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  1. ‘The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing Between Content and Force.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    The distinction between content and force is ‘a corner-stone of 20-century philosophy of language’ (Recanati 2013, 622). Yet, in recent years it has been argued that (a) the motivation for drawing the content-force distinction is flawed and (b) that making it bars us from solving the problem of the unity of the proposition. In this paper I will go back to the source of the content-force distinction in Frege’s work. Frege argued that ‘the nature of a question’ requires a distinction (...)
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  2. Are Frege’s Thoughts Fregean Propositions?Eduardo Pérez-Navarro - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (2):223-244.
    One of the most pressing issues in contemporary semantics is whether propositions are structured entities that should be individuated in terms of their components or, contrarily, they lack structure and should be individuated in terms of their inferential relations. Another one is whether propositions should always contain all the information that is needed to deem them true or false—whether they should always be Fregean propositions. The latter debate might seem to presuppose a certain position in the former. However, it is (...)
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  3. Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Peter Hanks defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content, according to which the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. He explains the unity of propositions and provides new solutions to a long list of puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.
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  4. Demythologizing the Third Realm: Frege on Grasping Thoughts.B. Scot Rousse - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (1).
    In this paper, I address some puzzles about Frege’s conception of how we “grasp” thoughts. I focus on an enigmatic passage that appears near the end of Frege’s great essay “The Thought.” In this passage Frege refers to a “non-sensible something” without which “everyone would remain shut up in his inner world.” I consider and criticize Wolfgang Malzkorn’s interpretation of the passage. According to Malzkorn, Frege’s view is that ideas [Vorstellungen] are the means by which we grasp thoughts. My counter-proposal (...)
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  5. The Structure of Frege's Thoughts.Marian Zouhar - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):199-209.
    Fregean thoughts (i.e. the senses of assertoric sentences) are structured entities because they are composed of simpler senses that are somehow ordered and interconnected. The constituent senses form a unity because some of them are ?saturated? and some ?unsaturated?. This paper shows that Frege's explanation of the structure of thoughts, which is based on the ?saturated/unsaturated? distinction, is by no means sufficient because it permits what I call ?wild analyses?, which have certain unwelcome consequences. Wild analyses are made possible because (...)
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  6. A Dilemma in Frege's Philosophy of Thought and Language.Wolfgang Künne - 2007 - Rivista di Estetica 47 (34):95-120.
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  7. Fregean Propositions, Belief Preservation and Cognitive Value.Marco Ruffino - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):217-236.
    In this paper I argue indirectly for Frege's semantics, in particular for his conception of propositions, by reviewing some difficulties faced by one of the main contemporary alternative approaches, i.e., the direct reference theory. While Frege's semantics can yield an explanation of cognitive value and belief-preservation, the alternative approach seems to run into trouble here. I shall also briefly consider the question of whether epistemic issues should be of any concern for semantics, i.e., whether the feature mentioned above should really (...)
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  8. Does Frege Have Too Many Thoughts? A Cantorian Problem Revisited.Kevin C. Klement - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):45–49.
    This paper continues a thread in Analysis begun by Adam Rieger and Nicholas Denyer. Rieger argued that Frege’s theory of thoughts violates Cantor’s theorem by postulating as many thoughts as concepts. Denyer countered that Rieger’s construction could not show that the thoughts generated are always distinct for distinct concepts. By focusing on universally quantified thoughts, rather than thoughts that attribute a concept to an individual, I give a different construction that avoids Denyer’s problem. I also note that this problem for (...)
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  9. Zagadnienie tak zwanego aksjomatu G. Fregego.Anna Kozanecka - 2005 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 53 (2):125-144.
    In the initial part of the article Frege\'s texts are analyzed in order to present his position on the question of denotation of propositions and the fragment points to the motives that made Frege recognize logical value as the denotation of proposition. In its further part the article presents the position taken in this question by commentators of Frege\'s thought. In the final part of the article it is shown what shape two versions of Frege\'s axiom (semantic and ontological) formulated (...)
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  10. Rieger's Problem with Frege's Ontology.N. Denyer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):166-170.
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  11. Rieger's Problem with Frege's Ontology.Nicholas Denyer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):166–170.
  12. Frege's Paradise and the Paradoxes.Sten Lindström - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), A Philosophical Smorgasbord: Essays on Action, Truth and Other Things in Honour of Fredrick Stoutland. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 52.
    The main objective of this paper is to examine how theories of truth and reference that are in a broad sense Fregean in character are threatened by antinomies; in particular by the Epimenides paradox and versions of the so-called Russell-Myhill antinomy, an intensional analogue of Russell’s more well-known paradox for extensions. Frege’s ontology of propositions and senses has recently received renewed interest in connection with minimalist theories that take propositions (thoughts) and senses (concepts) as the primary bearers of truth and (...)
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  13. The Truth and Nothing but the Truth, yet Never the Whole Truth: Frege, Russell and the Analysis of Unities.Graham Stevens - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (3):221-240.
    It is widely assumed that Russell's problems with the unity of the proposition were recurring and insoluble within the framework of the logical theory of his Principles of Mathematics. By contrast, Frege's functional analysis of thoughts (grounded in a type-theoretic distinction between concepts and objects) is commonly assumed to provide a solution to the problem or, at least, a means of avoiding the difficulty altogether. The Fregean solution is unavailable to Russell because of his commitment to the thesis that there (...)
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  14. Frege's Content-Principle and Relevant Deducibility.Neil Tennant - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):245-258.
    Given the harmony principle for logical operators, compositionality ought to ensure that harmony should obtain at the level of whole contents. That is, the role of a content qua premise ought to be balanced exactly by its role as a conclusion. Frege's contextual definition of propositional content happens to exploit this balance, and one appeals to the Cut rule to show that the definition is adequate. We show here that Frege's definition remains adequate even when one relevantizes logic by abandoning (...)
