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  1. Fregean de Re Thoughts.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2014 - Cognitio-Estudos 11 (1):1-12.
    This papers aims at clarifying some misunderstandings that seem to block an adequate account of de re thoughts within the Fregean framework. It is usually assumed that Fregean senses cannot be de re, or dependent upon objects. Contrary to this assumption, Gareth Evans and John McDowell have claimed that Fregean de re senses are not just possible, but in fact the most promising alternative for accounting for de re thoughts. The reasons blocking this alternative can be traced back to Russellian (...)
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  2. Comments on “Individuating Lexical Types And.Peter Alward - manuscript
    In this commentary, I am going to focus on the earlier sections of Lapointe’s paper in which she defends an interpretation of Frege’s account of the individuation of lexical types. According to Lapointe, Frege rejects the view that two signs – concrete particulars – belong to the same lexical type just in case they are tokens of the same orthographic or phonographic type. Instead Frege’s position is that two signs belong to the same lexical type “only if they are recognized (...)
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  3. Reflections on Reference and Reflexivity.Kent Bach - 2007 - In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. pp. 395--424.
    In Reference and Reflexivity, John Perry tries to reconcile referentialism with a Fregean concern for cognitive significance. His trick is to supplement referential content with what he calls ‘‘reflexive’’ content. Actually, there are several levels of reflexive content, all to be distinguished from the ‘‘official,’’ referential content of an utterance. Perry is convinced by two arguments for referentialism, the ‘‘counterfactual truth-conditions’’ and the ‘‘same-saying’’ arguments, but he also acknowledges the force of two Fregean arguments against it, arguments that pose the (...)
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  4. How 'Russellian' Was Frege?David Bell - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):267-277.
  5. The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism.Richard Bett (ed.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    This volume offers a comprehensive survey of the main periods, schools, and individual proponents of scepticism in the ancient Greek and Roman world. The contributors examine the major developments chronologically and historically, ranging from the early antecedents of scepticism to the Pyrrhonist tradition. They address the central philosophical and interpretive problems surrounding the sceptics' ideas on subjects including belief, action, and ethics. Finally, they explore the effects which these forms of scepticism had beyond the ancient period, and the ways in (...)
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  6. Unmentionables and Ineffables: An Interpretation of Some Fregean Metaphysical and Semantical Discourse. [REVIEW]Steven E. Boër - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (1):53-96.
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  7. A Pyrrhonian Plato? : Again on Sextus on Aenesidemus on Plato.Mauro Bonazzi - 2011 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
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  8. Is the Pyrrhonist an Internalist?Otávio Bueno - 2011 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill. pp. 126--179.
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  9. Millian Descriptivism.Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.
    In this paper, I argue against Millian Descriptivism: that is, the view that, although sentences that contain names express singular propositions, when they use those sentences speakers communicate descriptive propositions. More precisely, I argue that Millian Descriptivism fares no better (or worse) than Fregean Descriptivism: that is, the view that sentences express descriptive propositions. This is bad news for Millian Descriptivists who think that Fregean Descriptivism is dead.
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  10. Against Widescopism.Ben Caplan - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (2):167-190.
    Descriptivists say that every name is synonymous with some definite description, and Descriptivists who are Widescopers say that the definite description that a name is synonymous with must take wide scope with respect to modal adverbs such as “necessarily”. In this paper, I argue against Widescopism. Widescopers should be Super Widescopers: that is, they should say that the definite description that a name is synonymous with must take wide scope with respect to complementizers such as “that”. Super Widescopers should be (...)
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  11. A Context Principle for the Twenty-First Century.Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History.
    This is an article for an upcoming volume of essays in honor and memory of Eva Picardi. I engage with the literature that has tried to distill the significance of Frege's context principle for the philosophy of language (setting aside its role in Frege's argument for mathematical platonism). I argue that there are some interpretive problems with recent meta-semantic interpretations of the principle. Instead, I offer a somewhat weaker alternative: the context principle is a tool to license certain definitions. Moreover, (...)
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  12. The Diversity of Sense: An Appreciation of Frege’s Theory of Sense.Dr Sanjit Chakraborty - 2011 - Indian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (2):79-96.
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  13. Review of Scott Soames, Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism[REVIEW]Eros Corazza - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (12).
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  14. Introduction.Martin Davies & Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):1-10.
    The two-dimensional semantic framework, with its two-dimensional matrices of truth values, was developed for tense logic by Frank Vlach (1973), building on work by Hans Kamp (1971), and for modal logic by Lennart Åqvist (1973), Krister Segerberg (1973), and Bas van Fraassen (1977). Other antecedents of the contemporary use of the framework are found in formal work on contextdependence by Richard Montague (1968) and David Lewis (1970) and especially in David Kaplan’s distinction between character and content in ‘Demonstratives’ (published in (...)
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  15. Intentionalism, Descriptivism, and Proper Names.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 102.
