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  1. Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist.
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  2. Frege, the Self-Consciousness of Judgement, and the Indefinability of Truth.Colin Johnston - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-20.
  3. The Horizontal in Frege's Begriffsschrift.Junyeol Kim - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This paper addresses an issue with the sign ‘⊢’ in Frege’s mature version of Begriffsschrift, i.e., the version in ‘Function and Concept’ and Grundgesetze. The sign is a performative for asserting in that writing down ‘⊢p’ is equivalent to asserting that p. Frege further says that writing ‘ p’ is also equivalent to identifying the reference of ‘p’ with the truth-value True. It looks as if he holds that asserting that p consists in identifying the True with the reference of (...)
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  4. Does Frege Have a Metalinguistic Truth-Predicate in Begriffsschrift?Junyeol Kim - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    In the explanations of logical laws and inference rules of the mature version of Begriffsschrift in Grundgesetze, Frege uses the predicate “… is the True.” Scholars like Greimann maintain that this predicate is a metalinguistic truth-predicate for Frege. This paper examines an argument for this claim that is based on the “nominal reading” of Frege’s conception of sentences—the claim that for Frege a sentence “ $ p $ ” is equivalent to a nonsentential phrase like “the truth-value of the thought (...)
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  5. The Birth of Semantics.Richard Kimberly Heck & Robert C. May - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (6):1-31.
    We attempt here to trace the evolution of Frege’s thought about truth. What most frames the way we approach the problem is a recognition that hardly any of Frege’s most familiar claims about truth appear in his earliest work. We argue that Frege’s mature views about truth emerge from a fundamental re-thinking of the nature of logic instigated, in large part, by a sustained engagement with the work of George Boole and his followers, after the publication of Begriffsschrift and the (...)
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  6. Frege's Conception of Truth as an Object.Junyeol Kim - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
    In this dissertation I explore Frege’s conception of truth. In particular I defend the thesis that Frege in his mature career takes truth to be an object, i.e., the True qua the reference of true sentences. In the literature on truth Frege has been usually taken to be a truth deflationist or a truth primitivist. Indeed Frege leaves a number of comments that sound like typical deflationist claims and his famous indefinability argument is the most discussed argument for primitivism. However, (...)
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  7. Gottlob Frege on Truth During the Period of the Two Volume Edition of Grundgesetze Der Arithmethik.Gabriela Besler - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 30:61-84.
    In 1893 and 1903, two volumes of the most important of Frege’s works Grundegezte der Arithmetik were published. This period can be called the peak of Frege’s logicism. Although the subject of truth in Frege’s logical and philosophical works has been repeatedly investigated, there is a lack of studies on his view in this period, especially in Polish literature. In this article, therefore, I carry out the following research task: to collect and order Frege’s statements about truth during the period (...)
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  8. Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings.Junyeol Kim - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    The object reading of Frege's conception of truth holds that, for him, truth is an object---the truth-value the True. Greimann refutes the object reading and suggests an alternative reading. According to his suggested reading, Frege is the proponent of the assertion theory of truth the main thesis of which is that truth is what is expressed by the form of assertoric sentences and truth as such is neither an object nor a property. I argue that Frege cannot accept the assertion (...)
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  9. Wittgenstein and Frege on Assertion.Christoph C. Pfisterer - 2019 - In Paul Weingartner Gabriele M. Mras (ed.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 169–182.
    In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously criticizes Frege’s conception of assertion. “Frege’s opinion that every assertion contains an assumption”, says Wittgenstein, rests on the possibility of parsing every assertoric sentence into two components: one expressing the assumption that is put forward for assertion, the other expressing that it is asserted. But this possibility does not entail that the “assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting” - any more than the possibility of rendering assertions as pairs of questions and affirmative (...)
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  10. Gottlob Frege o prawdzie w okresie wydawania dwóch tomów Grundgesetze der Arithmethik.Gabriela Besler - 2018 - Studia Semiotyczne 32 (2):51-73.
