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  1. On Frege’s Assimilation of Sentences with Names.Dongwoo Kim - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):241-263.
    I shall discuss some of the issues concerning a notorious doctrine of Frege that sentences are names of truth-values. I am interested in a problem raised by Kripke that the doctrine obscures the distinction between judgeable and unjudgeable contents. I shall present what I take to be Frege’s account of judgeable content: a proper expression of a judgeable content is susceptible to an analysis into a predicate and an argument-word, where a predicate is understood as a concept-word used to attribute (...)
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  2. Nota Sobre o Frege de Evans.Sagid Salles - 2019 - Investigação Filosófica 10 (2):39-46.
    Evans famosamente declarou que Frege não aceitou a possibilidade de sentido sem referente, o que significa que ele não foi tão tolerante com nomes vazios quanto comumente se pensa. Um problema central para a tese de Evans é que Frege diz explicitamente que aceita esta possibilidade, e parece que ele de fato foi tolerante com nomes vazios. Neste artigo, defendo que a solução de Evans para este problema implica que Frege estava comprometido com uma explicação implausível das frases contendo nomes (...)
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  3. Termos Singulares Indefinidos: Frege, Russell e a tradição matemática.Daniel Durante Pereira Alves - 2016 - Saberes: Filosofia E Educação (Filosofia Lógica e Metafísica An):33-53.
    É bem conhecida a divergência entre as posições de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell com relação ao tratamento semântico dado a sentenças contendo termos singulares indefinidos, ou seja, termos singulares sem referência ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘Papai Noel’ ou ‘o atual rei da França’ ou ‘1/0 ’ ou ‘√4’ ou ‘o autor de Principia Mathematica’. Para Frege, as sentenças da linguagem natural que contêm termos indefinidos não formam declarações e portanto não são nem verdadeiras nem falsas. Já para (...)
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  4. What is a Meaningful Name? Frege's Idea of a Radical Semanto-Ontological Analysis.Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer - 1995 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 3:151-173.
    Some theories of language tell us that names have no meaning. A name just refers to the object named. On the other hand, we certainly may use the word „meaning” in the terminological way Frege uses the German word „Bedeutung”.
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  5. Russell, Frege and the Puzzle of Denoting.Aloysius P. Martinich - 1975 - International Studies in Philosophy 7:145-154.
    Russell said that the measure of a theory is its ability to solve puzzles. i show that frege's theory of sense and denotation is the equal of russell's theory of definite descriptions for solving the latter's three puzzles of denoting. i then show that their theories have some important features in common, which are key to solving two of the puzzles. the most important of these features is that each theory denies that the meaning of a description is its denotation.
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  6. How 'Russellian' Was Frege?David Bell - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):267-277.
  7. How to Frege a Russell-Kaplan.Esa Saarinen - 1982 - Noûs 16 (2):253-276.
    In all semantical investigations the following two principles must be kept firmly in mind. First, never to confuse metaphysical with epistemological modalities and possibilities, second, to observe that it is the latter kind of modalities and possibilities that are relevant for semantics. In this paper I shall consider some celebrated cases of so-called direct reference (referential uses of definite descriptions, indexicals, demonstratives and proper names) and argue that the generally accepted views about these turn on not appreciating the two principles. (...)
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Frege: Genuine Proper Names
  1. Connotation and Frege's Semantic Dualism.Michael R. Hicks - 2019 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (4):377-398.
    The traditional distinction between Millian and Fregean theories of names presupposes that what Mill calls ‘connotation’ lines up with what Frege calls ‘sense.’ This presupposition is false. Mill’s talk of connotation is an attempt to bring into view the line of thought that crystallizes in Frege’s distinction between concept and object. This latter is the semantic dualism of my title.
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  2. The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1107-1168.
    This paper argues for a version of metalinguistic descriptivism, the Mill-Frege view, comparing it to a currently popular alternative, predicativism. The Mill-Frege view combines tenets of Fregean views with features of the theory of direct reference. According to it, proper names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions. In support of the view the paper argues that the name-bearing relation—which predicativists cite to account for the properties that they take (...)
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  3. Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell Problems.Frederick Kroon - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (1):1-30.
