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108 found
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1 — 50 / 108
  1. added 2018-12-17
    Singular Thoughts and de Re Attitude Reports.James Openshaw - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437.
    It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject’s possession of a singular thought, then ‘acquaintance’-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on poorly motivated claims about how we talk about the attitudes. I offer a framework for propositional attitude reports which provides both attractive solutions to recalcitrant puzzle cases and the key to preserving (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-14
    Gottlob Frege: On Sense and Reference (Reading, Translation into Arabic and Comment).Salah Osman - 2016 - Contexts, Language and Interdisciplinary Studies, Natural Sciences Publishing Cor., USA 1 (1):277 - 298.
    كان «فريجه» – على حد تعبير «دامت» – من أوائل من أدركوا أن نظرية المعنى، أو فلسفة اللغة، هي جزءٌ اساسي من الفلسفة ترتكز عليه كافة الأجزاء الاخرى؛ فإلى جانب دراساته التأسيسية الرائدة في الرياضيات والمنطق، كان يُؤسس ايضًا لفلسفة اللغة ببعض المقالات التي فاقت في تاثيرها وشهرتها تاثير وشهرة معظم أعماله الرياضية الأخرى، دون إقلال من شان هذه الأخيرة وريادتها. وهذه الدراسة بمثابة قراءة تحليلية – نقدية لمقاله الأكثر أهمية في هذا الصدد «في المعنى والإشارة»، مشفوعة بترجمة إلى العربية (...)
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  3. added 2018-08-01
    Review. [REVIEW]Maite Ezcurdia - 1995 - Critica 27 (79):107-122.
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  4. added 2018-06-12
    Frege’s Puzzle and the Direct Reference Theory.Filip Kawczyński - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 109-126.
    In the paper, I discuss a possibility of defending the Direct Reference theory from its most dangerous threaten which is the notorious Frege's puzzle. I discuss two possible ways of doing that. First is based on King's theory of propositions as facts. I show that tools provided by King's theory are not enough to solve the puzzle. More promising is a method supported by new Soames's theory of propositions as cognitive event-types. I try to show that this framework allows us (...)
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  5. added 2018-05-18
    Frege’s Puzzle is About Identity After All.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory of identity statements. (...)
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  6. added 2018-05-14
    Indistinguishable Senses.Aidan Gray - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege’s Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable: to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an ‘intrinsic representational feature’ is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify (...)
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  7. added 2018-03-05
    Frege Puzzles and Mental Files.Henry Clarke - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):351-366.
    This paper proposes a novel conception of mental files, aimed at addressing Frege puzzles. Classical Frege puzzles involve ignorance and discovery of identity. These may be addressed by accounting for a more basic way for identity to figure in thought—the treatment of beliefs by the believer as being about the same thing. This manifests itself in rational inferences that presuppose the identity of what the beliefs are about. Mental files help to provide a functional characterization of a mind capable of (...)
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  8. added 2018-02-17
    Fregean Sense and the Proper Function of Assertion: Comments on Textor.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2000 - Theoria 15 (38):303-316.
    On behalf of Millian views on the meaning of proper names, Mark Textor offers in 'Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense' a suggestive critical discussion of an argument for Fregean views due to Richard Heck (1995). IWhat exactly Heck's argument is, however, is not very clear, as witnessed by Byrne & Thau's (1996) efforts at reconstructing it and Heck's (1996) reply to which is not terribly illuminating. After presenting a form of a Fregean view and a Heckian argument for it, the (...)
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  9. added 2018-02-07
    The Edenic Theory of Reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-33.
    I argue for a theory of the optimal function of the speech act of referring, called the edenic theory. First, the act of singular reference is defined directly in terms of Gricean communicative intentions. Secondly, I propose a doxastic constraint on the optimal performance of such acts, stating, roughly, that the speaker must not have any relevant false beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the intended object. In uttering a singular term on an occasion, on this theory, one represents (...)
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  10. added 2018-01-17
    The Publicity of Thought.Andrea Onofri - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272).
    An influential tradition holds that thoughts are public: different thinkers share many of their thoughts, and the same applies to a single subject at different times. This ‘publicity principle’ has recently come under attack. Arguments by Mark Crimmins, Richard Heck and Brian Loar seem to show that publicity is inconsistent with the widely accepted principle that someone who is ignorant or mistaken about certain identity facts will have distinct thoughts about the relevant object—for instance, the astronomer who does not know (...)
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  11. added 2018-01-11
    Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?Panu Raatikainen - forthcoming - In Andrea Bianchi (ed.), Language and Reality From a Naturalistic Perspective: Themes From Michael Devitt. Springer.
