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  1. added 2020-05-28
    Freges Begrifflehre, Ohne Ihr Angebliches Paradox.A. Kemmerling - 2004 - In Mark Siebel & Mark Textor (eds.), Semantik Und Ontologie. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 39--62.
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  2. added 2020-05-21
    Note on “a Paradox in Frege's Semantics”.Robert Sternfeld - 1965 - Philosophical Studies 16 (1-2):12 - 14.
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  3. added 2020-05-11
    Putting Davidson’s Semantics to Work to Solve Frege’s Paradox on Concept and Object.Philippe Rouilhan - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag.
    What Frege’s paradox on concept and object (FP) consists in and the manner in which Frege coped with it (the ladder strategy) are briefly reviewed (§ 1). An idea for solving FP inspired by Husserl’s semantics is presented; it results in failure, for it leads to a version of Russell’s paradox, the usual solution of which implies something like a resurgence of FP (§ 2). A generalized version of Frege’s paradox (GFP) and an idea for solving it inspired by Davidson’s (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-10
    Why Frege Would Not Be a Neo‐Fregean.Marco Ruffino - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):51-78.
    In this paper, I seek to clarify an aspect of Frege's thought that has been only insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical objects. I adduce some elements of Frege's philosophy that elucidate why he saw extensions as natural candidates for paradigmatic cases of logical objects. Moreover, I argue (against the suggestion of some contemporary scholars, in particular, Wright and Boolos) that Frege could not have taken Hume's Principle instead of Axiom V as a fundamental law of (...)
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  5. added 2020-05-07
    Once Moore Unto the Breach! Frege and the Concept ‘Horse’ Paradox.Kelly Dean Jolley - 2015 - Philosophical Topics 43 (1-2):113-124.
    In this essay, I respond to A. W. Moore’s instructive chapter on Frege. I respond by asking various questions, and I question particularly Moore’s claim that Frege, in reacting to Benno Kerry, falls into Hegelian excess. I toy with responding to my question by regarding Frege as anticipating a Wittgensteinian-Heideggerian exaction. It remains unclear whether this constitutes progress.
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  6. added 2020-05-07
    Freges Begriffslehre, ohne ihr angebliches Paradox.Andreas Kemmerling - 2004 - In Mark Siebel & Markus Textor (eds.), Semantik Und Ontologie: Beiträge Zur Philosophischen Forschung. Ontos Verlag. pp. 2--39.
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  7. added 2020-05-07
    Kerry und Frege über Begriff und Gegenstand.Eva Picardi - 1994 - History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):9-32.
    After describing the philosophical background of Kerry's work, an account is given of the way Kerry proposed to supplement Bolzano's conception of logic with a psychological account of the mental acts underlying mathematical judgements.In his writings Kerry criticized Frege's work and Kerry's views were then attacked by Frege.The following two issues were central to this controversy: (a) the relation between the content of a concept and the object of a concept; (b) the logical roles of the definite article. Not only (...)
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  8. added 2020-05-07
    Frege's Problems with 'the Concept Horse'.Edwin Martin Jr - 1971 - Critica 5 (15):45 - 64.
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  9. added 2020-05-05
    The Unnameable: Limits of Language in Early Analytic Philosophy.Michael Price - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    It is a remarkable fact about the early history of the analytic tradition that its three most important protagonists all held, at least during significant intervals of their respective careers, that there are entities that cannot be named. This shared commitment on the part of Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein is the topic of this thesis. I first clarify the particular form this commitment takes in the work of these three authors. I also illustrate a distinctive cluster of philosophical (...)
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  10. added 2020-05-04
    What is Frege's "Concept Horse Problem" ?Ian Proops - 2013 - In Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 76-96.
    I argue that Frege's so-called "concept 'horse' problem" is not one problem but many. When these separate sub-problems are distinguished, some are revealed to be more tractable than others. I further argue that there is, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption originating with Peter Geach, little evidence that Frege was concerned with the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions in writings available to Wittgenstein. In consequence, Geach is mistaken in thinking that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein simply accepts (...)
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  11. added 2020-05-04
    Horse Sense.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):85-131.
