French Philosophy

THESIS ABSTRACT The life of Catholic reformer Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, 1455- 1536, spanned the threshold between Medieval and Renaissance eras. Like other humanists, Lefèvre synthesized philosophical, theological and scientific theories and practices — of such is his unpublished treatise De Magia naturali, On Natural Magic. I elucidate Lefèvre’s focus on universal mystical metaphors of divine union, in order to offer a simpler view into the evolution of his writings. Engaging historic-intellectual background in critical analysis of Book II, I address the (...) conflicting political, religious, and academic opinions of natural magic, demonstrating that current Academia is poised to expand the historical, “theoretical” treatment of natural magic to engage it as a phenomenological, “practical” human experience. In De Magia naturali Book II, Lefèvre decloaks mythology, philosophy, astrology, literature and religion to a scientific theory, practice and experience of number as Idea. He reveals how the limit of metaphorical imagery is duality, the binary Coincidence of Opposites, symbolized by the number 2. The magic in Lefèvre’s number mysticism is human experience of numerical ascension from man to God, achieved through the number 3, the love-nexus re-uniting 2 into One, duality into unity. Renaissance humanists conceived of this prisca theologia, pristine or ancient theology, as embodied in the Christian Trinity through the Spirit of Christ. Current Academia is responsible to teach this wisdom tradition from a multicultural, interdisciplinary worldview, as I posit the humanists intended. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the sustainability of employing Philosophy for Children (P4C) to address the ongoing ecological crises affecting Guam. I argue that although P4C aims to foster a more ecological form of living, its failure to cultivate contemplation and dialogue grounded in specific ecosystems renders it incapable of fostering generative and sustainable inquiry that pushes against the serializing forces of capitalism and colonialism. I further draw on Austronesian seafaring traditions and the works of Indigenous CHamorus to reconceptualize the (...) community of philosophical inquiry as a community of philosophical wayfinding. Within such a community, the participants navigate an ocean of harmful ideas in an empowering and sustainable manner by emphasizing the local mental, social, and environmental conditions of their inquiry. I begin by first motivating the question of P4C's ecological sustainability for Guam through the history of capitalism's and the Brown Tree Snake's co-colonization of CHamoru subjectivity. I specifically use Félix Guattari's The Three Ecologies to identify the semiotics of power through which capitalism pollutes CHamoru Ecology to further Americanize CHamoru existential cartographies. While P4C offers a potential pathway for creating new subjectivities, I argue that the community of philosophical inquiry's abstract nature turns it into a source of capitalist expansion on Guam. Finally, I draw from Austronesian seafaring and CHamoru ecopoetry to reimagine the community of philosophical inquiry as a more locally grounded and impactful practice, capable of addressing Guam's ecological crisis through the creation of invested subjectivities. (shrink)

This collection consolidates these scattered works of Proudhon to provide researchers with citation sources in a paper format. The editing of this collection is a non-profit project. The articles and letters in this collection include: 1837 Application for the Suard Pension 1839 The Celebration of Sunday 1840 Letter to the Members of the Academy of Besançon 1842 Explanations Presented to the Public Minister on the Right of Property Letter to Bergmann 1845 My Testament: or, Society of Avengers 1846 Proudhon To (...) Marx 1847 On the Jews 1848 Letter to Jeanne Deroin The Malthusians, the Representatives of the People Toast to the Revolution 1849 God is Evil, Man is Free In Connection with Louis Blanc: The Present Use and Future Possibility of the State Interest and Principal: A Loan is a Service Interest and Principal: Arguments Drawn from the Operations of the Bank of France Interest and Principal: The Origin of Ground Rent Interest and Principle: The Circulation of Capital, Not Capital Itself, Gives Birth to Progress Letter to Pierre Leroux Parliamentary Isolation The Coming Era of Mutualism The Nature and Destination of Government The State: Its Nature, Object, and Destiny What is Government? What is God? 1850 Dilemma: Red or White 1851 Letter to A. M. Boutteville Letter to Langlois 1852 The Extremes The Social Revolution Demonstrated by the Coup d'Etat of December 2, 1851 Unanimity: Universal Consent 1855 New Propositions Demonstrated in the Practice of Revolutions Propositions: To Leave Behind Abstractions, Utopias, Systems, Doctrines, Theories and Empiricisms of the Parties Schools and Sects 1857 Letter to Villiaumé 1861 Relation of the State and Liberty, According to Modern Right The Theory of Taxation 1864 Letter to Several Workers in Paris and Rouen. (shrink)

