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Frege: Genuine Proper Names
  1. The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1107-1168.
    This paper argues for a version of metalinguistic descriptivism, the Mill-Frege view, comparing it to a currently popular alternative, predicativism. The Mill-Frege view combines tenets of Fregean views with features of the theory of direct reference. According to it, proper names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions. In support of the view the paper argues that the name-bearing relation—which predicativists cite to account for the properties that they take (...)
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  2. Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell Problems.Frederick Kroon - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (1):1-30.
    Contrary to frequent declarations that descriptivism as a theory of how names refer is dead and gone, such a descriptivism is, to all appearances, alive and well. Or rather, a descendent of that doctrine is alive and well. This new version—neo-descriptivism, for short—is supposedly immune from the usual arguments against descriptivism, in large part because it avoids classical descriptivism’s emphasis on salient, first-come-to-mind properties and holds instead that a name’s reference-fixing content is typically given by egocentric properties specified in terms (...)
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  3. Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense.Mark Textor - 2000 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 15 (2):287-302.
    Michael Dummett holds that the sense of a natural language proper name is part of its linguistic meaning. I argue that this view sits uncomfortably with Frege's observation that the sense of a natural language proper name varies from speaker to speaker. Moreover, the thesis under discussion is not supported by Frege's views on communication. Recently Richard Heck has tried to develop an argument which is intended to show that assertoric communication with sentences containing proper names is only possible if (...)
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  4. Frege-Inspired Neo-Descriptivism and Its Problems.Jan G. Michel - 2015 - In D. Schott (ed.), Frege: Freund(e) und Feind(e). Logos. pp. 161-175.
  5. Vacuous Names in Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, and Moore.Mark Textor - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (6):316-326.
    Empty proper names give rise to intriguing questions. Frege, Moore and Russell stand at the beginning of analytic philosophy's engagement with these questions. In this paper I will therefore introduce and assess their views on the topic of empty names and draw connections to recent work.
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  6. Frege and the Description Theory: An Attempt at Rehabilitation.Ari Maunu - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):109-116.
    I question the received view that Frege advocates the description theory of proper names. First, I argue that the textual evidence for this view from Frege’s writings is not conclusive. Secondly, I propose that the Fregean Sinne (of proper names) may be understood nondescriptionally in terms of symbolhood. Finally, I suggest that in the notorious passages where Frege is apparently supporting the description theory he is just indicating the potential problems with communication with proper names.
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  7. Identité et référence. La théorie des noms propres chez Frege et Kripke.Pascal Engel - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (4):529-529.
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  8. Frege's Referential Dualism Concerning Proper Names.Paulo Roberto Margutti-Pinto - 1999 - Manuscrito 22:117.
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  9. Singular Terms.Bob Hale - 1994 - In Brian McGuiness & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 17--44.
  10. Wittgenstein Und Frege Über Eigennamen Und Das Kontextprinzip.Eva Picardi - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (4):619-637.
    The paper discusses the bearing of Frege′s and Wittgenstein′s interpretations of the Context Principle on the use of proper names. It is argued that the later Wittgenstein, unlike the author of Tractatus, has many interesting things to say concerning the meaning and use of proper names that are not at variance with Frege′s views. If we bear in mind the paramount importance of context in communication we may come to see Frege′s and Wittgenstein′s observations on the fluctuating meaning of proper (...)
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  11. “Paderewski” y el problema del valor cognoscitivo en Frege.Ignacio Vicario Arjona - 2002 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 27 (2):361-387.
    The paper examines Frege’s argument based on the problem of cognitive value. This argument is opposed to Millian semantics on proper names and sustains Frege’s owns proposal. I point out a general flaw in the argument and elucidate the difficulty embodied by the ‘Paderewski’ example. I also defend the relevance of the example from a contention suggested in a recent paper by David Sosa.
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  12. Dos versiones de Frege.Luis Estrada González - 2006 - A Parte Rei 44:1-9.
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  13. Sentences and Names in Frege.H. W. Noonan - 1976 - Analysis 36 (4):188 - 190.