    W latach 1893 i 1903 ukazały się dwa tomy najważniejszego dzieła Fregego Grundegezte der Arithmetik. Ten okres można nazwać „szczytem logicyzmu” Fregego. Chociaż temat prawdy w logiczno-filozoficznej twórczości Fregego był podejmowany wielokrotnie, to brakuje pozycji skupiającej się na badaniu poglądów w tym okresie. Dotyczy to w szczególności literatury polskiej. Moim zadaniem jest zebranie i uporządkowanie wszystkich wypowiedzi Fregego na temat prawdy w okresie wydawania wspomnianych tomów. Realizując to zadanie, badam użycie tego pojęcia w pierwszym tomie Grundegezte der Arithmetik oraz w (...)
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  11. Frege on Negative Judgement and Assertion.Dirk Greimann - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):409-428.
    ABSTRACT In “Die Verneinung”, Frege discusses two types of negation, a semantic one and a pragmatic one. Semantic negation consists in the application of the logical function denoted by ‘it is false that p’ to a thought, and pragmatic negation in the act of asserting or judging a thought as false. According to the standard interpretation, Frege does not acknowledge pragmatic negation, because it is logically redundant. He therefore rejects the classical dualistic view that both truth and falsity are qualities (...)
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  12. Frege on Judgement and the Judging Agent.Maria van der Schaar - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):225-250.
    How is Frege able to claim that the notion of judgement is essential to his logic without introducing a form of psychologism? I argue first that Frege’s logical notion of judgement is to be distinguished from an empirical notion of judgement, that it cannot be understood as an abstract, idealized notion, and that there are doubts concerning a transcendental reading of Frege’s writings. Then, I explain that the logical notion of judgement has to be understood from a first-person perspective, to (...)
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  13. The Logical Significance of Assertion: Frege on the Essence of Logic.Walter B. Pedriali - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (8).
    Assertion plays a crucial dual role in Frege's conception of logic, a formal and a transcendental one. A recurrent complaint is that Frege's inclusion of the judgement-stroke in the Begriffsschrift is either in tension with his anti-psychologism or wholly superfluous. Assertion, the objection goes, is at best of merely psychological significance. In this paper, I defend Frege against the objection by giving reasons for recognising the central logical significance of assertion in both its formal and its transcendental role.
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  14. Frege's Performative Argument Against Truth Relativism.Dirk Greimann - 2015 - Journal of the History of Analytic Philosophy 3:1-17.
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  15. Frege’s Performative Argument Against Truth Relativism.Dirk Greimann - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (2).
    The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Frege’s argument against the relativity of truth contained in his posthumous writing Logic from 1897. Two points are made. The first is that the argument is a performative version of the common objection that truth relativism is incoherent: it is designed to show that the assertion of the relativity of truth involves a performative incoherence, because the absoluteness of truth is a success condition for making assertions. From a modern point of view, (...)
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  16. Ulrich Pardey, Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth. An Introduction to the Practice of Interpreting Philosophical Texts, History of Analytic Philosophy , Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke-New York, 2012, Xxiv+242 Pp. [REVIEW]Bernd Buldt - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):360-362.
  17. Reviewed Work: Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth. An Introduction to the Practice of Interpreting Philosophical Texts, History of Analytic Philosophy by Ulrich Pardey. [REVIEW]Review by: Bernd Buldt - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):360-362,.
  18. Freges Urteilslehre. Ein in der Logik vergessenes Lehrstück der Analytischen Philosophie.Moritz Cordes - 2014 - XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft Für Philosophie 28. September - 2. Oktober 2014.
    Frege's philosophy of language includes detailed views on judgments. His formal logic - the Begriffsschrift - documents some of these views in the introduction and treatment of the judgment stroke. In current logic such an expression is either entirely ignored or, appearing as turnstile, plays an fundamentally different role. In this paper I put forward four claims: (i) Considering Frege's Begriffsschrift, it is methodologically palpable why the judgment stroke was omitted in nearly all logical systems developed after Frege. (ii) The (...)
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  19. Frege on Truth, Assertoric Force and the Essence of Logic.Dirk Greimann - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):272-288.
    In a posthumous text written in 1915, Frege makes some puzzling remarks about the essence of logic, arguing that the essence of logic is indicated, properly speaking, not by the word ‘true’, but by the assertoric force. William Taschek has recently shown that these remarks, which have received only little attention, are very important for understanding Frege's conception of logic. On Taschek's reconstruction, Frege characterizes logic in terms of assertoric force in order to stress the normative role that the logical (...)
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  20. The Priority Principle From Kant to Frege.Jeremy Heis - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):268-297.