Proudhon is renowned for his anarchist ideas, yet his thoughts on federalism have long been overlooked. To such an extent that Proudhon himself wrote in his book that even at that time, his critics did not carefully read his ideas on federalism, but hastily concluded that all his discussions on federation were anarchistic, which greatly frustrated Proudhon. As for this book, The Principle Of Federation and the Need to Reconstitute the Party of Revolution, there is very limited information available on (...) both the English and Chinese Internet. Richard Vernon published an English translation of the book in 1979, but it only covered the main chapters discussing federalism, about 12 chapters in total. However, the original French version of the book consists of 31 chapters. To date, there is no Chinese translation of this book. Therefore, the translator believes that it is highly appropriate to translate the complete version of this book into Chinese and introduce it to the Chinese repository. After revising the Chinese translation, the translator also intends to re-translate the book into an English version to fill the gap of the remaining 19 chapters in the English repository. -/- Proudhon believed that politics, fundamentally, depends on two entirely opposite principles: authority and liberty. One is obedience and belief, while the other is freedom and reason. These two principles are as old as human history itself. The principle of authority is naturally given, while the principle of liberty is derived from thought and reason. Among the various combinations of liberty and authority, Proudhon classified all forms of government in the world into two major categories and four specific types. The two major categories are authoritative regimes and free regimes. In authoritative systems, power is indivisible, whereas in free systems, power is divisible. Every society contains elements of both authority and liberty. Only one kind of constitution can combine order and liberty, stability and justice. And this constitution, ultimately recognized by the people's reason, must be federalism. -/- So, how is federalism established? The author reviews the signing of the contract. To meet the conditions of cooperation and complementarity of the contract, citizens must fulfill the following when joining the contract: 1) The benefits they receive from the state must be equal to the sacrifices they make to the state. 2) They must retain their freedom, sovereignty, and initiative. Proudhon also explicitly pointed out that this stipulated and understood political contract is what is called a federation. The essence of the federal contract is that within this system, the contracting parties—namely, the heads of families, communes, states, provinces, or kingdoms—not only assume obligations to each other but also, through the contract, retain more rights, more freedom, more power, and more property than they have relinquished. (shrink)

This article proposes a novel interpretation of Montaigne’s and Bayle’s comments on Tacitus. My contention is that their Tacitism is a Foucauldian discourse on toleration. Toleration is an example of governmentality, a strategy to govern a population, not a genuine call for religious diversity. This novel reading applies to Michel de Montaigne’s Essays and Pierre Bayle’s Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet and his Historical and Critical Dictionary. Montaigne’s essay On the Useful and the Honourable, he shows that (...) there is a difference between his public and private persona. The author discusses ideas of toleration in a Tacitist style. This happens in his essay Something Lacking in Our Civil Administrations, where the author laments the death of Sebastian Castalio and, indirectly, he supports his commitment to religious pluralism. As I will show, Montaigne embraces a Gallican belief system, which is more conciliatory Bayle a century later, discusses the same issues. In his Various Thoughts, he makes a case for toleration as a tool to manage a population. Ultimately, it will be clear how this plea for toleration is not a product of the Enlightenment, but it is rather a discourse to achieve societal compliance. (shrink)

The point of this paper is to show that the understanding Solovyov penned and voiced about humanity close to the end of his life suggests that he regarded human rights as sacred. First of all, we provided a rough sense of who Solovyov was as a person, for he is a bit of a stranger to the majority of the audience, including scholars, in the Western hemisphere. Afterwards, we carried out what we have already said we intended to do here, (...) drawing on a public lecture that Solovyov gave at Saint Petersburg Imperial University to mark the 100th anniversary of Auguste Comte’s birth. Our perception is that Solovyov clearly thought of human rights from a faith-based angle and believed them to be sacred, and that all of his insights and those inspired by them are remarkably conducive to reflecting on human rights at the present time, whatever the religious background of each one of us. -/- . (shrink)

