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  1. added 2020-06-01
    A caracterização da lógica pela força assertórica em Frege. Resposta a Marco Ruffino.Dirk Greimann - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (1):61-83.
    According to the standard characterization of logic in Frege’s writings, the word “true” indicates the essence of logic, as the word “good” indicates the essence of ethics and the word “beautiful” the essence of aesthetics. In a posthumous writing from 1915, however, Frege says that it is the assertoric force, and not the word “true”, which indicates the essence of logic properly. Prima facie, this correction is in conflict with Frege’s criticism of the psychologist conception of logic. For according to (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-01
    Frege's Redundancy Thesis.Shin Sakuragi - 2006 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 39 (1):29-45.
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  3. added 2020-05-31
    Truth and the Imperfection of Language.Hans Sluga - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):1-26.
    Frege subscribed neither to a correspondence theory of truth nor, as is now frequently argued, to a simple redundancy theory of truth. He did not believe, in other words, that the word "true" can be dropped from the language without loss. He argues, instead, that in a perfect language we would not require the term "true" but that we are far from possessing such a language. A perfect language would be one that is fully adequate in the sense that it (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-30
    Freges Erläuterung des Urteils.Wolfgang Becker - 1989 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 20 (2):230-248.
    According to Frege the notion of judgement cannot be defined, but must be explicated by referring to natural language. Frege uses a subjective and an objective notion of judgement: on the one hand a judgement is an inner mental process, on the other hand judging is explained as advancing from the thought to the truth-value. The subjective notion of judgement logically depends on the objective conception of a judgement, but nevertheless remains indispensable. To clarify the objective notion of judgement, the (...)
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  5. added 2020-05-29
    Frege Und Die Redundanztheorie der Wahrheit.Andreas Kemmerling - 2003 - In Dirk Greimann (ed.), Das Wahre und das Falsche. Studien zu Freges Auffassung von Wahrheit. Hildesheim: Olms. pp. 29-38.
    Was Frege Liber Wahrheit sagt, lasst sich, mit ein wenig Gewalt, in zwei Schubfacher auiteilen} Das erste Schubfach — es trtigt die Aufschritt ,,Konstrul~:tives" enthalt die Lehre von der Wahrheit als Gegenstand und als Satzbedeutung. Das andere Schubfach —- mit der Aufschrift ,,Destruktives" —e ist reicher gefiilltg es finden sich hier Arguniente gegen die Korrespondenztheorie, gegen die De— iinierbarkeit von Wahrheit, gegen den Nutzen eines Walirheitsprttdikats und insbesondere Diagnosen dafur, welche Irrttimer den von Frege iiir falsch gehaltenen Auffassungen tiber Wahrheit (...)
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  6. added 2020-05-29
    Frege's Theory of Judgement By David Bell Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1979, 165 Pp., £8.50. [REVIEW]Leslie Stevenson - 1980 - Philosophy 55 (212):277-278.
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  7. added 2020-05-29
    Tarski, Frege and the Liar Paradox.Sloman Aaron - 1971 - Philosophy 46 (176):133-.
    A.1. Some philosophers, including Tarski and Russell, have concluded from a study of various versions of the Liar Paradox ‘that there must be a hierarchy of languages, and that the words “true” and “false”, as applied to statements in any given language, are themselves words belonging to a language of higher order’. In his famous essay on truth Tarski claimed that ‘colloquial’ language is inconsistent as a result of its property of ‘universality’: that is, whatever can be said at all (...)
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  8. added 2020-05-27
    Qu’est-ce qu’un jugement?Jocelyn Benoist - 1998 - Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28):169-192.
  9. added 2020-05-26
    Absolute Wahrheit Und Endliches Wahrheitsbewusstsein: Das Verhältnis von Logischem Und Theologischem Wahrheitsbegriff - Thomas von Aquin, Kant, Fichte Und Frege.Roderich Barth - 2004 - Mohr Siebeck.
    Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral - Halle-Wittenberg) under the title: Die Krise des theologischen Wahrheitsbegriffs.
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  10. added 2020-05-24
    Frege’s Performative Argument Against Truth Relativism.Dirk Greimann - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (2).
