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  1. Review of "Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics". [REVIEW]Marco Antonio Ruffino - forthcoming - Manuscrito.
    In this review I briefly explain the most important points of each chapter of Dummett's book, and critically discuss some of them. Special attention is given to the criticisms of Crispin Wright's interpretation of Frege's Platonism, and also to Dummett's interpretation of the role(s) of the context principle in Frege's thought.
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  2. Kant Versus Frege on Arithmetic.Nora Grigore - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (2):263-281.
    Kant's claim that arithmetical truths are synthetic is famously contradicted by Frege, who considers them to be analytical. It may seem that this is a mere dispute about linguistic labels, since both Kant and Frege agree that arithmetical truths are a priori and informative, and, therefore, it is only a matter of how one chooses to call them. I argue that the choice between calling arithmetic “synthetic” or “analytic” has a deeper significance. I claim that the dispute is not a (...)
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  3. Resolving Frege’s Other Puzzle.Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels & Stewart Shapiro - 2022 - Philosophica Mathematica 30 (1):59-87.
    Number words seemingly function both as adjectives attributing cardinality properties to collections, as in Frege’s ‘Jupiter has four moons’, and as names referring to numbers, as in Frege’s ‘The number of Jupiter’s moons is four’. This leads to what Thomas Hofweber calls Frege’s Other Puzzle: How can number words function as modifiers and as singular terms if neither adjectives nor names can serve multiple semantic functions? Whereas most philosophers deny that one of these uses is genuine, we instead argue that (...)
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  4. A filosofia da matemática de Frege no contexto do neokantismo.Gottfried Gabriel, Sven Schlotter, Lucas A. D. Amaral & Rafael R. Garcia - 2021 - Kant E-Prints 16 (2):363-376.
    Há muitos pontos de concordância entre Frege e os neokantianos. Isso vale especialmente para os representantes do neokantismo da teoria do valor ou do Sudoeste alemão na tradição de Hermann Lotze. Não discutiremos aqui todos os aspectos dessa proximidade; de acordo com o tema que propomos, ficaremos restritos à filosofia da matemática. A primeira parte do artigo tratará da relação entre aritmética e geometria, mostrando surpreendentes semelhanças entre Frege e o neokantiano Otto Liebmann. A segunda parte discutirá as diferentes recepções (...)
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  5. Arithmetic, Logicism, and Frege’s Definitions.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - International Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1):5-25.
    This paper describes both an exegetical puzzle that lies at the heart of Frege’s writings—how to reconcile his logicism with his definitions and claims about his definitions—and two interpretations that try to resolve that puzzle, what I call the “explicative interpretation” and the “analysis interpretation.” This paper defends the explicative interpretation primarily by criticizing the most careful and sophisticated defenses of the analysis interpretation, those given my Michael Dummett and Patricia Blanchette. Specifically, I argue that Frege’s text either are inconsistent (...)
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  6. Mr. Frege, The Platonist.Daniel Sierra - 2021 - Logiko-Filosofskie Studii 2 (Vol 19):136-144.
    Even though Frege is a major figure in the history of analytic philosophy, it is not surprising that there are still issues surrounding his views, interpreting them, and labeling them. Frege’s view on numbers is typically termed as ‘Platonistic’ or at least a type of Platonism (Reck 2005). Still, the term ‘Platonism’ has views and assumptions ascribed to it that may be misleading and leads to mischaracterizations of Frege’s outlook on numbers and ideas. So, clarification of the term ‘Platonism’ is (...)
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  7. Saying Something about a Concept: Frege on Statements of Number.Mark Textor - 2021 - History and Philosophy of Logic 42 (1):60-71.
    The paper gives a historically informed reconstruction of Frege's view of statements of number. The reconstruction supports Frege's claim that a statement can be 'about a concept' although it does not contain a singular term referring to the concept. Hence, Frege's philosophy of number is not subject to the problems Frege sees for singular reference to concepts.
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  8. Why did Frege reject the theory of types?Wim Vanrie - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (3):517-536.
    I investigate why Frege rejected the theory of types, as Russell presented it to him in their correspondence. Frege claims that it commits one to violations of the law of excluded middle, but this complaint seems to rest on a dogmatic refusal to take Russell’s proposal seriously on its own terms. What is at stake is not so much the truth of a law of logic, but the structure of the hierarchy of the logical categories, something Frege seems to neglect. (...)
