to have no subject. Such assertions cause problems not only for defenders of traditional subject-predicate views of assertive sentences, but also for those, such as Frege, who defended a view in terms of functions and arguments.
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  50. Predication and Unsaturation: An Essay on Frege's Philosophy of Logic.William Harvey Walters - 1975 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Hampshire, Mount Holyoke and Smith Colleges
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