    In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode […] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought (...)
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  21. Truth, Value, and Truth Value. Frege's Theory of Judgement and its Historical Background.Gottfried Gabriel - 2013 - In Mark Textor (ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. New York: Palgrave. pp. 36-51.
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  22. Merely Entertaining a Thought, Judging and Asserting.Wolfgang Künne - 2013 - In Mark Textor (ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Palgrave. pp. 52.
  23. Frege's Characterisation of Logic in Terms of Assertoric Force.Dirk Greimann - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (1):61-83.
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  24. A caracterização da lógica pela força assertórica em Frege. Resposta a Marco Ruffino.Dirk Greimann - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (1):61-83.
    According to the standard characterization of logic in Frege’s writings, the word “true” indicates the essence of logic, as the word “good” indicates the essence of ethics and the word “beautiful” the essence of aesthetics. In a posthumous writing from 1915, however, Frege says that it is the assertoric force, and not the word “true”, which indicates the essence of logic properly. Prima facie, this correction is in conflict with Frege’s criticism of the psychologist conception of logic. For according to (...)
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  25. Frege, la Verdad y El Progreso Cientifico.Carlos Ulises Moulines - 2012 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 1 (1):17--35.
    [ES] El presente trabajo muestra la continuidad, a través de la obra de Frege y en el contexto de su caracterización del hacer científico, de una noción de verdad que no es constructiva ni instrumental y ni siquiera puede entenderse como relación de correspondencia o adecuación. Se trata de un concepto primitivo y no definible, que se intenta llevar a sus últimas consecuencias —algo que no llegó a hacer Frege. El autor defiende, finalmente, una noción alternativa de verdad que podría (...)
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  26. Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth: An Introduction to the Practice of Interpreting Philosophical Texts.Ulrich Pardey - 2012 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book has two objectives: to be a contribution to the understanding of Frege's theory of truth – especially a defence of his notorious critique of the correspondence theory - and to be an introduction to the practice of interpreting philosophical texts.
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  27. La Noción De Verdad En “el Pensamiento: Una Investigación Lógica” De Gottlob Frege.Ricardo Araujo - 2011 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 31 (1):85-90.
    La noción de verdad juega un papel fundamental dentro del marco lógico- semántico expuesto por Gottlob Frege en sus ensayos “Función y concepto” y “Sentido y referencia”. En su artículo El pensamiento. Una investigación lógica, el filósofo alemán nos dice que la lógica es la ciencia que estudia lo verdadero y las leyes que en cuanto verdadero le competen, pero, ¿qué debemos entender por “verdad”? Esta interrogante será uno de los puntos centrales que Frege expondrá en su artículo. ¿La verdad (...)
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  28. Die Wahrheit verträgt kein Mehr oder Minder.Geert Keil - 2010 - In Holm Tetens & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), In Sprachspiele verstrickt. Festschrift für Hans Julius Schneider. de Gruyter. pp. 81-100.
    1. Einleitung 2. Herausforderungen für das Nichtgraduierbarkeits- und das Bivalenzprinzip 3. Freges Einwand gegen graduale Wahrheit 4. Warum semantische Vagheit keine Wahrheitsgrade erfordert 5. Grenzen ziehen, wo noch keine gezogen sind.
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  29. Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth.Mark Textor - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):615-655.
    According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, (...)
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  30. The Disunity of Truth.Josh Dever - 2009 - In Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Compositionality, Context and Semantic Values: Essays in Honour of Ernie Lepore. pp. 174-191.
    §§3-4 of the Begriffsschrift present Frege’s objections to a dominant if murky nineteenth-century semantic picture. I sketch a minimalist variant of the pre-Fregean picture which escapes Frege’s criticisms by positing a thin notion of semantic content which then interacts with a multiplicity of kinds of truth to account for phenomena such as modality. After exploring several ways in which we can understand the existence of multiple truth properties, I discuss the roles of pointwise and setwise truth properties in modal logic. (...)
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  31. Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in His ‘Justification’ of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner.Dirk Greimann - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):403-425.
    Joan Weiner has recently claimed that Frege neither uses, nor has any need to use, a truth-predicate in his justification of the logical laws. She argues that because of the assimilation of sentences to proper names in his system, Frege does not need to make use of the Quinean device of semantic ascent in order to formulate the logical laws, and that the predicate ‘is the True’, which is used in Frege's justification, is not to be considered as a truth-predicate, (...)