[Presented at the 52nd Annual Conference of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), University of Oregon, 24-26 October. Part of the panel Events, Actions and the Problem of Agency in the Wake of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, organized in collaboration with Sean Bowden and James Williams.] In this paper I will bring the positions of Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur into proximity with each other in order to draw out points of conflict. I do not aim to solve (...) these conflicts, nor to develop them into a full clash. Rather, I will show that both Ricoeur and Deleuze develop a theory of novelty that can be characterized as a reversal of Platonism. These theories are not opposed per se, but they differ in orientation. Deleuze situates novelty in the virtual event. This virtual event can be understood as a singular point of transition that transforms one system into another. Or to catch the event in a somewhat more concrete image, it is a kind of metamorphosis (in Kafka’s sense). In contrast, Ricoeur situates novelty in human actions that are played out as a fruitful tension between two poles. This tension opens up a field of potentiality in which new ideas and novel meanings can emerge. Ricoeur has analysed this tension on many levels. Its most basic structure can be found in what Ricoeur calls a living metaphor. This living metaphor is itself something ‘in action’; it brings two opposed semantic fields into a fruitful tension with each other. This tension reveals a previously unnoticed proximity between these two semantic fields, without destroying their distance. In this way a new, third semantic field is opened up that is only given in potential. Ricoeur argues that it is within tensions like this that generative differences arise, resulting in new ideas and novel meanings. The main point of divergence between Deleuze and Ricoeur can therefore be framed in two contrasting pairs: virtual event versus human action; point of transition versus tension (or: metamorphosis versus metaphor). (shrink)

This book is the first to introduce readers to contemporary philosophical works on moral judgement stemming from France, Germany and the Anglo-American world – many of which remain untranslated. By integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject, the author combines historiography and critical reflection to offer a rich picture of what it means to make good moral decisions. As both Kantians and Aristotelians argue, moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. Thus, it is by identifying (...) the obligations tied to the multiple dimensions of our identities (e.g., friend, teacher, romantic partner, citizen) that we can ultimately understand how we ought to act. Yet, Aristotle and Kant also remind us that doing so requires the acquisition of moral virtues which allow us to better discern practical reasons in concrete situations. (shrink)

This paper explores two Cartesian-based resolutions which embody a very fruitful problem for Cartesianism: the communication between body and soul. Keeping with the principles defended by the interlocutor, Elisabeth of Bohemia develops her philosophical position in the epistles exchanged with Descartes and argues that the soul should be conceived materially. Conversely, this communication between soul and body is argued differently from the perspective of Leibniz, who pursues a spiritualistic solution to the problem by making the body aggregated with inferior substances (...) instead of making the soul material. (shrink)

This essay highlights a methodological weakness in Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism often mistaken for a biographical shift in his philosophy. Naissance de la biopolitique is sometimes interpreted as evidence for Foucault’s conversion to neoliberalism, whereas its lack of critical acuity stems rather from its methodological limitations. Through a discussion of the “neoliberal conversion”-thesis, I highlight those limitations. Though Foucault’s appreciative tone in his neoliberalism lectures is surprising, his aim is mainly to defamiliarize readers from the dominant mode of neoliberal rationality (...) so that they can affirm the creative potential to foster new conducts, new identities, and new rationalities. Foucault did not convert to neoliberalism, but sought to destabilise it by revealing its historical contingency. However, as Foucault’s surprisingly positive tone shows, this strategy is insufficient for combatting neoliberalism. There is an elective affinity between Foucault’s own politics of creative self-reinvention and neoliberalism’s promise of a non-invasive, post-disciplinary government by indirect economic incentives alone. Foucault’s libertine stance toward subjectivity hence seems easily integrated into a neoliberal conduct of conducts. I propose to supplement Foucault’s genealogical method as he deploys it in Naissance de la biopolitique with an immanent critique of neoliberalism from the perspective of the governed. Rather than investigating neoliberal rationality as a promising endeavour for the future, we can study the real-life implementations of neoliberalism and their effects on subjective conducts. Neoliberal rationality is involved in a permanent struggle to shape the conduct of conducts along entrepreneurial and competitive lines, but subjects are refractory living beings whose conducts are not so simply transformed. Neoliberalism has had to give up its post-disciplinary aspirations and turn to the power of discipline and abandonment to enforce neoliberal norms of conduct. Neoliberalism has transformed into a negative biopolitics that sacrifices the lives of unproductive subjects as collateral damage to the overall welfare of the population. Immanent critique thereby reveals how subjects are pushed beyond their limits until neoliberal norms of conduct become unbearable. This intolerability of neoliberalism cannot be directly deduced from the writings of Becker, Friedman, or Hayek.111 It becomes manifest in the confrontation between neoliberal rationality and the material living bodies of finite human beings unable to be stretched in the ways neoliberalism requires. (shrink)

