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  1. added 2020-06-02
    Reply to Danielle Macbeth.John Mcdowell - 2004 - Theoria 70 (2-3):243-249.
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  2. added 2020-06-01
    Modes of Presentation and Modes of Determination in Frege.Rod Bertolet - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:233-238.
    Michael Beaney has argued that Frege’s characterization of the senses of names as modes of presentation early in “On Sense and Reference” is problematic, but the problem disappears if we use the notion of modes of determination as that was deployed in the Begriffsschrift to characterize senses. It is argued that there is no philosophically interesting difference between the two notions, and no problem posed by modes of presentation that would be resolved by appeal to modes of determination.
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  3. added 2020-06-01
    Modes of Presentation and Modes of Determination in Frege.Rod Bertolet - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:233-238.
    Michael Beaney has argued that Frege’s characterization of the senses of names as modes of presentation early in “On Sense and Reference” is problematic, but the problem disappears if we use the notion of modes of determination as that was deployed in the Begriffsschrift to characterize senses. It is argued that there is no philosophically interesting difference between the two notions, and no problem posed by modes of presentation that would be resolved by appeal to modes of determination.
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  4. added 2020-06-01
    Sign and Sense Russell's Criticisms of Frege.Susan M. Bredlau - 1999
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  5. added 2020-05-30
    The Truth of Thoughts: Variations on Fregean Themes.Oswaldo Chateaubriand - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):199-215.
    In this paper I present an abstract theory of senses, thoughts, and truth, inspired by ideas of Frege. "Inspired" because for the most part I shall not pretend to interpret Frege in a literal sense, but, rather, develop some of his ideas in ways that seem to me to preserve important aspects of them. Senses are characterized as identifying properties; i.e., roughly, as properties that apply, in virtue of their logical structure, to exactly one thing, if they apply to anything (...)
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  6. added 2020-05-30
    Review: Sense, Reference, and Philosophy. [REVIEW]S. Predelli - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):421-424.
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  7. added 2020-05-29
    Reconstructing Frege.Mark Textor - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (3):197-208.
  8. added 2020-05-29
    On the Link Between Frege's Platonic-Realist Semantics and His Doctrine of Private Senses.Sara Ellenbogen - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):375 - 382.
    Frege's doctrine that the demonstrative ‘I’ has a private, incommunicable sense creates tension within his theory of meaning. Fregean sense is supposed to be something objective, which exists independently of its being cognized by anyone. And the notion of a private sense corresponding to primitive aspects of an individual of which only he can be awaredoes violence both to Frege's theory of sense as well as to our notionof language as something essentially intersubjective. John Perry has arguedthat Frege was led (...)
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  9. added 2020-05-28
    Frege on Identity, Cognitive Value, and Subject Matter.John Perry - unknown
    Frege continues by explaining what bothered him in the Begriffsschrift, and motivated his treatment of identity in that work.2 He goes on to criticize that account. By the end of the paragraph, he has introduced his key concept of sinn, abandonning not only the Begriffsschrift account of identity, but its basical semantical framework. In the Begriffsschrift Frege’s main semantic concept was content [Inhalt ]. Already in the Begriffsschrift, he is struggling with this concept. In §3 he..
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  10. added 2020-05-27
    Introducing Sense.Maite Ezcurdia - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):279-312.
    In this paper I present what I take to be the best argument for the introduction of the semantic category of sense. This argument, or a version of it, can be extracted from Frege’s renowned ‘On Sense and Reference’, but has not been properly understood or appreciated. I begin by discussing the Russellian objections to other versions of the argument attributed to Frege, in order to expound the argument which fends off such objections.
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  11. added 2020-05-24
    Frege and Chomsky: Sense and Psychologism.Barry C. Smith - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25--46.
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  12. added 2020-05-21
    Turning the Tables on Frege or How is It That "Hesperus is Hesperus" is Trivial?Howard Wettstein - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:317-339.
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  13. added 2020-05-21
    Über Russells Kritik an Freges Unterscheidung Zwischen Sinn Und Bedeutung.Michael Strauss - 1978 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 9 (1):106-111.