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  9. Extensions, Numbers and Frege’s Project of Logic as Universal Language.Nora Grigore - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (5):577-588.
    Frege’s famous definition of number famously uses the concept of “extension”. Extensions, in the Fregean framework, are susceptible to bringing many difficulties, and, some say, even paradoxes. Therefore, neo-logicist programs want to avoid the problems and to replace the classical Fregean definition of number with Hume’s Principle. I argue that this move, even if it makes sense from a computational point of view, is at odds with Frege’s larger philosophical project. For Frege, I claim, extensions were an important part of (...)
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  10. Hilbertian Structuralism and the Frege-Hilbert Controversy†.Fiona T. Doherty - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (3):335-361.
    ABSTRACT This paper reveals David Hilbert’s position in the philosophy of mathematics, circa 1900, to be a form of non-eliminative structuralism, predating his formalism. I argue that Hilbert withstands the pressing objections put to him by Frege in the course of the Frege-Hilbert controversy in virtue of this early structuralist approach. To demonstrate that this historical position deserves contemporary attention I show that Hilbertian structuralism avoids a recent wave of objections against non-eliminative structuralists to the effect that they cannot distinguish (...)
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  11. The Problem of Fregean Equivalents.Joongol Kim - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (3):367-394.
    It would seem that some statements like ‘There are exactly four moons of Jupiter’ and ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’ have the same truth-conditions and yet differ in ontological commitment. One strategy to resolve this paradoxical phenomenon is to insist that the statements have not only the same truth-conditions but also the same ontological commitments; the other strategy is to reject the presumption that they have the same truth-conditions. This paper critically examines some popular versions of these (...)
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  12. Frege’s Constraint and the Nature of Frege’s Foundational Program.Marco Panza & Andrea Sereni - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):97-143.
    Recent discussions on Fregean and neo-Fregean foundations for arithmetic and real analysis pay much attention to what is called either ‘Application Constraint’ ($AC$) or ‘Frege Constraint’ ($FC$), the requirement that a mathematical theory be so outlined that it immediately allows explaining for its applicability. We distinguish between two constraints, which we, respectively, denote by the latter of these two names, by showing how$AC$generalizes Frege’s views while$FC$comes closer to his original conceptions. Different authors diverge on the interpretation of$FC$and on whether it (...)
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  13. On the Philosophical Significance of Frege’s Constraint.Andrea Sereni - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (2):244–275.
    Foundational projects disagree on whether pure and applied mathematics should be explained together. Proponents of unified accounts like neologicists defend Frege’s Constraint (FC), a principle demanding that an explanation of applicability be provided by mathematical definitions. I reconsider the philosophical import of FC, arguing that usual conceptions are biased by ontological assumptions. I explore more reasonable weaker variants — Moderate and Modest FC — arguing against common opinion that ante rem structuralism (and other) views can meet them. I dispel doubts (...)
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  14. The geometrical basis of arithmetical knowledge: Frege & Dehaene.Sorin Costreie - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (2):361-370.
    Frege writes in Numbers and Arithmetic about kindergarten-numbers and “an a priori mode of cognition” that they may have “a geometrical source.” This resembles recent findings on arithmetical cognition. In my paper, I explore this resemblance between Gottlob Frege’s later position concerning the geometrical source of arithmetical knowledge, and some current positions in the literature dedicated to arithmetical cognition, especially that of Stanislas Dehaene. In my analysis, I shall try to mainly see to what extent logicism is compatible with intuitionism.
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  15. Neologicism, Frege's Constraint, and the Frege‐Heck Condition.Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels & Stewart Shapiro - 2018 - Noûs 54 (1):54-77.
    One of the more distinctive features of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright’s neologicism about arithmetic is their invocation of Frege’s Constraint – roughly, the requirement that the core empirical applications for a class of numbers be “built directly into” their formal characterization. In particular, they maintain that, if adopted, Frege’s Constraint adjudicates in favor of their preferred foundation – Hume’s Principle – and against alternatives, such as the Dedekind-Peano axioms. In what follows we establish two main claims. First, we show (...)