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  32. Frege on Truths, Truth and the True.Wolfgang Künne - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):5-42.
    The founder of modern logic and grandfather of analytic philosophy was 70 years old when he published his paper 'Der Gedanke' (The Thought ) in 1918. This essay contains some of Gottlob Frege's deepest and most provocative reflections on the concept of truth, and it will play a prominent role in my lectures. The plan for my lectures is as follows. What is it that is (primarily) true or false? 'Thoughts', is Frege's answer. In §1, I shall explain and defend (...)
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  33. Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on "the Essence of Logic".William W. Taschek - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):375-401.
    In the opening to his late essay, Der Gedanke, Frege asserts without qualification that the word "true" points the way for logic. But in a short piece from his Nachlass entitled "My Basic Logical Insights", Frege writes that the word true makes an unsuccessful attempt to point to the essence of logic, asserting instead that "what really pertains to logic lies not in the word "true" but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered". Properly understanding what Frege (...)
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  34. Essays on Frege’s Conception of Truth.Dirk Greimann (ed.) - 2007 - Rodopi.
    In his writings on the foundations of logic, Gottlob Frege, the father of modern logic, sketched a conception of truth that focuses on the following questions: What is the sense of the word “true”? Is truth a definable concept or a primitive one? What are the kinds of things of which truth is predicated? What is the role of the concept of truth in judgment, assertion and recognition? What is the logical category of truth? What is the significance of the (...)
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  35. Did Frege Really Consider Truth as an Object?Dirk Greimann - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
    It is commonly assumed that the conception of truth defended by Frege in his mature period is characterized by the view that truth is not the property denoted by the predicate 'is true', but the object named by true sentences. In the present paper, I wish to make plausible an alternative interpretation according to which Frege's conception is characterized by the view that truth is what is expressed in natural language by the "form of the assertoric sentence". So construed, truth (...)
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  36. Evidence, Judgment and Truth.Verena Mayer - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):175-197.
    Although Frege was eager to theoretically eliminate the judging subject from logic and mathematics, his system is permeated with notions that refer to subjective mental processes, such as grasping a thought, assuming, judging, and value. His semantic system depends on such notions, but since Frege in general shuns explaining them, his central conception of judgment and truth remains dark. In this paper it is proposed to fill out the gaps in Frege's explanations with the help of Husserl's phenomenological descriptions, especially (...)
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  37. Frege on Truth, Judgment, and Objectivity.Erich H. Reck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):149-173.
    In Frege's writings, the notions of truth, judgment, and objectivity are all prominent and important. This paper explores the close connections between them, together with their ties to further cognate notions, such as those of thought, assertion, inference, logical law, and reason. It is argued that, according to Frege, these notions can only be understood properly together, in their inter-relations. Along the way, interpretations of some especially cryptic Fregean remarks, about objectivity, laws of truth, and reason, are offered, and seemingly (...)
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  38. Truth and the Imperfection of Language.Hans Sluga - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):1-26.
    Frege subscribed neither to a correspondence theory of truth nor, as is now frequently argued, to a simple redundancy theory of truth. He did not believe, in other words, that the word "true" can be dropped from the language without loss. He argues, instead, that in a perfect language we would not require the term "true" but that we are far from possessing such a language. A perfect language would be one that is fully adequate in the sense that it (...)
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  39. Frege's Redundancy Thesis.Shin Sakuragi - 2006 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 39 (1):29-45.
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  40. The Pragmatic Value of Frege's Platonism for the Pragmatist.Robert Arp - 2005 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19 (1):22-41.
  41. Absolute Wahrheit Und Endliches Wahrheitsbewusstsein: Das Verhältnis von Logischem Und Theologischem Wahrheitsbegriff - Thomas von Aquin, Kant, Fichte Und Frege.Roderich Barth - 2004 - Mohr Siebeck.
    Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral - Halle-Wittenberg) under the title: Die Krise des theologischen Wahrheitsbegriffs.
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  42. Freges Konzeption der Wahrheit. [REVIEW]Martin Grajner - 2004 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 58 (3).
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  43. Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth.Dirk Greimann - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):425-442.