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  11. added 2020-05-24
    Frege's Characterisation of Logic in Terms of Assertoric Force.Dirk Greimann - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (1):61-83.
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  12. added 2020-05-21
    A Restriction in Frege's Use of the Term “True”.Robert Sternfeld - 1955 - Philosophical Studies 6 (4):58 - 64.
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  13. added 2020-05-20
    Frege's Theory of Judgement.David Bell - 1979 - Oxford University Press.
    Examines Frege's theory of judgement, according to which a judgement is, paradigmatically, the assertion that a particular object falls under a given concept. Throughout the book the aim is to both state Frege's views clearly and concisely, and to defend, modify or reject these where appropriate.
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  14. added 2020-05-17
    Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in His ‘Justification’ of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner.Dirk Greimann - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):403-425.
    Joan Weiner has recently claimed that Frege neither uses, nor has any need to use, a truth-predicate in his justification of the logical laws. She argues that because of the assimilation of sentences to proper names in his system, Frege does not need to make use of the Quinean device of semantic ascent in order to formulate the logical laws, and that the predicate ‘is the True’, which is used in Frege's justification, is not to be considered as a truth-predicate, (...)
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  15. added 2020-05-17
    Did Frege Really Consider Truth as an Object?Dirk Greimann - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
    It is commonly assumed that the conception of truth defended by Frege in his mature period is characterized by the view that truth is not the property denoted by the predicate 'is true', but the object named by true sentences. In the present paper, I wish to make plausible an alternative interpretation according to which Frege's conception is characterized by the view that truth is what is expressed in natural language by the "form of the assertoric sentence". So construed, truth (...)
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  16. added 2020-05-17
    Evidence, Judgment and Truth.Verena Mayer - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):175-197.
    Although Frege was eager to theoretically eliminate the judging subject from logic and mathematics, his system is permeated with notions that refer to subjective mental processes, such as grasping a thought, assuming, judging, and value. His semantic system depends on such notions, but since Frege in general shuns explaining them, his central conception of judgment and truth remains dark. In this paper it is proposed to fill out the gaps in Frege's explanations with the help of Husserl's phenomenological descriptions, especially (...)
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  17. added 2020-05-17
    Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth.Dirk Greimann - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):425-442.
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be completely redundant (...)
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  18. added 2020-05-17
    Judgment and Truth in Frege.Michael Kremer - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (4):549-581.
    Thomas Ricketts has developed a powerful interpretation of Frege on judgment, truth and logic. Recently, Ricketts has modified his reading, holding that judgment is an act of knowledge-acquisition; this rules out incorrect judgment. I argue that Ricketts goes too far here. I criticize the textual basis for Ricketts's new view, and show that the interpretive problems which led him to this change can be met without such extreme measures. Thus, I defend Ricketts' earlier view against his own later modification. Along (...)
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  19. added 2020-05-17
    Three Puzzles in Frege's Theory of Truth.Thomas Baldwin - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--14.
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  20. added 2020-05-17
    Truth in Frege's 'Law of Truth'.Gary Kemp - 1995 - Synthese 105 (1):31 - 51.
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  21. added 2020-05-16
    Truth, Value, and Truth Value. Frege's Theory of Judgement and its Historical Background.Gottfried Gabriel - 2013 - In Mark Textor (ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. New York: Palgrave. pp. 36-51.
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  22. added 2020-05-16
    BELL, DAVID "Frege's Theory of Judgement". [REVIEW]Leslie Stevenson - 1980 - Philosophy 55:277.
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  23. added 2020-05-15
    Essays on Frege’s Conception of Truth.Dirk Greimann (ed.) - 2007 - Rodopi.
    In his writings on the foundations of logic, Gottlob Frege, the father of modern logic, sketched a conception of truth that focuses on the following questions: What is the sense of the word “true”? Is truth a definable concept or a primitive one? What are the kinds of things of which truth is predicated? What is the role of the concept of truth in judgment, assertion and recognition? What is the logical category of truth? What is the significance of the (...)
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  24. added 2020-05-15
    Frege on Truth and Judgment.Peter Pagin - 2001 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 8 (1):1-13.