    The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference (...)
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  12. added 2017-12-19
    Book Review: GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, Manuel & TORRE, Stephan . About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 368pp., ISBN 9780198713265. [REVIEW]Matheus Valente - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (2):127-135.
    ABSTRACT We review the book About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, a compilation of papers on de se thought and its implications for a theory of communication. We critically examine the main themes put forward by the papers and try to show how, when put together, they point the way for future discussions about the issue of indexical thought and communication.
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  13. added 2017-11-02
    Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
    Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
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  14. added 2017-10-20
    Ultra-Liberal Attitude Reports.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2043-2062.
    Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little attention has been paid to certain ‘ultra-liberal’ uses of those reports. We believe that if these uses are legitimate, then a number of interesting consequences for various theses in philosophical semantics follow. The majority of the paper involves describing these consequences. In short, we argue that, if true, ultra-liberal reports: bring counterexamples to a popular approach to de re attitude ascriptions, which we will call ‘descriptivism’; and (...)
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  15. added 2017-10-09
    Informativeness and Multiple Senses.Genoveva Marti - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica. Special Issue on Frege’s Puzzle (136):27-32.
    Stavroula Glezakos (2009) argues that Frege himself could not pose Frege’s puzzle without relying on the distinction between sense and reference, a distinction that the puzzle was supposed to motivate, not presuppose. In this paper I argue that there are still some puzzling questions about the informativeness of identity sentences, and I discuss a problem generated by the Fregean contention that one and the same proper name can have different senses for different speakers an issue that, in my view, Frege (...)
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  16. added 2017-09-08
    Frege on Subject Matter and Identity Statements.Eros Corazza & Kepa Korta - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):562-565.
    In formulating the puzzle about cognitive significance in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Frege rejects the approach he suggested in the Begriffsschrift on the ground that if the utterance of a sentence of the form a = b is understood as ‘a’ and ‘b’ referring to the same object we lose the subject matter. In this note, we will show how Frege’s concerns can be understood and circumvented.
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  17. added 2017-09-08
    What's Puzzling Gottlob Frege?Mike Thau & Ben Caplan - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):159-200.
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  18. added 2017-08-21
    Identity Statements and Conversationally Salient Content.Peter Alward - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (1):121-138.
    In this paper, I argue that viewing Frege’s puzzle through a semantic lens results in the rejection of solutions to it on irrelevant grounds. As a result, I develop a solution to it that rests on a non-semantic sense of context-sensitivity. And I apply this picture to Frege’s puzzle when it arises through the use of identity statements designed to establish that distinct speakers are talking about the same thing.
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  19. added 2017-06-26
    The Logic of Opacity.Andrew Bacon & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research.
    We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models to show (...)
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  20. added 2017-05-11
    Mental Files and Rational Inferences.Andrea Onofri - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):378-392.
    My goal in this paper is to discuss the 'Fregean' account of inferences proposed by Recanati in his 'Mental Files' (Oxford University Press, 2012). I raise the following dilemma for the mental files theory. (a) If the premises of certain inferences involve 'the same file' in a strict sense of the expression, then files cannot play the role of modes of presentation. (b) If, on the other hand, the files involved in the premises are 'the same' only in a loose (...)
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  21. added 2017-05-11
    Concepts in Context.Andrea Onofri - 2012 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    My thesis tackles two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: • What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept C₁ the same concept as a concept C₂? • What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? I will develop a pluralist and contextualist theory of concept individuation and possession: different concepts have different individuation and possession conditions, (...)
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  22. added 2017-02-10
    Leaving Identity Issues to Other Folks.Phyllis Allen - 2006 - In Jay Allison, Dan Gediman, John Gregory & Viki Merrick (eds.), This I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. H. Holt.
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  23. added 2017-01-31
    Informative Identities: A Challenge for Frege's Puzzle.Elisa Paganini - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):513-530.
    Frege's puzzle about identity sentences has long challenged many philosophers to find a solution to it but also led other philosophers to object that the evidential datum it is grounded on is false. The present work is an elaboration of this second kind of reaction: it explains why Frege's puzzle seems to resist the traditional objection, giving voice to different and more elaborated presentations of the evidential datum, faithful to the spirit but not to the letter of Frege's puzzle. The (...)
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  24. added 2017-01-31
    Frege's Puzzle.Graeme Forbes & Nathan Salmon - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
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  25. added 2017-01-26
    The Frege Puzzle One More Time.Martin Hahn - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 169--183.
  26. added 2017-01-24
    Frege's Puzzle a Phenomenological Solution?Shannon Vallor - 2002 - Philosophy Today 46 (5):178-185.