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  16. Frege’s Critique of Formalism.Sören Stenlund - 2018 - In Gisela Bengtsson, Simo Säätelä & Alois Pichler (eds.), New Essays on Frege: Between Science and Literature. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 75-86.
    This paper deals with Frege’s early critique of formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Frege opposes meaningful arithmetic, according to which arithmetical formulas express a sense and arithmetical rules are grounded in the reference of the signs, to formal arithmetic, exemplified in particular by J. Thomae, whose “formal standpoint”, according to Frege, is that arithmetic should be understood as a manipulation of meaningless figures. However, Frege’s discussion of Thomae’s analogy between arithmetic and chess shows that Frege does not understand his (...)
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  17. Wittgenstein “Great Analysis” and Frege's construal of number as a property of properties.Araceli Rosich Soares Velloso - 2018 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 21 (1):171-208.
    Resumo: o propósito desse artigo é circunscrever e discutir a autocrítica, feita por Wittgenstein no período de 1933-39, a uma das teses mais fundamentais do Tractatus (TLP): ”Há uma e apenas uma análise completa da proposição” (3.25). Chamaremos esse procedimento peculiar de a “Grande análise”. Os argumentos de Wittgenstein contra a sustentabilidade da sua antiga tese podem ser encontrados em algumas passagens do livro Investigações Filosóficas (IF), bem como em passagens do Grande Datiloscrito (BT). Conforme será argumentado nesse artigo, essa (...)
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  18. Frege's Cardinals Do Not Always Obey Hume's Principle.Gregory Landini - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (2):127-153.
    Hume's Principle, dear to neo-Logicists, maintains that equinumerosity is both necessary and sufficient for sameness of cardinal number. All the same, Whitehead demonstrated in Principia Mathematica's logic of relations that Cantor's power-class theorem entails that Hume's Principle admits of exceptions. Of course, Hume's Principle concerns cardinals and in Principia's ‘no-classes’ theory cardinals are not objects in Frege's sense. But this paper shows that the result applies as well to the theory of cardinal numbers as objects set out in Frege's Grundgesetze. (...)
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  19. Nominalization, Specification, and Investigation.Richard Lawrence - 2017 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Frege famously held that numbers play the role of objects in our language and thought, and that this role is on display when we use sentences like "The number of Jupiter's moons is four". I argue that this role is an example of a general pattern that also encompasses persons, times, locations, reasons, causes, and ways of appearing or acting. These things are 'objects' simply in the sense that they are answers to questions: they are the sort of thing we (...)
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  20. Philosophy of Mathematics.Øystein Linnebo - 2017 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
    Mathematics is one of the most successful human endeavors—a paradigm of precision and objectivity. It is also one of our most puzzling endeavors, as it seems to deliver non-experiential knowledge of a non-physical reality consisting of numbers, sets, and functions. How can the success and objectivity of mathematics be reconciled with its puzzling features, which seem to set it apart from all the usual empirical sciences? This book offers a short but systematic introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. Readers are (...)
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  21. Frege sobre Kant: uma motivação filosófica do logicismo.Manuela Teles - 2017 - Con-Textos Kantianos 6:207-236.
    Em 1882, Frege escreveu a Anton Marty que o seu projeto era provar que as leis fundamentais da aritmética são analíticas no sentido de Kant. A resposta a esta carta foi assinada por Carl Stumpf, que aconselhou Frege a escrever sobre as suas motivações para a criação da linguagem formal que apresentou na sua Begriffsschrift, escrita três anos antes. Os Grundlagen der Arithmetik, que Frege publicou dois anos depois, podem ser vistos como o seu resultado por seguir o conselho de (...)
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  22. Frege on Mathematical Progress.Patricia Blanchette - 2016 - In Sorin Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy – New Perspectives on the Tradition. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag. pp. 3 - 19.
    Frege claims that mathematical theories are collections of thoughts, and that scientific continuity turns on thought-identity. This essay explores the difficulties posed for this conception of mathematics by the conceptual development canonically involved in mathematical progress. The central difficulties are that mathematical development often involves sufficient conceptual progress that mature versions of theories do not involve easily-recognizable synonyms of their earlier versions, and that the introduction of new elements in the domains of mathematical theories would seem to conflict with Frege’s (...)