    For Frege’s general views about truth the standard reference is the first couple of pages of ‘The Thought’. Less attention has been paid to a short passage in ‘On Sense and Reference’ -- in, fact, only one paragraph long -- where Frege argues indirectly for the view that the relation between the thought and the True is an instance of the relation between sense and reference. He argues for this by discrediting the alternative view that it is an instance of (...)
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  25. added 2020-05-14
    Bell, D., "Frege's Theory of Judgment". [REVIEW]Gregory Currie - 1981 - Erkenntnis 16 (1):183.
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  26. added 2020-05-13
    David Bell's "Frege's Theory of Judgment". [REVIEW]Newton Garver - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (4):598-600.
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  27. added 2020-05-12
    O Conceito De Verdade Em Frege.Adalberto Dorneles - 1993 - Educação E Filosofia 7:9-15.
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  28. added 2020-05-11
    Frege's Performative Argument Against Truth Relativism.Dirk Greimann - 2015 - Journal of the History of Analytic Philosophy 3:1-17.
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  29. added 2020-05-11
    Frege, la Verdad y El Progreso Cientifico.Carlos Ulises Moulines - 2012 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 1 (1):17--35.
    [ES] El presente trabajo muestra la continuidad, a través de la obra de Frege y en el contexto de su caracterización del hacer científico, de una noción de verdad que no es constructiva ni instrumental y ni siquiera puede entenderse como relación de correspondencia o adecuación. Se trata de un concepto primitivo y no definible, que se intenta llevar a sus últimas consecuencias —algo que no llegó a hacer Frege. El autor defiende, finalmente, una noción alternativa de verdad que podría (...)
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  30. added 2020-05-11
    Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on "the Essence of Logic".William W. Taschek - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):375-401.
    In the opening to his late essay, Der Gedanke, Frege asserts without qualification that the word "true" points the way for logic. But in a short piece from his Nachlass entitled "My Basic Logical Insights", Frege writes that the word true makes an unsuccessful attempt to point to the essence of logic, asserting instead that "what really pertains to logic lies not in the word "true" but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered". Properly understanding what Frege (...)
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  31. added 2020-05-10
    Ulrich Pardey, Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth. An Introduction to the Practice of Interpreting Philosophical Texts, History of Analytic Philosophy , Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke-New York, 2012, Xxiv+242 Pp. [REVIEW]Bernd Buldt - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):360-362.
  32. added 2020-05-10
    Reviewed Work: Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth. An Introduction to the Practice of Interpreting Philosophical Texts, History of Analytic Philosophy by Ulrich Pardey. [REVIEW]Review by: Bernd Buldt - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):360-362,.
  33. added 2020-05-10
    The Priority Principle From Kant to Frege.Jeremy Heis - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):268-297.
    In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode […] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought (...)
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  34. added 2020-05-10
    Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth: An Introduction to the Practice of Interpreting Philosophical Texts.Ulrich Pardey - 2012 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book has two objectives: to be a contribution to the understanding of Frege's theory of truth – especially a defence of his notorious critique of the correspondence theory - and to be an introduction to the practice of interpreting philosophical texts.
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  35. added 2020-05-08
    Frege on Negative Judgement and Assertion.Dirk Greimann - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):409-428.
    ABSTRACT In “Die Verneinung”, Frege discusses two types of negation, a semantic one and a pragmatic one. Semantic negation consists in the application of the logical function denoted by ‘it is false that p’ to a thought, and pragmatic negation in the act of asserting or judging a thought as false. According to the standard interpretation, Frege does not acknowledge pragmatic negation, because it is logically redundant. He therefore rejects the classical dualistic view that both truth and falsity are qualities (...)
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  36. added 2020-05-08
    Frege on Truth, Judgment, and Objectivity.Erich H. Reck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):149-173.
    In Frege's writings, the notions of truth, judgment, and objectivity are all prominent and important. This paper explores the close connections between them, together with their ties to further cognate notions, such as those of thought, assertion, inference, logical law, and reason. It is argued that, according to Frege, these notions can only be understood properly together, in their inter-relations. Along the way, interpretations of some especially cryptic Fregean remarks, about objectivity, laws of truth, and reason, are offered, and seemingly (...)
