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  1. added 2020-05-24
    Existence and Propositional Attitudes: A Fregean Analysis.Leila Haaparanta - 2001 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 4:75-86.
    It is a commonly held view that Frege's doctrine of senses and references is not compatible with the idea that there are de re beliefs. The present paper is meant to challenge that view. Moreover, it seeks to show that, instead of forcing Frege's semantic framework to answer questions raised by twentieth-century philosophy of language, we could try to find other questions to which it might be an answer. It is argued that the proper treatment of Frege's views requires the (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-23
    REVIEWS-Frege: Two Theses, Two Senses. [REVIEW]Norma B. Goethe - 2004 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):232-233.
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  3. added 2020-05-22
    Frege and Russell: Does Science Talk Sense?Mark Wilson - 2007 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (2):179-190.
  4. added 2020-05-22
    Frege's Error.Horst Ruthrof - 1993 - Philosophy Today 37 (3):306-316.
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  5. added 2020-05-21
    Frege’s Puzzle is Here to Stay: Triviality and Informativity in Natural Languages.Matheus Valente & Emiliano Boccardi - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (1):115-150.
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  6. added 2020-05-21
    Frege’s Puzzle and Semantic Relationism.Surajit Barua - 2019 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 36 (1):197-210.
    Departing from the dominant theories of Frege, Russell and Mill, Kit Fine has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle in his book Semantic Relationism. In this article, I briefly discuss the puzzle in its various forms and the attempted solutions of Frege and Russell. I then explicate the essential features of the new theory and critically appraise the mechanism suggested by Fine to solve the puzzle. I show that Semantic Relationism fails to address the concerns raised in the puzzle.
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  7. added 2020-05-21
    Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-Reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents.Emiliano Boccardi - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):1-31.
    ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege’s puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege’s data apply to natural languages, are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates for (...)
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  8. added 2020-05-21
    Berg’s Answer to Frege’s Puzzle.Wayne Davis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):19-34.
    Berg seeks to defend the theory that the meaning of a proper name in a belief report is its reference against Frege’s puzzle by hypothesizing that when substituting coreferential names in belief reports results in reports that seem to have different truth values, the appearance is due to the fact that the reports have different metalinguistic implicatures. I review evidence that implicatures cannot be calculated in the way Grice or Berg imagine, and give reasons to believe that belief reports do (...)
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  9. added 2020-05-21
    Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):97-118.
    In a series of recent works, Kit Fine, 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, (...)
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  10. added 2020-05-21
    Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
    Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
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  11. added 2020-05-21
    Russellian Acquaintance and Frege’s Puzzle.Donovan Wishon - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):321-370.
    In this paper, I argue that a number of recent Russell interpreters, including Evans, Davidson, Campbell, and Proops, mistakenly attribute to Russell what I call ‘the received view of acquaintance’: the view that acquaintance safeguards us from misidentifying the objects of our acquaintance. I contend that Russell’s discussions of phenomenal continua cases show that he does not accept the received view of acquaintance. I also show that the possibility of misidentifying the objects of acquaintance should be unsurprising given underappreciated aspects (...)
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  12. added 2020-05-21
    Character, Proper Names, and Frege's Puzzle.Filipe Martone - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (1):75-80.
    Kaplan’s solution to the indexical version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the character of linguistic expressions has been greatly influential and much discussed. Many philosophers regard it as being correct, or at least as being on the right track. However, little has been said about how character is supposed to apply to proper names, and how it could account for the name version of the Puzzle. In this paper I want to fill this gap. I sketch some solutions to (...)
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  13. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle for Perception.Boyd Millar - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):368-392.
    According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique to perception (...)
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  14. added 2020-05-21
    Informative Identities: A Challenge for Frege's Puzzle.Elisa Paganini - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):513-530.
    Frege's puzzle about identity sentences has long challenged many philosophers to find a solution to it but also led other philosophers to object that the evidential datum it is grounded on is false. The present work is an elaboration of this second kind of reaction: it explains why Frege's puzzle seems to resist the traditional objection, giving voice to different and more elaborated presentations of the evidential datum, faithful to the spirit but not to the letter of Frege's puzzle. The (...)
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  15. added 2020-05-21
    Frege’s Puzzle and the Direct Reference Theory.Filip Kawczyński - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 109-126.
    In the paper, I discuss a possibility of defending the Direct Reference theory from its most dangerous threaten which is the notorious Frege's puzzle. I discuss two possible ways of doing that. First is based on King's theory of propositions as facts. I show that tools provided by King's theory are not enough to solve the puzzle. More promising is a method supported by new Soames's theory of propositions as cognitive event-types. I try to show that this framework allows us (...)
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  16. added 2020-05-21
    Informativeness and Multiple Senses.Genoveva Marti - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica. Special Issue on Frege’s Puzzle (136):27-32.
