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  1. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
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  2. Slicing Thoughts.Vojislav Bozickovic - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):3-13.
    According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different if it is at the same time possible for a rational subject to take conflicting epistemic attitudes toward them. But applying this criterion to perception-based demonstrative thoughts seems to slice thoughts too finely and lead to their proliferation which makes the criterion implausible. I argue that such a proliferation of thoughts is blocked by transforming this criterion into a related one that is shown to be (...)
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  3. Frege’s Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Extended.Mark Textor - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):823-847.
    According to Frege, neither demonstratives nor indexicals are singular terms; only a demonstrative together with ‘circumstances accompanying its utterance’ has sense and singular reference. While this view seems defensible for demonstratives, where demonstrations serve as non-verbal signs, indexicals, especially pure indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, seem not to be in need of completion by circumstances of utterance. In this paper I argue on the basis of independent reasons that indexicals are in fact in need of completion; I identify the (...)
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  4. Über Künne Über Kripke Über Künne Über Frege.Andreas Kemmerling - 2011 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (3):389-402.
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  5. Indexicals: A Problem for Gottlob Frege's Semantic.Ángela Rocío Bejarano Chaves - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):139-149.
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  6. Los deícticos: Un problema para la semántica de Gottlob Frege.Ángela Rocío Bejarano Chaves - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):139-149.
    La tesis de este artículo es que tenemosrazones suficientes para considerar losdeícticos un problema para la propuestasemántica de Gottlob Frege. Dividiremosel texto en dos partes: en la primera,expondremos el programa semánt i codel l ógi co al emán por medi o de t rest e s i s e s t r uc t ur ant e s. En l a s e gunda,introduciremos la cuestión de los deícticos,explorando en qué medida representan unproblema para dicho programa. The thesis of this (...)
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  7. Los deícticos. Un problema para la semántica de Gottlob Frege.Ángela Rocío Bejarano Chaves - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11:139-149.
    La tesis de este artículo es que tenemosrazones suficientes para considerar losdeícticos un problema para la propuestasemántica de Gottlob Frege. Dividiremosel texto en dos partes: en la primera,expondremos el programa semánt i codel l ógi co al emán por medi o de t rest e s i s e s t r uc t ur ant e s . En l a s e gunda,introduciremos la cuestión de los deícticos,explorando en qué medida representan unproblema para dicho programa. The thesis of (...)
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  8. Sense, Reference and Hybridity.Wolfgang Künne - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):529-551.
    In his paper on ‘Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference’ Saul Kripke remarks: “Like the present account, Künne stresses that for Frege times, persons, etc. can be part of the expression of the thought. However, his reading is certainly not mine in significant respects . . .”. On both counts, he is right. As regards the differences between our readings, in some respects I shall confess to having made a mistake, in several others I shall remain stubbornly unmoved. Thus I (...)
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  9. Occasional expressions as functional expressions in Gottlob Frege's semantic.Volha Kukushkina - 2008 - Diametros:1-29.
    In the article I present a new way to integrate occasional expressions into Frege's semantic. The principal thesis of the article is that it is possible to construct an interpretation that is fully Fregean and which is immune to the counterexamples put forward by Perry and Kaplan. According to this interpretation occasional expressions are functional expressions that name first-order functions specified on objects. Such functional expressions taken together with the objects constitute so-called hybrid proper names. I argue that Frege's requirement (...)
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  10. Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended.Mark Textor - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):947-982.
    Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why (...)
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  11. Frege on Indexicals.Robert May - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):487-516.
    It is a characteristically Fregean thesis that the sense expressed by an expression is the linguistic meaning of that expression. Sense can play this role for Frege since it meets fundamental desiderata for meaning, that it be universal and invariantly expressed and objectively the same for everyone who knows the language. It has been argued,1 however, that, as a general thesis about natural languages, the identi cation of sense and meaning cannot be sustained since it is in con ict with (...)
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  12. Frege on Indexicals.Robert May - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):487-516.
  13. Do Demonstratives Have Senses?Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-33.
    Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted (...)
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  14. Frege On ‘I’, ‘Now’, ‘Today’ And Some Other Linguistic Devices.Edward Harcourt - 1999 - Synthese 121 (3):329-356.
    In this paper, I argue against an influential view of Frege's writings on indexical and other context-sensitive expressions, and in favour of an alternative. The centrepiece of the influential view, due to Evans and McDowell, is that according to Frege, context-sensitive word-meaning plus context combine to express senses which are essentially first person, essentially present tense and so on, depending on the contextsensitive expression in question. Frege's treatment of indexicals thus fits smoothly with his Intuitive Criterion of difference of sense. (...)
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  15. Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will.Ari Maunu - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
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  16. Frege on Indexicals: Sense and Context Sensitivity.Richard Charles Devidi - 1996 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    Indexical expressions--e.g., 'I', 'here', 'yesterday', 'this', etc.--pose a serious challenge for a Fregean theory of meaning. A Fregean theory holds that the meaning of an expression is its sense, and that this sense determines the reference of the expression independently of context. The most notable feature of indexicals, however, is their sensitivity to context. David Kaplan and John Perry argue that there can be no Fregean solution to this issue. They assume that the Fregean sense of a singular term is (...)
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  17. Are Hybrid Proper Names the Solution to the Completion Problem? A Reply to Wolfgang Künne.Edward Harcourt - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):301-313.
  18. Hybrid Proper Names.Wolfgang Künne - 1992 - Mind 101 (404):721-731.
  19. Frege and the Case of the Missing Sense.Pavel Tichy - 1986 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 27 (1):27-47.
    It is widely held that oblique contexts and indexical terms present difficulties to Frege's theory of sense. The aim of the present paper is to show that a simple device involving no revision of Frege's semantic doctrine resolves all the alleged difficulties. A simple extension of Frege's notation is proposed which makes it possible to translate oblique contexts into the concept script.
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  20. Frege and Peirce: Indexicality and the Philosophy of Language.Patrick Barker - 1985 - Semiotics:3-14.
  21. Frege on Indexicals.Kazuyuki Nomoto - 1985 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 6 (5):253-259.
  22. Indexikalität, Sinn Und Propositionaler Gehalt.Wolfgang Künne - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 18 (1):41-74.
    Wodurch wird der Sinn des Prädikats in einer Äußerung des indexikalischen Satzes 'Ich habe Blutgruppe A' zu dem propositionalen Gehalt vervollständigt, den der Sprecher ausdrückt? Durch einen Individualbegriff (unter den der Sprecher fällt)? Durch ein Individuum (den Sprecher in propria persona)! Keiner dieser Lösungsvorschläge für das (von Perry zuerst formulierte) Vervollständigungsproblem ist überzeugend. Für Frege ist der in einer solchen Äußerung verwendete Eigenname hybrid: er besteht aus einem Vorkommnis von 'ich' und den Umständen seiner Äußerung. Der Indikator 'ich' allein ist (...)
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  23. Frege on Demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.