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  37. added 2020-05-07
    Frege's Theory of Judgement. [REVIEW]Thomas G. Ricketts - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):313-315.
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  38. added 2020-05-07
    Frege on Assertion.V. H. Dudman - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):61-64.
    It is urged (1) that geach is correct in his claim ("assertion", "philosophical review", 74, (1965), Page 449) that what he calls 'the frege point' is logically independent of frege's doctrine that sentences are names of objects, And (2) that frege's 'propositions of begriffsschrift' are neither truths nor falsehoods.
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  39. added 2020-05-06
    Frege und Husserl über Urteilen und Denken.Markus Stepanians - 1998 - Paderborn: Schöningh.
  40. added 2020-05-05
    Frege on Truth, Assertoric Force and the Essence of Logic.Dirk Greimann - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):272-288.
    In a posthumous text written in 1915, Frege makes some puzzling remarks about the essence of logic, arguing that the essence of logic is indicated, properly speaking, not by the word ‘true’, but by the assertoric force. William Taschek has recently shown that these remarks, which have received only little attention, are very important for understanding Frege's conception of logic. On Taschek's reconstruction, Frege characterizes logic in terms of assertoric force in order to stress the normative role that the logical (...)
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  41. added 2020-05-05
    Sigwart, Husserl and Frege on Truth and Logic, or is Psychologism Still a Threat?Eva Picardi - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):162–182.
  42. added 2020-05-05
    Frege on Truth.Tyler Burge - 1986 - In L. Haaparanta & J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized. D. Reidel Publishing Co.. pp. 97--154.
  43. added 2020-05-05
    The Concept of Truth in Frege's Program.Tyler Burge - 1984 - Philosophia Naturalis 21 (2/4):507-512.
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  44. added 2020-05-04
    Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist.
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  45. added 2020-05-04
    Wittgenstein and Frege on Assertion.Christoph C. Pfisterer - 2019 - In Paul Weingartner Gabriele M. Mras (ed.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. Berlin, Germany: pp. 169–182.
    In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously criticizes Frege’s conception of assertion. “Frege’s opinion that every assertion contains an assumption”, says Wittgenstein, rests on the possibility of parsing every assertoric sentence into two components: one expressing the assumption that is put forward for assertion, the other expressing that it is asserted. But this possibility does not entail that the “assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting” - any more than the possibility of rendering assertions as pairs of questions and affirmative (...)
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  46. added 2020-05-04
    Frege on Judgement and the Judging Agent.Maria van der Schaar - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):225-250.
    How is Frege able to claim that the notion of judgement is essential to his logic without introducing a form of psychologism? I argue first that Frege’s logical notion of judgement is to be distinguished from an empirical notion of judgement, that it cannot be understood as an abstract, idealized notion, and that there are doubts concerning a transcendental reading of Frege’s writings. Then, I explain that the logical notion of judgement has to be understood from a first-person perspective, to (...)
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  47. added 2020-05-04
    Merely Entertaining a Thought, Judging and Asserting.Wolfgang Künne - 2013 - In Mark Textor (ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Palgrave. pp. 52.
  48. added 2020-05-04
    Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth.Mark Textor - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):615-655.
    According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, (...)
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  49. added 2020-05-04
    Frege on Truths, Truth and the True.Wolfgang Künne - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):5-42.
    The founder of modern logic and grandfather of analytic philosophy was 70 years old when he published his paper 'Der Gedanke' (The Thought ) in 1918. This essay contains some of Gottlob Frege's deepest and most provocative reflections on the concept of truth, and it will play a prominent role in my lectures. The plan for my lectures is as follows. What is it that is (primarily) true or false? 'Thoughts', is Frege's answer. In §1, I shall explain and defend (...)
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  50. added 2020-05-03
    The Birth of Semantics.Richard Kimberly Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy.
    We attempt here to trace the evolution of Frege's thought about truth. What most frames the way we approach the problem is a recognition that hardly any of Frege's most familiar claims about truth appear in his earliest work. We argue that Frege's mature views about truth emerge from a fundamental re-thinking of the nature of logic instigated, in large part, with a sustained engagement with the work of George Boole and his followers, after the publication of Begriffsschrift and the (...)
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