    In "On Denoting" behauptet Russell, Freges "Sinn" sei so beschaffen, daß beim Versuch, von ihm - genauer: von einer bestimmten Sinn-Einheit - etwas auszusagen, eine Verwirrung entsteht. Er macht verschiedene Versuche, von dem Sinn einer hindeutenden Phrase zu sprechen, und es stellt sich immer wieder heraus, daß etwas anderes als das Beabsichtigte besprochen wurde. Im Folgenden will ich zeigen, daß diese Verwirrung nicht in Freges Unterscheidung zwischen Sinn und Bedeutung ihren Ursprung hat, sondern in einem Fehler, den Russell in seinen (...)
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  14. added 2020-05-21
    Sense in Frege.J. Van Heijenoort - 1977 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):93-102.
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  15. added 2020-05-20
    Washing Away Original Sinn.Eros Corazza - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (4):743-764.
    RÉSUMÉ: L'objectif de cet article est essentiellement négatif. Suivant en cela Dummett, j'introduis deux manières attrayantes d'interpréter le Sinn original de Frege, que j'appelle respectivement la doctrine du sens privé et la doctrine du sens public. Je montre que ces conceptions ne peuvent être utilisées dans le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua. Il faut donc abandonner soit l'interprétation du Sinn par Dummett, soit le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua.
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  16. added 2020-05-20
    Taking Frege's Name in Vain.James Zaiss - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (2):167 - 190.
    A widely held view about Fregean Sense has it that the determination of a sign's referent by the sign's sense is achieved viasatisfaction: the sense specifies a condition (or set of conditions) and the referent is that entity, if any, which uniquely satisfies that (set of) condition(s). This is usually held in conjunction with the claim that the sense is existentially and qualitatively independent of the referent: if the referent did not exist, or did not uniquely satisfy the sense, the (...)
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  17. added 2020-05-20
    The Notion of Sense in Frege's Ontology.James Zaiss - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (1):21-32.
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  18. added 2020-05-20
    On Reference and Sense.Panayot Butchvarov - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (10):551-553.
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  19. added 2020-05-20
    Sinning Against Frege.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (3):398-432.
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  20. added 2020-05-20
    The Meaning of “Sense” in Frege.Frank Lucash - 1972 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):435-441.
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  21. added 2020-05-18
    Variations of Sinn.M. Anduschus - 1997 - In M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. Csli Press. pp. 277--292.
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  22. added 2020-05-18
    The Next Best Thing to Sense in Begriffsschrift.Peter Simons - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 129--140.
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  23. added 2020-05-18
    A Note on the ``Carving Up Content'' Principle in Frege's Theory of Sense.Bernard Linsky - 1991 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33 (1):126-135.
    In the Grundlagen Frege says that "line a is parallel to line b" differs from "the direction of a = the direction of b" in that "we carve up the content in a way different from the original way". It seems that such recarving is crucial to Frege's logicist program of defining numbers, but it also seems incompatible with his later theory of sense and reference. I formulate a restriction on recarving, in particular, that no names may be introduced that (...)
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  24. added 2020-05-16
    De Re Senses.John McDowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.
  25. added 2020-05-16
    The Sense of a Name.Michael Luntley - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):265-282.
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  26. added 2020-05-16
    The Sense and Reference of Predicates: A Running Repair to Frege's Doctrine and a Plea for the Copula.David Wiggins - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):311-328.
  27. added 2020-05-15
    Sense and Reference: The Origins and Development of the Distinction.Michael Kremer - 2010 - In Tom Ricketts & Michael D. Potter (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Frege. Cambridge University Press. pp. 220--292.
    Frege’s distinction between sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeutung) is his most influential contribution to philosophy, however central it was to his own projects, and however he may have conceived its importance. Philosophers of language influenced by, or reacting against the distinction, and historians of philosophy commenting on it, have all contributed to the voluminous literature surrounding it.1 Nonetheless in this essay I hope to shed new light on the distinction by considering it in the context of the development of Frege’s (...)
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  28. added 2020-05-12
    Sobre El Sentido Fregeano y El Contenido Mental.Eduardo García-Ramírez - 2014 - Análisis Filosófico 34 (1):77-100.
    Fregeans follow Frege in accepting informativeness and substitution failure as reliable criteria for the existence of senses as objects of thought. In this paper I show that if we accept this, we must also accept the existence of an infinite hierarchy of senses as objects of thought. This is a bad result since it turns Fregeanism into a doctrine according to which object-related thoughts either have an infinite number of objects as contents or none at all. This shows, against the (...)