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  23. Is Frege's Definition of the Ancestral Adequate?Richard G. Heck - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):91-116.
    Why should one think Frege's definition of the ancestral correct? It can be proven to be extensionally correct, but the argument uses arithmetical induction, and that seems to undermine Frege's claim to have justified induction in purely logical terms. I discuss such circularity objections and then offer a new definition of the ancestral intended to be intensionally correct; its extensional correctness then follows without proof. This new definition can be proven equivalent to Frege's without any use of arithmetical induction. This (...)
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  24. Fragments of frege’s grundgesetze and gödel’s constructible universe.Sean Walsh - 2016 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 81 (2):605-628.
    Frege's Grundgesetze was one of the 19th century forerunners to contemporary set theory which was plagued by the Russell paradox. In recent years, it has been shown that subsystems of the Grundgesetze formed by restricting the comprehension schema are consistent. One aim of this paper is to ascertain how much set theory can be developed within these consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze, and our main theorem shows that there is a model of a fragment of the Grundgesetze which defines a (...)
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  25. Logicism as Making Arithmetic Explicit.Vojtěch Kolman - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):487-503.
    This paper aims to shed light on the broader significance of Frege’s logicism against the background of discussing and comparing Wittgenstein’s ‘showing/saying’-distinction with Brandom’s idiom of logic as the enterprise of making the implicit rules of our linguistic practices explicit. The main thesis of this paper is that the problem of Frege’s logicism lies deeper than in its inconsistency : it lies in the basic idea that in arithmetic one can, and should, express everything that is implicitly presupposed so that (...)
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  26. Number sentences and specificational sentences: Reply to Moltmann.Robert Schwartzkopff - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2173-2192.
    Frege proposed that sentences like ‘The number of planets is eight’ be analysed as identity statements in which the number words refer to numbers. Recently, Friederike Moltmann argued that, pace Frege, such sentences be analysed as so-called specificational sentences in which the number words have the same non-referring semantic function as the number word ‘eight’ in ‘There are eight planets’. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that Moltmann fails to show that such sentences should be analysed (...)
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  27. Frege, Indispensability, and the Compatibilist Heresy.Andrea Sereni - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (1):11-30.
    In Grundgesetze, Vol. II, §91, Frege argues that ‘it is applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a game to the rank of a science’. Many view this as an in nuce statement of the indispensability argument later championed by Quine. Garavaso has questioned this attribution. I argue that even though Frege's applicability argument is not a version of ia, it facilitates acceptance of suitable formulations of ia. The prospects for making the empiricist ia compatible with a rationalist Fregean framework appear (...)
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  28. Frege meets Brouwer.Stewart Shapiro & Øystein Linnebo - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):540-552.
    We show that, by choosing definitions carefully, a version of Frege's theorem can be proved in intuitionistic logic.
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  29. Three Kantian Strands in Frege’s View of Arithmetic.Gilead Bar-Elli - 2014 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2 (7).
    On the background of explaining their different notions of analyticity, their different views on definitions, and some aspects of Frege’s notion of sense, three important Kantian strands that interweave into Frege’s view are exposed. First, Frege’s remarkable view that arithmetic, though analytic, contains truths that “extend our knowledge”, and by Kant’s use of the term, should be regarded synthetic. Secondly, that our arithmetical (and logical) knowledge depends on a sort of a capacity to recognize and identify objects, which are given (...)
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  30. Frege on Formality and the 1906 Independence-Test.Patricia A. Blanchette - 2014 - In Godehard Link (ed.), Formalism and Beyond: On the Nature of Mathematical Discourse. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 97-118.
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  31. Predicative Frege Arithmetic and ‘Everyday’ Mathematics.Richard Heck - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):279-307.
    The primary purpose of this note is to demonstrate that predicative Frege arithmetic naturally interprets certain weak but non-trivial arithmetical theories. It will take almost as long to explain what this means and why it matters as it will to prove the results.
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  32. Euclid Strikes Back at Frege.Joongol Kim - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):20-38.