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  12. added 2020-05-04
    Why Frege Did Not Deserve His Granum Salis.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:239-263.
    The „Paradox of the Concept Horse" arises on the assumption of the Reference Principle: that co-referential expressions should be cross-substitutable salva veritate in extensional contexts and salva congruitate in all. Accordingly no singular term can co-refer with an unsaturated expression. The paper outlines a number of desiderata for a satisfactory response to the problem and argues that recent treatments by Dummett and Wiggins fall short by their lights. It is then pointed out that a more consistent perception of the requirements (...)
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  13. added 2020-05-04
    Paradoxien und die Vergegenständlichung von Begriffen – zu Freges Unterscheidung zwischen Begriff und Gegenstand.Rosemarie Rheinwald - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (1):7-35.
    In this paper I discuss Frege's distinction between objects and concepts and suggest a solution of Frege's paradox of the concept horse. The expression ''the concept horse'' is not eliminated and the concept is not identified with its extension, but the concept is identified with the sense of the corresponding predicate. This solution fits better into a fregean ontology and philosophy of language than alternative solutions and allows for a general answer to the question why Frege's system is infected with (...)
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  14. added 2020-05-04
    Frege and Dummett on the Problem with the Concept Horse.I. Susan Russinoff - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):63-78.
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  15. added 2020-05-04
    Why Frege Should Not Have Said "The Concept Horse is Not a Concept".Terence Parsons - 1986 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):449 - 465.
    Frege held various views about language and its relation to non-linguistic things. These views led him to the paradoxical-sounding conclusion that "the concept horse is NOT a concept." A key assumption that led him to say this is the assumption that phrases beginning with the definite article "the" denote objects, not concepts. In sections I-III this issue is explained. In sections IV-V Frege's theory is articulated, and it is shown that he was incorrect in thinking that this theory led to (...)
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  16. added 2020-05-04
    Frege and Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Irving M. Copi - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (3-4):447-461.
    The purpose of the article is to explain two curious doctrines maintained by frege and rejected by wittgenstein in the 'tractatus logico-philosophicus'. that a special assertion sign is necessary was maintained by frege because he wanted to apply his concept-writing to ordinary language, and it was rejected by wittgenstein because his concern in the 'tractatus' was with scientific assertions only. frege's paradoxical notion that 'the concept horse is not a concept' was a consequence of his symbolizing functions by 'unsaturated' expressions. (...)
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  17. added 2020-05-04
    Frege, Geach, and `the Concept Horse'.William Gustason - 1972 - Mind 81 (321):125-130.
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  18. added 2020-05-03
    The Concept Horse is a Concept.Ansten Klev - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):547-572.
    I offer an analysis of the sentence "the concept horse is a concept". It will be argued that the grammatical subject of this sentence, "the concept horse", indeed refers to a concept, and not to an object, as Frege once held. The argument is based on a criterion of proper-namehood according to which an expression is a proper name if it is so rendered in Frege's ideography. The predicate "is a concept", on the other hand, should not be thought of (...)
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  19. added 2020-05-03
    Naming the Concept Horse.Michael Price - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2727-2743.
    Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties confronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such claim—that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a singular term—has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set out Trueman’s argument for this (...)
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  20. added 2020-05-03
    A Quasi-Fregean Solution to ‘The Concept Horse’ Paradox.Mihail Petrisor Ivan - 2015 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):7-22.
    In this paper I offer a conceptually tighter, quasi-Fregean solution to the concept horse paradox based on the idea that the unterfallen relation is asymmetrical. The solution is conceptually tighter in the sense that it retains the Fregean principle of separating sharply between concepts and objects, it retains Frege’s conclusion that the sentence ‘the concept horse is not a concept’ is true, but does not violate our intuitions on the matter. The solution is only ‘quasi’- Fregean in the sense that (...)
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  21. added 2020-05-03
    The Concept Horse with No Name.Robert Trueman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906.
    In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful.
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  22. added 2020-05-03
    Frege's Problems with 'the Concept Horse'.Edwin Martin - 1971 - Critica 5 (15):45-64.
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