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  29. added 2020-05-12
    Frege Making Sense. [REVIEW]Mitchell Green - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):567-570.
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  30. added 2020-05-12
    Sense and the First Person.Edward Harcourt - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
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  31. added 2020-05-12
    Why is There so Little Sense in Grundgesetze?Peter Simons - 1992 - Mind 101 (404):753-766.
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  32. added 2020-05-12
    The Bonds of Sense: An Essay in the History of Analytic Philosophy.Michael Beaney - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This work pursues certain themes in the rise and development of analytic philosophy, focussing in particular on the relationship between Aristotelian and Fregean logic, and the emergence and evolution of interest in questions of meaning, with reference to Frege and Wittgenstein. ;In the introductory chapter I consider the general relationship between analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy, suggesting the need for a closer examination of the 'paradigm shift' (...)
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  33. added 2020-05-11
    Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
    Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to argue that Dummett and others are mistaken in this claim. First, Frege's aversion of the correspondence theory of truth does not square well with Dummett's claim. Secondly, and more importantly, Grundgesetze I, §32, is the only place where Frege even appears to be talking about truth conditions in connection with his notion of thought -- (...)
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  34. added 2020-05-10
    Chateaubriand's Senses.Marco Ruffino - 2008 - Manuscrito 31 (1):299-314.
    In this paper I discuss Chateaubriand’s notion of senses. His notions retains the spirit of the original Fregean notion, but differ from it in some fundamental ways. I compare both notions, especially concerning the issue of indirect reference, and also concerning their explanatory power in epistemic matters. Finally, I raise some worries concerning the semantic role played by Chateaubriand’s senses, as well as the notion of judgment that his notion of thoughts seems to imply.Neste artigo, discuto a noção de sentido (...)
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  35. added 2020-05-09
    Sense, Incomplete Understanding, and the Problem of Normative Guidance.Walter B. Pedriali - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):1-37.
    Frege seems committed to the thesis that the senses of the fundamental notions of arithmetic remain stable and are stably grasped by thinkers throughout history. Fully competent practitioners grasp those senses clearly and distinctly, while uncertain practitioners see them, the very same senses, “as if through a mist”. There is thus a common object of the understanding apprehended to a greater or lesser degree by thinkers of diverging conceptual competence. Frege takes the thesis to be a condition for the possibility (...)
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  36. added 2020-05-07
    Frege’nin Özel Ad Kuramındaki Sonsuz Gerileme Sorunu.Alper Yavuz - 2018 - In Vedat Kamer & Şafak Ural (eds.), VIII. Mantık Çalıştayı Kitabı. İstanbul: Mantık Derneği Yayınları. pp. 513-527.
    Öz: Frege özel adların (ve diğer dilsel simgelerin) anlamları ve gönderimleri arasında ünlü ayrımını yaptığı Anlam ve Gönderim Üzerine (1948) adlı makalesinde, bu ayrımın önemi, gerekliliği ve sonuçları üzerine uzun değerlendirmeler yapar ancak özel adın anlamından tam olarak ne anlaşılması gerektiğinden yalnızca bir dipnotta kısaca söz eder. Örneğin “Aristoteles” özel adının anlamının Platon’un öğrencisi ve Büyük İskender’in öğretmeni ya da Stagira’da doğan Büyük İskender’in öğretmeni olarak alınabileceğini söyler. Burada dikkat çeken nokta örnekteki özel adın olası anlamları olarak gösterilen belirli betimlemelerin (...)
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  37. added 2020-05-07
    A Note on Frege on Sense.V. H. Dudman - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):119 – 122.
    This brief note shows that the following three tenets, All to be found in frege's "on sense and reference", Form an inconsistent triad: (1) two proper names express the same sense iff their identity-Sentence "contains no actual knowledge"; (2) sentences are proper names; (3) if in a sentence we replace one proper name by another having a different sense, "we see that in such a case the thought changes".
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  38. added 2020-05-05
    Living Wages of Sinn.Tyler Burge - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):40-84.
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  39. added 2020-05-05
    On the “Gray’s Elegy” Argument and its Bearing on Frege’s Theory of Sense.James Levine - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):251–295.
    In his recent book, "The Metaphysicians of Meaning" (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called "Gray's Elegy" argument (the GEA) in "On Denoting", Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects (...)