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be completely redundant (...)
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  44. Putting Form Before Function: Logical Grammar in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein.Kevin C. Klement - 2004 - Philosophers' Imprint 4:1-47.
    The positions of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the priority of complexes over (propositional) functions are sketched, challenging those who take the "judgment centered" aspects of the Tractatus to be inherited from Frege not Russell. Frege's views on the priority of judgments are problematic, and unlike Wittgenstein's. Russell's views on these matters, and their development, are discussed in detail, and shown to be more sophisticated than usually supposed. Certain misreadings of Russell, including those regarding the relationship between propositional functions and (...)
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  45. Frege on Truth, Beauty and Goodness.Simon Evnine - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):315-330.
    The paper attempts to shed light on Frege's views on the relation of logic to truth by looking at several passages in which he compares it to the relation of ethics to the good and aesthetics to the beautiful. It turns out that Frege makes four distinct points by means of these comparisons only one of which both concerns truth and makes use of distinctive features of ethics and aesthetics. This point is that logic is about reaching truth in the (...)
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  46. Das Wahre und das Falsche: Studien zu Freges Auffassung von Wahrheit.Dirk Greimann (ed.) - 2003 - Hildesheim: Olms.
    Frege hat in seinen Schriften zu den philosophischen Grundlagen der Logik eine eigenwillige Konzeption der Wahrheit skizziert, der zufolge das Wahre und das Falsche keine Eigenschaften von Sätzen oder Gedanken sind, sondern Gegenstände, die von Sätzen bezeichnet werden. In dem vorliegenden Sammelband werden zentrale Komponenten dieser Konzeption näher beleuchtet: die Thesen der Undefinierbarkeit der Wahrheit und der Redundanz des Wortes „wahr“, die Auffassung der Wahrheitswerte als Gegenstände, das so genannte slingshot-Argument, die Konzeption der Tatsachen als wahre Gedanken und die Bestimmung (...)
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  47. Freges Konzeption der Wahrheit.Dirk Greimann - 2003 - Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
    Frege hat über Jahrzehnte hinweg an einem Buch über die Grundlagen der Logik gearbeitet, dessen erster Teil folgenden Fragen gewidmet sein sollte: Ist Wahrheit definierbar oder ein „logisches Urelement“? Ist Wahrheit die Übereinstimmung eines inneren Bildes mit der Realität, oder ein Spezialfall der Beziehung zwischen dem Sinn eines Zeichens und seinem Bezug? Welchen Beitrag leistet der Sinn des Wortes ,wahr’ zu dem Sinn der Sätze, in denen es vorkommt? Sind die Wahrheitswerte – „das Wahre“ und „das Falsche“ – als Eigenschaften (...)
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  48. Frege Und Die Redundanztheorie der Wahrheit.Andreas Kemmerling - 2003 - In Dirk Greimann (ed.), Das Wahre und das Falsche. Studien zu Freges Auffassung von Wahrheit. Hildesheim: Olms. pp. 29-38.
    Was Frege Liber Wahrheit sagt, lasst sich, mit ein wenig Gewalt, in zwei Schubfacher auiteilen} Das erste Schubfach — es trtigt die Aufschritt ,,Konstrul~:tives" enthalt die Lehre von der Wahrheit als Gegenstand und als Satzbedeutung. Das andere Schubfach —- mit der Aufschrift ,,Destruktives" —e ist reicher gefiilltg es finden sich hier Arguniente gegen die Korrespondenztheorie, gegen die De— iinierbarkeit von Wahrheit, gegen den Nutzen eines Walirheitsprttdikats und insbesondere Diagnosen dafur, welche Irrttimer den von Frege iiir falsch gehaltenen Auffassungen tiber Wahrheit (...)
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  49. The Inferential Significance of Frege's Assertion Sign.Mitchell S. Green - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2).
  50. Frege on Truth and Judgment.Peter Pagin - 2001 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 8 (1):1-13.
    For Frege’s general views about truth the standard reference is the first couple of pages of ‘The Thought’. Less attention has been paid to a short passage in ‘On Sense and Reference’ -- in, fact, only one paragraph long -- where Frege argues indirectly for the view that the relation between the thought and the True is an instance of the relation between sense and reference. He argues for this by discrediting the alternative view that it is an instance of (...)
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