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  15. Frege and Object Dependent Propositions.Heimir Geirsson - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):299–314.
    Gareth Evans and John McDowell have challenged the traditional reading of Frege according to which Frege accepted propositions that are not object dependent, i.e., propositions that can exist even though the proper names that occur in the sentences that express them do not refer. A consequence of the Evans‐McDowell interpretation of Frege is that if someone hallucinates that there is an oasis in front of her, then there is no thought of an oasis but only an illusion of a thought. (...)
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  16. Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
    Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to argue that Dummett and others are mistaken in this claim. First, Frege's aversion of the correspondence theory of truth does not square well with Dummett's claim. Secondly, and more importantly, Grundgesetze I, §32, is the only place where Frege even appears to be talking about truth conditions in connection with his notion of thought -- (...)
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  17. Propositions and Reasoning in Russell and Frege.Gary Kemp - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):218–235.
    Both Russell and Frege were inclined to think that there is nothing essentially linguistic about thought: any actual reliance of ours upon language is a mere psychological contingency. If so then it should be possible to formulate logic in such a way that logical relationships are not represented or expressed as principles pertaining to linguistic forms. Russell and Frege take pains to achieve this, but fail. I explain this by looking at some features of Grundgesetz and Principia . Their failure, (...)
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  18. Judgment and Thought in Frege’s Begriffsschrift.Andrew Reynolds - 1998 - Semiotica 120 (1-2):129-138.
  19. Has Dummett Over-Salted His Frege? Remarks on the Conveyability of Thought.Alexander George - 1997 - In Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Oxford University Press. pp. 35--69.
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  20. Propositions in Bolzano and Frege.Wolfgang Künne - 1997 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 53 (1):203-240.
    Bolzano's Sätze an sich and Frege's Gedanken are obviously close relatives. The paper underlines both similarities and dissimilarities between the psychological and semantical roles assigned to structured truth-evaluable contents in Bolzano's and Frege's theories. In particular, their different accounts of propositional identity are compared, and it is argued that Dummett's recent criticism of Frege's account is grist to Bolzano's mill.
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  21. Meaning, Truth‐Conditions, Proposition: Frege's Doctrine of Sense Retrieved, Resumed and Redeployed in the Light of Certain Recent Criticisms.David Wiggins - 1992 - Dialectica 46 (1):61-90.
    This article first recounts the history of the truth‐conditional conception of meaning from Frege to the present day, emphasizing both points that are neglected in receidev accounts of this history and points of permanent philosophical interest. It then concludes with a review of certain current objections to the truth‐conditional conception and seeks to answer the difficulties pressed by Stephen Schiffer in Remnants of Meaning, offering certain fresh considerations upon the question what it is for two speech action to representent the (...)
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  22. Thought and Perception: The Views of Two Philosophical Innovators.Michael Dummett - 1990 - In The Analytic Tradition: Philosophical Quarterly Monographs, Volume 1. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  23. Frege‐Russell Semantics?Howard Wettstein - 1990 - Dialectica 44 (1‐2):113-135.
    Contemporary semantical discussions make mention of the traditional approach to semantics represented by Frege and/or Russell--even sometimes by Frege-Russell. Is there a Frege-Russell view in the philosophy of language? How much of a common semantical perspective did Frege and Russell share? The matter bears exploration. I begin with Frege and Russell on propositions.
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  24. Beurteilbarer Inhalt und Gedanke in der Philosophie Gottlob Freges.Hartfried Kaschmieder - 1989 - Hildesheim: Olms.
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  25. Eternal Thoughts.Peter Carruthers - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):186-204.
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  26. Frege on Thoughts: A Reply.Gregory Currie - 1984 - Mind 93 (370):256-258.
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  27. Fregean Thoughts.Harold Noonan - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):205-224.
  28. The Composition of Fregean Thoughts.Harold T. Hodes - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (2):161 - 178.
  29. Indexikalität, Sinn Und Propositionaler Gehalt.Wolfgang Künne - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 18 (1):41-74.
    Wodurch wird der Sinn des Prädikats in einer Äußerung des indexikalischen Satzes 'Ich habe Blutgruppe A' zu dem propositionalen Gehalt vervollständigt, den der Sprecher ausdrückt? Durch einen Individualbegriff (unter den der Sprecher fällt)? Durch ein Individuum (den Sprecher in propria persona)! Keiner dieser Lösungsvorschläge für das (von Perry zuerst formulierte) Vervollständigungsproblem ist überzeugend. Für Frege ist der in einer solchen Äußerung verwendete Eigenname hybrid: er besteht aus einem Vorkommnis von 'ich' und den Umständen seiner Äußerung. Der Indikator 'ich' allein ist (...)
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  30. Frege Structures and the Notions of Truth and Proposition.P. Aczel - 1980 - In J. Barwise, H. J. Keisler & K. Kunen (eds.), The Kleene Symposium. North-Holland.
  31. Frege on Thoughts.Gregory Currie - 1980 - Mind 89 (354):234-248.
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  32. Frege on 'Possible Content of Judgment'.Ronald E. Nusenoff - 1980 - Analysis 40 (2):83.
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  33. How Many Thoughts Can Fit in the Form of a Proposition?Susan Sterrett - unknown
    I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the relation between sentences and the thoughts they express is that, ideally, a sentence expresses exactly one thought, and a thought is expressed by exactly one (canonical) sentence. This may clash with some mainstream views of Frege, for it has the consequence of de-emphasizing the philosophical significance of the question of how it is possible for someone to regard one sentence as true yet regard another sentence that expresses the same thought as (...)
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