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  16. Dummett's Forward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism.Jan Dejnožka - 2010 - Diametros 25:118-131.
    This paper continues Michael Dummett's and my discussion of Frege in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett [2007]. Most of it is about Dummett’s change in view on Frege’s senses and objects. The issues include: the cognitive order versus the ontological order for the forward road; the nature and identity of senses and the different senses of "intension;" the nature of saturation; whether special quantifiers are now needed for senses; and Frege’s earlier and later permutation arguments. I discuss the implications of (...)
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  17. Singular Terms, Predicates and the Spurious 'Is' of Identity.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (3):325-343.
    Contemporary orthodoxy affirms that singular terms cannot be predicates and that, therefore, ‘is’ is ambiguous as between predication and identity. Recent attempts to treat names as predicates do not challenge this orthodoxy. The orthodoxy was built into the structure of modern formal logic by Frege. It is defended by arguments which I show to be unsound. I provide a semantical account of atomic sentences which draws upon Mill's account of predication, connotation and denotation. I show that singular terms may be (...)
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  18. Fregean Connection: Bedeutung, Value and Truth-Value.Gottfried Gabriel - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):372-376.
    It is shown how frege's problematic connection between truth-Value and "bedeutung" (of a sentence) becomes more plausible when set against the background of german language and philosophy, Especially by comparing frege's position with the value-Theoretical school of neo-Kantianism (w windelband).
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  19. Indistinguishable Senses.Aidan Gray - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege’s Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable: to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an ‘intrinsic representational feature’ is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify (...)
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  20. On the Error of Treating Functions as Objects.Karen Green - 2016 - Analysis and Metaphysics 15.
  21. A Pinch of Salt for Frege.Karen Green - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):209-228.
    Michael Dummett has argued that a formal semantics for our language is inadequate unless it can be shown to illuminate to our actual practice of speaking and understanding. This paper argues that Frege’s account of the semantics of predicate expressions according to which the reference of a predicate is a concept (a function from objects to truth values) has exactly the required characteristics. The first part of the paper develops a model for understanding the distinction between objects and concepts as (...)
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  22. The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege's Scientific Language. [REVIEW]D. Greimann - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (2):213-238.
    The syntax of Frege's scientific language is commonly taken to be characterized by two oddities: the representation of the intended illocutionary role of sentences by a special sign, the judgement-stroke, and the treatment of sentences as a species of singular terms. In this paper, an alternative view is defended. The main theses are: the syntax of Frege's scientific language aims at an explication of the logical form of judgements; the judgement-stroke is, therefore, a truth-operator, not a pragmatic operator; in Frege's (...)
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  23. The Bearable Lightness of Being (Vol 20, Pg 399, 2010).Bob Hale - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (4):597 - 597.
    How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories—such as object , property , and relation —are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth and logical (...)
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  24. Grundlagen §64.Bob Hale - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (3):243–261.
  25. The Sceptics.R. J. Hankinson - 1995 - Routledge.
    _The Sceptics_ is the first comprehensive, up-to-date treatment of Greek scepticism, from the beginnings of epistemology with Xenophanes, to the final full development of Pyrrhonism as presented in the work of Sextus Empiricus. Tracing the evolution of scepticism from 500 B.C to A.D 200, this clear and rigorous analysis presents the arguments of the Greek sceptics in their historical context and provides an in-depth study of the various strands of the sceptical tradition.
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  26. A Higher-Order Solution to the Problem of the Concept Horse.Nicholas K. Jones - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    This paper uses the resources of higher-order logic to articulate a Fregean conception of predicate reference, and of word-world relations more generally, that is immune to the concept horse problem. The paper then addresses a prominent style of expressibility problem for views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Linnebo, Hale, and Wright.
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  27. Foundations of Intensional Logic.David Kaplan - 1964 - Dissertation, UCLA
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  28. Frege's Begriffsschrift as a Lingua Characteristica.Tapio Korte - 2010 - Synthese 174 (2):283 - 294.
    In this paper I suggest an answer to the question of what Frege means when he says that his logical system, the Begrijfsschrift, is like the language Leibniz sketched, a lingua characteristica, and not merely a logical calculus. According to the nineteenth century studies, Leibniz's lingua characteristica was supposed to be a language with which the truths of science and the constitution of its concepts could be accurately expressed. I argue that this is exactly what the Begriffsschrift is: it is (...)
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  29. Wyrażenia okazjonalne jako wyrażenia funkcyjne.Volha Kukushkina - 2008 - Diametros 17:1-29.
    I’m going to present a new idea about how to find the right place for the indexical and demonstrative expressions in Gottlob Frege’s semantics. My main thesis is: that it is possible to find such interpretation of Frege’s view on indexicals and demonstratives which is entirely “fregean” and is not vulnerable to the counterexamples given by Kaplan and Perry. According to the interpretation I propose, these expressions are functional and they denote first-level functions defined on objects. These functional expressions taken (...)