    Frege’s argument against the ancient Greek conception of numbers as 'multitudes of units’ has been hailed as one of the most successful in his "Grundlagen". The aim of this paper is to show that despite Frege’s best efforts, the Euclidean conception remains a viable alternative to the Fregean conception of numbers by arguing that neither a dilemma argument Frege brings against the Euclidean conception nor a possible argument against it based on the truth of what is known as "Hume’s Principle" (...)
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  33. Generality and objectivity in Frege's foundations of arithmetic.William Demopoulos - 2013 - In Alex Miller (ed.), Logic, Language and Mathematics: Essays for Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
  34. Frege, Dedekind, and the Origins of Logicism.Erich H. Reck - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):242-265.
    This paper has a two-fold objective: to provide a balanced, multi-faceted account of the origins of logicism; to rehabilitate Richard Dedekind as a main logicist. Logicism should be seen as more deeply rooted in the development of modern mathematics than typically assumed, and this becomes evident by reconsidering Dedekind's writings in relation to Frege's. Especially in its Dedekindian and Fregean versions, logicism constitutes the culmination of the rise of ?pure mathematics? in the nineteenth century; and this rise brought with it (...)
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  35. Frege’s Ancestral and Its Circularities.Ignacio Angelelli - 2012 - Logica Universalis 6 (3-4):477-483.
    After presenting the ordinary and the Fregean formulations of the ancestral, I raise the question of what is their relationship, the natural candidate being that the Fregean version is an analysans intended to improve upon, and replace, the common notion of ancestral (the analysandum). Next, two types of circles that arise in connection with the Fregean ancestral are presented, and it is claimed that one of the circles makes it impossible to maintain the just described (“replacement”) interpretation. A reference is (...)
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  36. Some Naturalistic Comments on Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics.Y. E. Feng - 2012 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 7 (3):378-403.
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  37. Frege's Changing Conception of Number.Kevin C. Klement - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):146-167.
    I trace changes to Frege's understanding of numbers, arguing in particular that the view of arithmetic based in geometry developed at the end of his life (1924–1925) was not as radical a deviation from his views during the logicist period as some have suggested. Indeed, by looking at his earlier views regarding the connection between numbers and second-level concepts, his understanding of extensions of concepts, and the changes to his views, firstly, in between Grundlagen and Grundgesetze, and, later, after learning (...)
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  38. Platonic and Fregean Numbers.N. White - 2012 - Philosophia Mathematica 20 (2):224-244.
    Rather than reading Plato's philosophy of arithmetic ‘charitably’, it is better to try to explain its failure to generate any fruitful ideas. Prominent in the explanation is Plato's focus on predicates assigning cardinalities and on ‘groups’ falling under them. This focus left Plato unable to envisage the possibility, emerging in Dedekind and Frege but which arithmetic in Plato's time would not easily have suggested, of regarding numbers as objects essentially ranged in the structure of a progression.
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  39. Ramified Frege Arithmetic.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):715 - 735.
    Øystein Linnebo has recently shown that the existence of successors cannot be proven in predicative Frege arithmetic, using Frege's definitions of arithmetical notions. By contrast, it is shown here that the existence of successor can be proven in ramified predicative Frege arithmetic.
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  40. Numerical Abstraction via the Frege Quantifier.G. Aldo Antonelli - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (2):161-179.
    This paper presents a formalization of first-order arithmetic characterizing the natural numbers as abstracta of the equinumerosity relation. The formalization turns on the interaction of a nonstandard cardinality quantifier with an abstraction operator assigning objects to predicates. The project draws its philosophical motivation from a nonreductionist conception of logicism, a deflationary view of abstraction, and an approach to formal arithmetic that emphasizes the cardinal properties of the natural numbers over the structural ones.
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  41. Lowe on Locke's and Frege's Conceptions of Number.A. Arrieta-Urtizberea - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (1):39-52.
    In his last book about Locke’s philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege’s arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative reading of Frege’s arguments throws light on Frege’s and Lowe’s different agendas. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences (...)
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  42. Frege, the complex numbers, and the identity of indiscernibles.Wenzel Christian Helmut - 2010 - Logique Et Analyse 53 (209):51-60.