    Contrary to frequent declarations that descriptivism as a theory of how names refer is dead and gone, such a descriptivism is, to all appearances, alive and well. Or rather, a descendent of that doctrine is alive and well. This new version—neo-descriptivism, for short—is supposedly immune from the usual arguments against descriptivism, in large part because it avoids classical descriptivism’s emphasis on salient, first-come-to-mind properties and holds instead that a name’s reference-fixing content is typically given by egocentric properties specified in terms (...)
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  4. Mill-Frege Compatibalism.John Justice - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:567-576.
    It is generally accepted that Mill’s classification of names as nonconnotative terms is incompatible with Frege’s thesis that names have senses. However, Milldescribed the senses of nonconnotative terms—without being aware that he was doing so. These are the senses for names that were sought in vain by Frege. When Mill’s and Frege’s doctrines are understood as complementary, they constitute a fully satisfactory theory of names.
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  5. Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense.Mark Textor - 2000 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 15 (2):287-302.
    Michael Dummett holds that the sense of a natural language proper name is part of its linguistic meaning. I argue that this view sits uncomfortably with Frege's observation that the sense of a natural language proper name varies from speaker to speaker. Moreover, the thesis under discussion is not supported by Frege's views on communication. Recently Richard Heck has tried to develop an argument which is intended to show that assertoric communication with sentences containing proper names is only possible if (...)
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  6. Frege-Inspired Neo-Descriptivism and Its Problems.Jan G. Michel - 2015 - In D. Schott (ed.), Frege: Freund(e) und Feind(e). Berlin: Logos. pp. 161-175.
    In this paper, I mainly pursue the following two goals: on the one hand, I want to show how a central Fregean insight is tried to be captured within a two-dimensional strategy. On the other hand, I want to show that, in the light of Saul Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism, this strategy is faced with a fundamental problem. I proceed in four steps: in a first step, I bring together the passages that contain a central Fregean insight as a source (...)
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  7. Vacuous Names in Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, and Moore.Mark Textor - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (6):316-326.
    Empty proper names give rise to intriguing questions. Frege, Moore and Russell stand at the beginning of analytic philosophy's engagement with these questions. In this paper I will therefore introduce and assess their views on the topic of empty names and draw connections to recent work.
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  8. Frege and the Description Theory: An Attempt at Rehabilitation.Ari Maunu - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):109-116.
    I question the received view that Frege advocates the description theory of proper names. First, I argue that the textual evidence for this view from Frege’s writings is not conclusive. Secondly, I propose that the Fregean Sinne (of proper names) may be understood nondescriptionally in terms of symbolhood. Finally, I suggest that in the notorious passages where Frege is apparently supporting the description theory he is just indicating the potential problems with communication with proper names.
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  9. Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege.Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...)
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  10. Identité et référence. La théorie des noms propres chez Frege et Kripke.Pascal Engel - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (4):529-529.
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  11. Frege's Referential Dualism Concerning Proper Names.Paulo Roberto Margutti-Pinto - 1999 - Manuscrito 22:117.
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  12. Singular Terms.Bob Hale - 1994 - In Brian McGuiness & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 17--44.
  13. Wittgenstein Und Frege Über Eigennamen Und Das Kontextprinzip.Eva Picardi - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (4):619-637.
    The paper discusses the bearing of Frege′s and Wittgenstein′s interpretations of the Context Principle on the use of proper names. It is argued that the later Wittgenstein, unlike the author of Tractatus, has many interesting things to say concerning the meaning and use of proper names that are not at variance with Frege′s views. If we bear in mind the paramount importance of context in communication we may come to see Frege′s and Wittgenstein′s observations on the fluctuating meaning of proper (...)
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  14. “Paderewski” y el problema del valor cognoscitivo en Frege.Ignacio Vicario Arjona - 2002 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 27 (2):361-387.
    The paper examines Frege’s argument based on the problem of cognitive value. This argument is opposed to Millian semantics on proper names and sustains Frege’s owns proposal. I point out a general flaw in the argument and elucidate the difficulty embodied by the ‘Paderewski’ example. I also defend the relevance of the example from a contention suggested in a recent paper by David Sosa.
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  15. Dos versiones de Frege.Luis Estrada González - 2006 - A Parte Rei 44:1-9.
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  16. Mill-Frege Compatibalism.John Justice - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:567-576.
