Related categories

97 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 97
  1. Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes and Non-Descriptive Connotations.Diana Ackerman - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (1):55 - 69.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  2. Leaving Identity Issues to Other Folks.Phyllis Allen - 2006 - In Jay Allison, Dan Gediman, John Gregory & Viki Merrick (eds.), This I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women. H. Holt.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
    This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   506 citations  
  4. Belief and Possibility.Ferenc Altrichter - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):364-382.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Comments on Mark Kalderon's “The Open Question Argument, Frege's Puzzle, and Leibniz's Law”.Peter Alward - unknown
    A standard strategy for defending a claim of non-identity is one which invokes Leibniz’s Law. (1) Fa (2) ~Fb (3) (∀x)(∀y)(x=y ⊃ (∀P)(Px ⊃ Py)) (4) a=b ⊃ (Fa ⊃ Fb) (5) a≠b In Kalderon’s view, this basic strategy underlies both Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA) as well as (a variant formulation of) Frege’s puzzle (FP). In the former case, the argument runs from the fact that some natural property—call it “F-ness”—has, but goodness lacks, the (2nd order) property of its (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Identity Statements and Conversationally Salient Content.Peter Alward - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (1):121-138.
    In this paper, I argue that viewing Frege’s puzzle through a semantic lens results in the rejection of solutions to it on irrelevant grounds. As a result, I develop a solution to it that rests on a non-semantic sense of context-sensitivity. And I apply this picture to Frege’s puzzle when it arises through the use of identity statements designed to establish that distinct speakers are talking about the same thing.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles.Murat Aydede - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  8. The Logic of Opacity.Andrew Bacon & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research.
    We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models to show (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism.Arvid Båve - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):271 - 289.
    A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  10. Toward a New Theory of Content.George Bealer - 1994 - In R. Casati, B. Smith & G. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 179-92.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay out the algebraic approach to propositions and then to show how it can be implemented in new solutions to Frege's puzzle and a variety of related puzzles about content.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. A Solution to Frege's Puzzle.George Bealer - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.
    This paper provides a new approach to a family of outstanding logical and semantical puzzles, the most famous being Frege's puzzle. The three main reductionist theories of propositions (the possible-worlds theory, the propositional-function theory, the propositional-complex theory) are shown to be vulnerable to Benacerraf-style problems, difficulties involving modality, and other problems. The nonreductionist algebraic theory avoids these problems and allows us to identify the elusive nondescriptive, non-metalinguistic, necessary propositions responsible for the indicated family of puzzles. The algebraic approach is also (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  12. Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Ultra-Liberal Attitude Reports.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little attention has been paid to certain ‘ultra-liberal’ uses of those reports. We believe that if these uses are legitimate, then a number of interesting consequences for various theses in philosophical semantics follow. The majority of the paper involves describing these consequences. In short, we argue that, if true, ultra-liberal reports: bring counterexamples to a popular approach to de re attitude ascriptions, which we will call ‘descriptivism’; and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Cognitive Significance and Reflexive Content.Vojislav Bozickovic - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):545-554.
    John Perry has urged that a semantic theory for natural languages ought to be concerned with the issue of cognitive significance—of how true identity statements containing different (utterances of) indexicals and proper names can be informative, held to be unaccountable by the referentialist view. The informativeness that he has in mind—one that has puzzled Frege, Kaplan and Wettstein—concerns knowledge about the world. In trying to solve this puzzle on referentialist terms, he comes up with the notion of cognitive significance as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Are Salmon's 'Guises' Disguised Fregean Senses?João Branquinho - 1990 - Analysis 50 (1):19 - 24.
    In a review of Frege's Puzzle1, Graeme Forbes makes the claim that Salmon's account of belief might be seen, under certain conditions, as a mere notational variant of a neo-Fregean theory; and thus that such an account might be reduced to a neo-Fregean one simply by rewriting it in terms of Fregean terminology. With a view to supporting his claim, Forbes offers an outline of an account of belief which, according to him, would satisfy the following conditions: (i) it could (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs.David M. Braun - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege.Tyler Burge - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    Tyler Burge presents a collection of his seminal essays on Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who has a strong claim to be seen as the founder of modern analytic philosophy, and whose work remains at the centre of philosophical debate today. Truth, Thought, Reason gathers some of Burge's most influential work from the last twenty-five years, and also features important new material, including a substantial introduction and postscripts to four of the ten papers. It will be an essential resource for any historian (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  18. Sense and Mode of Presentation.H. G. Callaway - 2008 - In Meaning without Analyticity.
    Theories of linguistic meaning have been a major influence in twentieth century philosophy. This is due, in part, to the assumption that meaning is the crucial and interesting thing about language. To know the meaning of an expression is to understand it, and since understanding is central to philosophy in many different ways, it should be no surprise that the notion of meaning has often taken center stage. The aim of this paper is to briefly explore some influential views concerning (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. The Hesperus and Phosphorus Puzzle.James D. Carney - 1980 - Mind 89 (356):577-581.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Referentialism and the Objects of Credence: A Reply to Braun.David J. Chalmers - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):499-510.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):587-635.
    The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  22. Frege on Subject Matter and Identity Statements.Eros Corazza & Kepa Korta - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):562-565.