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  14. Comparing Frege and Russell.Kent Bach - manuscript
    Frege's and Russell's views are obviously different, but because of certain superficial similarities in how they handle certain famous puzzles about proper names, they are often assimilated. Where proper names are concerned, both Frege and Russell are often described together as "descriptivists." But their views are fundamentally different. To see that, let's look at the puzzle of names without bearers, as it arises in the context of Mill's purely referential theory of proper names, aka the 'Fido'-Fido theory.
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  15. The Sense of a Name.Michael Luntley - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):265-282.
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Frege: The First-Person Pronoun
  1. The Thoughts That God Cannot Think: A Fregean Argument for Particular, Primitive, and Private Self-Presentation.Abraham Mathew - 2020 - Noēsis – Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):3-8.
    In his seminal 'The Thought', Gottlob Frege claims that “everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way in which he is presented to no one else.”) Nonetheless, he does not set out an argument to defend this claim. In this paper, I utilize Fregean concepts from 'The Thought', in addition to supplemental arguments from Gareth Evans and Saul Kripke, to show how Frege could have argued for this conclusion.
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  2. Frege's Unthinkable Thoughts.Lukas Skiba - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):333–343.
    There are two common reactions to Frege’s claim that some senses and thoughts are private. Privatists accept both private senses and thoughts, while intersubjectivists don’t accept either. Both sides agree on a pair of tacit assumptions: first, that private senses automatically give rise to private thoughts; and second, that private senses and thoughts are the most problematic entities to which Frege’s remarks on privacy give rise. The aim of this paper is to show that both assumptions are mistaken. This will (...)
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  3. IV—Sharing Thoughts About Oneself.Guy Longworth - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):57-81.
    This paper is about first‐person thoughts—thoughts about oneself that are expressible through uses of first‐person pronouns. It is widely held that first‐person thoughts cannot be shared. My aim is to postpone rejection of the more natural view that such thoughts about oneself can be shared. I sketch an account on which such thoughts can be shared and indicate some ways in which deciding the fate of the account will depend upon further work.
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  4. Frege on Indexicals.Robert May - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):487-516.
  5. Frege über den Sinn des Wortes „Ich”.Andreas Kemmerling - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1):1-22.
    Frege hat an seiner metaphysischen und semantischen Lehre der frühen 90er Jahre Veränderungen vorgenommen, um Besonderheiten des Sinns von „ich” Rechnung zu tragen. Diese Veränderungen betreffen zum einen den Status von Gedanken als objektiven Entitäten, zum andern betreffen sie die sprachlogische Behandlung von Ausdrücken, deren Sinn erst im Zusammenspiel mit dem Verwendungskontext einen selbständigen Gedankenteil ergibt. Diese Veränderungen lassen die alte Lehre in ihrem Kern unberührt. Doch obgleich Freges Auffassungen über den Sinn von „ich” eine kohärente Weiterentwicklung seiner Lehre darstellen, (...)
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  6. The Communication of First Person Thoughts.François Recanati - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 95-102.
    A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.
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  7. Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
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  8. Frege On ‘I’, ‘Now’, ‘Today’ And Some Other Linguistic Devices.Edward Harcourt - 1999 - Synthese 121 (3):329-356.
    In this paper, I argue against an influential view of Frege's writings on indexical and other context-sensitive expressions, and in favour of an alternative. The centrepiece of the influential view, due to Evans and McDowell, is that according to Frege, context-sensitive word-meaning plus context combine to express senses which are essentially first person, essentially present tense and so on, depending on the contextsensitive expression in question. Frege's treatment of indexicals thus fits smoothly with his Intuitive Criterion of difference of sense. (...)
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  9. 2. Frege on I Thoughts.Wolfgang Carl - 2014 - In The First-Person Point of View. De Gruyter. pp. 55-81.
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  10. Sense and the First Person.Edward Harcourt - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
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  11. Frege and the First Person.Richard DeVidi - 2001 - In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. pp. 30--31.
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  12. Frege über den Sinn des Wortes „Ich”.Andreas Kemmerling - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1):1-22.
