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  1. added 2020-05-31
    The Truth and Nothing but the Truth, yet Never the Whole Truth: Frege, Russell and the Analysis of Unities.Graham Stevens - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (3):221-240.
    It is widely assumed that Russell's problems with the unity of the proposition were recurring and insoluble within the framework of the logical theory of his Principles of Mathematics. By contrast, Frege's functional analysis of thoughts (grounded in a type-theoretic distinction between concepts and objects) is commonly assumed to provide a solution to the problem or, at least, a means of avoiding the difficulty altogether. The Fregean solution is unavailable to Russell because of his commitment to the thesis that there (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-26
    Zagadnienie tak zwanego aksjomatu G. Fregego.Anna Kozanecka - 2005 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 53 (2):125-144.
    In the initial part of the article Frege\'s texts are analyzed in order to present his position on the question of denotation of propositions and the fragment points to the motives that made Frege recognize logical value as the denotation of proposition. In its further part the article presents the position taken in this question by commentators of Frege\'s thought. In the final part of the article it is shown what shape two versions of Frege\'s axiom (semantic and ontological) formulated (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-22
    Frege Structures and the Notions of Truth and Proposition.P. Aczel - 1980 - In J. Barwise, H. J. Keisler & K. Kunen (eds.), The Kleene Symposium. North-Holland.
  4. added 2020-05-21
    How Many Thoughts Can Fit in the Form of a Proposition?Susan Sterrett - unknown
    I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the relation between sentences and the thoughts they express is that, ideally, a sentence expresses exactly one thought, and a thought is expressed by exactly one (canonical) sentence. This may clash with some mainstream views of Frege, for it has the consequence of de-emphasizing the philosophical significance of the question of how it is possible for someone to regard one sentence as true yet regard another sentence that expresses the same thought as (...)
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  5. added 2020-05-20
    Frege on Thoughts: A Reply.Gregory Currie - 1984 - Mind 93 (370):256-258.
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  6. added 2020-05-17
    Frege's Theory of Thoughts and the Prospect of Language.Michael Felber - 2001 - Acta Analytica 25:83-96.
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  7. added 2020-05-16
    Eternal Thoughts.Peter Carruthers - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):186-204.
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  8. added 2020-05-16
    Fregean Thoughts.Harold Noonan - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):205-224.
  9. added 2020-05-16
    The Composition of Fregean Thoughts.Harold T. Hodes - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (2):161 - 178.
  10. added 2020-05-15
    Has Dummett Over-Salted His Frege? Remarks on the Conveyability of Thought.Alexander George - 1997 - In Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Oxford University Press. pp. 35--69.
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  11. added 2020-05-14
    The Structure of Frege's Thoughts.Marian Zouhar - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):199-209.
    Fregean thoughts (i.e. the senses of assertoric sentences) are structured entities because they are composed of simpler senses that are somehow ordered and interconnected. The constituent senses form a unity because some of them are ?saturated? and some ?unsaturated?. This paper shows that Frege's explanation of the structure of thoughts, which is based on the ?saturated/unsaturated? distinction, is by no means sufficient because it permits what I call ?wild analyses?, which have certain unwelcome consequences. Wild analyses are made possible because (...)
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  12. added 2020-05-11
    Rieger's Problem with Frege's Ontology.N. Denyer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):166-170.
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  13. added 2020-05-11
    Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
    Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to argue that Dummett and others are mistaken in this claim. First, Frege's aversion of the correspondence theory of truth does not square well with Dummett's claim. Secondly, and more importantly, Grundgesetze I, §32, is the only place where Frege even appears to be talking about truth conditions in connection with his notion of thought -- (...)
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  14. added 2020-05-10
    Fregean Propositions, Belief Preservation and Cognitive Value.Marco Ruffino - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):217-236.
    In this paper I argue indirectly for Frege's semantics, in particular for his conception of propositions, by reviewing some difficulties faced by one of the main contemporary alternative approaches, i.e., the direct reference theory. While Frege's semantics can yield an explanation of cognitive value and belief-preservation, the alternative approach seems to run into trouble here. I shall also briefly consider the question of whether epistemic issues should be of any concern for semantics, i.e., whether the feature mentioned above should really (...)
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  15. added 2020-05-08
    Frege on Thoughts.Gregory Currie - 1980 - Mind 89 (354):234-248.
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  16. added 2020-05-04
    A Dilemma in Frege's Philosophy of Thought and Language.Wolfgang Künne - 2007 - Rivista di Estetica 47 (34):95-120.
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  17. added 2020-05-04
    Propositions in Bolzano and Frege.Wolfgang Künne - 1997 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 53 (1):203-240.
    Bolzano's Sätze an sich and Frege's Gedanken are obviously close relatives. The paper underlines both similarities and dissimilarities between the psychological and semantical roles assigned to structured truth-evaluable contents in Bolzano's and Frege's theories. In particular, their different accounts of propositional identity are compared, and it is argued that Dummett's recent criticism of Frege's account is grist to Bolzano's mill.
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  18. added 2020-05-04
    Propositions in Bolzano and Frege.Wolfgang Künne - 1997 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 53 (1):203-240.
    Bolzano's Sätze an sich and Frege's Gedanken are obviously close relatives. The paper underlines both similarities and dissimilarities between the psychological and semantical roles assigned to structured truth-evaluable contents in Bolzano's and Frege's theories. In particular, their different accounts of propositional identity are compared, and it is argued that Dummett's recent criticism of Frege's account is grist to Bolzano's mill.
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  19. added 2020-05-04
    Indexikalität, Sinn Und Propositionaler Gehalt.Wolfgang Künne - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 18 (1):41-74.
    Wodurch wird der Sinn des Prädikats in einer Äußerung des indexikalischen Satzes 'Ich habe Blutgruppe A' zu dem propositionalen Gehalt vervollständigt, den der Sprecher ausdrückt? Durch einen Individualbegriff (unter den der Sprecher fällt)? Durch ein Individuum (den Sprecher in propria persona)! Keiner dieser Lösungsvorschläge für das (von Perry zuerst formulierte) Vervollständigungsproblem ist überzeugend. Für Frege ist der in einer solchen Äußerung verwendete Eigenname hybrid: er besteht aus einem Vorkommnis von 'ich' und den Umständen seiner Äußerung. Der Indikator 'ich' allein ist (...)
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  20. added 2020-05-03
    Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Peter Hanks defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content, according to which the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. He explains the unity of propositions and provides new solutions to a long list of puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.
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  21. added 2020-05-03
    Demythologizing the Third Realm: Frege on Grasping Thoughts.B. Scot Rousse - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (1).
    In this paper, I address some puzzles about Frege’s conception of how we “grasp” thoughts. I focus on an enigmatic passage that appears near the end of Frege’s great essay “The Thought.” In this passage Frege refers to a “non-sensible something” without which “everyone would remain shut up in his inner world.” I consider and criticize Wolfgang Malzkorn’s interpretation of the passage. According to Malzkorn, Frege’s view is that ideas [Vorstellungen] are the means by which we grasp thoughts. My counter-proposal (...)
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  22. added 2020-05-02
    ‘The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing Between Content and Force.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    Recently, the content/force distinction has had a bad press. It has been argued that the distinction is not properly motivated and that it makes the problem of the unity of the proposition intracta...
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