    In formulating the puzzle about cognitive significance in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Frege rejects the approach he suggested in the Begriffsschrift on the ground that if the utterance of a sentence of the form a = b is understood as ‘a’ and ‘b’ referring to the same object we lose the subject matter. In this note, we will show how Frege’s concerns can be understood and circumvented.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. For a Truth-Conditional Semantic Solution to Frege-Like Paradoxes.Philippe De Rouilhan - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. On Direct Reference.Harry Deutsch - 1989 - In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-195.
  25. Frege: Philosophy of Language.Michael Dummett - 1973 - London: Duckworth.
    This highly acclaimed book is a major contribution to the philosophy of language as well as a systematic interpretation of Frege, indisputably the father of ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   373 citations  
  26. The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
  27. Names Are Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.
    One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  28. De Lingua Belief.Robert Fiengo & Robert May - 2006 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    It is beliefs of this sort--de linguabeliefs--that Robert Fiengo and Robert May explore in this book.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  29. Names and Expressions.Robert Fiengo & Robert May - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (8):377-409.
  30. Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle Reviewed By.G. W. Fitch - 1987 - Philosophy in Review 7 (5):210-212.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Chalmers on the Objects of Credence.Jesse Fitts - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):343-358.
    Chalmers (Mind 120(479): 587–636, 2011a) presents an argument against “referentialism” (and for his own view) that employs Bayesianism. He aims to make progress in a debate over the objects of belief, which seems to be at a standstill between referentialists and non-referentialists. Chalmers’ argument, in sketch, is that Bayesianism is incompatible with referentialism, and natural attempts to salvage the theory, Chalmers contends, requires giving up referentialism. Given the power and success of Bayesianism, the incompatibility is prima facie evidence against referentialism. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32. Frege's Puzzle.Graeme Forbes & Nathan Salmon - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  33. The Four Puzzles of Reference.Bryan Frances - manuscript
  34. The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism.Bryan Frances - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1007-1022.
    For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  35. Disquotation and Substitutivity.Bryan Frances - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):519-25.
    Millianism is reasonable; that is, it is reasonable to think that all there is to the semantic value of a proper name is its referent. But Millianism appears to be undermined by the falsehood of Substitutivity, the principle that interchanging coreferential proper names in an intentional context cannot change the truth value of the resulting belief report. Mary might be perfectly rational in assenting to ‘Twain was a great writer’ as well as ‘Clemens was not a great writer’. Her confusion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.
    Kripke’s puzzle has puts pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g., if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, then (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. Defending the Defense.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):563-566.
    My hunch has always been that in the end, Fregeanism will defeat Millianism. So I suspect that my (1998) arguments on behalf of Millianism are flawed. Peter Graham (1999) is confident he has found the flaws, but he has not. I hope that some clarification will encourage others to reveal the errors.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Defending Millian Theories.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):703-728.
    In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent, so it has no additional sense. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke’s puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean’s arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  40. The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.
  41. Sense and Reference.Gottlob Frege - 1948 - Philosophical Review 57 (3):209-230.
    This book is an analysis of Frege's views on language metaphysics raised in On Sense Reference, arguably one of the most important philosophical essays of the past hundred years. It provides a thorough introduction to the function/argument analysis and applies Frege's technique to the central notions of predication, identity, existence and truth. Of particular interest is the analysis of the Paradox of Identity and a discussion of three solutions: the little-known Begriffsschrift solution, the sense/reference solution, and Russell's 'On Denoting' solution. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  42. n Sinn n d Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Frege Reader. Blackwell. pp. 151-172.
  43. Fregean Sense and the Proper Function of Assertion.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2000 - Theoria 15 (2):303-316.
    On behalf of Millian views on the meaning of proper names, Mark Textor offers in 'Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense' a suggestive critical discussion of an argument for Fregean views due to Richard Heck (1995). IWhat exactly Heck's argument is, however, is not very clear, as witnessed by Byrne & Thau's (1996) efforts at reconstructing it and Heck's (1996) reply to which is not terribly illuminating. After presenting a form of a Fregean view and a Heckian argument for it, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44. Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 202.
    Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. -/- Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can be posed prior to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
    Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Minimal Descriptivism.Aidan Gray - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):343-364.
    Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account of names minimally descriptivistif it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into extant (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. Is a Logic for Belief Sentences Possible?Karen Green - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (1):29 - 55.
    In this paper I distinguish normative and descriptive reasons for attempting to construct a logic for belief sentences, and argue that because the interpretation of the content of an attribution of belief is context sensitive and ambiguous, no simple logic is adequate.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  48. Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth.Dirk Greimann - 2004 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):425 – 442.
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be completely redundant (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. The Frege Puzzle One More Time.Martin Hahn - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 169--183.
  50. What is the Sense of Phos and Hes?Robert M. Harnish - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 47:185-196.
    Frege's puzzle for demonstratives is accounting for the cognitive significance of identity statements containing demonstratives, such as "That [demonstration-1] is identical to that [demonstration-2]". Since the demonstrative 'that' makes the same semantic contribution (has the same 'character') on both occurrences, the difference must be due to the cognitive significance or 'senses' of the associated demonstrations. But what is the sense of a demonstration? Kaplan's suggested solutions in terms of gestures and appearances are not compatible with his general theory, and do (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 97