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  1. added 2020-05-29
    Reconstructing Frege.Mark Textor - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (3):197-208.
  2. added 2020-05-29
    On the Link Between Frege's Platonic-Realist Semantics and His Doctrine of Private Senses.Sara Ellenbogen - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):375 - 382.
    Frege's doctrine that the demonstrative ‘I’ has a private, incommunicable sense creates tension within his theory of meaning. Fregean sense is supposed to be something objective, which exists independently of its being cognized by anyone. And the notion of a private sense corresponding to primitive aspects of an individual of which only he can be awaredoes violence both to Frege's theory of sense as well as to our notionof language as something essentially intersubjective. John Perry has arguedthat Frege was led (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-28
    Frege über den Sinn des Wortes „Ich”.Andreas Kemmerling - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1):1-22.
    Frege hat an seiner metaphysischen und semantischen Lehre der frühen 90er Jahre Veränderungen vorgenommen, um Besonderheiten des Sinns von „ich” Rechnung zu tragen. Diese Veränderungen betreffen zum einen den Status von Gedanken als objektiven Entitäten, zum andern betreffen sie die sprachlogische Behandlung von Ausdrücken, deren Sinn erst im Zusammenspiel mit dem Verwendungskontext einen selbständigen Gedankenteil ergibt. Diese Veränderungen lassen die alte Lehre in ihrem Kern unberührt. Doch obgleich Freges Auffassungen über den Sinn von „ich” eine kohärente Weiterentwicklung seiner Lehre darstellen, (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-20
    Frege Et le Cogito.Stéphane Chauvier - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (2):349-368.
    Most of the readers of Frege's first Logical Investigation, have been convinced that, according to Frege, the sense of was a private one, that an I-thought was a private thought. But it is not the case: the famous Fregean distinction between private representations and public thoughts seems an explanation and a generalization of the I-thought problem as much as an anti-Cartesian repetition of the Cartesian Second Meditation. Frege's position concerning indexical thoughts is that they are public thoughts, for the sense (...)
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  5. added 2020-05-18
    Frege and the First Person.Richard DeVidi - 2001 - In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. pp. 30--31.
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  6. added 2020-05-17
    IV—Sharing Thoughts About Oneself.Guy Longworth - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):57-81.
    This paper is about first‐person thoughts—thoughts about oneself that are expressible through uses of first‐person pronouns. It is widely held that first‐person thoughts cannot be shared. My aim is to postpone rejection of the more natural view that such thoughts about oneself can be shared. I sketch an account on which such thoughts can be shared and indicate some ways in which deciding the fate of the account will depend upon further work.
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  7. added 2020-05-12
    The First Person: Problems of Sense and Reference.Edward Harcourt - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46:25-46.
    0 Consider ‘I’ as used by a given speaker and some ordinary proper name of that speaker: are these two coreferential singular terms which differ in Fregean sense? If they could be shown to be so, we might be able to explain the logical and epistemological peculiarities of ‘I’ by appeal to its special sense and yet feel no temptation to think of its reference as anything more exotic than a human being.
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  8. added 2020-05-12
    Sense and the First Person.Edward Harcourt - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
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  9. added 2020-05-12
    Are Hybrid Proper Names the Solution to the Completion Problem? A Reply to Wolfgang Künne.Edward Harcourt - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):301-313.
  10. added 2020-05-11
    Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes.Saul A. Kripke - 2008 - Theoria 74 (3):181-218.
    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well-known 'unlearnability' argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so that giving a (...)
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  11. added 2020-05-04
    Frege on Indexicals.Robert May - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):487-516.
  12. added 2020-05-04
    Frege on Demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
  13. added 2020-05-03
    The Thoughts That God Cannot Think: A Fregean Argument for Particular, Primitive, and Private Self-Presentation.Abraham Mathew - 2020 - Noēsis – Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):3-8.
    In his seminal 'The Thought', Gottlob Frege claims that “everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way in which he is presented to no one else.”) Nonetheless, he does not set out an argument to defend this claim. In this paper, I utilize Fregean concepts from 'The Thought', in addition to supplemental arguments from Gareth Evans and Saul Kripke, to show how Frege could have argued for this conclusion.
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  14. added 2020-05-03
    Frege's Unthinkable Thoughts.Lukas Skiba - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):333–343.
    There are two common reactions to Frege’s claim that some senses and thoughts are private. Privatists accept both private senses and thoughts, while intersubjectivists don’t accept either. Both sides agree on a pair of tacit assumptions: first, that private senses automatically give rise to private thoughts; and second, that private senses and thoughts are the most problematic entities to which Frege’s remarks on privacy give rise. The aim of this paper is to show that both assumptions are mistaken. This will (...)
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  15. added 2020-05-03
    Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
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  16. added 2020-05-03
    2. Frege on I Thoughts.Wolfgang Carl - 2014 - In The First-Person Point of View. De Gruyter. pp. 55-81.
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  17. added 2020-05-03
    Frege On ‘I’, ‘Now’, ‘Today’ And Some Other Linguistic Devices.Edward Harcourt - 1999 - Synthese 121 (3):329-356.
    In this paper, I argue against an influential view of Frege's writings on indexical and other context-sensitive expressions, and in favour of an alternative. The centrepiece of the influential view, due to Evans and McDowell, is that according to Frege, context-sensitive word-meaning plus context combine to express senses which are essentially first person, essentially present tense and so on, depending on the contextsensitive expression in question. Frege's treatment of indexicals thus fits smoothly with his Intuitive Criterion of difference of sense. (...)
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  18. added 2020-05-03
    Frege über den Sinn des Wortes „Ich”.Andreas Kemmerling - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1):1-22.
    Frege hat an seiner metaphysischen und semantischen Lehre der frühen 90er Jahre Veränderungen vorgenommen, um Besonderheiten des Sinns von „ich” Rechnung zu tragen. Diese Veränderungen betreffen zum einen den Status von Gedanken als objektiven Entitäten, zum andern betreffen sie die sprachlogische Behandlung von Ausdrücken, deren Sinn erst im Zusammenspiel mit dem Verwendungskontext einen selbständigen Gedankenteil ergibt. Diese Veränderungen lassen die alte Lehre in ihrem Kern unberührt. Doch obgleich Freges Auffassungen über den Sinn von „ich” eine kohärente Weiterentwicklung seiner Lehre darstellen, (...)
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  19. added 2020-05-03
    The Communication of First Person Thoughts.François Recanati - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 95-102.
    A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.
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