    Stavroula Glezakos (2009) argues that Frege himself could not pose Frege’s puzzle without relying on the distinction between sense and reference, a distinction that the puzzle was supposed to motivate, not presuppose. In this paper I argue that there are still some puzzling questions about the informativeness of identity sentences, and I discuss a problem generated by the Fregean contention that one and the same proper name can have different senses for different speakers an issue that, in my view, Frege (...)
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  17. added 2020-05-21
    Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):587-635.
    The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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  18. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.
    Millians sometimes claim that we can explain the fact that sentences like "If Hesperus exists, then Hesperus is Phosphorus" seem a posteriori to speakers in terms of the fact that utterances of sentences of this sort would typically pragmatically convey propositions which really are a posteriori. I argue that this kind of pragmatic explanation of the seeming a posterioricity of sentences of this sort fails. The main reason is that for every sentence like the above which (by Millian lights) is (...)
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  19. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle.Nathan Solomon - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.
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  20. added 2020-05-21
    Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 202.
    Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. -/- Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can be posed prior to (...)
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  21. added 2020-05-21
    Approaching Frege's Puzzle.Aleksandar Kellenberg - 2008 - Facta Philosophica 10 (1):247-268.
  22. added 2020-05-21
    Frege’s Puzzle and Frege Cases: Defending a Quasi-Syntactic Solution.Robert D. Rupert - 2008 - Cognitive Systems Research 9:76-91.
    There is no doubt that social interaction plays an important role in language-learning, as well as in concept acquisition. In surprising contrast, social interaction makes only passing appearance in our most promising naturalistic theories of content. This is particularly true in the case of mental content (e.g., Cummins, 1996; Dretske, 1981, 1988; Fodor, 1987, 1990a; Millikan, 1984); and insofar as linguistic content derives from mental content (Grice, 1957), social interaction seems missing from our best naturalistic theories of both.1 In this (...)
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  23. added 2020-05-21
    A Note on the Relationship Between Mates' Puzzle and Frege's Puzzle.M. A. Moffett - 2002 - Journal of Semantics 19 (2):159-166.
    In this note I argue that, relative to certain largely uncontroversial background conditions, any instance of Mates’ Puzzle is equivalent to some instance of Frege’s Puzzle. If correct, this result is surprising. For, barring the radical move of rejecting the possibility of synonymous expressions in a language tout court, it shows that there is no strictly lexical solution to at least some instances of Frege’s Puzzle. This forces the hand of theorists who wish to provide a semantic (rather than pragmatic) (...)
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  24. added 2020-05-21
    Why is Frege's Puzzle Still Puzzling?Eros Corazza & Jerome Dokič - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 151--168.
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  25. added 2020-05-21
    The Frege Puzzle One More Time.Martin Hahn - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 169--183.
  26. added 2020-05-21
    A Semantic Solution to Frege's Puzzle.Takashi Yagisawa - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:135-154.
  27. added 2020-05-21
    A Solution to Frege's Puzzle.George Bealer - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.
    This paper provides a new approach to a family of outstanding logical and semantical puzzles, the most famous being Frege's puzzle. The three main reductionist theories of propositions (the possible-worlds theory, the propositional-function theory, the propositional-complex theory) are shown to be vulnerable to Benacerraf-style problems, difficulties involving modality, and other problems. The nonreductionist algebraic theory avoids these problems and allows us to identify the elusive nondescriptive, non-metalinguistic, necessary propositions responsible for the indicated family of puzzles. The algebraic approach is also (...)
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  28. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle, Sense, and Information Content.William W. Taschek - 1992 - Mind 101 (404):767-791.
  29. added 2020-05-21
    The Reverse Frege Puzzle.Takashi Yagisawa - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:341-367.
  30. added 2020-05-21
    Frege’s Puzzle. [REVIEW]A. D. Smith - 1988 - Mind 97 (385):136-137.
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  31. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle.Anthony Appiah - 1988 - History of European Ideas 9 (2):243-244.
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  32. added 2020-05-21
    Salmon, N., "Frege's Puzzle". [REVIEW]A. D. Smith - 1988 - Mind 97:136.
  33. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Jan Wolenski - 1988 - Studia Logica 47 (4):439-440.
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  34. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle : Nathan Salmon, Bradford Books , Xi + 194 Pp., $12.50. [REVIEW]Anthony Appiah - 1988 - History of European Ideas 9 (2):243-244.
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  35. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Jennifer Hornsby - 1987 - Philosophical Books 28 (3):161-163.
  36. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
  37. added 2020-05-21
    Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle Reviewed By. [REVIEW]G. W. Fitch - 1987 - Philosophy in Review 7 (5):210-212.
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  38. added 2020-05-21
    Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]G. Fitch - 1987 - Philosophy in Review 7:210-212.