    Frege hat an seiner metaphysischen und semantischen Lehre der frühen 90er Jahre Veränderungen vorgenommen, um Besonderheiten des Sinns von „ich” Rechnung zu tragen. Diese Veränderungen betreffen zum einen den Status von Gedanken als objektiven Entitäten, zum andern betreffen sie die sprachlogische Behandlung von Ausdrücken, deren Sinn erst im Zusammenspiel mit dem Verwendungskontext einen selbständigen Gedankenteil ergibt. Diese Veränderungen lassen die alte Lehre in ihrem Kern unberührt. Doch obgleich Freges Auffassungen über den Sinn von „ich” eine kohärente Weiterentwicklung seiner Lehre darstellen, (...)
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  13. Frege Et le Cogito.Stéphane Chauvier - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (2):349-368.
    Most of the readers of Frege's first Logical Investigation, have been convinced that, according to Frege, the sense of was a private one, that an I-thought was a private thought. But it is not the case: the famous Fregean distinction between private representations and public thoughts seems an explanation and a generalization of the I-thought problem as much as an anti-Cartesian repetition of the Cartesian Second Meditation. Frege's position concerning indexical thoughts is that they are public thoughts, for the sense (...)
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  14. The First Person: Problems of Sense and Reference.Edward Harcourt - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46:25-46.
    0 Consider ‘I’ as used by a given speaker and some ordinary proper name of that speaker: are these two coreferential singular terms which differ in Fregean sense? If they could be shown to be so, we might be able to explain the logical and epistemological peculiarities of ‘I’ by appeal to its special sense and yet feel no temptation to think of its reference as anything more exotic than a human being.
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  15. Reconstructing Frege.Mark Textor - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (3):197-208.
  16. On the Link Between Frege's Platonic-Realist Semantics and His Doctrine of Private Senses.Sara Ellenbogen - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):375 - 382.
    Frege's doctrine that the demonstrative ‘I’ has a private, incommunicable sense creates tension within his theory of meaning. Fregean sense is supposed to be something objective, which exists independently of its being cognized by anyone. And the notion of a private sense corresponding to primitive aspects of an individual of which only he can be awaredoes violence both to Frege's theory of sense as well as to our notionof language as something essentially intersubjective. John Perry has arguedthat Frege was led (...)
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  17. Are Hybrid Proper Names the Solution to the Completion Problem? A Reply to Wolfgang Künne.Edward Harcourt - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):301-313.
  18. Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes.Saul A. Kripke - 2008 - Theoria 74 (3):181-218.
    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well-known 'unlearnability' argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so that giving a (...)
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  19. Frege on Demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
Frege: Descriptions
  1. Russell's Revenge: A Problem for Bivalent Fregean Theories of Descriptions.Jan Heylen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):636-652.
    Fregean theories of descriptions as terms have to deal with improper descriptions. To save bivalence various proposals have been made that involve assigning referents to improper descriptions. While bivalence is indeed saved, there is a price to be paid. Instantiations of the same general scheme, viz. the one and only individual that is F and G is G, are not only allowed but even required to have different truth values.
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  2. Descriptions: Frege and Russell Combined.Oswaldo Chateaubriand - 2002 - Synthese 130 (2):213-226.
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  3. Descriptions: Frege and Russell Combined.Oswaldo Chateaubriand - 2002 - Synthese 130 (2):213 - 226.
  4. Russell Vs. Frege on Definite Descriptions as Singular Terms.Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky - 2009 - In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of. Routledge.
    In ‘On Denoting’ and to some extent in ‘Review of Meinong and Others, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie’, published in the same issue of Mind (Russell, 1905a,b), Russell presents not only his famous elimination (or contextual defi nition) of defi nite descriptions, but also a series of considerations against understanding defi nite descriptions as singular terms. At the end of ‘On Denoting’, Russell believes he has shown that all the theories that do treat defi nite descriptions as singular terms fall (...)
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Frege: Indexicals and Demonstratives, Misc
  1. Frege on Indexicals.Robert May - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):487-516.
  2. Slicing Thoughts.Vojislav Bozickovic - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):3-13.
    According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different if it is at the same time possible for a rational subject to take conflicting epistemic attitudes toward them. But applying this criterion to perception-based demonstrative thoughts seems to slice thoughts too finely and lead to their proliferation which makes the criterion implausible. I argue that such a proliferation of thoughts is blocked by transforming this criterion into a related one that is shown to be (...)
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  3. Frege On ‘I’, ‘Now’, ‘Today’ And Some Other Linguistic Devices.Edward Harcourt - 1999 - Synthese 121 (3):329-356.