    It is generally accepted that Mill’s classification of names as nonconnotative terms is incompatible with Frege’s thesis that names have senses. However, Milldescribed the senses of nonconnotative terms—without being aware that he was doing so. These are the senses for names that were sought in vain by Frege. When Mill’s and Frege’s doctrines are understood as complementary, they constitute a fully satisfactory theory of names.
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  17. Sentences and Names in Frege.H. W. Noonan - 1976 - Analysis 36 (4):188-190.
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  18. Russell and Frege Again.P. T. Geach - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):159 - 160.
    ......Mathematics coincides with Frege's theory of Sinn and Bedeutung...argued that in cases where Frege would say we recognize over...successful.) With this sort of elucidation, then, I indeed proposed to...use of . . .', or between Frege's 'einen Sinn ausdruckeri.....
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  19. Comparing Frege and Russell.Kent Bach - manuscript
    Frege's and Russell's views are obviously different, but because of certain superficial similarities in how they handle certain famous puzzles about proper names, they are often assimilated. Where proper names are concerned, both Frege and Russell are often described together as "descriptivists." But their views are fundamentally different. To see that, let's look at the puzzle of names without bearers, as it arises in the context of Mill's purely referential theory of proper names, aka the 'Fido'-Fido theory.
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  20. The Sense of a Name.Michael Luntley - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):265-282.
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Frege: The First-Person Pronoun
  1. When Lingens Meets Frege: Communication Without Common Ground.Jens Kipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1441-1461.
    In this paper, I argue that, contrary to Robert Stalnaker’s highly influential account of linguistic communication, successful communication does not depend on a common ground between speaker and hearer. The problem for Stalnaker’s account manifests itself in communicative situations that represent both Lingens cases, i.e., cases involving egocentric beliefs, and Frege cases, i.e., cases involving identity confusions. I describe two hypothetical cases that involve successful communication, but in which no common ground of the kind required by Stalnaker’s account is available. (...)
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  2. Facetten des "ich".Thomas Spitzley - 2000 - Paderborn: mentis.
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  3. De Se Exceptionalism and Frege Puzzles.James R. Shaw - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:1057-1086.
    De se exceptionalism is the view, notably championed by Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979), that our characteristically 'first-personal' ways of thinking about ourselves present unique challenges to standard views of propositional attitudes like belief. Though the view has won many adherents, it has recently come under a barrage of deserved criticism. A key claim of detractors is that classic examples used to motivate de se exceptionalism from de se ignorance or misidentification are nothing more than familiar Frege-puzzles, which raise no (...)
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  4. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
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  5. Frege's Unthinkable Thoughts.Lukas Skiba - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):333–343.
    There are two common reactions to Frege’s claim that some senses and thoughts are private. Privatists accept both private senses and thoughts, while intersubjectivists don’t accept either. Both sides agree on a pair of tacit assumptions: first, that private senses automatically give rise to private thoughts; and second, that private senses and thoughts are the most problematic entities to which Frege’s remarks on privacy give rise. The aim of this paper is to show that both assumptions are mistaken. This will (...)
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  6. IV—Sharing Thoughts About Oneself.Guy Longworth - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):57-81.
    This paper is about first‐person thoughts—thoughts about oneself that are expressible through uses of first‐person pronouns. It is widely held that first‐person thoughts cannot be shared. My aim is to postpone rejection of the more natural view that such thoughts about oneself can be shared. I sketch an account on which such thoughts can be shared and indicate some ways in which deciding the fate of the account will depend upon further work.
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  7. Frege on Indexicals.Robert May - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):487-516.
  8. Frege über den Sinn des Wortes „Ich”.Andreas Kemmerling - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1):1-22.
    Frege hat an seiner metaphysischen und semantischen Lehre der frühen 90er Jahre Veränderungen vorgenommen, um Besonderheiten des Sinns von „ich” Rechnung zu tragen. Diese Veränderungen betreffen zum einen den Status von Gedanken als objektiven Entitäten, zum andern betreffen sie die sprachlogische Behandlung von Ausdrücken, deren Sinn erst im Zusammenspiel mit dem Verwendungskontext einen selbständigen Gedankenteil ergibt. Diese Veränderungen lassen die alte Lehre in ihrem Kern unberührt. Doch obgleich Freges Auffassungen über den Sinn von „ich” eine kohärente Weiterentwicklung seiner Lehre darstellen, (...)
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  9. The Communication of First Person Thoughts.François Recanati - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 95-102.
    A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.