    There are mathematical structures with elements that cannot be distinguished by the properties they have within that structure. For instance within the field of complex numbers the two square roots of −1, i and −i, have the same algebraic properties in that field. So how do we distinguish between them? Imbedding the complex numbers in a bigger structure, the quaternions, allows us to algebraically tell them apart. But a similar problem appears for this larger structure. There seems to be always (...)
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  43. Frege on Number Properties.Andrew D. Irvine - 2010 - Studia Logica 96 (2):239-260.
    In the Grundlagen , Frege offers eight main arguments, together with a series of more minor supporting arguments, against Mill’s view that numbers are “properties of external things”. This paper reviews all eight of these arguments, arguing that none are conclusive.
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  44. Kitcher and Frege on A Priori Knowledge.Christoph C. Pfisterer - 2010 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 94:29-43.
    In his book "The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge" and in a series of articles, Philip Kitcher attacks the traditional conception of a priori mathematical knowledge. The reliabilism he develops as an alternative situates all our knowledge within a psychological framework. However, in "Frege's Epistemology" he claims that Frege's conception of a priori knowledge is compatible with a psychological account. Kitcher attributes to Frege a traditional concept of proof, according to which mathematical and logical proofs are psychological activities. I shall argue (...)
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  45. A Reflection on Frege's Definition of the Number.Marta Vlasakova - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (3):339-353.
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  46. Zamyšlení nad Fregovou definicí čísla.Marta Vlasáková - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (3):339-353.
    In his treatise Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Gottlob Frege tries to find a definition of number. First he rejects the idea that number could be a property of external objects. Then he comes with a suggestion that a numerical statement expresses a property of a concept, namely it indicates how many objects fall under the concept. Subsequently Frege rejects, or at least essentially modifies, also this definition, because in his view that a number cannot be a property – it should (...)
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  47. Der Zahlbegriff und seine Logik. Die Entwicklung einer Begründung der Arithmetik bei Frege, Gödel, und Lorenzen.Vojtech Kolman - 2009 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 12.
    The article deals with the evolution of the foundations of arithmetic: from the auspicious beginnings with Frege and Dedekind through the cataclysm of Russell’s antinomy to the late writings of Hilbert and the work of Paul Lorenzen. The proposed historical and dialectic reconstruction does not consist in ad hoc attempts to overcome formal difficulties of the systems in question. It rather shows how Frege’s and Dedekind’s original intentions are to be understood and can partly be justified. For this, Gödel’s famous (...)
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  48. Liberté et vérité: pensée mathématique & spéculation philosophique.Imre Tóth - 2009 - Paris: Éclat.
    La géométrie non euclidienne fut non seulement un bouleversement sans précédent dans l'histoire des mathématiques, mais également une bouffée d'air pur pour les partisans d'une "vérité sans les dogmes". Par ce "non" augmentatif, elle affirmait l'existence d'un en-dehors de l'Être, vingt-quatre siècles après le Parménide de Platon, et plaçait, more geometrico, la philosophie dans l'espace de la spiritualité occidentale, ouvrant la voie à la liberté dans le domaine des sciences rigoureuses. C'est aux implications philosophiques de cette révolution mathématique qu'est consacré (...)
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  49. Wittgenstein on Circularity in the Frege-Russell Definition of Cardinal Number.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):354-373.
    Several scholars have argued that Wittgenstein held the view that the notion of number is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation, and that therefore Hume's principle is not a sound basis for a definition of number. I offer a new interpretation of the relevant fragments on philosophy of mathematics from Wittgenstein's Nachlass, showing that if different uses of ‘presupposition’ are understood in terms of de re and de dicto knowledge, Wittgenstein's argument against the Frege-Russell definition of number turns out (...)
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  50. Der Zahlbegriff und seine Logik. Die Entwicklung einer Begründung der Arithmetik bei Frege, Gödel, und Lorenzen.Vojtech Kolman - 2008 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 11.
    The article deals with the evolution of the foundations of arithmetic: from the auspicious beginnings with Frege and Dedekind through the cataclysm of Russell’s antinomy to the late writings of Hilbert and the work of Paul Lorenzen . The proposed historical and dialectic reconstruction does not consist in ad hoc attempts to overcome formal difficulties of the systems in question. It rather shows how Frege’s and Dedekind’s original intentions are to be understood and can partly be justified. For this, Gödel’s (...)
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