Michel Henry is regarded as one of the most important French philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. Yet, he is still not widely cited as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida and Jean Paul Sartre are. His thought constitutes a philosophy of life, distancing itself not only from the phenomenology of the 20th century, but also from the science and technology inaugurated by Galileo Galilei and Rene Descartes. Furthermore, Leopold Sedar Senghor is an African philosopher whose philosophy (...) has often been misunderstood in both African as well as in most Western philosophical scholarly circles. Critiquing representation in Western thought only makes sense if it is made clear that it is entirely conceivable that this critique squanders its meaning elsewhere, in the East. It is inherent in it. However, very few academics have felt that this should be done. It is essential to make connections, because what Henry discovers puts him in an immediate proximity of the radical approach of Vedanta and the approach of Senghor’s Negritude theory of emotion. The objective of this article is to find significant points of convergence between absolute subjectivity, the idea of affectivity, and Negritude and Vedanta in Henry’s speculative thought. The reading of Henry, Indian philosophy (Vedanta) and Negritude (Senghor) allows for establishing a bridge between Indian philosophy (Vedanta) and phenomenology, most notably a bridge between Negritude and the phenomenology of life. (shrink)

Evandra e Thiago: No artigo Ideologia–aprisionamento ou campo paradoxal?, Pêcheux ([1983b] 2015i, p. 115, grifos do autor) teoriza acercados objetos paradoxais como “idênticos consigo mesmo e se comportam antagonicamente consigo mesmos).” Com base nessa reflexão, que comportava significantes como “povo, direito, liberdade, trabalho, gênero, vida, ciência e paz” (Pêcheux, [1983b] 2015i, p. 115), como podemos entender a noção de objetos paradoxais? Que outros significantes podem ser tomados como objetos paradoxais? Há deslocamentos possíveis na noção de objetos paradoxais nas atuais condições (...) de produção? (shrink)

This book chapter represents one of the engagements between Catholic and Wesleyan philosophers at the 2008 Wesleyan Philosophy Society. The issue of what precisely "Wesleyan philosophy" would mean and comprise can be usefully illuminated by comparison with the positions and issues that were raised and discussed by Catholic scholars during the 1930s Christian philosophy debates in France, which included Etienne Gilson, Maurice Blondel, Jacques Maritain, and Gabriel Marcel. We also discuss how the thought on a contemporary Catholic philosopher Adriaan Peperzack, (...) specifically on affectivity, can be brought into comparison with that important theme in Wesleyan philosophy. (shrink)

How can something finite mediate an infinite God? Weaving patristics, theology, art history, aesthetics, and religious practice with the hermeneutic phenomenology of Hans-George Gadamer and Jean-Luc Marion, Stephanie Rumpza proposes a new answer to this paradox by offering a fresh and original approach to the Byzantine icon. She demonstrates the power and relevance of the phenomenological method to integrate hermeneutic aesthetics and divine transcendence, notably how the material and visual dimensions of the icon are illuminated by traditional practices of prayer. (...) Rumpza's study targets a problem that is a major fault line in the continental philosophy of religion – the integrity of finite beings I relation to a God that transcends them. For philosophers, her book demonstrates the relevance of a cherished religious practice of Eastern Christianity. For art historians, she proposes a novel philosophical paradigm for understanding the icon as it is approached in practice. (shrink)