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  30. Antecedents in Early Greek Philosophy.Mi-Kyoung Lee - 2010 - In Richard Arnot Home Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13.
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  31. Analysis and Decomposition in Frege and Russell.James Levine - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):195-216.
    Michael Dummett has long argued that Frege is committed to recognizing a distinction between two sorts of analysis of propositional contents: 'analysis', which reveals the entities that one must grasp in order to apprehend a given propositional content; and 'decomposition', which is used in recognizing the validity of certain inferences. Whereas any propositional content admits of a unique ultimate 'analysis' into simple constituents, it also admits of distinct 'decompositions', no one of which is ultimately privileged over the others. I argue (...)
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  32. On Sosa's "Fregean Reference Defended".William G. Lycan - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:100-103.
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  33. Introduction.E. Machuca Diego - 2011 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
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  34. Kristeva’s Subject-in-Process: From Structure to Semiotic Criticism.William D. Melaney - 2009 - In Paul Forsell Eero Tarasti (ed.), Understanding/misunderstanding : Proceedings of the 9th Congress of the IASS/AIS, Helsinki-Imatra, 11-17 June, 2007. International Semiotics Institute. pp. 1074-81.
    As presented in the early work, 'Revolution in Poetic Language,' Julia Kristeva’s 'subject-in-process' can be interpreted as a semiotic alternative to older conceptions of the philosophical subject.This discussion of Kristeva’s early work will attempt to demonstrate that new interpretations of Fregean logic and Freudian psychoanalysis radically displace the traditional subject. This act of displacement allows Kristeva to employ Hegelian dialectics to introduce a “textual” conception of meaning of experience. As a consequence, the Kristevan semiotexte offers a basis for both understanding (...)
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  35. Sense and Proof.Carlo Penco & Daniele Porello - 2010 - In M. D'agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani & C. Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science,. College Publicationss.
    In this paper we give some formal examples of ideas developed by Penco in two papers on the tension inside Frege's notion of sense (see Penco 2003). The paper attempts to compose the tension between semantic and cognitive aspects of sense, through the idea of sense as proof or procedure – not as an alternative to the idea of sense as truth condition, but as complementary to it (as it happens sometimes in the old tradition of procedural semantics).
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  36. The Same F.John Perry - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (2):181-200.
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  37. Objects, Concepts, Unity.Ulrich Reichard - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Legacy of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. De Gruyter. pp. 213-224.
    The paradox of the concept horse has often been taken to be devastating for Frege’s ontological distinction between objects and concepts. I argue that if we consider how the concept-object distinction is supposed to account for the unity of linguistic meaning, it transpires that the paradox is in fact not paradoxical.
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  38. Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology.Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat & Jonathan Barnes (eds.) - 1979 - Oxford University Press.
    THE PROTAGONISTS David Sedley The primary object of this historical introduction1 is to enable a reader encountering Hellenistic philosophy for the first ...
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  39. How Weak and How Definite Are Weak Definites?Florian Schwarz - manuscript
  40. Rejecting Statements with Non-Referring Definites – Experimental Support for a Presuppositional View.Florian Schwarz - manuscript
  41. Comments on Saul Kripke’s Philosophical Troubles.Theodore Sider - 2015 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 4 (5):67--80.
    [ES] Esta es una discusión de algunos temas vagamente conectados en los artículos de Saul Kripke «The first person» y «Frege’s theory of sense and reference». [EN] This is a discussion of some loosely connected issues in Saul Kripke’s articles «The first person» and «Frege’s theory of sense and reference».
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  42. Anaphora and Semantic Innocence.J. P. Smit & A. Steglich-Petersen - 2010 - Journal of Semantics 27 (1):119-124.
    Semantic theories that violate semantic innocence, i.e. require reference-shifts when terms are embedded in ‘that’ clauses and the like, are often challenged by producing sentences where an anaphoric expression, while not itself embedded in a context in which reference shifts, is anaphoric on an antecedent expression that is embedded in such a context. This, in conjunction with a widely accepted principle concerning unproblematic anaphora, is used to show that such reference shifting has absurd consequences. We show that it is the (...)
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  43. Academics Versus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered.Gisela Striker - 2010 - In Richard Arnot Home Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 195.
  44. Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on "the Essence of Logic".William W. Taschek - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):375-401.
    In the opening to his late essay, Der Gedanke, Frege asserts without qualification that the word "true" points the way for logic. But in a short piece from his Nachlass entitled "y Basic Logical Insights", Frege writes that the word true makes an unsuccessful attempt to point to the essence of logic, asserting instead that "what really pertains to logic lies not in the word "true" but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered". Properly understanding what Frege (...)
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  45. What God Didn't Know (Sextus Empiricus AM IX 162-166).James Warren - 2011 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill. pp. 126--41.
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  46. Pyrrhonian Inquiry.Marta Anna Włodarczyk - 2000 - Cambridge Philological Society.
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