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  40. added 2020-05-05
    Frege on Sense and Linguistic Meaning.Tyler Burge - 1990 - In David Bell & Neil Cooper (eds.), The Analytic Tradition. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 30-60.
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  41. added 2020-05-05
    Frege, Sense and Mathematical Knowledge.Gregory Currie - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5 – 19.
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  42. added 2020-05-04
    The Invariance of Sense.Robert May - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (3):111-144.
    How many senses can a given name have, with its reference held fixed? One, more than one? One answer that most would agree to is that sense is unique for each utterance of a name, that is, that a name can have no more than one sense on any given occasion. But is sense unique in any stronger sense than this? The answer that is typically attributed to Frege is that there is not, that, as Tyler Burge puts it, 1 (...)
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  43. added 2020-05-04
    The Number of Senses.Kevin C. Klement - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (3):303 - 323.
    Many philosophers still countenance senses or meanings in the broadly Fregean vein.However, it is difficult to posit the existence of senses without positing quite a lot ofthem, including at least one presenting every entity in existence. I discuss a number ofCantorian paradoxes that seem to result from an overly large metaphysics of senses, and various possible solutions. Certain more deflationary and non-traditional understandings of senses, and to what extent they fare better in solving the problems, are also discussed. In the (...)
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  44. added 2020-05-04
    Sense and Basic Law V in Frege's Logicism.Jan Harald Alnes - 1999 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 4:1-30.
  45. added 2020-05-04
    Toward a New Theory of Fregean Sense.Jungshin Suh Rhee - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
    While Frege himself and many other Fregeans emphasized the objectivity of Fregean Sense, Frege, in "The Thought" and even in "Sense and Reference," also discussed some epistemological issues concerning the Sense of expressions in natural language, which neither his distinction of Sense and Reference alone, nor his emphasis on objectivity of thoughts can successfully resolve. Proper names and indexical 'I' especially, present Frege with cases in which a detailed explanation of "how each of us thinks about the referent of a (...)
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  46. added 2020-05-04
    Indexikalität, Sinn Und Propositionaler Gehalt.Wolfgang Künne - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 18 (1):41-74.
    Wodurch wird der Sinn des Prädikats in einer Äußerung des indexikalischen Satzes 'Ich habe Blutgruppe A' zu dem propositionalen Gehalt vervollständigt, den der Sprecher ausdrückt? Durch einen Individualbegriff (unter den der Sprecher fällt)? Durch ein Individuum (den Sprecher in propria persona)! Keiner dieser Lösungsvorschläge für das (von Perry zuerst formulierte) Vervollständigungsproblem ist überzeugend. Für Frege ist der in einer solchen Äußerung verwendete Eigenname hybrid: er besteht aus einem Vorkommnis von 'ich' und den Umständen seiner Äußerung. Der Indikator 'ich' allein ist (...)
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  47. added 2020-05-03
    Dummett and Frege on Sense and Selbständigkeit.Stephen K. McLeod - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (2):309-331.
    As part of his attack on Frege’s ‘myth’ that senses reside in the third realm, Dummett alleges that Frege’s view that all objects are selbständig is an underlying mistake, since some objects depend upon others. Whatever the merits of Dummett’s other arguments against Frege’s conception of sense, this objection fails. First, Frege’s view that senses are third-realm entities is not traceable to his view that all objects are selbständig. Second, while Frege recognizes that there are objects that are dependent upon (...)
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  48. added 2020-05-03
    On the Ontological Status of Senses in Frege.Gilead Bar-Elli - 2015 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (2-3):287-306.
    Resumo Os sentidos para Frege são reais e objectivos, mas não são nem objectos nem funções. Eles são reais por causa da sua objectividade e por serem referências em contextos oblíquos. E, mesmo assim, eles não são objectos: eles não têm o modo de ser dos objectos – entidades identificáveis auto-subsistentes independentes – nem são funções. Assim, a ontologia de Frege inclui ainda uma outra categoria ontológica, a do sentido, que tem o seu próprio modo especial de ser. Entre as (...)
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  49. added 2020-05-03
    On Sense, Tone and Accompanying Thoughts.Eva Picardi - 2007 - In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. pp. 491--520.
  50. added 2020-05-03
    Frege: Making Sense.Michael Beaney - 1996 - London: Duckworth.
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