Over the last thirty years, the narrative conceptions of the Self attempted to account for the connection that ties together human lives and the narratives thanks to which they come to expression. In a famous passage of Nausea, the main character of Jean-Paul Sartre’s novel claims that our first-person narratives necessarily fail to account for the irreducibility of life as it is lived. Analyzing this passage, Richard Moran recently pointed out the weaknesses of Sartre’s phenomenological claim about life as it (...) is lived, which wrongly describes narratives as fundamentally inadequate to our lives, and thus fails to account for their relationship. This article addresses this critique by examining the different kinds of involvement of narrators within their own story, and the ways Sartre dealt with this particular issue in his analysis of the relationship between writers and readers in literature. This particular focus on Sartre’s theory of literature allows us to highlight the originality of his critique of first-person narratives, which stresses the problem of the credibility of the narrator and must bring us to interrogate the claim for recognition that first-person narratives involve, giving a novel meaning to their inadequacy. -/- Les discussions entourant depuis une trentaine d’années le développement des conceptions narratives du soi ont tenté de préciser la nature du lien qui permet aux formes narratives du récit en première personne de rendre compte des articulations propres à la vie humaine. C’est très précisément ce lien que critiquait dans La nausée le personnage principal du roman de Jean-Paul Sartre, dans un passage où l’irréductibilité de l’expérience vécue en première personne lui sert d’argument pour décréter l’incapacité du récit à en rendre fidèlement compte. Richard Moran a récemment proposé une critique de la conception sartrienne de l’expérience vécue que met en avant ce passage, en montrant les limites de toute analyse qui reprocherait au récit son inadéquation à l’égard à la vie dont il prétend rendre compte. Cet article tente de répondre à cette critique en examinant les différentes modalités d’implication du narrateur dans son récit, et le traitement auquel cette question a donné lieu dans l’œuvre de Sartre. Cette analyse permet ainsi de mettre en valeur l’originalité de la critique sartrienne du récit de soi, qui, en faisant passer au premier plan le problème de la crédibilité du narrateur et du type de reconnaissance que le récit en première personne exige, confère un sens nouveau à son inadéquation. (shrink)

If, as asserted by the French collective Tiqqun, we are essentially living in a global colony, where the 1% control the 99%, then it follows that the revolutionary struggle should strategically reorient itself as guerrilla warfare. The agents of this war, Tiqqun characterize, in part, by drawing on ethnologists Pierre de Clastres and Ernesto de Martino, specifically their figures of the Indigenous American warrior and the Southern Italian sorcerer, respectively. Hybridizing these two figures into that of the “warrior-mage,” the present (...) article posits an actionable exemplar thereof in players of the massively popular trading and online card game, Magic: The Gathering (MTG). More specifically, I propose a strategic mapping of MTG’s five colors of magic onto the five divisions of a coalition against late capitalist Empire, which I call the “Warrior-Mage Guild,” including liberation clerics, animal rights activists, propagandists, anti-psychiatrists, hackers, saboteurs, and those who threaten decolonizing force contra Empire. (shrink)

This chapter explores the place of remorse in Sophie de Grouchy’s moral theory, as presented in her 1798 work, Letters on Sympathy, which was originally published with her translation of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. I argue that, for Grouchy, a cultivated sense of remorse weakens our self-conceit by drawing our attention to the ways in which we harm others, even for seemingly justifiable reasons. In so doing, we are led to recognize the equal standing of others, which gives (...) rise to the “sentiment of natural equality.” This “sentiment of natural equality” places a check on our norms and institutions and allows for the potential of moral progress. While Grouchy frames the Letters as a commentary on Smith’s writings, her discussion of remorse, equality, and moral progress shows her to be a bold and original thinker, and one worth taking seriously. (shrink)

In this article, I consider Grouchy's critique of economic inequality and her proposed solution to what she perceives as this grave social ill. On her view, economic inequality chips away at the bonds of accountability in society and prevents people from seeing one another as moral equals. As a step toward restoring these bonds between people, Grouchy argues that: first, we should expand property ownership, thereby giving each person a stake in the community; second, we should ensure access to education (...) and redirect its aims, to provide people with the necessary tools to reason about the common good. In so doing, Grouchy claims, we can reawaken the sense of accountability that people have to one another in community. (shrink)