  39. added 2020-05-21
    Frege's Puzzle.Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Ridgeview.
  40. added 2020-05-21
    Comments on Mark Kalderon's “The Open Question Argument, Frege's Puzzle, and Leibniz's Law”.Peter Alward - unknown
    A standard strategy for defending a claim of non-identity is one which invokes Leibniz’s Law. (1) Fa (2) ~Fb (3) (∀x)(∀y)(x=y ⊃ (∀P)(Px ⊃ Py)) (4) a=b ⊃ (Fa ⊃ Fb) (5) a≠b In Kalderon’s view, this basic strategy underlies both Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA) as well as (a variant formulation of) Frege’s puzzle (FP). In the former case, the argument runs from the fact that some natural property—call it “F-ness”—has, but goodness lacks, the (2nd order) property of its (...)
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  41. added 2020-05-20
    Sense, Reference, and Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nicholas J. Moutafakis - 2006 - International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):506-509.
  42. added 2020-05-19
    Kripke's Frege.Yourgrau Palle - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):100-107.
    In a recent essay, “Frege's Theory of Sense of Reference: Some Exegetical Notes”, Saul Kripke shows that in addition to being an astute critic of Frege, he is also an insightful interpreter. Kripke's Frege emerges as a closet Russellian, who, like Russell, relies heavily on a doctrine of acquaintance. Is Kripke right? Where exactly does his approach resemble, and where depart from earlier interpretations, and what should one take away about whether or not Frege really was a Russellian and the (...)
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  43. added 2020-05-19
    Senses: Response to Marco Ruffino.O. Chateaubriand - 2008 - Manuscrito 31 (1):315-329.
    Marco Ruffino compares the notion of sense developed in my book with Frege’s notion of sense, and argues that whereas there are ontological similarities, my notion faces epistemological and semantic problems. In my response I discuss the various issues he raises, arguing that my notion of sense can confront them at least as well as Frege’s notion.Marco Ruffino compara a noção de sentido desenvolvida em meu livro com a noção de sentido de Frege, argumentando que mesmo havendo semelhanças ontológicas, minha (...)
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  44. added 2020-05-19
    Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope. [REVIEW]Charles Landesman - 1997 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (2):310-312.
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  45. added 2020-05-19
    Frege y Peirce: En Torno Al Signo y Su Fundamento.María Uxía Rivas Monroy - 1996 - Anuario Filosófico 29 (56):1211-1224.
    The aim of this paper is to present the close connection which can be established between the notion of mode of presentation (Frege) and ground (Peirce) in order to show that they are used to explain why signs can give us knowledge -nonconventional knowledge- about the world.
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  46. added 2020-05-19
    Remarks on Sense and Reference in Frege and Husserl.Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock - 1982 - Kant-Studien 73 (1-4):425-439.
    Frege's semantics of sense and reference and two husserlian alternatives are discussed. it is shown that husserl neither took his semantics of sense and reference from frege nor abandoned psychologism under his influence. frege's arguments on behalf of his choice of truth values as the reference of statements and of concepts as the reference of conceptual words are submitted to criticism. some algebraic considerations are sketched in the last part of the article.
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  47. added 2020-05-12
    Sense and Reference, Again.Jocelyn Benoist - 2015 - In Nicolas de Warren & Jeffrey Bloechl (eds.), Phenomenology in a New Key: Between Analysis and History. Springer Verlag.
  48. added 2020-05-12
    How to Frege–Dummett a Putnam.Jerzy Brzozowski - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (2):301.
    The object of this paper is to suggest how the Frege–Dummettian notions of criterion of identity and criterion of application can be put to work within Putnam’s account of reference for natural kind terms in “Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. By doing so, some light can be shed on Putnam’s earlier views on “necessity relative to a body of knowledge” as well as his later views on sortal identity. If the Frege–Dummettian criteria are indeed at work within Putnam’s account, then we (...)
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  49. added 2020-05-12
    Philosophie der Bedeutung: Bedeutung Als Bestimmung Und Bestimmbarkeit. Eine Studie Zu Frege, Husserl Cassirer Und Hönigswald. [REVIEW]Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 54 (1):211-229.
  50. added 2020-05-12
    Assertion, Negation and Contradiction: A Conjunction of Literature, Psychoanalysis and Philosophy in Modern Thought.Karl Nigel Simms - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Southampton (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;The first chapter considers the early twentieth century theories of meaning of Frege, Russell, Husserl and Wittgenstein. It argues that Frege's philosophy, particularly in the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung is flawed by contradiction, and that the greater sophistication afforded by Husserl's phenomenology accounts for various categories of meaning which other theories must condemn as "nonsense." ;Chapter 2 discusses Husserl's distinction between "expression" and "indication" . It considers the discrepancy between his (...)
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