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  27. added 2017-01-24
    Frege's Puzzle.Jennifer Hornsby - 1987 - Philosophical Books 28 (3):161-163.
  28. added 2017-01-23
    For a Truth-Conditional Semantic Solution to Frege-Like Paradoxes. Rouilhan - unknown
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  29. added 2017-01-19
    Frege on the Psychological Significance of Definitions.John F. Horty - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):223 - 263.
  30. added 2017-01-19
    The Reverse Frege Puzzle.Takashi Yagisawa - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:341-367.
  31. added 2017-01-18
    Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles.Murat Aydede - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-17
    Frege's Puzzle.Shannon Vallor - 2002 - Philosophy Today 46 (9999):178-185.
  33. added 2016-12-08
    Referentialism and the Objects of Credence: A Reply to Braun.David J. Chalmers - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):499-510.
  34. added 2016-12-08
    Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
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  35. added 2016-12-08
    Frege's Puzzle and Belief Ascriptions.Pierre Jacob - manuscript
    This paper is about belief ascriptions and problems that arise for a Fregean theory.
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  36. added 2016-09-05
    Frege-Inspired Neo-Descriptivism and Its Problems.Jan G. Michel - 2015 - In D. Schott (ed.), Frege: Freund(e) und Feind(e). Logos. pp. 161-175.
  37. added 2016-08-02
    Extraction, Displacement, and Focus: A Reply to Balcerak Jackson.Thomas Hofweber - unknown
    On the one hand they seem to be quite obviously truth conditionally equivalent, but on the other hand they seem to be about different things. Whereas (1) is about Jupiter and its moons, (2) is about numbers. In particular, the word ‘four’ appears in (1) in the position of an adjective or determiner, whereas it seems to be a name for a number in (2). Furthermore, (2) appears to be an identity statement claiming that what two number terms stand for (...)
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  38. added 2016-07-15
    Minimal Descriptivism.Aidan Gray - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):343-364.
    Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account of names minimally descriptivistif it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into extant (...)
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  39. added 2016-06-21
    On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View.Tristan Haze - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):269-293.
    This paper is about the meaning and function of identity statements involving proper names. There are two prominent views on this topic, according to which identity statements ascribe a relation: the object-view, on which identity statements ascribe a relation borne by all objects to themselves, and the name-view, on which an identity statement 'a is b' says that the names 'a' and 'b' codesignate. The object- and name-views may seem to exhaust the field. I make a case for treating identity (...)
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  40. added 2016-05-14
    Saul, Salmon, and Superman.Stefano Predelli - 1999 - Analysis 59 (2):113–116.
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  41. added 2016-03-14
    Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions, by Jennifer Saul.N. A. Pinillos - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):523-526.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  42. added 2016-02-11
    Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):204-227.
    Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
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  43. added 2016-01-07
    Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):97-118.
    In a series of recent works, Kit Fine, 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, (...)
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  44. added 2016-01-06
    De Re Belief.David Kaplan - 2013 - In Richard Hull (ed.), Presidential Addresses of The American Philosophical Association 1981–1990. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25-37.
  45. added 2016-01-03
    Opacity.David Kaplan - 1986 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn & Paul Arthur Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. Open Court. pp. 229-289.
  46. added 2015-12-17
    Toward a New Theory of Content.George Bealer - 1994 - In R. Casati, B. Smith & G. White (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993). Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 179-92.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay out the algebraic approach to propositions and then to show how it can be implemented in new solutions to Frege's puzzle and a variety of related puzzles about content.
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  47. added 2015-09-18
    Russellian Acquaintance and Frege’s Puzzle.Donovan Wishon - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):321-370.
    In this paper, I argue that a number of recent Russell interpreters, including Evans, Davidson, Campbell, and Proops, mistakenly attribute to Russell what I call ‘the received view of acquaintance’: the view that acquaintance safeguards us from misidentifying the objects of our acquaintance. I contend that Russell’s discussions of phenomenal continua cases show that he does not accept the received view of acquaintance. I also show that the possibility of misidentifying the objects of acquaintance should be unsurprising given underappreciated aspects (...)
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  48. added 2015-09-05
    Is a Logic for Belief Sentences Possible?Karen Green - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (1):29 - 55.
    In this paper I distinguish normative and descriptive reasons for attempting to construct a logic for belief sentences, and argue that because the interpretation of the content of an attribution of belief is context sensitive and ambiguous, no simple logic is adequate.
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  49. added 2015-08-18
    The Antinomy of the Variable: A Tarskian Resolution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (3):137-170.
    Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables ‘x’ (...)
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  50. added 2015-04-14
    The Four Puzzles of Reference.Bryan Frances - manuscript
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