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  10. Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
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  11. Frege On ‘I’, ‘Now’, ‘Today’ And Some Other Linguistic Devices.Edward Harcourt - 1999 - Synthese 121 (3):329-356.
    In this paper, I argue against an influential view of Frege's writings on indexical and other context-sensitive expressions, and in favour of an alternative. The centrepiece of the influential view, due to Evans and McDowell, is that according to Frege, context-sensitive word-meaning plus context combine to express senses which are essentially first person, essentially present tense and so on, depending on the contextsensitive expression in question. Frege's treatment of indexicals thus fits smoothly with his Intuitive Criterion of difference of sense. (...)
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  12. Objects of Thought.Ian Rumfitt - 2016 - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meaning and Other Things: Essays on the Philosophy of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford University Press.
    In his book The Things We Mean, Stephen Schiffer advances a subtle defence of what he calls the ‘face-value’ analysis of attributions of belief and reports of speech. Under this analysis, ‘Harold believes that there is life on Venus’ expresses a relation between Harold and a certain abstract object, the proposition that there is life on Venus. The present essay first proposes an improvement to Schiffer’s ‘pleonastic’ theory of propositions. It then challenges the face-value analysis. There will be such things (...)
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  13. 2. Frege on I Thoughts.Wolfgang Carl - 2014 - In The First-Person Point of View. De Gruyter. pp. 55-81.
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  14. Sense and the First Person.Edward Harcourt - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
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  15. Frege and the First Person.Richard DeVidi - 2001 - In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. pp. 30--31.
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  16. Frege über den Sinn des Wortes „Ich”.Andreas Kemmerling - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1):1-22.
    Frege hat an seiner metaphysischen und semantischen Lehre der frühen 90er Jahre Veränderungen vorgenommen, um Besonderheiten des Sinns von „ich” Rechnung zu tragen. Diese Veränderungen betreffen zum einen den Status von Gedanken als objektiven Entitäten, zum andern betreffen sie die sprachlogische Behandlung von Ausdrücken, deren Sinn erst im Zusammenspiel mit dem Verwendungskontext einen selbständigen Gedankenteil ergibt. Diese Veränderungen lassen die alte Lehre in ihrem Kern unberührt. Doch obgleich Freges Auffassungen über den Sinn von „ich” eine kohärente Weiterentwicklung seiner Lehre darstellen, (...)
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  17. AE or EA?H. W. Noonan - 1986 - Analysis 46 (2):87-89.
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  18. Frege Et le Cogito.Stéphane Chauvier - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (2):349-368.
    Most of the readers of Frege's first Logical Investigation, have been convinced that, according to Frege, the sense of was a private one, that an I-thought was a private thought. But it is not the case: the famous Fregean distinction between private representations and public thoughts seems an explanation and a generalization of the I-thought problem as much as an anti-Cartesian repetition of the Cartesian Second Meditation. Frege's position concerning indexical thoughts is that they are public thoughts, for the sense (...)
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  19. The First Person: Problems of Sense and Reference.Edward Harcourt - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46:25-46.
    0 Consider ‘I’ as used by a given speaker and some ordinary proper name of that speaker: are these two coreferential singular terms which differ in Fregean sense? If they could be shown to be so, we might be able to explain the logical and epistemological peculiarities of ‘I’ by appeal to its special sense and yet feel no temptation to think of its reference as anything more exotic than a human being.
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  20. Reconstructing Frege.Mark Textor - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (3):197-208.
  21. On the Link Between Frege's Platonic-Realist Semantics and His Doctrine of Private Senses.Sara Ellenbogen - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):375 - 382.
    Frege's doctrine that the demonstrative ‘I’ has a private, incommunicable sense creates tension within his theory of meaning. Fregean sense is supposed to be something objective, which exists independently of its being cognized by anyone. And the notion of a private sense corresponding to primitive aspects of an individual of which only he can be awaredoes violence both to Frege's theory of sense as well as to our notionof language as something essentially intersubjective. John Perry has arguedthat Frege was led (...)
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  22. Are Hybrid Proper Names the Solution to the Completion Problem? A Reply to Wolfgang Künne.Edward Harcourt - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):301-313.
  23. Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes.Saul A. Kripke - 2008 - Theoria 74 (3):181-218.
    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well-known 'unlearnability' argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so that giving a (...)
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