    In this paper, I argue against an influential view of Frege's writings on indexical and other context-sensitive expressions, and in favour of an alternative. The centrepiece of the influential view, due to Evans and McDowell, is that according to Frege, context-sensitive word-meaning plus context combine to express senses which are essentially first person, essentially present tense and so on, depending on the contextsensitive expression in question. Frege's treatment of indexicals thus fits smoothly with his Intuitive Criterion of difference of sense. (...)
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  4. Frege’s Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Extended.Mark Textor - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):823-847.
    According to Frege, neither demonstratives nor indexicals are singular terms; only a demonstrative together with ‘circumstances accompanying its utterance’ has sense and singular reference. While this view seems defensible for demonstratives, where demonstrations serve as non-verbal signs, indexicals, especially pure indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, seem not to be in need of completion by circumstances of utterance. In this paper I argue on the basis of independent reasons that indexicals are in fact in need of completion; I identify the (...)
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  5. Über Künne Über Kripke Über Künne Über Frege.Andreas Kemmerling - 2011 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (3):389-402.
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  6. Frege on Indexicals: Sense and Context Sensitivity.Richard Charles Devidi - 1996 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    Indexical expressions--e.g., 'I', 'here', 'yesterday', 'this', etc.--pose a serious challenge for a Fregean theory of meaning. A Fregean theory holds that the meaning of an expression is its sense, and that this sense determines the reference of the expression independently of context. The most notable feature of indexicals, however, is their sensitivity to context. David Kaplan and John Perry argue that there can be no Fregean solution to this issue. They assume that the Fregean sense of a singular term is (...)
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  7. Frege and Peirce: Indexicality and the Philosophy of Language.Patrick Barker - 1985 - Semiotics:3-14.
  8. Indexikalität, Sinn Und Propositionaler Gehalt.Wolfgang Künne - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 18 (1):41-74.
    Wodurch wird der Sinn des Prädikats in einer Äußerung des indexikalischen Satzes 'Ich habe Blutgruppe A' zu dem propositionalen Gehalt vervollständigt, den der Sprecher ausdrückt? Durch einen Individualbegriff (unter den der Sprecher fällt)? Durch ein Individuum (den Sprecher in propria persona)! Keiner dieser Lösungsvorschläge für das (von Perry zuerst formulierte) Vervollständigungsproblem ist überzeugend. Für Frege ist der in einer solchen Äußerung verwendete Eigenname hybrid: er besteht aus einem Vorkommnis von 'ich' und den Umständen seiner Äußerung. Der Indikator 'ich' allein ist (...)
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  9. Indexicals: A Problem for Gottlob Frege's Semantic.Ángela Rocío Bejarano Chaves - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):139-149.
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  10. Los deícticos: Un problema para la semántica de Gottlob Frege.Ángela Rocío Bejarano Chaves - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):139-149.
    La tesis de este artículo es que tenemosrazones suficientes para considerar losdeícticos un problema para la propuestasemántica de Gottlob Frege. Dividiremosel texto en dos partes: en la primera,expondremos el programa semánt i codel l ógi co al emán por medi o de t rest e s i s e s t r uc t ur ant e s. En l a s e gunda,introduciremos la cuestión de los deícticos,explorando en qué medida representan unproblema para dicho programa. The thesis of this (...)
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  11. Frege and the Case of the Missing Sense.Pavel Tichy - 1986 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 27 (1):27-47.
    It is widely held that oblique contexts and indexical terms present difficulties to Frege's theory of sense. The aim of the present paper is to show that a simple device involving no revision of Frege's semantic doctrine resolves all the alleged difficulties. A simple extension of Frege's notation is proposed which makes it possible to translate oblique contexts into the concept script.
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  12. Sense, Reference and Hybridity.Wolfgang Künne - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):529-551.
    In his paper on ‘Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference’ Saul Kripke remarks: “Like the present account, Künne stresses that for Frege times, persons, etc. can be part of the expression of the thought. However, his reading is certainly not mine in significant respects . . .”. On both counts, he is right. As regards the differences between our readings, in some respects I shall confess to having made a mistake, in several others I shall remain stubbornly unmoved. Thus I (...)
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