In By Way of Obstacles, Emmanuel Falque revisits the major themes of his work--finitude, the body, and the call for philosophers and theologians to "cross the Rubicon" by entering into dialogue--in light of objections that have been offered. In so doing, he offers a pathway through a work that will offer valuable insights both to newcomers to his thought and to those who are already familiar with it. For it is only after one has carved out one's pathway that one (...) may see more clearly where one has been and where one might be going. Here readers will discover the profound relation between Falque's emphasis on the human experience of the world and his desire for philosophy and Christian theology to enter into conversation. For only by speaking within the human horizon of finitude can Christianity be credible for human beings, and it is because Christian theology teaches that God entered into our finitude that it can also teach us something of what it is to be human. Contemporary phenomenology, Falque warns, over-privileges an encounter with the infinite that cannot be originary. Calling us back to finitude, he calls us to a deeper understanding of our humanity. (shrink)

How do we know ourselves? When it comes to our states of mind, it might seem that self-knowledge enjoys a privilege: I know what I'm thinking because I have immediate access to my mind. Inspired by Sartre, two American philosophers, Richard Moran and Charles Larmore, have argued that this idea fails to account for our singular relationship with our own minds. In addition to knowing ourselves through theoretical reflection, we are also capable of practical reflection. We can answer the question (...) of what we think in a practical way: through a decision or a commitment, rather than a self-interpretation. But what is the relationship between these two types of self-reflection? What should we do when they conflict? This book seeks to answer these questions. In so doing, it shows the importance of another path to self-knowledge hitherto left aside by analytic authors: phenomenological reflection on our experience of the world. -/- Comment se connaît-on soi-même ? Concernant nos états d’esprit, il peut sembler que la connaissance de soi jouisse d’un privilège : je sais ce que je pense parce que j’ai un accès immédiat à mon esprit. S’inspirant de Sartre, deux philosophes américains, Richard Moran et Charles Larmore, ont soutenu que cette idée ne rend pas compte de notre rapport singulier à notre propre esprit. En plus de se connaître par une réflexion théorique, on est aussi capable d’une réflexion pratique. On peut répondre de façon pratique à la question de savoir ce qu’on pense : par une décision ou un engagement, plutôt qu’une interprétation de soi. Mais quel est le rapport entre ces deux types de réflexion sur soi ? Que faire lorsqu’elles entrent en conflit ? Ce livre cherche à répondre à ces questions. Ce faisant, il montre l’importance d’une autre voie vers la connaissance de soi jusqu’à présent laissée de côté par les auteurs analytiques : la réflexion phénoménologique sur notre expérience du monde. (shrink)

The reason from reasoning, i.e., there's always a hope to succeed.

How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the “paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology,” and for this reason, she concludes, “We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must be identified with (...) openness to unpredictability.” The article offers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth. (shrink)

The “Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine" is one of the most important and innovative chapters in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's book, A Thousand Plateaus. It is a highly original text in political philosophy whose implications have yet to be fully mined—or even partially mined, for that matter. This short text analyzes the "noumenal" status that Deleuze assigns to the nomadic war machine, and analyzes the fundamental role that the nomadology plays in Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy.

Citation: Christodoulou, Marina. “Philosophical An(n)ales: Laideur Abject Dégoût...comme une allergie à l’Autre (féminin),” (trans. Bertrand Naivin) in Sur la laideur. [Actes du symposium On Ugliness, organizé par Lars Aagaard- Mogensen au Wassard Elea (Ascea, Italie) en juin 2016], edited by d Bertrand Naivin and Lars Aagaard-Mogensen (Paris: Editions Complicités, 20178, 97-109. ISSN: 9782351201435 -/- -------------------- -/- Laideur Abject Dégoût ... comme une allergie à l’Autre (féminin) Sur l’art et l’esthétique sexués. -/- Pourquoi le dégoût est-il (ou peut-il être considéré) comme (...) sexiste (phallocratique et misogyne): Une allergie à l’Autre. (shrink)

La somme d’Humbrecht fait preuve d’une érudition peu commune et d’un réel amour de Thomas d’Aquin (mais au détriment d’Aristote, comme c’est de mode). Sa réflexion s’allonge au fil de la plume, en des méandres et des reflux quelquefois difficiles à suivre. Mais donne aussi le sentiment heureux d’une libre méditation de l’auteur voguant au gré de ses pensées, méditation à laquelle il nous invite avec amitié, pourvu que nous acceptions de nous laisser guider. Hélas, si nous branchons un GPS, (...) nous réalisons que nous nous promenons benoîtement au milieu de sables mouvants prêts à nous engloutir tout entiers à chaque pas. (shrink)